The politics of language planning in the Sudan: the case of the Naivasha language policy by Abdelhay, Ashraf K
 
THE POLITICS OF LANGUAGE PLANNING IN THE 












Thesis Presented for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of 
Linguistics and English Language 













© Ashraf Kamal Abelhay 
 ii 
 
To those engaged in a daily social struggle to invent 

























This thesis has been composed by me and is entirely my own work, and has not been 


























The National Congress Party (NCP), representing the government of the Sudan, and 
the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed key peace 
protocols on the 26th May 2004 in the Kenyan town of Naivasha. The Protocol on 
Power–sharing contains a significant section on language policy. Having a language 
policy interwoven within the very discoursal fabric of the Protocol on Power–sharing 
is an arena of intense power struggle between the south and the north. Indeed, it has 
been so since the emergence of the colonial Southern Policy. The historical social 
struggle between the south and the north of Sudan, which incorporates unequal 
power relations, is encoded in the linguistic signs of the language policy. The current 
Interim National Constitution has adopted the Naivasha Language Policy. The study 
has four main objectives. The first objective is to historicise the Naivasha Language 
Policy. The study aims to disinvent the ‘naturalised’ notions of ‘indigenous 
languages’, ‘north Sudan’, and ‘south Sudan’ by revealing their colonial 
constructedness. The social and semiotic processes involved in the colonial 
representation of the discursive differentiation of the ‘south’ from the ‘north’ are 
examined. The historical analysis of the colonial Southern Policy reveals the hidden 
agenda that lies behind what might be termed the ‘politics of linguistic 
indigenousness’. The analysis demonstrates that the technical phrase ‘indigenous 
languages’ is used as part of a metaphorical strategy of symbolic differentiation of 
the ‘African south’ from the ‘Arab north’. The fact that the south is to gain the right 
to external self–determination in four years’ time points to the political 
instrumentality of the notion of linguistic indigenousness in language planning. The 
second objective is to examine the language rights regime embodied in the Naivasha 
Language Policy. One of the central arguments is that the language rights embedded 
in the Naivasha Language Policy should not be conceptualised in essentialising and 
totalising terms as a set of abstract universal givens. Instead, the contention is that 
the notion of language rights should be treated as part of the ‘habitus’ of the 
concerned community of practice. The employment of the concept of habitus as an 
analytic tool can help us avoid the essentialist trap of the mainstream ‘language–
rights’ paradigm by asserting the social constructedness of languages, identities, and 
rights. Thus, grounding the advocacy of language rights in the notion of habitus can 
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provide a means of uncoupling language from religion and race in the Sudan. It is 
demonstrated that the colonial construction of identities in the Sudan involved, 
among other things, the invention of traditions, the construction of languages, the 
(re)creation of tribal boundaries, and the racial classification of people.  
 
The third objective of the study is a comparative analysis between the proposed 
structural political system and the discourse of the Naivasha Language Policy. The 
argument here is that a faithful implementation of the Naivasha Language Policy 
within a multinational democratic federation informed by the principle of active 
citizenship can act as both: 1) a strategic corrective to the divisive monolingual 
ideology of Arabicisation, and 2) a foundation for a new regime of language rights 
determined by a bottom–up approach. The fourth objective is to explore the 
relationship between the allocation of political power in the peace protocols and the 
language policy, and to investigate the ways in which power relations may influence 
the realisation of the language policy. The analysis shows that the proposed 
configuration of power relations would mainly affect the language situation in the 
south of Sudan. The thesis concludes with an assessment of the current status of the 











LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................... ix 
LIST OF TABLES .........................................................................................................x 
LIST OF MAPS ........................................................................................................... xi 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS..................................................................................... xii 
LIST OF ARABIC WORDS...................................................................................... xiii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ......................................................................................... xiv 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ........................................................................1 
1.1 Statement of the problem .........................................................................................1 
1.2 The objectives of the study ......................................................................................4 
1.3 Research questions ...................................................................................................7 
1.4 The scope of the study..............................................................................................8 
1.5 The significance of the study .................................................................................10 
1.6 Definition of key terms ..........................................................................................11 
1.7 The structure of the thesis ......................................................................................12 
CHAPTER TWO: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF LANGUAGES IN THE 
SUDAN........................................................................................................................13 
2.1 Distribution of languages in the Sudan ..................................................................14 
2.1.1 Linguistic classification of Sudanese languages: Greenberg’s typology...... 21 
2.1.1.1 Niger–Kordofanian ................................................................................ 24 
2.1.1.1.1 Niger–Congo ................................................................................... 24 
2.1.1.1.2 Kordofanian..................................................................................... 25 
2.1.1.2 Nilo–Saharan.......................................................................................... 26 
2.1.1.3 Afroasiatic .............................................................................................. 26 
2.1.1.4 Khoisan .................................................................................................. 28 
2.1.2 Joseph Greenberg and the Hamitic hypothesis as a fictitious discourse of 
identity ................................................................................................................... 28 
2.2 Spread of the Arabic language in the Sudan ..........................................................47 
2.2.1 Spread of the Arabic language in the north................................................... 48 
2.2.2 Spread of the Arabic language in the south .................................................. 52 
2.3 Summary ................................................................................................................55 
 vii 
CHAPTER THREE: LANGUAGE PLANNING AND LANGUAGE POLICY: 
THEORETICAL AND COMPARATIVE BACKGROUND ................................57 
3.1. A terminological and conceptual basis for language planning and policy............57 
3.1.1 Language planning and policy: Definitions .................................................. 57 
3.1.2 The context of language planning and policy ............................................... 62 
3.1.3 A typology of language planning processes and activities ........................... 65 
3.1.3.1 Status planning and corpus planning ..................................................... 66 
3.1.3.2 Language–in–education planning .......................................................... 69 
3.1.3.3 Discourse planning................................................................................. 71 
3.1.4 Models and frameworks of language planning and language policy............ 71 
3.1.5 Approaches to language planning and policy ............................................... 75 
3.2 Language planning and policy and power .............................................................87 
3.2.1 Language planning and policy, class and the state ....................................... 88 
3.2.2 Top–down planning vs. Bottom–up policy................................................... 89 
3.2.3 Language rights............................................................................................. 92 
3.2.3.1 Tolerance–oriented vs. promotion–oriented rights ................................ 94 
3.2.3.2 Norm–and–accommodation vs. official language rights ....................... 95 
3.2.3.3 Personal vs. territoriality rights .............................................................. 96 
3.2.3.4 Universal and group differentiated rights .............................................. 96 
3.3 Educational planning and literacy: Critical approaches to literacy........................97 
3.4 Language planning and language education: Critical language awareness .........102 
3.5 Language planning and the construction of national languages and identities....104 
3. 6 Language planning and language policy in Africa: The case of Nigeria ............110 
3.7 Summary ..............................................................................................................115 
CHAPTER FOUR: LANGUAGE PLANNING AND POLICY IN SUDAN, 
1898–2005..................................................................................................................116 
4.1 The colonial period ..............................................................................................117 
4.1.1 Rejaf Language Conference 1928............................................................... 124 
4.1.2 The creation of no–man’s land.................................................................... 128 
4.1.3 The Closed District Order 1929 .................................................................. 129 
4.2 The post colonial period.......................................................................................133 
4.3 Arabicisation policy in the Sudan: Definitions ....................................................152 
4.3.1 Arabicisation policy in the north................................................................. 159 
4.3.2 Arabicisation policy in the south ................................................................ 163 
4.4 Summary ..............................................................................................................164 
 viii 
CHAPTER FIVE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NAIVASHA 
LANGUAGE POLICY (NLP) ................................................................................166 
5.1 Data and methods of data analysis .......................................................................166 
5.2. Data analysis .......................................................................................................174 
5.2.1 The NLP and the politics of linguistic indigenousness............................... 174 
5.2.1.1 The definition of ‘indigenous’ in the international legal discourse ......... 177 
5.2.1.2 The colonial Southern Policy and the invention of indigenous languages
.............................................................................................................................. 185 
5.2.2 The NLP as a corrective to the nationalist policy of Arabicisation ............ 202 
5.2.3 The NLP and university bilingual education .............................................. 206 
5.2.4 The NLP and language rights as habitus within a federal system .............. 218 
5.2.5 The NLP and the configuration of power relations during the Interim Period
.............................................................................................................................. 234 
5.3 Summary ..............................................................................................................238 




















LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
FIGURE 3.1. CONTEXT AND ELEMENTS OF THE LANGUAGE PLANNING PROCESS ..........63 
FIGURE 3.2. LANGUAGE PLANNING AND POLICY GOALS: AN INTEGRATIVE 
FRAMEWORK.........................................................................................................74 
FIGURE 5.1. A BOARD ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE JUST PEACE FORUM AT THE 
UNIVERSITY OF KHARTOUM, SUDAN, DECEMBER 2006 ............................   202 
FIGURE 5.2.  A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE ENGLISH PREMIER LEAGUE ............232 
FIGURE 5.3. CONFIGURATION OF POLITICAL POWER RELATIONS IN THE NORTHERN 
SUDAN DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD .................................................................235 
FIGURE 5.4. LANGUAGE AND ETHNICITY IN THE NORTHERN SUDAN ..........................236 
FIGURE 5.5. CONFIGURATION OF POLITICAL POWER RELATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN 





















LIST OF TABLES 
 
TABLE 2.1. ETHNIC AFFILIATION AND MOTHER TONGUE IN NORTHERN SUDAN 
ACCORDING TO THE 1993 POPULATION CENSUS....................................................16 
TABLE 2.2. DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS BY NORTHERN STATES 
ACCORDING TO 1993 POPULATION CENSUS ..........................................................17 
TABLE 2.3. DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR LANGUAGE GROUPS BY NORTHERN STATES 
ACCORDING TO 1993 POPULATION CENSUS ..........................................................17 
TABLE 2.4. LANGUAGE DISTRIBUTION IN CENTRAL SUDAN ACCORDING TO THE 1956 
AND 1993 NATIONAL CENSUSES ...........................................................................19 
TABLE 2.5. THE DISTRIBUTION OF NON–ARABIC LANGUAGES IN THE SUDAN BY 
POPULATION .........................................................................................................19 
TABLE 2.6. DISTRIBUTION OF EUROPEAN AND ASIAN LANGUAGES IN THE SUDAN 
BASED ON 1955 NATIONAL CENSUS .....................................................................21 
TABLE 4.1. A CHRONOLOGICAL OVERVIEW OF LANGUAGE POLICIES IN SUDAN 1920–
2004....................................................................................................................150 
TABLE 4.2. THE CHRONOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF LANGUAGE POLICIES ..............151 
TABLE 5.1. ILO CONVENTION NO. 169, ARTICLE 28 ..................................................178 
TABLE 5.2.  ILO CONVENTION NO. 169, ARTICLE 1.1.................................................179 
TABLE 5.3. ILO CONVENTION NO. 169, ARTICLE 27 ..................................................180 
TABLE 5.4. THE UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (2006), 
ARTICLE 3 ...........................................................................................................181 
TABLE 5.5. THE UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (2006), 
ARTICLES 6 AND 9...............................................................................................181 
TABLE 5.6. THE UN DECLARATION ON DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES, 2006, ARTICLE 14................................................................................182 
TABLE 5.7. INDIGENOUS LANGUAGES IN THE INDIGENOUS STUDY ..............................182 
TABLE 5.8. THE LANGUAGE POLICY OF THE AFRICAN UNION ....................................184 
TABLE 5.9. LANGUAGE RIGHTS IN THE NAIVASHA LANGUAGE POLICY ......................226 





LIST OF MAPS 
 
MAP 2.1. LANGUAGES OF SUDAN..................................................................................20 
MAP 2.2. GREENBERG’S CLASSIFICATION OF AFRICAN LANGUAGES ............................28 




























LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AU  African Union 
CDA   Critical Discourse Analysis 
CLA  Critical Language Awareness 
CPA  Comprehensive Peace Agreement  
DUP  Democratic Unionist Party 
DOP  Declaration of Principles  
ECOSOC (UN) Economic and Social Council 
FFT  First Fail Try 
GONU  Government of National Unity  
GOSS  Government of Southern Sudan  
IGAD  Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
ILO  International Labour Organisation  
JPF  Just Peace Forum 
MR  Members’ Resources 
NCP  National Congress Party  
NCRC  National Constitutional Review Commission 
NDA  National Democratic Alliance 
NIF  National Islamic Party 
NLP  Naivasha Language Policy 
NGO  Non-governmental organisation 
PDP  People's Democratic Party 
SACDNU Sudan African Closed District National Union 
SOAS  The School of Oriental and African Studies 
SPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army 
TLC  The Tima Language Committee 
UN  United Nations  





LIST OF ARABIC WORDS 
 
The practice adopted in this thesis concerning Arabic words is that the transliterated 
words are placed into two inverted commas to be followed by an English translation 
placed into two brackets. For the Arabic public announcements cited in Chapter Five, 
the practice followed in this thesis is that the announcement is reproduced in its 
totality (without any intervention), and then a context and translation are provided 
under the announcement. Translations of the political announcements are mine. The 
list below gives an English equivalent to the Arabic words used in the text: 
Abid    slaves 
almashru alhadar  Islamist Civilisation Project  
Awlad Albalad  inheritors of the land  
Awlad Al’arb   children of Arab 
halabi    belonging to a Gypsy–type racial group  
khalwa    Quranic pre-elementary schools 
 khawaja   European 
khutba    religious preaching 
lahjat    dialects 
lughat    languages 
ma’had  an Islamic school 
mondokoro   Arabs 
Mujahideen (jadiya) soldiers fighting for Muslim beliefs 
omdas    tribal leaders  
baqt    pact/treaty 
qadis    Judges  
Sharia    Islamic law 
sheikh algarya   village leader  
  tafsir    religious explanation/interpretation 





I would like to acknowledge a deep sense of gratitude to Prof. John Joseph for 
supervising this thesis starting from when it was nothing more than an idea. I am 
deeply indebted to him for encouraging me to work on the Naivasha Language 
Policy as a timely research topic, and for introducing me to the social 
anthropological area of nationalism studies on which I draw largely in this work.  I 
should express my debt to my second supervisor Joseph Gafaranga for his help and 
support during the course of conducting this study. I am grateful to Hugh Trappes 
Lomax for his encouragement and advice.  
 
My sincere thanks go to Sinfree Makoni for valuable suggestions and constructive 
comments, and the encouragement to participate in the AILA conference in Essen 
2007; to Barbara Trudell for the fruitful discussion we had at the BAAL 40th Annual 
Conference at Edinburgh; to Gibson Ferguson for the interest he has shown in the 
topic of the research; to Norman Fairclough for the fruitful discussion and 
encouragement; and to Deborah Cameron for her advice and support. I would like to 
thank the staff at the Graduate School of Political and Social Studies of the 
University of Edinburgh for their assistance and help during this study. I am 
particularly grateful to Jonathan Hearn, John Kennedy, Robert Morris, and Sara 
Dorman for their assistance. I am deeply grateful to Ian Martin at the Department of 
Higher and Community Education at the University of Edinburgh for constructive 
discussion.  
 
Thanks go to my colleagues at the Department of Linguistics and English Language 
at the University of Edinburgh, and to the community of scholars at ‘Language in 
Africa SIG’ at BAAL for their help and support. I would like in particular to thank 
John Holmes for the invitation to participate in Leeds’s roundtable seminar on 
‘Language and Gender in Africa, 2007’.  
 
I owe a special debt of gratitude to the Arts and Humanities Research Council for an 
award supporting my doctoral studies. I am grateful to Postgraduate administrative 
assistants of the School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences at the 
 xv 
University of Edinburgh. I am particularly indebted to Katie Keltie and Toni Noble 
for their help and assistance. I would like to thank the staff at Tollcross Educational 
Community Centre, and particularly John Player, Stan Reeves, and John Busby for 
their assistance and support. I would like to thank Leoma Gilley, Madani Ahmed, 
and Al-Ameen Abo Manga at the University of Khartoum for their help and 
encouragement. I am grateful to the officials at the Ministry of Higher Education and 
Scientific Research in the Sudan for answering my questions in relation to the 
implementation of the Naivasha Language Policy. Thanks are due to the officials at 
the Vice-Chancellor’s Office at the University of Khartoum for information 
regarding the status of the Naivasha Language Policy.  
 
I am deeply indebted to the members of Tima tribe in the western Sudan for the 
valuable interviews and discussions on education as a tool in their social struggle 
against the ideological domination of the centre. My thanks go to my friend Abdel 
Rahim Mugadam at the University of Khartoum for his help and support. I am also 
grateful to Catherine Miller for her valuable suggestions and advice. I would like to 
thank my friend Afaf Abdel-Rahim at the University of Pretoria, South Africa for the 
wonderful remarks and suggestions. I am indebted to my friend Yasir Fazaa for his 
technical support throughout the project. I would like to thank the following 
colleagues and friends for their support throughout the study:  Heather Hewitt, 
Susanna Flett, Aaliya Rajah-Carrim, Salah Alhasan, Saef Ahmed (Abu–ras), Shawgi 
Isamail, Hakim, Linah, Mahir Deyab, Mustafa Abdelhamid, Abdulla Awad, Ibrahim 
Hassan, and Yasir Mirgani for their support and encouragement. My apologies to 
those I have left out. I am deeply indebted to my family for their loving support.  
 
All errors and shortcomings in this work are my own responsibility. 
 
 1 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Statement of the problem 
Nation-builders in the Sudan have, unsurprisingly, conceptualised ‘multilingualism, 
language change, and non–standard usage’ as ‘threats to the very foundation of a 
culture, since the language itself is the principal text in which the culture’s mental 
past and its present coherence are grounded’ (Joseph 2006a: 33). Yet, the 
consideration given to language in the Naivasha peace accord is an indication that the 
two rivals who signed them, or at least one of them, have recovered from a kind of 
imperial amnesia – ‘the inability or refusal to confront the complexity of history from 
which emerged various discourses on language and education’ (Tupas 2003: 1) – and 
have recognised the fact that the question of language is there at the heart of the 
struggle. The Naivasha Language Policy (NLP) is shaped by the social relations of 
power between the NCP (National Congress party) and the SPLM/A (Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/Army). The peace agreement in its totality is intended to 
create new social conditions at societal and institutional levels that can be summed 
up in the ideologically charged phrase of ‘New Sudan’. The political project of ‘New 
Sudan’ is expected to transform the old social order with its associated institutions.  
 
The month of May 2004 was a landmark in the history of the Sudan when the Government of 
the Sudan (represented by the National Congress Party, NCP) and the Sudan Peoples’ 
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A, the major southern opposition) signed key peace 
protocols on the 26th in Naivasha, Kenya. The Protocol on Power Sharing contains an 
important section of language policy which has become a fundamental part of the current 
Interim National Constitution. The main five statements which constitute the Naivasha 
language policy are: 
2.8 Language: 
2.8.1 All the indigenous languages are national languages which shall be 
respected, developed and promoted. 
2.8.2 Arabic language is the widely spoken national language in the Sudan. 
2.8.3  Arabic, as a major language at the national level, and English shall be the 
official working languages of the National Government business and 
languages of instruction for higher education. 
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2.8.4 In addition to Arabic and English, the legislature of any sub-national level 
of government may adopt any other national language(s) as additional 
official working language(s) at its level. 
2.8.5 The use of either language at any level of government or education shall not 
be discriminated against. 
This thesis is concerned with the analysis of the above five statements. To construct a 
historically informed interpretation of these five clauses, I shall look at the politics of 
linguistic indigenousness, the historical genealogy of Arabicisation, the colonial 
narrative of language planning, the social construction of social identities, the politics 
of racial identity, and the development in the epistemological and methodological 
foundations which inform the linguistic analysis of language policy discourses. 
 
The current reality of the disparate polities in Sudan challenges us to make the 
practice of language planning more politically accountable, and not to remain 
disengaged from the ideological question of how we became the way we are. 
Colonial and postcolonial language policies that are designed on the basis of 
ideologically–laden views of ‘who we should be’ rather than ‘who we really are’ 
have resulted in the construction of unequal power relations between the south and 
the north. A critical invocation of the constructed national diachronic narrative may 
provide just one reply to the question of how we came to be the way we are. History 
is certainly bilingual, as Makoni (2007) has asserted, in the sense that different 
nationalist groups in the Sudan have their own readings of the past. The claim that 
the blind imposition of a particular top–down nationalist project in a pluralist 
ecology was an act of betrayal to the cultural and linguistic diversity of the land, 
while provocative to nationalists, is in my view quite tenable. To argue that language 
is not part of the power struggle over material and discursive resources plays into the 
conspiracy of silence that aims at wiping out the very multilinguality of history. The 
dynamic and contingent struggle between a multiplicity of interpretations over ‘who 
we should be’ (e.g., an Arab, African, Afro–Arab country, etc.) rather than over ‘who 
we really are’ shatters any claim to ‘neutrality’ held by many ideological positions. 
Despite the availability of alternatives, nationalists and power holders chose plans 
which resulted in linguistic and cultural homogenisation, deploying coercive means 
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of implementation. This was backed up with the machinery of state–education and 
centralised bureaucratic incorporation. The state–nation practice of language 
planning and policy has engaged at some stage in the constitutionalisation of 
linguistic inequality. The postcolonial practice of language planning not only 
constructed but also ‘naturalised’, among other things, the colonial constructedness 
of some linguistic resources as ‘indigenous languages’, the invention of artificial 
tribal boundaries, and the designing of racial/ethnic typologies. These colonial 
constructs were the base upon which two self–contained identities in the Sudan were 
invented: the south vs. the north. Colonial and postcolonial policies, I would argue, 
led to the fixation of particular ideological constructions of identity as ‘given’, 
‘natural’, and ‘obvious’. Hence, the centrality of the practice of linguistic 
standardisation in the ‘politics of linguistic indigenousness’ is all the more important 
in the social struggle over ‘who we really are’, and ultimately over ‘who is/is not part 
of the soil’. The colonial construction of ‘indigenous languages’ and ‘indigenous 
people’ relied upon ‘a dialectic of collective remembering and forgetting’ (Billig 
1995: 10). Here a caveat should be added. There is little doubt that the ‘tribe’ in the 
African or Arabic universe of discourse is a precolonial social organisation. The 
European view of the ‘tribe’, on the other hand, is somewhat different. The colonial 
order did not view the ‘tribe’ as a natural social group; rather it viewed it as a social 
unit with a ‘tribal chief’ invested with sufficient political power. In order to bring 
into existence these ‘tribal chiefs’ with moral and material power, ‘tribes’ in this 
strict European sense were reconstructed, and in some situations, invented. Kurita 
(1994: 203) explains the difference between the different representations of the 
‘tribe’ as follows: 
Sometimes, especially in the south and in some parts of the Nuba 
Mountains, the British encountered societies which were, unlike 
northern Sudanese society, unmistakably ‘tribal’, but totally different 
from the ideal ‘tribe’ the British had in mind. They lacked a tribal chief, 
an asset essential in the eyes of the colonial administrators. They were 
examples of what Evans-Prichard called a ‘stateless society’, a society 
presumably lacking any form of government. Undaunted, the British 




The point here is that although part of the focus in this thesis is on the colonial 
narrative of social identities in the Sudan, this should not be taken to imply that the 
pre-colonial history is unimportant or should be ignored. A view which adopts this 
position is ahistorical. Rather, there was an interaction between the pre-colonial, 
colonial, and postcolonial histories. This continuist perspective asserts the fact that 
the colonial and postcolonial orders did not take place in a social vacuum.  
 
It is language that always has the decisive job in the operation of this ideology and 
the construction of all forms of ideological consciousness (Voloshinov 1973: 13). 
Thus, the ‘demythologising’ of the common–place beliefs about our linguistic 
identity depends on a critical examination of concrete patterns of discourse (Billig 
1996: 17). The discourse of the Naivasha Language Policy remains, at least at the 
level of political conviction, an endeavour to demythologise the taken–for–
grantedness of linguistic inequality, and to construct a new discursive identity 
instead.  
 
1.2 The objectives of the study 
The study sets out: 
1. To provide a sociohistorical contextualisation of the discourse of the language 
policy. The aim here is to understand the distribution of languages in the 
Sudan prior to the institutional intervention of language planning. The 
linguistic typology of African languages by Greenberg (1963a) provides an 
analytic and logical piece of evidence against the dominant language 
ideologies. The (colonial/postcolonial) language ideologies conceptualise the 
north and the south in monolithic and essentialising terms as two separate 
identities. Another related objective here is to identify the sociopolitical 
implications of Greenberg’s work. The focus here is not on the purely 
technical aspect of the ways in which Greenberg implements a morphological 
analysis to draw structural resemblances between languages.  
2. To historicise the statement that ‘all indigenous languages are national 
languages’ by constructing an interpretation of overt and hidden effects 
behind this political status–planning declaration. I perform a critical analysis 
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of the social historical conditions (at textual, intertextual, and contextual 
levels) which have led to the discursive construction of the ‘indigenous’ as 
both ‘language’ and ‘national’. In the course of doing so, I contend that the 
(colonial/postcolonial) practice of language planning in the Sudan in itself 
has acted, in the language of Blommaert (1999a: 9), as an ‘ideology broker’, 
both when: 1) it has ideologically and coercively ‘objectified’ and 
‘naturalized’ the imposition of the Arabic language as a single 
official/national language upon non–Arabic speaking regions, and 2) when it 
has endorsed a top–down approach with the intention to shape the linguistic 
social practices of the diverse multilingual polities. I show that the expression 
‘indigenous languages’ in the NLP is intended to act as a metaphorical 
strategy of symbolic differentiation of the ‘African south’ from the ‘Arab 
north’. I would contend that what is called ‘indigenous languages’ in the 
Sudan is a colonial invention intended as a dialectical part of the project of 
constructing two separate social identities in the Sudan. Hence it is my 
objective to ‘disinvent’ (Makoni and Pennycook 2006) the ‘normalised’ 
notions of ‘indigenous languages’, the ‘north Sudan’, and the ‘south Sudan' 
by revealing their colonial constructedness. Drawing on Irvine and Gal 
(2000), I investigate the social and semiotic processes involved in the 
colonial representation of the ‘south’ and the ‘north’. I argue that the political 
notions of the ‘south’ and the ‘north’ are in themselves social creations that 
involved the colonial construction of linguistic differentiation. A discussion 
of the colonial institutional practices requires a consideration of the policies 
of Arabicisation/Arabisation (‘Arabisation’ and ‘Arabicisation’ will be used 
interchangeably) and Islamisation. During the course of analysing the 
historical contexts which have conditioned or shaped the north-south relation, 
I have come to the view that Phillipson’s (1992) critique of English linguistic 
imperialism does not quite fit the colonial social context in the southern 
Sudan, where English served alongside local languages in the resistance to 
Arabicisation. I point out that that the necessary correlation of Arabic with 
Islam is a product of the colonial policy in the Sudan that involved the 
process of ‘invention of traditions’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983), creations 
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of tribes, construction of ‘indigenous languages’, etc. I show that the  
linguistic dimension of the colonial Southern Policy provides one of the 
significant and meaningful social contexts for understanding the historical 
genealogy of the southern social struggle; hence it is revealing of the ‘hidden 
agenda’ that lies behind what might be termed the ‘politics of linguistic 
indigenousness’. It is my intention to indicate that the discourse of linguistic 
indigenousness is far from being innocent, but rather it is politically 
motivated. The fact that the south is granted the right to external self–
determination in four years time now points to the political instrumentality 
and the ideological implications of the notion of ‘indigenousness’ in the 
language policy. Viewed in this way, it is my objective to show that the use 
of the term ‘indigenous’ is not desultory but rather perfectly intertextual and 
compatible with the international legal discourse on the rights of indigenous 
people. I shall show that language has always been a site of, and had a stake 
in, the colonial/postcolonial struggle over political and material power in the 
Sudan. This ideological struggle which is largely discursive is encoded in the 
textual system of the Naivasha Language Policy. I shall argue for a radical 
conceptual reframing in the Sudanese folk and institutional discourse of the 
role language should play in the gradual restructuring of the existing 
sociopolitical configuration, and consequently, the construction of a new 
sociolinguistic order, as part of the project of ‘New Sudan’. Otherwise the 
Naivasha language policy will remain a rhetorical device that will be 
employed by power holders to perpetuate the existing structures of the 
Arabicisation policy which is widely blamed for the current social disorder.  
3. To analyse the language rights regime embodied in the NLP. I contend that 
the language rights embedded in the NLP should not be viewed in 
universalising and totalising terms. The argument here is that the concept of 
language rights should be firmly based in Bourdieu’s notion of ‘habitus’ 
rather than being treated in a decontextualised manner as an abstract universal 
construct. Language is a practice that is embodied in the social structure 
through socialisation. I argue that the notion of language rights, and 
particularly the right to use mother tongue in education should be viewed as 
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part of the ‘habitus’ of speakers of a given community, rather than to be 
imposed on them under the banner of territorially based language rights. Here 
I tend to concur with Joseph (2006a: 55) that ‘languages belong to people, not 
to places’. Conceptualized in this way, the embodied discursive practices of a 
given number of native speakers are a constituent part of their identity. This 
understanding of language rights can help us avoid the political polarisation 
of the south and the north along essentialising linguistic lines (Arabic–north 
vs. English/local language–south). The endorsement of the concept of habitus 
can lead us to avoid the essentialist trap of the mainstream ‘language–rights’ 
paradigm by asserting the social constructedness of languages and identities; 
hence can help us uncouple language from religion and race. I contend that 
British colonial rule in collaboration with key local figures (whose authority 
itself is a colonial invention) in the Sudan constructed the political national 
identity out of the habitus of the northern riverain social groups, while others’ 
habitus was misrecognised. 
4. To draw a comparison between the structural political system and the 
discourse of the NLP. My argument here is that a faithful implementation of 
the NLP within a multinational democratic federation informed by the 
principle of active citizenship can act as both: 1) a strategic corrective to the 
divisive monolingual ideology of Arabicisation, and 2) a foundation for a 
new regime of language rights determined by a bottom–up approach.   
5. To explore the relationship between the allocation of political power in the 
peace protocols and the language policy, and to examine the ways in which 
power relations may influence the realisation of the NLP. 
6. To examine the type of language change that the language policy may bring 
about, and more importantly the areas that are likely to be influenced by this 
change. 
7. To provide an assessment of ‘where we are’ with respect to the institutional–
implementation process of the NLP. 
   
1.3 Research questions 
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In pursuing the above aims and objectives, the study will attempt to tackle the 
following research questions:  
1. What are the overt and covert interpretations of the way in which the NLP is 
worded? What is the hidden agenda behind the status–planning statement that 
‘all indigenous languages are national languages’? Does the technical phrase 
‘indigenous languages’ have any political implications for the speakers who 
are identified or self–identified as ‘indigenous’? If so, what are these 
implications? What are the social processes involved in the colonial 
construction of ‘indigenous languages’ in the southern Sudan?  
2. What role did the colonial/postcolonial practice of language planning play in 
the ‘invention of traditions’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) including the 
social construction of ‘indigenous languages’ and the artificial creation of 
tribes in the Sudan? 
3. What are the types of language rights embodied in the NLP? How can a 
reconceptualisation of the notion ‘language rights’ as a contextualised part of 
one’s ‘habitus’ (in Bourdieu’s 1977, 1991 sense of the term) help us avoid the 
political polarisation of the south and the north along reductionist linguistic 
lines (Arabic–north vs. English/local language–south)? How can language–
in–education planning in the Sudan draw on the insights that the notion of 
‘habitus’ provides? 
4. Can the way in which political power is distributed in the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (henceforth CPA) influence the implementation of the 
language policy? If so, what are the regions that are most likely to be affected 
sociolinguistically by this political distribution of power relations in the 
Sudan? What implications and ramifications does the distribution of political 
power in the peace protocols have for the implementational process of the 
NLP? 
 
1.4 The scope of the study 
One of the primary objectives of this work is to perform a critical analysis of the 
historical conditions in which the NLP has been produced. However, it is beyond the 
capacity of the thesis to go through all the peace protocols. Therefore, only a passing 
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reference to some Articles in the peace protocols will be made, where analysis of the 
language policy makes this appropriate. With regard to the academic contribution of 
the linguistic anthropologist Joseph Greenberg (Chapter 2), it is beyond the scope of 
this thesis to examine the (purely) technical aspect of the ways in which Greenberg 
implements a morphological analysis to identify a word. Rather, the focus will be on 
the social conditions which influenced his scholarship with the hope that more light 
will be shed on the sociohistorical implications of his work. Another point related to 
the scope of this research is that although colonial and postcolonial language policies 
have impacted on the whole Sudan, much of the focus in this thesis is on the 
south/north relation. This is not to imply that other regions in the Sudan are 
linguistically homogeneous. The current civil conflict in the western Sudan (Darfur) 
indicates that the opposite is quite true. Rather, the reason behind this restriction is 
that the CPA was signed exclusively between the major Southern Opposition 
movement (the SLPM) and the NCP (representing the government of the Sudan). A 
second justification for my concentration on the south/north relation is that the 
question of the ‘national language’ was/has been an arena of the longest civil wars in 
Africa (see Miller 2003a: 163). Thus, the historical narrative of the way in which the 
new sociolinguistic order as foreseen in the Naivasha language policy was 
constructed should be critically considered from the perspective of the south-north 
relationship.  
 
With respect to the historical development of official language policies in the Sudan 
(Chapter 4), I periodise language policies in the Sudan, following other writers, into 
two stages: colonial and postcolonial. The colonial period here refers, unless 
otherwise indicated, to the Condominium 1898–1956 (The Anglo–Egyptian rule of 
Sudan). A complete survey of the evolutionary development of the language 
planning and policies beyond the Anglo–Egyptian period is beyond the limitations of 
the thesis, albeit an occasional mention will be made where necessary. This 
restriction can be accounted for by the fact that most of the language policies were 
made during the British colonial rule of the Sudan. Finally, I do not attempt to make 
the case that the proposed language policy is much more promising than the old 
policy of Arabicisation. Rather, the ultimate purpose is to engage with questions of 
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power and inequality in language planning, and to uncover the implications of 
adopting one reading position over another in order to come to a better understanding 
of the NLP.  
 
1.5 The significance of the study 
The primary aim of the study is to provide a critical analysis of the NLP. The 
analysis of the sociohistorical conditions of the production of the NLP supports the 
argument that ‘indigenous languages’ in the Sudan are colonial inventions. The study 
examines the social processes which ultimately led to the social construction of 
‘languages’ as ‘indigenous’. This requires a critical reinterpretation of the colonial 
policy in the Sudan. I show that the colonial project constructed ‘languages’, 
recreated ‘tribes’, invented traditions, etc. in order to develop two incompatible 
identities in the Sudan (the north vs. the south). The practice of language planning, I 
would argue, was instrumental in the colonial/postcolonial project of social invention 
of identities in the Sudan. The analysis also shows that the fate of local languages is 
always determined, at least at status–planning level, by power holders, and concludes 
that nationalism–based and utilitarian language policies have produced resistance and 
disintegration instead of unity and homogeneity in Sudan. Language, I maintain, is 
always instrumental in the production, maintenance and reproduction of unequal 
power relations in the Sudan.  
 
I examine the language rights regime embedded in the text of the language policy, 
and I argue for a reframing of the notion of ‘language rights’ as part of the habitus. A 
related argument is that the desire to operationalise a language as a medium of 
instruction should stem from the speakers of a language, rather than be imposed upon 
them. I draw on my visit to the Nuba Mountains in the western part of Sudan to show 
that a grassroots level of engagement in the process of language planning can be 
successful and effective. I touch on the new language policy of the southern Sudan 
since it is legislated under the framework of the NLP. Here I show that the statement 
concerning sign language is problematic and misleading, and I explore alternative 




I argue that the appropriate structural system for the implementation of the NLP is a 
kind of ‘multinational’ federalism, and show that the discourse of the NLP is 
compatible with the proposed structural system. I review the relationship between the 
configuration of power relations in the CPA and the distribution of linguistic 
resources in the country, and examine the influence of the new configuration of 
political power relations on the language situation in the Sudan. I conclude by 
providing an assessment of the status of the implementation of the NLP. The ultimate 
purpose which drives this work has to do with the ways in which one can and should 
attempt to ‘increase consciousness of how language contributes to domination of 
some people by others, because consciousness is the first step towards emancipation’ 
(Fairclough 2001: 193). Hence, the reasons for carrying out this study are based on 
the hope that useful implications can be drawn from it.  
 
1.6 Definition of key terms 
1. Language is understood in this thesis as ‘the principal means of our socialisation 
into our group and the principal means of our meaning making. Language can be a 
tool for inclusion and exclusion. Language builds human societies, solidarity and 
cooperation but it also plays a crucial role in the distribution of power and resources 
within a society and among societies. In non–democratic societies it serves to mark 
class and caste acquired through non–linguistic means; in democratic societies it is 
power itself, since authority in a democracy derives ultimately from a leader’s ability 
to persuade the electorate to accord to authority’ (Wright 2004: 5, 7). 
 2. Ideology is employed to refer to ‘ways of representing and interpreting reality, 
and there is no life outside of them. Ideologies are always partial and partisan to 
one’s community. They are more or less libratory or oppressive, depending on the 
social practice of historical background of the community. They change in relation to 
the historical conditions and social practices of the respective communities’ 
(Canagarajah 2000: 123–130). 
3. North and south Sudan. According to Deng (1995: 2-4), Sudan is a country of 
immense racial, cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity. The diversities involved in 
the country’s composition are frequently referred to as falling into two main 
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divisions, the north and the south. The north, making up two–thirds of the country in 
land and population, is inhabited by local tribal groups of which the dominant 
intermarried with incoming Arab traders, and over the centuries produced a 
genetically mixed African–Arab racial and cultural hybrid. Although there are large 
numbers of non–Arab communities in the north, the north has adopted Islam and 
uses Arabic language as a common system of communication. The south, which 
constitutes the remaining third in land and population, adopts African identity in its 
racial and cultural composition, and is characterised by Christianity, the English 
language and local languages. It should be noted that this North-South broad 
demarcation works only at the political/ideological level but does not reflect the 
reality of the complex social fabrics of the Sudan. The north should not be 
conceptualised in monolithic and reductionist terms as a linguistically homogenous 
part. Rather, it is a linguistically heterogenous area and its cultural and linguistic 
diversity is reflected in the number of languages spoken by the different tribal groups 
residing in the northern part of the country. Suffice it here to note that the current 
humanitarian crisis in the Darfurian region has problematised the very political 
notion of the ‘North’ and revealed the cultural diversity of the western Sudan which 
was historically framed as part of the northern Sudan. 
 
1.7 The structure of the thesis 
This thesis is composed of six chapters (including this introductory chapter). In 
Chapter 2, the distribution of languages in the Sudan is surveyed, and the academic 
scholarship of Greenberg in relation to language situation in the Sudan is reviewed. 
Chapter 3 surveys the conceptual and terminological definitions in the field of 
language planning and policy, and the key actors and elements involved in the 
process of language planning. A number of descriptive and critical approaches to 
language planning are reviewed. The chapter finishes with a broad review of the 
language situation in Nigeria for comparative purposes. In Chapter 4, I review the 
history of language planning and policy in the Sudan. Part of the discussion involves 
considerable attention to the postcolonial policies of Arabicisation in the north and 
the south. In Chapter 5, I perform a critical analysis of the NLP, with special 
historical analytic focus on the ‘politics of linguistic indigenousness’ in the Sudan. 
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CHAPTER TWO: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF LANGUAGES 
IN THE SUDAN 
 
This chapter has four objectives. The first is to produce a reconstruction of the 
distribution of the languages of the Sudan prior to the spread of the Arabic language 
in the Sudan (Section 2.1). The second is to place the Sudanese languages within the 
African linguistic context by reviewing one of the most commonly cited systems of 
linguistic classifications, Joseph Greenberg’s (sub–section 2.1.1). The third is to 
examine the notion of the Hamitic hypothesis as a racial statement of identity and its 
deployment in the linguistic classification of African languages and races including 
those of the Sudan.  The scholarly stance of Greenberg on the mobilisation of the 
Hamitic hypothesis in linguistic typologies is examined. The final aim of the chapter 
is to trace the genealogy and spread of the Arabic language in the Sudan prior to the 
state intervention (Section 2.3). The whole chapter is intended to provide a textured 
view of the ecolinguistic environment within which later official language policies 
have been made by colonial and postcolonial regimes in the Sudan (see Chapter 4). 
 
With regard to the intellectual achievement of the linguistic anthropologist Joseph 
Greenberg, I should note that the focus on the work of Greenberg as a central theme 
of the chapter can be justified on three grounds: first, the contribution of Greenberg 
to the description of African languages is important in itself. Secondly, the 
distribution of Sudanese languages can best be understood through the typological 
model of Greenberg. Thirdly, the analysis of the social implications of Greenberg’s 
work can provide us with insights into understanding the discursive relationship 
between the North and South of Sudan. It is worth mentioning that I have not found a 
single source in the literature which examines the social implications of Greenberg’s 
work, particularly for the Sudanese languages, as a free–standing topic. Historical 
linguists whom I have consulted at Edinburgh University and at the School of 
Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) at London University have told me that they 
have not encountered any specific research into this question. This, I would suggest, 
undoubtedly points to a visible gap in the general field of knowledge that I cannot 
pretend to fill. Rather, the aim is to scrutinise the issue and to attempt to open a 
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debate wider on this research question by examining the historical and intellectual 
environment which shaped Greenberg’s linguistic contribution. Another point that 
should be mentioned in relation to Greenberg’s work is that the main interest will not 
be in the purely technical aspect of how Greenberg goes about analysing a language, 
or how he implements his methods of morphological analysis to get a word. Rather, 
the prime focus lies in the historical and contextual understanding of the intellectual 
climate which shaped Greenberg’s antagonism to the practice of deploying the 
physical anthropological concept of race in the description of African languages 
(Section 2.1.2). An investigation of the alliance between racial theories and philology 
in the nineteenth century is meant to provide a historical background against which 
one can comprehend the way in which the notion of race has been mobilised by both 
political theoreticians and practitioners under the banner of a particular version of 
monolithic linguistic nationalism in postcolonial Sudanese politics (see Chapter 4). It 
is hoped that light can be shed on the possible sociopolitical implications of 
Greenberg’s linguistic typology of African languages. So the objectives behind the 
focus on the work of Greenberg are closely related. 
 
2.1 Distribution of languages in the Sudan 
The Sudan is rich in the variety of its languages, cultures and peoples, each of which 
is part of the total heritage and contributes to the pattern of national life. The Sudan 
prides itself on being the ‘crossroads of Africa’ (Stevenson 1971: 11). The 
importance of the geographical location of the Sudan within Africa can be 
appreciated when it is realised that the country contains within its borders 
representatives of all the major defined African language families, except the 
Khoisan languages of South Africa (see Map 2.1). The linguistic wealth of the Sudan 
has brought it to the frontline in the scholarship of African languages.  
  
A note about the key sources for the present overview of the distribution of 
languages in the Sudan is in order. The first source is the Summer Institute of 
Linguistics’ Ethnologue database (www.ethnologue.com), which provides detailed 
information about the distribution of Sudanese languages. The second source is 
Thelwall (1978), which contains a comprehensive linguistic profile of the country. 
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Thelwall’s analytic study is based on the First Population Census of 1955 which 
contains tables concerning ‘Tribe, Nationality, and Language’ (see Thelwall 1978: 
1). The figures Thelwall cites concerning the distribution of languages in the Sudan, 
particularly the ones spoken in the southern Sudan (e.g., Shilluk and Anuak) are far 
from being up–to–date in the view of the significant political and structural 
transformations that the whole country has witnessed since Addis Ababa Agreement 
of 1972. Thelwall (1978: 1) makes a cautious note that ‘the figures given should be 
treated as indicative of the varying ingredients of complexity in each area rather than 
exact measures’. The third source is Miller (2006), a paper containing a statistical 
analysis of the finding of the 1993 Population Census which included a question on 
language.  
 
The number of languages of the Sudan listed in the Ethnologue database is 142, of 
which 134 are living languages, and eight are extinct. The national and official 
language of the Sudan before 2005 was Arabic. The current peace agreement, which 
ended one of the longest wars in Africa between the north and the south of the Sudan 
and was enshrined in the Interim National Constitution, names both English and 
Arabic as official languages (see Protocol of Power sharing, Appendix). Arabic is a 
widely distributed language in the northern part of the country due to the fact that 
Arabic had, and still enjoys, the status of the national and official language of the 
whole country, with the exception of the southern Sudan. There are a number of 
forms of Arabic used in the northern part, including: a) Standard Arabic, which is 
employed as the language of government transactions, education, and broadcasting; 
b) Khartoum Arabic (i.e., Sudanese colloquial Arabic), a variety spoken by around 
15,000,000 persons (see Ethnologue). Arabic is also used as a lingua franca in 
multilingual areas. It is not an exaggeration to say that Arabic has become the 
dominant and the dominating language in the Sudan (see Nyombe 1997; Miller 
2003a; Yokwe 1984; Abdelhay 2004, 2006). The inception of this domination had 
already been observed by the prominent anthropologist Franz Boas in 1920 when he 
noted that ‘Arabic is superseding the native speech in North Africa’ (Boas 1966: 
211). One of the defining features of what Boas calls ‘native speech’ (i.e., 
vernaculars) in the Sudan is tribal or ethnical affiliation (see Map 2.1; Table 2.1). 
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The problematic term ‘tribe’ may be defined in the Sudanese context as ‘a political 
form based on a territory and marked by traditional customs and by political 
organisation in terms of chiefly office’ (Greenberg 1965a: 207). The reason why 
many studies and national censuses have selected the tribal language as the primary 
marker of ethnic identification in the Sudan or in Africa generally can be seen in the 
following remark: 
In Africa language is clearly fundamental since the tribe, still the social 
grouping to which the vast majority of Africans give their primary 
allegiance, is defined mainly on linguistic lines. A linguistic map of 
Africa will hardly differ from a tribal map. (Greenberg 1966: 242) 
However, there is no necessary connection between a given tribal identity and a 
given local language in the Sudan. Table 2.1, which is based on the 1993 Population 
National Census, furnishes us with information indicating an increasing discrepancy 
between the ethnic first language and tribal identity in the northern Sudan (see Miller 
2006: 4). 








Ethnicity 51,79 4,71 6,41 3,22 22,12 7,42 1,74 1,31 0,77 0,50 
Language 73,84 2,49 4,55 0,94 9,99 5,22 1,59 0,74 0,21 0,43 
Table 2.1. Ethnic Affiliation and Mother Tongue in Northern Sudan according 
to the 1993 Population Census (Source: Miller 2006: 4). (Note: the Census categories 
have been clustered into major ethnic and language groups). 
 
The above observation calls for a note about the widely observed phenomenon of 
language shift from the vernacular to Arabic. First, it should be remarked that shift to 
the Arabic language varies according to ethnic affiliation and region (Miller 2006: 4). 
For instance, if we compare in Table 2.2 and 2.3 the claimed language uses with 
claimed ethnicity in what can be regarded as the homeland of each major ethnic 
group, we find that the Nubiyins in the northern Sudan, the Nuba (in the Southern 
Kordofan) and the Darfurian speaking groups (in Darfur) seem to be more influenced 
by language shift to Arabic than the Beja in eastern Sudan and West Africans in most 





Table 2.2. Distribution of Major Ethnic Groups by Northern States according to 
1993 Population Census (Source: Miller 2006: 4–5) 
 
Table 2.3. Distribution of Major Language Groups by Northern States 
according to 1993 Population Census (Source: Miller 2006: 5) 




Northern 44,07 0,98 46,66 4,50 0,01 2,34 1,05 0,04 0,12 0,22 
Nahr al Nil 82,28 10,12 3,22 2,01 0,03 0,53 0,74 0,32 0,06 0,67 
Red Sea 15,00 66,49 4,77 4,39 0,10 1,43 1,37 4,32 1,53 0,60 
Kassala 18,37 48,90 5,29 1,91 0,09 0,67 9,51 11,51 3,19 0,56 
Gedarif 46,37 7,28 0,54 4,04 0,31 1,08 20,22 16,94 2,79 0,44 
Khartoum 57,24 1,31 10,69 9,64 0,30 6,74 7,88 3,22 1,28 1,70 
Gezira 83,26 0,96 2,31 2,16 0,15 0,88 5,47 2,82 1,45 0,54 
Sennar 62,04 0,60 1,76 2,38 2,02 1,54 6,22 22,75 0,20 0,50 
White Nile 76,86 0,68 2,30 2,46 0,23 2,54 8,48 5,86 0,14 0,45 
Blue Nile 25,77 0,35 1,14 4,54 37,46 2,60 6,27 20,83 0,37 0,67 
North Kordofan 81,09 0,26 0,62 2,71 0,06 0,66 6,65 7,46 0,22 0,27 
West Kordofan 79,33 0,29 0,18 0,87 0,35 4,97 10,51 3,25 0,15 0,09 
South Kordofan 31,84 0,38 0,15 37,83 0,03 0,97 10,15 18,09 0,33 0,24 
North Darfur 12,97 0,17 3,64 0,18 0,56 1,21 78,20 2,70 0,06 0,32 
West Darfur 10,47 0,80 0,04 0,44 0,02 0,35 85,80 1,11 0,66 0,31 
South Darfur 38,54 0,53 0,09 0,39 0,13 1,96 49,27 8,76 0,06 0,26 
Total 51,79 6,41 3,22 4,71 1,31 1,74 22,12 7,42 0,77 0,50 




Northern 76,81 0,01 17,74 3,35 0,00 1,88 0,08 0,01 0,00 0,00 
Nahr al Nil 97,44 0,56 0,48 0,78 0,11 0,26 0,12 0,09 0,01 0,01 
Red Sea 25,91 63,77 1,60 2,83 0,01 1,00 0,42 3,24 0,80 0,05 
Kassala 30,67 43,93 3,65 1,44 0,04 0,72 7,92 10,27 0,82 0,04 
Gedarif 63,98 5,22 0,27 1,98 0,02 0,82 8,50 18,12 0,61 0,01 
Khartoum 85,44 0,17 1,02 3,97 0,02 4,46 2,00 1,69 0,41 0,09 
Gezira 93,80 0,06 0,06 0,50 0,00 0,31 1,79 3,15 0,06 0,00 
Sennar 75,48 0,04 0,03 0,85 0,02 1,11 2,81 19,38 0,03 0,00 
White Nile 90,03 0,01 0,11 1,06 0,00 1,94 1,23 5,35 0,01 0,01 
Blue Nile 40,38 0,10 0,13 3,09 29,36 3,39 2,61 20,34 0,04 0,00 
Northern 
Kordofan. 
95,82 0,02 0,02 0,43 0,00 0,36 0,04 3,15 0,00 0,00 
Western 
Kordofan. 
90,60 0,00 0,01 0,22 0,00 3,25 3,12 2,28 0,00 0,00 
Southern 
Kordofan. 
64,71 0,03 0,86 23,13 0,01 0,75 0,49 9,86 0,01 0,03 
Northern 
Darfur 
66,89 0,00 0,09 0,04 0,01 0,89 31,68 0,17 0,00 0,00 
Western 
Darfur 
22,86 0,57 0,01 0,19 0,00 0,22 72,64 2,24 0,11 0,00 
Southern 
Darfur 
76,66 0,06 0,00 0,45 0,00 1,07 18,13 3,24 0,00 0,00 
Total 73,84 4,55 0,94 2,49 0,74 1,59 9,99 5,22 0,19 0,02 
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The difference between first language and ethnic identity is accounted for by a 
number of factors including the historical processes of Arabisation, very intense 
linguistic diversity, and lower demographic weight and higher mobility. For instance, 
the outbreak of war in the Nuba Mountains in the west of Sudan in the mid 1980s 
accelerated the process of language shift (Mugadam 2006: 292). Miller and Abu–
Manga (1992: 1) observe that migration and settlement of non–Arabic groups in the 
Khartoum Area in the central Sudan could lead in the long run to a modification of 
the linguistic map of the country. Mugadam (2006) has found out that age, education 
and urbanisation have significant effects on the shift from the ethnic languages in the 
Nuba Mountains. Women were also reported to have played a part in the process of 
language shift in the Nuba Mountains. This is due to the increasing role of women in 
the socioeconomic life and their increasing educational opportunities (Mugadam 
2006: 290). According to Miller, the massive population movement of the last two 
decades to central Sudan and Khartoum, which were almost entirely Arabic–
speaking in 1956 (90–100%), led to an increasing ethnic and linguistic diversity. 
Table 2.4 based on the results of the 1955 and 1993 Population National Censuses 
underlines this observation.  
 
Apart from Arabic, the Dinka language in the southern Sudan represents a major 
language spoken by more than 10% of the total population (Miller and Abu–Manga 
1992: 8). Fifteen state–based local languages with a significant population size are 
spoken in the Sudan, which now has 25 states. Table 2.5 orders them by population, 
with the figures taken from Thelwall (1978), and the Ethnologue database. Thelwall 
(1978: 1) refers to the languages listed in Table 2.5 as ‘minor languages’, but since 
this expression has potential ideological connotations I will refer to them, following 
other researchers (e.g., Miller and Abu–Manga 1992: 8), as non–Arabic languages. 
 
Most of these languages are distributed in the regional states: border zones of the 
West (Chadian border) and the East (Ethiopian Borderlands), the Red Sea 
Mountains, the extreme north (Nubia) and the southern Sudan (Miller and Abu–
Manga 1992: 8). The fact that none of the local languages has obtained the status of a 
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national language or official language or a dominant lingua franca is remarkable in 
view of the political considerations that will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
State Language 1956 (Thelwall 
1978) 
1993 (Miller 2006) 
Khartoum State. Arabic 96,9% 85,4 % 
 Nuba  3,97% 
 South S.  4,46% 
 Darfur  2% 
    
Central  Sudan Arabic 84 % 74,9% 
= Sennar, Gezira, BN, West African 8% 12 % 
& W.N Berta–Burun  7,3% 
Table 2.4. Language Distribution in Central Sudan according to the 1956 and 





Thelwall (1978) Ethnologue 
Language 
Thelwall (1978) Ethnologue 
Beja 472,534 951,000 Masalit 162,524 173,810 
Nuer 464,159 740,000 Fulani 156,840 – 
Fur 265,565 500,000 Koalib 154,685 44,258 
Teso 219,301 – Hausa 118,230 489,000 



























Map 2.1. Languages of Sudan (Source: Ethnologue, Languages of the Sudan, 
http://www.ethnologue.com/show_map.asp?name=SD&seq=10. Accessed 29 August 
2006) 
 
It is worth noting that the ethno–linguistic data provided by the 1993 National 
Census, which makes use of the same ethnic and language categories, do not cater 
for the southern Sudan on account of the civil wars in the region (see Miller 2006: 4). 
The analytic studies provided by Thelwall which are based on the 1955 Population 
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National census include information on the southern Sudan (see Thelwall 1978: 4–5). 
A final note concerns the distribution of European and Asian languages in the Sudan 
(see Table 2.6). Since there is no up–to–date statistical study which shows the 
distribution of these languages in the Sudan, Thelwall (1978) remains our only 
available resource. The English language is the most common second language, and 
the majority of older members of the educated classes have a fluent command of it 
by virtue of having received their entire secondary schooling through the medium of 
English (Thelwall 1978: 4). The policies of Arabicisation, especially of higher 
education since 1989, have had a negative impact on the status of the English 
language. The Naivasha peace accord signed in 2005 has reinstated English as an 
official language, side by side with Arabic. 
 
LANGUAGE GROUP 
 Language  
Sub–Language 
Number of persons LANGUAGE GROUP 
Language 
Sub–Language 
Number of persons 
EUROPEAN 7,877 East European  3,725 
West European 4,138 Czech 8 
Danish 1 Greek 3,637 
Dutch 28 Hungarian 8 
English 2,796 Polish 70 
French 105 Serbo–Croatian 2 
German 97 Other European  14 







Indian Languages 2,032 
Japanese 8 
Table 2.6. Distribution of European and Asian Languages in the Sudan Based 
on 1955 National Census (Source: Thelwall 1978: 14) 
 
2.1.1 Linguistic classification of Sudanese languages: Greenberg’s typology 
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The papers presented by Greenberg and Stevenson at the February 1968 conference 
on ‘The Sudan in Africa’ (under the auspices of the Institute of African and Asian 
Studies, University of Khartoum) emphasised the importance of the Sudan for the 
languages of Africa and ‘pointed to its key position in containing within its borders a 
substantial number of languages which are historically of vital importance in this 
field’ (Stevenson 1975: 58). Hence, the task of describing and classifying the 
languages of the Sudan is not possible without reference to the languages of Africa 
generally. Equally important, a discussion of African languages cannot be carried out 
without reference to the methodologies employed in historical and comparative 
linguistics. For a systematic review, I shall first try to broadly define the commonly 
employed approaches to the linguistic classification, especially the ones used in the 
definition of African languages. I will then try to consider Greenberg’s linguistic 
typology, with special reference to Sudan.   
 
To begin with, there are three different methodologies of language classification in 
the literature: the genetic, the typological and the areal. Genetic classification lies at 
the heart of historical and comparative linguistics. Comparative linguistics is mainly 
concerned with the description and classification of languages into mutually 
exclusive families, each containing related languages. A family of languages may be 
defined as a set of distinct languages presumed to have evolved from a single 
ancestral language, the so–called protolanguage (Greenberg 1964: 176). The genetic 
classification as a historical approach to the description of languages may be defined 
as ‘classification based on common origin’ (Greenberg 1957a: 66, 1957b: 93), and it 
is founded on the evolutionary theory of language which assumes the existence of 
some forms ancestral to all human languages. Greenberg’s widely celebrated book 
The Languages of Africa (1963a) is considered by scholars as one of the pioneering 
contributions to the genetic classification of African languages. Greenberg (1963a: 1) 
makes it clear at the outset that his work ‘contains a complete genetic classification 
of the languages of Africa’. Greenberg notes that the genetic methodology has three 
distinguishing features: non–arbitrariness, exhaustiveness and uniqueness. The 
feature of non–arbitrariness refers to the fact that ‘there is no choice of criteria 
leading to different and equally legitimate results’ (Greenberg 1957a: 66). The 
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‘exhaustiveness’ of a classification designates that all human languages are classified 
into families (ibid.). ‘Uniqueness’ refers to the fact that no language should be 
classified into more than one class (Greenberg 1957a: 66, 1957b: 93).  
 
According to Greenberg (1963a: 1–5) there are three basic methodological principles 
underlying the genetic classification of languages: similarity of sound and meaning 
in a pair of languages, mass comparison, and the basing of classifications exclusively 
on linguistic evidence. The first fundamental is defined as ‘the sole relevance in 
comparison of resemblances involving sound and meaning in specific forms’ 
(Greenberg 1963a: 1). That is to say, a phonetic similarity should be accompanied by 
a corresponding semantic similarity. The second principle underlying the genetic 
classification is the availability of what Greenberg calls ‘mass comparison’ between 
pairs of languages. The third principle is self–explanatory: classification of languages 
should be founded solely on linguistic evidence, without regard to historical or 
anthropological considerations.  
  
The second type of linguistic comparison is the typological method. This method of 
classification is non–historical since it employs criteria that refer to ‘similarities 
which may arise without any necessary implication of historical connection through 
either contact or common origin’ (Greenberg 1968: 291–292). It is founded on the 
fundamentals: similarity of sound without meaning, similarity of meaning without 
sound, or both. An instructive instance for phonetic similarity is the classification of 
all world languages into two typological classes: tonal system and non–tonal. 
Greenberg argues that this approach to classification suffers from the problem that it 
is not exhaustive as a result of the multiplicity of criteria which may leave some 
languages un–classified. One of the pioneers of this approach is Carl Meinhof, whose 
work on comparative phonology and comparative grammar came to form the basis of 
Bantu linguistics (Greenberg 1965b: 221). The third scheme of linguistic 
classification is the areal method. Areal classifications are concerned with effects of 
languages upon one another, whether they are related or unrelated. This approach 
depends on criteria which involve historical processes such as linguistic contact, 
 24 
which are of four types: borrowing, order, semantic influence, and phonetic 
influence.  
 
In what follows, I shall reproduce the linguistic groupings of African languages as 
proposed by Greenberg (1963a). Sudanese languages and other African languages 
spoken in the Sudan (see Stevenson 1971: 10–12) are italicised. I should note that the 
enumeration of the African or Sudanese languages is far from complete and would 
comprise many more. Greenberg’s typology postulates four families: Niger–
Kordofanian, Nilo–Saharan, and Afroasiatic, and Khoisan (see Map 2.2). 
 
2.1.1.1 Niger–Kordofanian: is divided into two sub–families: Niger–Congo and 
Kordofanian.  
2.1.1.1.1 Niger–Congo: consists of six main branches: 
1. West Atlantic: a. Northern: Wolof, Serer–sin, Fulani (not an indigenous Sudanese 
language), Serer–Non, Konyagi, Basari, Biafada, (Pajade), Dyola, Mandyak, 
Balante, Banyun, Cobiana, Cassanga, Bidogo. b. Southern: Temne, Baga, Landoma, 
Kissi, Bulom, Limba, and Gola.  
2. Mande: a. Western: 1. Sonike, Malinke, Bambara, Dyula, Numu, Ligbi, Huela, 
Vai, Kono, Koranko, Khasonke, Susu, Dyalonke. 2. Sya. 3. Mande, Loko, Gbandi, 
Gbunde, Loma, Kpelle (Guerze). b. Eastern: Mano, Dan (Gio), Kweni (Guro), Mwa, 
Nwa. 2. Samo, Bisa, Busa. 
3. Gur: a. Senufo: Minianka, Tagba, Foro, Tagwana (Takponin), Dyimini, Nafana. b. 
Lobi–Dogon: Lobi, Dyan, Puguli, Gan, Gouin, Turuka, Doghosie, Doghosie–Fing, 
Kyan, Tara, Bwamu, Wara, Natioro, Dogon, Kulango. c. Grusi: Awuna, Kasena, 
Munuma, Lyele, Tamprusi, Kanjaga (Bulea), Degha, Siti, Kurumba (Fulse), Sisala. 
d. Mossi, Dagomba, Kusasi, Nankanse, Talensi, Mamprusi, Wala, Dagari, Birifo, 
Namnam, e. Tem, Kabre, Delo, Chala, f. Bargu (Bariba). g. Gurma, Tobote (Basari), 
Kasele (Chamba), Moba. 
4. Kwa: a. Kru: Bete, Bakwe, Grebo, Bassa, De, Kru (Krawi). b. Avatime, Nyangbo, 
Tafi, Logba, Likpe, Ahlo, Akposo, Lefana, Bowili, Akpafu, Santrokofi, Adele, Kebu, 
Anyimere, Ewe, Aladian, Avikam, Gwa, Kyama, Akye, Ari, Abe, Adyukru, Akan 
(Twi, Anyi, Baule, Guang, Metyibo, Abure), Ga, Adangme. c. Yoruba, Igala. d. 
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Nupe, Gbari, Igbira, Gade. e. Bini, Ishan, Kukuruku, Sobo. f. Idoma, Agatu, Iyala. g. 
Ibo. h. Ijo. 
5. Benue–Congo: A. Plateau: 1. a. Kambari, Dukawa, Dakarkari, Basa, Kamuku, 
Reshe. b. Piti, Janji, Kurama, Ghawai, Anaguta, Buji, Amap, Gure, Kahugu, Ribina, 
Butawa, Kudawa. 2. Afusare, Irigwe, Katab, Kagoro, Kaje, Kachicheri, Morwa, Jaba, 
Kamantan, Kadara, Koro, Afo. 3. Birom, Ganawuri (Aten). 4. Rukuba, Ninzam, Ayu, 
Mada, Kaninkwom. 5. Eggon, Nungu, Yeskwa. 6. Kaleri, Pyem, Pai. 7. Yergam, 
Basherawa. B. Jukunoid: Jukun, Kentu, Nyidu, Tigong, Eregba, Mbembe, Zumper 
(Kutev, Mbarike), Boritsu. C. Cross–River: 1. Boki, Gayi (Uge), Yokoro. 2. Ibibio, 
Efik, Ogoni (Kana), Andoni, Akoiyang, Ododop, Korop. 3. Akunakuna, Abine, 
Yako, Asiga, Ekuri, Ukelle, Okpoto–Mteze, Olulomo. D. Bantoid: Tiv, Bitare, Batu, 
Ndoro, Mambila, Bute, Bantu.  
6. Adamawa–Eastern: A. Adamawa: 1. Tula, Dadiya, Waja, Cham, Kamu. 2. 
Chamba, Donga, Lekon, Wom, Mumbake. 3. Daka, Taram. 4. Vere, Namshi, 
Kolbila, Pape, Sari, Sewe, Woko, Kotopo, Kutin, Durru. 5. Mumuye, Kumba, 
Gengle, Teme, Waka, Yendang, Zinna. 6. Dama, Mono, Mbere, Mundang, Yasing, 
Mangbei, Mbum, Kpere, Lakka, Dek. 7. Yungur, Mboi, Libo, Roba. 8. Kam. 9. Jen, 
Munga. 10. Longuda. 11. Fali. 12. Nimbari. 13. Bua, Nielim, Koke. 14. Masa. B. 
Eastern: 1. Gbaya, Manja, Mbaka. 2. Banda. 3. Ngbandi, Sango, Yakoma. 4. Zande, 
Nzakara, Barambo, Pambia. 5. Bwaka, Monjombo, Gbanziri, Mundu, Mayogo, 
Bangba. 6. Ndogo, Bai, Bviri, Golo, Sere, Tagbo, Feroge, Indri, Mangaya, Togoyo. 
7. Amadi (Madyo, Ma). 8. Mondunga, Mba (Bamanga). 
2.1.1.1.2 Kordofanian: These are the languages of the Nuba hills of Kordofan. The 
Kordofanian group is completely contained in the Nuba hills area of West Sudan 
(Stevenson 1975: 58). The members of this family are as follows: 
1. Koalib group: Koalib, Kanderma, Heiban, Laro, Otoro, Kawama, Shwai, Tira, 
Moro, Fungor. 
2. Tegali group: Tegali, Rashad, Tagoi, Tumale. 
3. Talodi group: Talodi, Lafofa, Eliri, Masakin, Tacho, Lumun, El Amira. 
4. Tumtum group: Tumtum, Tuleshi, Keiga, Karondi, Krongo, Miri, Kadugli, Katcha. 
5. Katla group: Katla, Tima. 
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2.1.1.2 Nilo–Saharan: Greenberg was reported to have said at a conference on 
‘Sudan in Africa’ in 1968 that ‘the Sudan comprises the heartland of the Nilo–
Saharan family and the single most comprehensive task of Sudanese linguistics is the 
comparative study of this language family’ (Stevenson 1975: 58). The Nilo–Saharan 
family consists of six branches: 
1. Songhai: Songhai (not an indigenous language but can be heard in the Sudan). 
2. Saharan: a) Kanuri, Kanembu; (b) Teda, Daza; (c) Zaghawa, Berti 
3. Maban: Masalit, Maba (not indigenous languages but heard in Sudan), Runga, 
Mimi (of Nachtigal), Mime (of Gaudefroy–Demombynes). 
4. Fur: Fur 
5. Chari–Nile: consists of two branches: Eastern Sudanic and Central Sudanic: 
a. Eastern Sudanic: has the following ten branches: 1. Nubian: (a) Nile Nubian 
(Mahas–Fadidja and Kenuzi–Dongola); (b) Kordofanian Nubian: Dair, Dilling, 
Gulfan, Garko, Kadero, Kundugr; (c)Midob; (d) Birked. 2. Murle (Beir), Longarim, 
Didinga, Suri, Mekan, Murzu, Surma (including Tirma and Zulmanu), Masongo. 3. 
Barea (not indigenous language but heard in Sudan). 4. Ingassana (Tabi). 5. Nyima, 
Afitti. 6. Temein, Teis–um–Danab. 7. Merarit, Tama, Sungor. 8. Dagu of Darfur, 
Baygo, Sila, Dagu of Dar Dagu (Wadi), Dagu of Western Kordofan, Njalgulgule, 
Shatt, Liguri. 9. Nilotic: (a) Western: (1) Burun, (2) Shilluk, Anuak, Acholi, Lango, 
Alur, Luo, Jur, Bor, (3) Dinka, Nuer; (b) Eastern: (1) Bari, Fajulu, Kakwa, Mondari, 
(2a) Jie, Dodoth, Karamojong, Teso, Topotha, Turkana, (2b) Masai; (3) Southern: 
Nandi, Suk, Tatoga; 10. Nyangiya, Teuso. 
b. Central Sudanic: consists of the following languages: 1. Bogno, Baka, Morokodo, 
Beli, Gberi, Sara dialects (not indigenous language but heard in Sudan: Mad–
jinngay, Gulai, Mbai, Gamba, Kaba, Dendje, Laka), Vale, Nduka, Tana, Horo, 
Bagirmi (not indigenous language, but heard in the Sudan), Kuka, Kenga (not 
indigenous language but heard in the Sudan), Disa, Bubalia. 2. Kreish. 3. Binga, 
Yulu, Kara. 4. Moru, Avukaya, Logo, Keliko, Lugbara, Madi. 5. Mangbetu, Lombi, 
Popoi, Makere, Meje, Asua. 6. Mangbutu, Mamvu, Lese, Mvuba, Efe. 7. Lendu. 
6. Coman: Koma, Ganza, Uduk, Gule, Gumuz, Mao. 
2.1.1.3 Afroasiatic: traditionally named Hamito–Semitic languages, but Greenberg 
replaced this by Afroasiatic and also abandoned the term Hamite since it ‘has led to a 
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racial theory in which the majority of the native population of Negro Africa is 
considered to be the result of mixture between Hamites and Negroes’ (Greenberg 
1963a: 49, see also Section 2.1.2 for the discussion of the relation between the 
Hamitic hypothesis and linguistic typologies of African languages). This Afroasiatic 
family has five coordinate branches:  
(1) Semitic: Arabic.  
(2) Berber.  
(3) Ancient and Middle Egyptian (an ancient language). 
(4) Cushitic: consists of five sub–branches: 1. Northern Cushitic: Beja (Bedauye). 2. 
Central Cushitic: Bogo (Bilin), Kamir, Khamta, Awiya, Damot, Kemant, Kayla, 
Quara. 3. Eastern Cushitic: Saho–Afar, Somali, Galla, Konso, Geleba, Marille, 
(Reshiat, Arbore), Gardula, Gidole, Gowaze, Burji, Sidamo, Darasa, Kambata, 
Alaba, Hayda, Tambaro. 4. Western Cushitic: Janjero, Wolamo, Zala, Gofa, Basketo, 
Baditu, Haruro, Zaysse, Chara, Gimira, Benesho, Nao, Kaba, Shako, She, Maji, 
Kafa, Garo, Mocha, Anfillo (Mao), Shinasha, Bako, Amar, Bana, Dime, Gayi, Kerre, 
Tsamai, Doko, Dollo. 5. Southern Cushitic: Burungi (Mbulungu), Goroa (Fiome), 
Alawa (Uwassi), Iraqw, Mbugu, Sanye.  
(5) Chad: this group of Afroasiatic languages is mainly spoken in the region of Lake 
Chad (Chad, as a name of a country, is neighbouring Sudan). The Chad languages 
are classified into nine groups. The arrangement is approximately from west to east: 
1. (a) Hausa (not indigenous, spoken by immigrants), Gwandara; (b) Ngizim, Mober, 
Auyokawa, Shirawa, Bede; (c) (i) Warjawa, Afawa, Diryawa, Miyawa, Sirawa, (ii) 
Gezawa, Seiyawa, Barawa of Dass; (d) (i) Bolewa, Karekare, Ngamo, Gerawa, 
Gerumawa, Kirifawa, Dera (Kanakuru), Tangale, Pia, Pero, Chongee, Miriam, 
Montol, Sura, Tal, Gerka, (iii) Ron. 2. Kotoko group: Logone, Ngala, Buduma, Kuri, 
Gulfei, Affade, Shoe, Kuseri. 3. Bata–Margi group: (a) Bachama, Demsa, Gudo, 
Malabu, Njei (Kobochi, Nzangi, Zany), Zumu (Jimo), Holma, Kapsiki, Baza, Hiji, 
Gude (Cheke), Fali of Mubi, Fali of Kiria, Fali of Jilbu, Margi, Chibak, Kilba, Sukur, 
Vizik, Vemgo, Woga, Tur, Bura, Pabir, Podokwo; (b) Gabin, Hona, Tera, Jera, 
Hinna (Hina). 4. (a) Hina, Daba, Musgoi, Gauar; (b) Gisiga, Balda, Muturua, Mofu, 
Matakam. 5. Gidder. 6. Mandara, Gamergu. 7. Musgu. 8. Bana, Banana (Masa), 
Lame, Kulung. 9. (a) Somrai, Tumak, Ndam, Miltu, Sarwa, Gulei; (b) Gabere, Chiri, 
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Dormo, Nangire; (c) Sokoro (Bedanga), Barein; (d) Modgel; (e) Tuburi; (f) Mubi(not 
indigenous), Karbo. 
2.1.1.4 Khoisan: This is the only language family that is not represented in the 
Sudan.  The term is composed of two parts: the first part (Khoi) which refers to name 
of the Hottentot, while the second part (San) stands for the Bushmen (Greenberg 
1963a: 66). The most conspicuous feature of the languages of this family is the 
presence of click–sounds. The members of this language family are: Hottentot, 
Bushman, Sandawe, and Hatsa. 
 
 
Map 2.2. Greenberg’s Classification of African Languages (Source: Greenberg 
1963a) 
 
2.1.2 Joseph Greenberg and the Hamitic hypothesis as a fictitious discourse of 
identity 
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The aim behind this sub–section is twofold: first, to launch an investigation into the 
relationship between one of the dominant nineteenth–century physical 
anthropological theories of race, the so–called ‘Hamitic hypothesis’, and the 
discipline which was concerned with the classification of languages, philology. The 
other related aim is to highlight the intellectual stance of Greenberg on the issue of 
the connection of language to race and identity politics. It is immensely difficult to 
pursue a full coverage of the historical complexities involved in the nineteenth–
century concept of race. Three factors necessarily restrict the scope of the discussion: 
first, given the historically conditioned disciplinary fragmentation of social sciences 
in the nineteenth and mid–twentieth centuries, the ramifications of racial thought 
should (but cannot) be traced into the various intellectual areas of historical, social, 
literary, philological, biological and political thought, as well as into European 
colonialism, nationalism, slavery, and all the innumerable events and processes that 
helped delineate thinking about the problem of human differences (see Stocking 
1968a: 44). Secondly, the question as to why Greenberg distanced himself from the 
use of racial materials in his study of African languages, which was a current practice 
at the time, appears to hinge on a careful investigation of the historical environment 
which informed the set of linguistic typologies devised by scholars who preceded 
Greenberg, including Boas, whose revolutionary approach to language description 
and classification had a shaping influence on Greenberg’s scholarship. The third 
reason is that the Hamitic hypothesis had very serious ramifications for the lives of 
African people in the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. Suffice 
it at this stage to point out that the findings of some physical anthropological studies 
were instrumental in deciding what educational provisions would be made in a 
number of African countries. The fact that the British colonial government in the 
Sudan relied almost entirely on Seligman’s study of the races of South Sudan in 
deciding whether to provide the southern Sudanese with education is an instructive 
case in point (see Seligman 1913: 593; Sanderson et al. 1981: 68).  
 
To begin with, in Africa, examples of linguistic and anthropological taxonomies 
which operate on the basis of a constant correlation of linguistic, cultural and 
physical traits are in abundance. A good illustration is the use of the term ‘Hamite’ 
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with its racial extensions in a number of linguistic and anthropological 
classifications. The vagueness of Hamite as a linguistic and ethnological racial term 
led to a racial theory known as the Hamitic hypothesis, according to which the 
majority of the native population of Africa is the product of a mixture between 
Hamites and Negroes (Greenberg 1963a: 49). The Hamitic hypothesis holds that 
everything of value ever found in the black continent was brought there by the 
Hamites allegedly a branch of the Caucasian race (Sanders 1969: 521). A key 
example of work taking this view is the standard study by C.G. Seligman Races of 
Africa (1930), in which he formulates the hypothesis in the following terms: 
Apart from relatively late Semitic influence – whether Phoenician 
(Carthaginian) and strictly limited, or Arab (Muhammadan) and widely 
diffused – the civilisations of Africa are the civilisations of Hamites, its 
history the record of these peoples and of their interaction with the two 
more primitive African stocks, the Negro and the Bushman, whether 
this influence was exerted by highly civilised Egyptians or by such 
wilder pastoralists as are represented at the present day by the Beja [a 
major tribe in the eastern Sudan] and Somalis … The Hamites – who 
are Caucasians, i.e., belong to the same great branch of mankind as 
almost all Europeans – are commonly divided into the great branches, 
Eastern and Northern. (Seligman 1930: 96–97) 
On a closer look at the intellectual genealogy of the concept, it becomes crystal clear 
that the Hamitic hypothesis is suggestive of the nature of race relations (Sanders 
1969: 521). Broadly speaking, the mythical story states that the term ‘Ham’ appears 
for the first time in the Genesis, Chapter 5, where Noah curses his youngest son Ham 
and his descendants with blackness. It is worth noting that the Bible makes no 
reference to the racial differences among the ancestors of humankind. It is much later 
that a concept of race emerged with reference to the descendants of Ham. The 
Babylonian Talmud, a collection of oral traditions of the Jews dating to the sixth 
century after Christ depicts Ham as a sinful man and identifies the Hamites with 
Negroes.  
 
This hypothesis was not accepted universally. Sanders (1969: 522) counter–argues 
that ‘these oral traditions grew out of a need of the Israelites to rationalise their 
subjugation of Canaan, a historical fact validated by the myth of Noah’s curse’. 
Sanders contends that this myth has been normalised at a particular point of time to 
achieve a particular economic project: ‘Ideas have a way of being accepted when 
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they become useful as a rationalisation of an economic fact of life’ (ibid.). Sanders 
states that the mythical hypothesis permitted the exploitation of the Negro for 
economic gain to continue undisturbed by any religious or moral concerns. She 
remarks that Christian cosmology could remain at peace since the identification of 
the Negro as a Hamite kept him in the family of man in accordance with the story of 
the creation of mankind in the Bible. But this theological interpretation of the 
peopling of the universe would be challenged by men of the Enlightenment who 
attempted to apply the scientific method to the study of human history. The point 
here is that there was intense controversy over the Negro’s place in nature.  
 
Two explanations of this physical diversity dominated the debate: the first was 
offered by those who supported the unity of humankind by a single creation (i.e., 
monogenism), and the second view assumed multiple creations of humankind (i.e., 
polygenism). Before proceeding to outline the main points of this controversy, it 
would be useful to explain how the two approaches (i.e., monogenetic and 
polygenetic), among others, are based on the theory of evolution. Although the term 
‘evolution’ is characterised by a multiplicity of definitions, the basic idea underlying 
all evolutionary approaches is that they provide an explanation of how a variety of 
forms, whether biological species, cultural systems, or languages came to be (for a 
full discussion of the evolutionary theory of language see Greenberg 1957c, 1959). 
Of the four approaches offered in the literature to account for racial diversity, two are 
based on the theory of evolution. The four approaches are: (1) the evolutionary 
monogenetic; (2) the evolutionary polygenetic; (3) the creationist; and (4) the 
catastrophic. The first and third approaches assume single creations, while the second 
and fourth ones, multiple creations; the second and fourth views assume 
transformation of species, and the third and fourth, fixity of species. The creationist 
was the generally accepted view concerning the biological species before Darwin. In 
linguistics, the creationist view is represented by the traditional Tower of Babel 
account of the origin of linguistic diversity, according to which all linguistic 
variation was created at the same time by the confusion of tongues (Greenberg 
1957c: 80, 1959: 111). I shall only be concerned here with the identification of the 
evolutionary views since they formed the basis of the controversy over the definition 
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of the Hamitic hypothesis. With the definition of the evolutionary monogenist and 
polygenist approaches in the background, let us now resume our discussion of the 
intellectual genealogy of the Hamitic hypothesis.  
 
Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt led to the emergence of a new form of the Hamitic 
theory. The scientists and experts who accompanied Napoleon discovered signs of 
ancient civilisations such as well–preserved mummies. But these archaeological 
discoveries in a land populated by a Negroid race were incompatible with the 
dominant Western ideologies. A widespread notion was that the Western civilisation 
was the oldest civilisation; another was that Negroes were innately inferior. To 
resolve the ideological contradiction between such views and the archaeological 
findings, the history of the Egyptians had to be re–written, thus laying the basis for a 
new Hamitic theory.  
 
One the one hand, the new Hamitic theory identified the Egyptians with the 
Caucasian race and not with the African Negroes, and on the other; a new Biblical 
interpretation was offered. The new theological explanation of races claimed that the 
Egyptians were descendants of Mizraim, son of Ham (Mizr being the name of Egypt 
in Arabic), and that Noah had only cursed Ham’s son Canaan. Hence, Ham himself 
and his other sons, and their children, were uncursed. Language was mobilised by 
polygenists to lend support to this racial hierarchisation. Polygenist theories of race 
assumed that since each race was created separately, it was endowed with its own 
language.  Polygenists drew the conclusion that nations who spoke related languages 
must have evolved from one parental stock (Sanders 1969: 526).  
 
The late nineteenth century produced two new ideologies which utilised and 
elaborated the concept of the Caucasoid Hamite: colonialism and modern racism 
(ibid.: 528). Both shaped Western attitudes to Africa and Africans. Hamites were 
now considered as early culture–bearers in Africa due to the natural superiority of 
character and intellect of all Caucasoids (ibid.). Such a representation had dual 
utility: it perpetuated the image of the Negro as an inferior being, and it enforced the 
alleged fact that he could be developed only by intervention of the white race. Now 
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the Hamite found himself in an unclear situation. On the one hand, he was designated 
as superior for his Caucasian affiliations. One the other hand, he was an African 
native, making him part of ‘the white man’s burden’ (ibid.: 529). Here the Teutonic 
theory of race was rallied to settle what looked as an inconsistency in the working of 
the hypothesis. Having devised a hierarchy within the Caucasian race, the designers 
of the theory placed the Teutonic Anglo–Saxons on the top of the rung of the ladder, 
with the Slavs on the lower rung. But the lower space is open–ended and could 
always be added to, and this is where the Hamites came to fit. Hence, the alliance of 
politics and race ‘provided a seemingly cogent ideological framework for colonial 
expansion and exploitation’ (ibid.).  
 
The start of the twentieth century saw the Caucasoid–Hamite firmly established 
(ibid.). Racial classifications devised a separate Hamitic branch of the Caucasian 
race, closely following the creation of a linguistic entity called the family of Hamitic 
languages (ibid.). Linguistic typologies were founded on racial types and racial 
classifications on linguistic identifications. For instance, the early racial typology of 
Sergi (1901) identified certain peoples as Hamitic primarily on the basis of their 
linguistic identity. Seligman (1930) followed in the steps of Sergi and kept the term 
‘Hamite’ in his typology. Seligman (1930: 15–16) put it bluntly that linguistics play 
an important part in his typology. He writes:  
The study of the races of Africa has been so largely determined by the 
interest in speech, and it is so much easier to acquire a working 
knowledge of a language than of any other part of man’s cultural make–
up, that names based upon linguistic criteria are constantly applied to 
large groups of mankind and, indeed, if intelligently based, often fit 
quite well. Hence, in describing the great racial groups of Africa, terms 
such as ‘Bantu,’ which strictly speaking have no more than a linguistic 
significance, are habitually employed …  [L]inguistic criteria will play 
a considerable part in the somewhat mixed classification adopted. 
(Seligman 1930: 9–10) 
It is worth mentioning that Seligman and his wife paid two academic visits to Sudan 
in the winters of 1909–1910 and 1912 on behalf of the British colonial government. 
Seligman acknowledges that the two expeditions to Sudan led him to argue the case 
that ‘many of the customs and ideas which exist in the Sudan are not Negro, Arab or 
even Islamic as they appear at first sight’ (Seligman 1913: 593). The data Seligman 
collected with his wife led him to claim that some of the peoples in the Sudan are 
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Hamites or at least have Hamitic blood in their veins. He published his claims, 
relying on cultural and anatomical evidence, in a paper entitled ‘Some Aspects of the 
Hamitic Problem in the Anglo–Egyptian Sudan’ (1913). It is remarkable that among 
the prominent figures whose help Seligman acknowledges in his paper is the 
anthropologist B. Malinowski. The appearance in connection with Seligman’s 
argument for the existence of the Hamites in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan of the names 
of outstanding figures such as Malinowski, who changed the historical path of 
linguistics with his concept of the ‘Context of situation’, which was taken up by the 
prominent British linguist J. R. Firth and later by his student M. A. K. Halliday, 
cannot go unnoticed. The scope of my research forestalls any attempt to investigate 
Malinowski’s views on the relationship between language and the Hamitic 
hypothesis. However, his assistance, in the words of Seligman (1913: 594), ‘by the 
skill and care with which he has followed up a number of obscure references’, 
indicates that Malinowski was  aware of  and may have had a hand in Seligman’s 
racial typology of the peoples of the Sudan.  
 
Returning to Seligman’s paper in which he claims that some of the Sudanese tribes 
are of Hamitic origin, we find him beginning his argument by claiming that ‘just as 
the Zulu–Kaffirs contain a strong Hamitic element, so the Nilotic Negroids of the 
Sudan contain a varying, and in some tribes considerable, amount of Hamitic blood’ 
(Seligman 1913: 595). Seligman (ibid.) refers to these Hamites as a ‘primitive Aryan 
race’ whose physical identities shall never be known. It is worth mentioning that the 
Nilotic–speaking tribes in the Sudan include southern groups such as Nuer and Dinka 
(see Section 2.1.1 above) whose languages have not only been completely ignored by 
post–independence language policies (see Chapter 4), but who have also been dealt 
with as belonging to the ‘slave race’. Seligman describes the area of the true Hamitic 
people of the Sudan as follows: 
At the present day the true Hamitic area of the Anglo–Egyptian Sudan 
extends from the Red Sea to the Nile, from the Egyptian boundary in 
the north to the neighbourhood of the junction of the Atbara with the 
Nile. The area so defined embraces the Red Sea coastal plain and the 
whole of the Eastern Desert. (Seligman 1913: 596) 
Despite its racial extension, the term Hamite was still kept by a number of the 
designers of early scientific classifications of African languages (see Smith 1935: 
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44–51). Richard Lepsius (1863), a nineteenth–century Egyptologist and the inventor 
of a standard alphabet, classified the African languages into three families: (1) 
Semitic; (2) Hamitic; (3) Primitive African, including (a) Bantu and (b) mixed Negro 
(see Cust 1883: 56–57). Friedrich Müller of Vienna devised a typology of African 
languages into six families, again keeping the term Hamite: 1) Semitic; (2) Hamitic; 
(3) Nuba–Fula; (4) Negro; (5) Bantu; (6) Hottentot–Bushman (see Cust 1883: 1, 56). 
Friedrich Müller of Vienna should not be confused with Friedrich Max Müller 
(1823–1900), the Oxford professor of comparative philology, on whom see Di 
Gregorio 2002:  96; Joseph 2004: 46-47.). Friedrich Müller’s typology was adopted 
by Robert Needham Cust in his Sketch of the Modern Languages of Africa (1883), 
long a standard reference. D. Westermann refined Cust’s typology and combined the 
Hamitic and Semitic into one language family: (1) the Khoisan family; (2) Negro 
languages, including (a) Sudanic, (b) Bantu and (c) Nilotic languages; (3) Hamito–
Semitic languages . The anthropologist Smith makes his protest against 
Westermann’s use of the value–laden expression ‘Negro languages’, though he did 
not suggest an alternative, when he argues that: 
‘Negro’ describes a racial type, and a word which has a physical 
connotation cannot be properly applied to a language: Men may be 
Negroes, but a form of speech cannot be Negro. Negersprachen should 
mean ‘languages spoken by Negroes’ and can this be said when we do 
not know precisely what differentiates the Negro and when the people 
speaking these tongues are of such diverse physical types as Fulani, 
Masai, Mandigo? (Smith 1935: 44) 
The same racial units were embraced by Meinhof whose work attracted wide 
attention through A. Werner’s (1915) popular book The Language–Families of 
Africa. Meinhof describes the complex linguistic situation of Africa in terms of five 
families: (1) Semitic; (2) Hamitic; (3) Bantu; (4) Sudanese; (5) Bushman. Meinhof 
goes on to claim that Bantu is a mixed language descended from a Hamitic father and 
a Negro mother (Greenberg 1963a: 49). More significantly, since the Hamites found 
in Africa south of the Sahara were denoted as pastoralists, and since the traditional 
occupation of the Negro was allegedly agriculture, pastoralism and all its qualities 
then became endowed with an aura of cultural superiority. Therefore, the term 
Hamites added another defining dimension: cultural identity (Sanders 1969: 530). 
Sayce provides another rebuttal against the nineteenth–century philologists’ support 
of the racial theories: 
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Though language is no mark of race, it is a mark of society. Even the 
most rudimentary society could not exist without it; certainly no 
civilised society could do so. It is social in its origin and nature, the 
creation and mirror of society, as well as the bond that keeps society 
together. Had men always led isolated lives, any means of 
communication with one another would have been unnecessary, and 
language need never have been elaborated. (Sayce 1876: 212) 
The above quote contains three significant terms which have been a source of 
controversy that led to further divisions among scholars of linguistics. The three 
terms or concepts which came to act later as the cornerstone of many leading 
contemporary linguistic theories are: (1) language is a social construction (i.e., 
creation of society), (2) language is a representation, be it perfect or distorted, of 
society (i.e., a mirror), (3) language is a socially–shared property. The significance of 
the above formulation of language, which is very much with us today, lies in the fact 
that it leads us to view twentieth–century linguistics, of which Greenberg is a part, 
from a ‘continuist perspective’, rather than a ‘progressivist’ one. According to the 
continuist view, twentieth–century thinking about language should be considered as a 
continuation of the debate and development of the same themes, arguments, 
questions, issues that preoccupied the Western scholarship of language since its start. 
The progressivist perspective, on the other hand, treats linguistic thought as ‘a matter 
of progress towards the theories that have now attained the status of academic 
standards’ (Joseph et al. 2001: vii). In what follows, I will have space for only a 
relatively brief discussion of the views of some scholars such as Boas and Sapir on 
the relationship between language, cultural identity, and thought, in order to 
understand or infer where Greenberg stands. It is beyond the capacity of this section 
to produce a full examination of their views; hence my review is bound to be highly 
selective.  
 
I start with the views of the American Sanskritist and linguist William Dwight 
Whitney (1827–1894). Whitney defines language as an institution, a historical 
product created by speakers to encode already existing thought (see Joseph 2004: 
46–47).  It should be noted that Whitney’s argument was produced in a context that 
was dominated by the German romanticist view of language in the spirit of the Baron 
Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835). Before talking about the nineteenth–century 
theory of language evolution, it should be mentioned that there are many 
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evolutionary theories. Joseph (2006b) reviews the evolutionary theories of language 
from ancient to modern times. Joseph defines the term ‘evolutionary’ to refer to ‘any 
enquiry into the origin of language that assumes it appeared not fully blown, but in 
some rudimentary form that then developed toward the kind of language we know 
today’ (Joseph 2006b:365). The German Romantic theory of language assumed three 
stages of evolutionary advance in language in terms of the analysis of morphological 
complexity of words in languages: isolating, agglutinative and inflectional. The 
internal morphological structure of isolating languages is composed of a single 
morpheme. For the agglutinative languages, a word consists of more than one 
morpheme, and, basically, does not have irregular morphophonemic forms, while 
inflectional languages have different morphophonemic constructions and irregular 
alternations. The line of evolutionary advance, according to this view, is from the 
isolating stage (i.e., with simple morphemic constructions), through the agglutinative 
to the inflectional stage (i.e., with internally complex words). And this was defined 
as an intellectual development from the analytic to the synthetic stage; thus grouping 
peoples into ‘primitive’ and ‘civilised’ (Greenberg 1957c; Joseph 2004: 46). 
According to Joseph (2004: 45–46), Humboldt held that the intellectual power of a 
language was decided by its purity in its type (whether isolating, agglutinating, or 
inflectional). It could be the case that Humboldt’s work might have been a source of 
inspiration for Greenberg to focus on the morphological structure of a language as a 
key to understanding the working of a language. 
 
Another prominent linguistic anthropologist who was concerned with the description 
of, to use a term of the time, ‘exotic’ languages is Franz Boas (1858–1942). Boas 
launched a devastating critique of the racialistic and evolutionary assumptions in 
ethnology. Boas’s intellectual research was shaped by the nineteenth–century 
German historicism and materialism, romanticism, and liberalism. The force of his 
anthropological critique led towards twentieth–century cultural relativism (Handler 
1990: 252). A number of Boasians (e.g., Alfred Louis Kroeber, Edward Sapir, Robert 
Lowie, Melville Herskovits, Ruth Benedict, and Margaret Mead) were cultural critics 
who looked to anthropology to account for the social and political controversies of 
their time. Boasian anthropology was determined above all to disseminate a 
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relativistic and anti–racist ‘social scientific orientation to human differences’ 
(Stocking 1968b: 133). Boas’s critique of the nineteenth–century polygenist racial 
thought transformed him, in the words of Stocking, into ‘a kind of mythical hero 
figure carrying the torch to reason into irrational racial darkness’ (ibid.) to clarify the 
situation. Boas founded an approach to language that came to be known as 
‘American descriptivism’ (see Joseph et al. 2001: 2; Jakobson 1944). One of the 
primary contributions of Boas to American linguistics was to design a method of 
transcribing native languages of America employing a set of descriptive labels that 
was different from the ones used in the description of European languages (Joseph et 
al. 2001: 3). The main concern of Boas was to reveal the historical affiliations of 
various American Indian languages, and this is where he broke away from a 
German–dominated Indo–European linguistics which was preoccupied with the 
reconstruction of a proto–Indo European language. Boas argues that many linguistic 
similarities result from acculturation (i.e., cultural contact) among peoples, and that 
this influences all levels of language structure i.e., phonology, vocabulary, and 
grammar (ibid.: 4). Although mainly associated with synchronic study, Boas argues 
that his synchronic enquiry was actually a way to history: ‘For him every social 
science was in the last resort a historic science’ (Jakobson 1944: 194). And this 
principle is evidently a continuation of Whitney’s tradition (ibid.).  
 
Boas’ conception of acculturation was further developed by his student Edward Sapir 
who was regarded as the principal practitioner of Boasian linguistic anthropology 
(Joseph et al. 2001: 4). There is a trend in the literature to trace Sapir’s writings on 
the relationship between language and culture (the so–called Sapir–Whorfian 
hypothesis in its strong interpretation) to the eighteenth– and nineteenth–century 
German Romantic theories of language. But actually Sapir did not follow the 
German Romantic view of language (for a detailed discussion of the immediate 
sources to the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis see Joseph 1996). Sapir’s suggestion that a 
language, whether simple or complex in structure, should not be necessarily 
connected with thought is evident in his widely celebrated statement: ‘When it comes 
to linguistic form, Plato walks with the Macedonian swineherd, Confucius with the 
head–hunting savage of Assam’ (Sapir 1921: 219). Sapir was strongly opposed to 
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any thesis which draws a causal connection between language, race and culture. He 
writes: 
The very fact that races and cultures which are brought into historical 
contact tend to assimilate in the long run, while neighbouring languages 
assimilate each other only casually and in superficial respects, indicates 
that there is no profound causal relation between the development of 
language and the specific development of race and of culture. (Sapir 
1921: 216) 
From the mid–1920s Sapir paid more attention to individual personality as an 
important dimension in the understanding of human experience (Joseph et al. 2001: 
12). Sapir (1921) proposed ‘a destructive analysis of the familiar’ in cross–cultural 
comparison which one writer likened to deconstruction (e.g., Handler 1990: 255). 
This approach offers a useful way to de–naturalise the racial concept of the ‘Hamite’ 
and could eventually lead us to view the whole question of race in discoursal rather 
than in physical terms: 
Destructive analysis of the familiar is the only method of approach to an 
understanding of fundamentally different modes of expression. When 
one has learned to feel what is fortuitous or illogical or unbalanced in 
the structure of his own language, he is already well on the way toward 
a sympathetic grasp of the expression of the various classes of concepts 
in alien types of speech. Not everything that is ‘outlandish’ is 
intrinsically illogical or farfetched. It is often precisely the familiar that 
a wider perspective reveals as the curiously exceptional. (Sapir 1921: 
89) 
Let us now turn to Joseph Greenberg to see where he stands on the question of the 
Hamitic hypothesis, and what possible sociopolitical implications of his scholarship 
one could draw within that context.  Before proceeding, it is worth mentioning that 
the contribution of Joseph Greenberg and particularly his intellectual opposition to 
the use of the Hamitic hypothesis in African linguistic classification neither appeared 
suddenly nor constituted the only resisting scholarship. There had been considerable 
amount of research in Europe which resisted the deployment of the Hamitic theory in 
linguistics that paved the way for Greenberg’s linguistic typology. For example, the 
Semitic linguist Marcel Cohen (1884-1974) commented on the uncertainty 
concerning the possible extension of the ‘Hamito-Semitic’ languages in Africa by 
pointing out that (cited in Greenberg 1955: 43): 
 The question is … complex and irritating. What must be determined is 
whether certain of these languages or even the majority of them should 
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not be considered to be members of the Hamito-Semitic family whose 
definition should be revised in consequence. 
The work of Tucker and Bryan (1956), who were in a minority of linguists involved 
in the survey of the languages spoken in the Sudan during the colonial regime, 
deserves special mention.  It should be noted that Tucker and Bryan (1956: 153) used 
the term ‘Hamitic’ in their early work, although they were aware of the connotations 
associated with this term. Tucker and Bryan (ibid.: 152) justified their use of the 
racial category of the Hamitic (particularly the Nilo-Hamitic) in their work of the 
1950s in that, among other reasons, ‘the term Nilo-Hamitic is already well known, 
and no satisfactory alternative has yet been put forward’. In their later writings, 
Tucker and Bryan (1966) Tucker (1967) abandoned the term ‘Hamitic’ and 
suggested the term ‘Erythraic’ instead, which is based on the Greek word for the Red 
Sea. Moreover, Hodge (1972, 1983) suggested the term ‘Lisramic’ as a replacement 
of the term ‘Hamitic’, which is based on the roots for ‘people’ and ‘tongue’ in some 
of the languages which make up the language group (see Fellman 1978: 604). 
Although there were changes in nomenclature, the content of the language group was 
more or less the same. The point here is that the scholarship of Greenberg should be 
viewed as a continuation of the practice of constructing linguistic typologies on non–
racial basis.  
 
As a point of departure we may ask: what was the relevant intellectual context in 
which Greenberg’s thinking developed? What were the figures upon which 
Greenberg might have drawn or to which he might be related? A reply to these two 
questions hinges on providing a brief biographical and intellectual background about 
Greenberg (for a detailed bibliographical review of Greenberg see Croft 2007). 
 
Joseph Harold Greenberg (1915–2001) was born in Brooklyn, New York. Greenberg 
showed early interest in language studies and began learning Hebrew, Latin and 
German at school and Greek and a few other languages on his own. As an 
undergraduate student at Columbia College, he attended the linguistic seminars of 
Franz Boas. His parents expected him to develop his musical aptitude and perhaps 
become a pianist, but Greenberg wanted to dedicate his life to medieval history, a 
field in which he thought his motivation in languages could be of advantage. 
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However things went contrary to what young Greenberg planned. A conversation 
with Alexander Lesser, his anthropological teacher, led to his being recommended by 
Franz Boas and Ruth Benedict for a Social Science Research Council pre–doctoral 
fellowship in Anthropology. At Northwestern University Greenberg met the major 
pioneer of African studies, Melville J. Herskovits. However, Northwestern 
University lacked the resources for linguistic research that Greenberg required. He 
spent a year at Yale University where he met Sapir’s successor Leonard Bloomfield, 
and Bloomfield's former student Bernard Bloch (see Anwar 1971: xi–xiv). 
Bloomfield introduced Greenberg to logical positivism when he advised him to read 
Carnap. Logical positivism had a significant impact on Greenberg particularly in its 
general rigour of argumentation (Croft: 2001: 816). After completing a year’s field 
work in West Africa, he returned to Northwestern University where he received a 
Ph.D. in anthropology. In 1946, Greenberg published his monograph the Influence of 
Islam on a Sudanese Religion and began teaching at the University of Minnesota. In 
1948 Greenberg joined Columbia University. Roman Jakobson and André Martinet 
had arrived from Europe and had established the Linguistic Circle of New York. It 
was through these prominent scholars that Greenberg was exposed to the 
structuralism of the Prague school, including the work of Trubetzkoy on markedness 
(ibid.). He then moved to Stanford University in 1962, where in addition to his duties 
as Professor of Anthropology, he became Chairman of the Committee on African 
Studies and Director of the National Defence Education Act African Language and 
Area Program. Greenberg’s book The Languages of Africa (1963a) attracted 
international attention, and his system of linguistic classification sparked a great deal 
of controversy (see Anwar 1971: xi–xii). 
 
Greenberg’s interests did not stop with African languages, but included the 
classification of the languages of the Americas, Australia, and other parts of the 
world (for a complete bibliography of his publications see Croft 2007). Greenberg’s 
reputation as one of the most prominent linguists in the area of African languages 
had already been established with the publication of his Essays in Linguistics 
(1957a). Anwar (1971: xiii) comments that ‘his bold methodological explorations 
and his outstanding ability to reduce a great mass of facts to precise generalisations is 
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[sic] seen in this small but important book’. The significance of this book was 
recognised by a number of prominent scholars who reviewed it. For instance, 
Chomsky (1959: 214, 218) acknowledges in his review that Greenberg’s proposals 
for morphemic analysis are the most complete and detailed of their kind. Chomsky 
adds that the work of Greenberg makes a definite contribution towards raising the 
level of methodological discussion.   
 
It is worth mentioning that Greenberg’s typological linguistics is based on the 
premise that language is in constant change, and that language change can only be 
systematically studied at the level of ‘performance’ and not ‘competence’. 
Greenberg’s interest lies in the interaction between the human mind and the social 
environment. Here one can see the shadow of the Darwinian theory of evolution 
looming large over Greenberg’s thinking about language. Greenberg asserted this 
point when he was interviewed by Paul Newman in 1991: 
The way the mind works shows itself in how it works on material. And 
this, in a way, is an evolutionary adaptation. Language must constantly 
adapt because certain quite natural changes produce consequences in 
the system which, at a particular moment, may seem unnatural; but 
these aberrancies do get ironed out in the course of historical change. 
(Newman 1991: 460) 
Although Greenberg talked about the evolutionary adaptation of language as a 
fundamental principle upon which a language should be studied, he was antagonistic 
to any theory that associated evolutionary progress with greater complexity. 
Greenberg produces the following counter–argument displaying their methodological 
defects: 
Traditional theories of language evolution have … assumed a 
correlation between complexity and advance which is unjustified … 
Just the opposite seems more likely to be the case, so that in this limited 
aspect the despised pidgin languages are more advanced than such 
cherished forms of speech as classical Sanskrit. (Greenberg 1957c: 91) 
Greenberg was against the hierarchisation of languages when he pointed at the 
functional equality of all human languages: 
Languages are equal in the sense they are all ‘created equal,’ that is, 
have equal potentialities. In fact, some which have undergone 
cultivation probably have greater resources of expression, but this is not 
owing to any inherent superiority. Any language placed in the same 
position through non–linguistic factor will be capable of similar 
development. (Greenberg 1957c: 92) 
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The core of Greenberg’s argument which could rightly sum up his opposition to 
certain evolutionary theories of language is that ‘it is not language as such which 
evolves but rather communication in general’ (Greenberg 1957c: 91). It is this 
preoccupation with ‘communication’ that allowed his approach to be classified under 
the banner of functionality. Greenberg provides the following functional definition of 
language: 
Language is the prerequisite for the acculturation and transmission of 
other cultural traits. Such fundamental aspects of human society as 
organised political life, legal systems, religion and science are 
inconceivable without that most basic and human of tools, a linguistic 
system of communication. Language is not only a necessary condition 
for culture, it is itself a part of culture. (Greenberg 1963b: 156) 
The above quoted conception of language shows the influence of Sapir. Newman 
rightly noted that: ‘Throughout his work, Greenberg has always been in the Sapirian 
tradition’ (Newman 1991: 454). I should note that although Sapir was, in the 
language of Croft (2001: 819), ‘always Joe’s linguistic hero’, the two men never met 
because Sapir was already in his final illness when Greenberg arrived at Yale (ibid.: 
816). Another important point to be made here is that since the basic function of 
language in Greenberg’s understanding is communication, and that language is a 
fundamental part of the cultural identity, then the cultural identity, or some aspects of 
it, is essentially constructed during the process of communication itself. Put another 
way, Greenberg believes that language is instrumental in the construction and 
reconstruction of the sociocultural identity of the African polities. Anwar rightly 
observed that: 
Guided by the belief that language provides one of the fundamental 
bases for the reconstruction of human history, Greenberg’s genetic 
classification of African languages provides penetrating insights into 
the sociocultural identity of the African people. (Anwar 1971: xii)    
Greenberg was careful to draw attention to the fact that a functional definition of 
language should extend beyond viewing language as a ‘mere’ means of 
communication to represent the sociopolitical reality of the people who speak it. 
Greenberg notes that ‘language is perhaps the most important single criterion of 
group identification’ (Greenberg 1965a: 205). This point could be illustrated by 
reference to the fact that in Africa tribal identity is defined mainly on the basis of 
first language, and Africans themselves are conscious of the fact that the loss of their 
tribal identity would almost inevitably lead to the loss of their first language. 
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Greenberg argues that since language is a basic source of tribal cohesion in Africa, 
then ‘any political and social planning that would count on the loss of tribal identity 
through the universal use of a lingua franca in the next generation, at least, is not 
realistic’ (Greenberg 1965a: 207). Greenberg in more than one place emphasises the 
vital role of language in the reconstruction of the history of Africa. For instance, 
Greenberg (1960a: 139) states that the languages spoken in Africa reflect its history. 
One interpretation, which I can do no more than suggest at this level, is that the 
African past can be retold from the perspective of local discourses in Africa (cf. 
Makoni’s 2007 argument on the bilinguality of history). History should be 
multimodal to include local dancing, signing, etc. The statement of the former 
Emperor of Ethiopia Haile Selassie in 1967 points to the role linguistics can play in 
the reconstruction of the African past (cited in Anwar 1971: xii–xiii): 
In a continent where the written record is so scant, the work of 
Professor Greenberg, which scientifically reconstructs an important 
aspect of the African past, is of the highest importance for our greater 
knowledge of this continent.  
It should not then be surprising that the ultimate aim of Greenberg’s linguistic 
anthropological methods should be the establishment of a connection between the 
distributions of the linguistic resources on the one hand, and the political and 
economic resources on the other, in a given geographical area, along with the 
recognition of the role that politics and economics play in the domination or the 
ultimate eclipse of a given linguistic idiom. The following statement which 
Greenberg made while he was developing a quantitative approach for measuring the 
linguistic diversity corroborates this point:  
The examination of any map of linguistic distributions for an extended 
area will show some regions of great diversity … The problem 
considered here is that of developing quantitative measures of this 
diversity in order to render such impressions more objective, allow the 
comparison of disparate geographical areas, and eventually to correlate 
varying degrees of linguistic diversity with political, economic, 
geographic, historic, and other non–linguistic factors … The increase of 
communication that goes with greater economic productivity and more 
extensive political organisation will lead typically to the spread of a 
lingua franca, whether indigenous or imported, resulting in widespread 
bilingualism and the ultimate disappearance of all except a single 
dominant language. (Greenberg 1956: 68, 70) 
Although Greenberg casts his view on the relationship between language and cultural 
identity, he refuses not only to use the term ‘Hamitic’ as a racial unit of analysis in 
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his classification, but is also a hostile critic of all the linguistic anthropological 
studies which did so. Greenberg rejects wholesale any one–to–one connection 
between language and race: ‘There is no necessary correlation between race and 
language, since a people can adopt the language of a different race or, on the other 
hand, retain their language in spite of thoroughgoing physical modification by 
another race’ (Greenberg 1960b: 135). In this connection, one can note that 
Greenberg’s view of the relationship between language and race is completely 
compatible with that of Whitney and Sapir (see above). Greenberg backs up his 
argument on this point by referring to the status of Arabic in the Sudan and Ethiopia: 
Of the Semitic languages proper, Arabic has spread widely in the Sudan 
and is sometimes spoken by people who are hardly to be distinguished 
racially from their Negro neighbours. So likewise the dominant group 
of Ethiopia speak Semitic languages brought over the Red Sea from 
Southern Arabia some time before the Christian era. (Greenberg 1960a: 
140) 
Greenberg strongly criticises the linguistic typologies which are grounded in the 
Hamitic hypothesis such as those of Meinhof and Seligman (see Greenberg 1963a: 
49–50). This point can be supported by the fact that Greenberg devoted significant 
parts of his 1963a Classification of African Languages to combating the previous 
linguistic classifications that had been made on racial basis. When asked by Newman 
(1991: 455–456) about his reaction to Meinhof’s typology, which is based on the 
Hamitic hypothesis, Greenberg replied:  
As I recall, I did work out my classification initially in reconsidering 
Meinhof’s extended form of the Hamitic theory and the status of 
Hamitic as a valid linguistic unit … As I began to look at the matter, 
what struck me was the extent to which people were being misled by 
labels. Once you call something Nilo–Hamitic, you feel that it is 
different from ordinary Nilotic; but if you just had the languages in 
front of you and they weren’t given labels, you wouldn’t see anything 
all that special about them, apart, perhaps, from the typological 
observation that a lot of these languages (for example, Masai and 
Turkana) have sex gender.  
The implication is that Meinhof and other typologists prior to Greenberg were 
blinded to linguistic reality by the classificatory labels they used and the theories 
behind them, not least the Hamitic theory. Greenberg’s book was a reaction not only 
to the type of philology that was fashionable at the time, but also against the very 
ethics of using racial terms such as ‘Hamitic’ as units of linguistic classification. 
Greenberg subscribes to the view that the term Hamitic was a socially and politically 
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dangerous myth and that it was driven by racial considerations (see Newman 1991: 
456).   
 
In conclusion, Greenberg’s criticism of the enterprise of typologising African 
languages on a racial basis, which is now beyond the pale of intellectual discourse, 
could only, I suspect, be fully appreciated after a much more systematic attempt to 
locate him in his historical context. The teaching and learning of his linguistic 
typologies in terms of the present–day intellectual climate obscures this fact. Another 
point is that critical examination of the historical/intellectual context of Greenberg’s 
scholarship, of nineteenth–century racial thought, and of the role played by such 
scholars such as Boas, Sapir and Jakobson in shaping Greenberg’s intellectual 
outlook, help draw out a number of significant social and political interpretations of 
Greenberg’s linguistic groupings of African languages. One of these interpretations 
leads back to Boas and the idea of the functional equality of all languages, and by 
implication the equality of all races. I should note here that the above brief survey 
should not be taken to indicate that Greenberg’s thought is immune from rebuttal, 
nor to imply that Greenberg led a life free of epistemological crises (see Croft 2001: 
818). For example, Greenberg employed the expression ‘linguistic democracy’ (see 
Newman 1991: 456) in, at best, an ‘undemocratic manner’, when he completely 
ignored the centrality of the producer of a language in the process of what I consider 
one of the most important manifestations of democracy: 
From my point of view of language history and classification, it doesn’t 
matter how many people speak a language: in determining 
relationships, the essential thing is to look at the linguistic evidence and 
not pay attention to extraneous factors. (Newman 1991:456) 
However, given the fact that newly independent African states tended to implement a 
European model of nation–state which required a significant degree of linguistic 
homogenisation, Greenberg’s intellectual contribution could be used as 
incontrovertible linguistic anthropological evidence in support of the cultural 
identities of the African groups, or as a defence against nationalist projects which 
threaten the very survival of historically–rooted African identities. Another 
significant interpretation is that the work of Greenberg problematises the fixed–
givenness of the notion of ‘indigenous languages’, since for Greenberg the basic 
function of language is communication, and identities are socially constructed and 
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reconstructed in and through communication (for a detailed critical review of the 
politics of linguistic indigenousness see Chapter 5). And it should be added that 
Greenberg was well aware of the relationship between language and politics when he 
noted that ‘language not only furnishes a primary basis for ethnicity but itself 
becomes a political issue’ (Greenberg 1966: 242). Greenberg had evidently no 
quarrel with the well known thesis that ‘class and status differences are reflected in, 
and indeed are partially marked by, language difference’ (Greenberg 1966: 240). 
This particular intellectual stance recalls the Marxist conceptualisation of the 
relationship between language and social class which was fully articulated in 
Voloshinov (1973). In a word, if Greenberg was to be credited with  one thing, it 
would be his call to look at language as a defining part of the ‘infrastructure’, in the 
Marxist sense, of a country, and not to dismiss it as a mere ‘superstructural’ 
component. It is this stance, coupled with his uncompromising position against the 
use of the myth of the Hamitic hypothesis as a source in the classification of African 
languages, that made him appropriating Croft’s language (2001: 824), ‘the scholar’s 
scholar’: 
The question of language … has more than local import. Because 
tribalism, as a basic political factor in Africa, is tied to the question of 
the survival of communities, each with its own peculiar linguistic 
heritage, the question of language becomes a fundamental one for the 
newly independent African states. A degree of linguistic unity is a 
presupposition of European nationalism. In Africa, outside Somalia and 
the Malagasy Republic, this linguistic unity is lacking … I propose 
merely to point out that there is a problem of language in relation to 
nationalism … The language situation, taken in a broad sense, is a 
substantial part of what economists call the ‘infrastructure’ of 
development. (Greenberg 1965a: 208–209, 210) 
  
2.2 Spread of the Arabic language in the Sudan 
Generally speaking, the spread of Arabic is closely linked with the spread of Islam 
and the creation of Muslim empires. However, the relationship between the two is far 
from simple and has been at the centre of controversy in the literature. This 
controversy stems partly (as we will see in more details in Chapter 4) from the 
sensitive connection of Arabic to Islam (i.e., the language of the Quran) on the one 
hand, and to Arab nationalism on the other (i.e., a marker of Arabic identity). For 
instance, the Sudanese historian Hasan (1967: 174) argues that ‘the processes of 
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Arabisation and Islamisation had probably gone hand in hand and it would be 
difficult to separate the two’. The French linguist Miller (2003a: 154) counter–argues 
that there was no necessary connection between Islamisation and Arabisation since 
either of them could occur without necessarily leading to the other. Miller explains 
that the only global feature of Islamisation is the use of the language of the Quran for 
prayers. However, ‘tafsir’ (religious explanations) and ‘khutba’ (religious preaching) 
can be conducted in the local language. This is the case in a number of non–Arabic 
speaking areas in the world where Arabs are in a minority. Miller notes that 
‘wherever Arabs were in minority [sic] or when Islamisation was achieved by non–
Arabs, Arabic never became the dominant language and did not expand into the 
secular aspects of life’ (ibid.).  
 
Miller (ibid.) points out that the causes behind the variation in the spread and 
dominance of the Arabic language in the countries invaded by Arabs are unknown.  
According to MacMichael (1922: 195–196), the Arabs of the Sudan form a single 
entity in two respects: first, they are all Mohammedans, yet their Mohammedanism 
has been trained by the local traditions and superstitions of the various 
autochthonous inhabitants among whom they have settled; secondly they speak 
Arabic. This is linguistically evident, MacMichael argues, in the fact that Sudanese 
colloquial Arabic contains a number of phrases and words which would be 
unintelligible to Egyptians and Syrians. In the following two sub–sections, I will first 
describe the spread of the Arabic language in the north; and then I shall move on to 
consider its spread in the south of the Sudan. 
 
2.2.1 Spread of the Arabic language in the north 
According to Hasan (1967: 135) the creation of a culturally Arabised stock in the 
Sudan was the direct product of the penetration of large numbers of Arab immigrant 
tribes. It is remarkable that little is reported in the literature on the way in which 
Arabisation was accomplished (see Miller 2003a: 155; Hasan 1967: 135). The whole 
of our information is derived from two different kinds of sources: medieval Arabic 
writings and a large collection of Sudanese genealogical traditions (for a 
genealogical typology of Sudanese tribes see MacMichael 1922; Hasan 1967). 
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According to Miller (2003a: 161), the Arabicisation of the Sudan began late and 
spread gradually. A similar view is held by Hasan (1967: 176) when he notes that 
‘despite the tremendous impact of Arabic as the language of Islam, and possibly of 
trade, its adoption by the majority of the population as a lingua franca took many 
generations’. The ‘baqt’ treaty that regulated Arab–Nubian relations from AD 652 up 
to the fall of the Christian Kingdoms protected the land from direct Arab 
colonisation. The Arabicisation of central Sudan took place between the thirteenth 
and sixteenth centuries due to the Arab migration. However, it does not appear that 
Arabs launched military campaigns to spread Islam. That is to say, no organised 
sectarian persecution or military expedition was reported in this area of the country 
(Miller 2003a: 161). Between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, Islamisation 
and partial Arabicisation spread westward and eastward but was mainly restricted to 
the Arabicisation of local ruling elites of the Muslim Kingdoms (Miller 2003a: 161). 
The degree of Arabisation varies from one tribe to another and differs among the 
various branches of a single tribe (Hasan 1967: 175).  
 
According to Miller (2003a: 161), full Arabicisation took place not only in areas of 
extensive Arab migration and intermarriage with local population (central Sudan and 
lowlands of western and eastern Sudan), but also spread to other areas where Arabic 
penetrated local languages and became the religious language or a lingua franca. The 
processes of Islamisation and Arabisation led to the sociopolitical situation where 
remote Sudanese regions came to define themselves as part of the Arab world. A 
number of Sudanese ruling elites and tribes adopted Arab genealogies (see 
MacMichael 1922 for a detailed discussion of the history of Arabian tribes in the 
Sudan; Hasan 1967: 143). Beshir (1969: 4) argues that although there had been 
contact between the Arabs and Kush, Nubian, or Ethiopian before Islam, the 
dominance of the Arabic culture in the northern regions started after the spread of 
Islam. Arabic was adopted by local people as a language and Islam as a religion. 
However, Beshir adds, two regions were not affected by this language change: Nubia 
and the Beja land. Few Arab tribes settled among the Beja due to the fact that their 
land was less attractive as grazing areas for their livestock. For the Nubia, the Nubian 
language had already developed a writing system during the Christian period, and 
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this enabled them to survive the new language invasion up to the present day. Hasan 
(1967: 176) subscribes to the same view when he pointed out that ‘the Nubians and 
the Baja, the first people of the Sudan to have contacts with the Arabs, continue to 
speak their own language’. According to Beshir (1969: 5), three factors led to the 
emergence of religious education in northern Sudan: the spread of Islam, the 
settlement of Arab tribes, and the rise of Muslim societies. Religious education 
demanded knowledge of the language of the Quran (i.e., Arabic). Learning the Quran 
was a duty of all Muslims, and parents were required to create the right conditions 
for its learning. The Arab settlers wanted to educate their children in order to achieve 
cultural and political dominance over the native population of the country. The main 
educational institutions were mosques and ‘Khalwas’ (Quranic pre-elementary 
schools).  
 
The Turco–Egyptian invasion (1820–1885) provided the country for the first time 
with a central government (Beshir 1969: 12). Accordingly, Sudan became part of 
Egypt and lost control over its cultural and economic resources. The Turco–Egyptian 
regime opened a number of modern schools and allowed, even encouraged, the 
Christian missionaries to operate in the country. The Mahdist regime (1885–1898), 
which put an end to the Turco–Egyptian rule in the Sudan, abandoned the missionary 
work and the schools established by the Turco–Egyptian government. The Mahdi’s 
movement advocated a return to pure Islam, and the Arabic language played a 
decisive role in this project. The Mahdist state was brought to an end by the Anglo–
Egyptian conquest of Sudan (1899–1956). This marked the beginning of a new 
regime that would intervene to change the linguistic map of the country, particularly 
in the south (see Chapter 4).   
 
A number of sociolinguistic surveys and language studies have been conducted to 
assess the use of the Arabic language vis–à–vis other Sudanese languages. One of the 
major sociolinguistic surveys was called the ‘Language Survey of the Sudan, 1972’. 
This major sociolinguistic survey was undertaken by Bjorn Jernudd, a Visiting 
Research Fellow at the time at the Institute of African and Asian Studies, University 
of Khartoum, with the collaboration of Sayed Hurreiz and the assistance of Ushari 
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Mahumd (Jernudd 1975). The Language Survey of the Sudan was initiated by the 
Institute of African and Asian Studies, Khartoum University. The Language Survey 
of the Sudan consisted of two phases. The first phase focused on patterns of language 
use, and teachers and students in the first year of the junior secondary schools in the 
northern Sudan (Dongola, Sinkat, Kabushiyya, al–Fasher, Dilling, Heiban, Salara, 
Sinja, Dinder, and New Halfa). The survey also administered questionnaires in the 
selected schools. Its scope was nationwide. The first phase covers schools from all 
provinces of the country except the southern provinces of Bahr al–Ghazal and 
Equatoria. It should be noted here that the first phase of the survey took place just 
after the peace agreement of Addis Ababa had been signed; hence the southern 
provinces were left out until refugees return and settle in the south (Hurreiz and Bell 
1975a: 1). Phase two of the survey was initiated in 1973, and the focus was entirely 
on the province of Bahr al–Ghazal. Intensive interviews were conduced with 
teachers, students, labourers, merchants, farmers, and government workers. The 
second phase was intended to assess the degree of multilingualism in the area, and to 
address the question of the spread of Arabic, English, Dinka and other local 
languages in the south as second languages (ibid.). The launching of the second 
phase coincided with the second census of the Sudan in April 1973. It should be 
mentioned that the first census in 1955–56 contained a question on the ‘language 
spoken at home’, but such a question failed to describe the repertoires that 
individuals had, and led to some misleading generalisations (ibid.: 2). Returning to 
the survey, Jernudd found out that the language of instruction in secondary schools 
was Arabic. Teachers were educated in both Arabic and English, and more 
importantly, their employability depended on excellent knowledge of Arabic, 
particularly the classical form (Jernudd 1975: 19). This last condition could explain 
why it was not unusual for many teachers to claim Arabic as their mother tongue. 
Jernudd found out that around less than the half of the Arab teachers expressed 
willingness to learn a local language.  
 
Jernudd also notes that all literature was in Arabic, and that students had already 
been selected out of the primary school partly on the basis of linguistic ability and on 
the condition that they master Arabic. Based on the findings of this project, Jernudd 
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(1975: 21) argues that a policy which encourages the development and use of local 
languages in schools would not conflict in any way with the Arabic language policy. 
We should recall that interest in the Sudanese colloquial Arabic, let alone other 
vernacular languages, was at some point in history considered ‘a blasphemous 
venture which would ultimately lead to the neglect of the language of the Qur’an 
(classical Arabic)’ (Hurreiz and Bell 1975b: 79). However, the Arabic linguist Awn 
al–Sharif Qasim (1975: 94), who shed more systematic light on this Sudanese variety 
of Arabic, rejects such a claim outright and argues instead that Sudanese Colloquial 
Arabic has its own distinguishing social environment which deserves to be given 
scholarly attention. For him, the Arabic proto–language is unknown. 
 
Another significant language survey of the Sudan was carried out by Thelwall 
(1978). Thelwall orders the provinces on the basis of their degree of linguistic 
fragmentation (for the distribution of the languages of Sudan according to Dalby’s 
linguistic fragmentation belt see Tucker 1978). His study shows that local languages 
play a significant role throughout the Sudan. Arabic dominates the northern part of 
Sudan with 91%. Nubian makes up 19%; whereas in eastern Sudan Beja dominates 
the Kasala province (50% to 36.3 %). Hausa and Fulani languages (from West 
Africa) constitute 11%. Having outlined the distribution of languages in the northern 
part of the Sudan, I shall now proceed to consider the southern part of the country. 
 
2.2.2 Spread of the Arabic language in the south 
According to Nyombe (1997: 100), before the making of the new Sudanese state, the 
people of the southern Sudan spoke a variety of their own vernaculars. Miller 
(2003a: 161) notes that the spread of Arabic in the southern Sudan occurred in very 
specific historical circumstances: the establishment of a large–scale slave trade in the 
nineteenth century, and subsequently the building of trade and military centres which 
led to the emergence of a specific Arabic pidgin used primarily as a lingua franca 
(for a detailed discussion of the relationship between slavery and language change in 
the southern Sudan see Mahmud 1983). Miller (2003a: 161) adds that the Arabic 
language was introduced as a lingua franca in the southern Sudan during the second 
half of the nineteenth century following the incursion into southern Sudan by 
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Turkish–Egyptian rule in 1841. Mahmud provides the following dialectic 
explanation, which deserves to be quoted in full, of the genealogy of the Arabic 
varieties spoken in the southern Sudan which he traced back to the nineteenth 
century:  
At that time, the historical development of southern communities was 
disrupted and their socio–economic structures were radically being 
transformed under the coercive domination by foreign merchants from 
the northern Sudan, Egypt and Europe. Successive alien rulers and 
colonial administration have effectively succeeded in articulating the 
southern communities into the periphery of the capitalist system. In the 
dynamics of this articulation process, a political and economic 
centralisation of the previously disparate tribal–linguistic groups 
evolved. These processes fostered and determined the emergence, 
development, and spread of what can be referred to as ‘Southern 
Sudanese Arabic’. (Mahmud 1983: 10) 
Prior to the conquest, the southern part of the Sudan was presumed to be a relatively 
isolated region, protected from outside influences by mountains, vast swamps and 
sudds (Nyombe 1997: 100). Thus, the Turco–Egyptian invasion not only seemed to 
have marked the first contact of the south with the outside world, but also opened up 
the south to future invasions and influences. However, Nyombe argues that the 
southerners had been interacting with their northern Arab neighbours long before the 
Turco–Egyptian conquest of the area. The essence of Nyombe’s argument is that 
there was already a tolerably widespread use of Arabic in the south as a trade 
language before the Turco–Egyptian invasion. Mahmud (1983: 17) counter–argues 
that mere trade contact which was then monopolised by the local ruling classes could 
not affect language change. Mahmud (ibid.) claims that ‘Arabic could not have 
spread in southern communities without a sustained contact produced by a 
transformation of the pre–existing socio–economic structures’. The Mahdist uprising 
(i.e., a religious movement) of 1884 brought to an end the Turco Egyptian rule in the 
Sudan. The Mahdists created a theocratic state in the Sudan and renewed attempts to 
spread Arabic culture and the teachings of the Quran in the south (Nyombe 1997: 
102). By 1884, the Mahdists established their control over Bahr al–Ghazal, and later 
over Equatoria which they lost control of shortly. In Equatoria, they took control of 
Rejaf from the Belgians, who were also trying to dominate the source of the Nile in 
1888. The Mahdists recruited southern slaves who converted to Islam into the 
Mahdi’s army, forming ‘mujahideen’ or ‘jadiya’ (soldiers fighting for Muslim 
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beliefs) in Bari. Nyombe notes that the local members of this army were instrumental 
in the spread of Arabic and Islam in the Equatoria region. Nevertheless, the scattered 
remnants of the Turco–Egyptian army, the local people, and the Belgians formed an 
alliance and forced the Mahdists to withdraw from the Rejaf in 1897. Then, the 
Belgians assumed control of the area and renamed it ‘Lado Enclave’, and Lingala 
became the lingua franca of the area (Nyombe 1997: 102). In 1898, the British, who 
had colonised Egypt, decided to gain control of the Sudan. A joint Anglo–Egyptian 
invasion led to the famous Anglo–Egyptian Condominium rule of the Sudan, and 
consequently to radical political, socioeconomic, cultural and linguistic changes in 
the Sudan. The British government assumed the administration of the south in 1900. 
The first two decades of the British Condominium (1900–1917) did not witness any 
official language planning due to the fact that the British were still relying on 
Arabic–speaking Egyptian officers and civil servants. From 1924 to 1946, the British 
made significant language policies with the aim at changing the language situation in 
the south. English and the local languages were given a pride of place while Arabic 
was almost eliminated in the whole of the southern Sudan (see Chapter 4).  
 
Before closing, a note about the type of Arabic spoken in the south is in order. The 
variety of the Arabic language spoken in the southern Sudan is referred to in the 
every day language as Juba Arabic (i.e., technically Southern Arabic or pidgin–
creole). It is worth noting that ‘there are probably no varieties of Arabic more 
divergent from the classical than Juba Arabic and Ki–Nubi of Uganda’ (Hurreiz and 
Bell 1975b: 79). As a pidgin, Juba Arabic was a product of the contact between 
African languages and Arabic (ibid.: 80). It is spoken only as a second language 
acting as a lingua franca of the multilingual local group, but children are starting to 
acquire it as a mother tongue (Nhial 1975: 81). Nhial claims that Juba Arabic and 
Ki–Nubi probably evolved from the military Arabic of the southern Sudan in the 
nineteenth century (ibid.). It should be noted that Nhial’s comment on the status of 
Juba Arabic is out of date, since Juba Arabic is now the mother tongue of many 
young, southerners particularly in urban areas. Mahmud points out that Juba Arabic 




In conclusion, although the English language was given a pride of place in the 
southern Sudan and the whole country, none of the local languages or the Arabic 
pidgin–creole in the southern Sudan has been given any consideration by 
postcolonial governments in the distribution of political and material resources of the 
country. I end by raising the following question which will be dealt with in more 
detail in Chapter 5: Could the use of the southern vernaculars as media of education 
lead to an equal distribution of economic resources, and ultimately to the elimination 
of class hierarchisation, which has been a product of the domination of Arabic, 
between the southerners themselves in the first place, and between the south and the 
north in the second place? The thesis of linguistic hegemony is suggestive of a reply 
to this question since ‘one of the major issues in the struggle by the south to end 
northern hegemony was that of the role of the vernaculars in education’ (Mahmud 
1983: 5): 
Language–related problems plague the southern Sudan. The fifty 
vernacular languages and the Arabic pidgin–creole varieties that are 
spoken by the overwhelming majority of the people have virtually no 
place in the context of the political power distribution and of access to 
the socio–economic resources – controlled and organised by the state 
mainly through the medium of English. Under this arrangement, 
structural inequalities continue to reproduce themselves and are 
continually maintained and guarded by a constellation of hegemonic 
forces, one of which is language. Thus language becomes a critical 
ingredient in the evolution of a class divided society in the southern 
Sudan. (Mahmud 1983: 2) 
 
2.3 Summary 
In this chapter I have attempted to produce a reconstruction of the linguistic map of 
the Sudan prior to the spread of the Arabic language particularly in the northern 
Sudan. I have situated the languages spoken in the Sudan within the African social 
context by reviewing one of the widely cited linguistic typologies of African 
languages, Greenberg’s (1963a) classification of African languages. Although 
Greenberg’s ultimately remains an artificial construction, it points to the structural 
similarities between the languages spoken in the very north (e.g., Nubiin languages) 
and the languages spoken in the very south (Nilotic languages). I have provided a 
sociohistorical understanding of the academic climate which shaped Greenberg’s 
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opposition to the mobilisation of the physical anthropological notion of race in the 
typology of African languages. The analysis has shown that there is no necessary 
link between language and ethnicity. In Chapter 5 I will argue that this indexical 
representation of the relationship between Arabic and Islam on the one hand and 
English and Christianity on the other hand is a colonial/postcolonial invention.  The 
work of Greenberg also provides an analytic and logical piece of evidence against the 
language ideology which conceptualises each part of the country (the north and the 
south) in monolithic and singular terms as discursively homogeneous. This 
background is important for I will argue in Chapter 5 that the language ideologies 
that the south and the north are linguistically incompatible are a colonial invention. 
The ideological notions of the south and the north are in themselves colonial 
creations that involved the colonial construction of linguistic differentiation. The 
chapter also examined the historical genealogy of the Arabicisation before the 
institutional intervention of language planning whether in the colonial or postcolonial 
period. With this in mind, I shall contend in Chapter 5 that the official declaration of 
Arabic and Islam as state policies in the northern Sudan is a colonial creation. 
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CHAPTER THREE: LANGUAGE PLANNING AND LANGUAGE 
POLICY: THEORETICAL AND COMPARATIVE BACKGROUND 
      
In the previous chapter I broadly surveyed the distribution and linguistic 
classification of Sudanese languages prior to any official intervention by colonial or 
postcolonial governments. The deliberate act of intervention into the structural 
system of a language or its functional domains of use is generally known as 
‘language planning and policy’. In this chapter I review the major themes in the 
scholarship of language planning and policy. The chapter is thematically organised 
into the following sections: Section 3.1 is concerned with conceptual and 
terminological definitions in the field, and locates the domain of language planning 
contextually by examining the key elements and actors involved in the process of 
language planning. The section also surveys the various frameworks and intellectual 
approaches to language planning. Section 3.2 explores the relationship between 
language planning and power, with a focus on the construct of ‘language rights’ and 
different language rights regimes available in the literature. Section 3.3 reviews the 
critical perspectives to literacy education. Section 3.4 examines the concept of 
critical language awareness in educational planning. Section 3.5 discusses the link 
between language planning and national identity, and Section 3.6 broadly reviews the 
language situation in Nigeria for comparative purposes. The whole chapter is 
intended to provide a theoretical grounding for Chapter 5. 
 
3.1. A terminological and conceptual basis for language planning and policy 
3.1.1 Language planning and policy: Definitions 
Haugen (1959) was the first to use the term ‘language planning’ to refer to the 
process of developing a new standard national language in Norway following 
independence from Denmark (see Karam 1974: 104; Fettes 1997: 13). Haugen 
defined language planning as follows: 
By language planning I understand the activity of preparing a normative 
orthography, grammar, and dictionary for the guidance of writers and 
speakers in a non–homogeneous speech community. In this practical 
application of linguistic knowledge we are proceeding beyond 
descriptive linguistics into an area where judgement must be exercised 
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in the form of choices among available linguistic forms. (Haugen 1959: 
8) 
Various terms such as ‘language engineering’ had previously been used to refer more 
or less to the same activity (see Karam 1974: 104). Language planning and policy as 
an academic field has a comparatively recent history associated with decolonisation 
and the language problems of newly independent states (Ferguson 2006: 1). 
According to Kaplan and Baldauf (1997: ix), our knowledge of language planning as 
a phenomenon is a constituent part of human beings’ ways of meaning making, thus 
it is old as recorded human history. However, there is a general consensus among 
scholars that the early (i.e., classical/traditional/mainstream) version of language 
planning and policy was born within sociolinguistics in the 1960s and 1970s, and 
was dominated by positivist paradigms. Joseph (1987: 14) points out that language 
planning as an academic field is a product of the sociolinguistic attention to language 
standardisation in the 1950s and 1960s. Wright (2004: 1) has argued that despite the 
fact that language planning as a discipline is a relatively new development, it is as 
old as language itself. It should be noted that scholars of language planning and 
policy are not consistent in their use of terminology when they refer to the field. For 
instance, the terms ‘language planning’ and ‘language policy’ are frequently used 
either synonymously or in tandem, either with the same or different technical range 
of application. Some scholars such as Kaplan and Baldauf (1997: xi) maintain that 
the two terms describe two distinct aspects of language change process. The 
researchers define ‘language policy’ as ‘a body of ideas, laws, regulation, rules and 
practices intended to achieve the planned language change in the society, group or 
system’ (ibid.). ‘Language planning’, on the other hand, is an activity that is usually 
undertaken by governments with the aim to ‘promote some systematic linguistic 
change in some community of speakers’ (ibid.). According to Spolsky (2006: 87), the 
term ‘language policy’ denotes two senses: First, it describes ‘the customary 
consensual judgements and practices of a speech community with regards to the 
appropriateness of a large number of significant choices among all the kinds of 
variants allowed in speech or writing’. Secondly, the term ‘language policy’ points to 




There are likewise a number of definitions and interpretations of the term ‘language 
planning’ in the literature. According to Baldauf (1990: 14), language planning is a 
complex series of processes which involve deliberate language change in the system 
of language by the concerned planning bodies. Rubin and Jernudd (1971a: xvi) point 
out that developing a language plan needs ‘the mobilisation of a great variety of 
disciplines because it implies the channelling of problems and values to and through 
some administrative structure’. Baldauf (1990: 15) remarks that although language 
planners should consult widely before developing a language policy, they usually 
work under specific social and political constraints, and within the resources and 
bureaucratic structures that are available.  
 
Language planning is not intended to be theory driven, but rather ‘responsive to real–
world interdisciplinary solutions of immediate practical problems’ (Kaplan and 
Baldauf 1997: xi). Rubin (1971) states that good planning includes steps such as 
extensive fact–finding, the consideration of alternative plans of action, decision–
making, and the implementation of decisions in specific ways. Rubin (ibid.: 218) 
characterised language planning as ‘an activity whereby goals are established, means 
are selected, and the outcomes predicted in a systematic and explicit manner’ (ibid.: 
218). Language planning concentrates on the solutions to language problems 
‘through decisions about alternative goals, means, and outcomes to solve these 
problems’ (ibid.). Rubin and Jernudd (1971a: xvi) make much the same point that 
language planning is focused on ‘problem solving and is characterised by the 
formulation and evaluation of alternatives for solving language problems to find the 
best (or optimal, most efficient) decision’. Fishman (1974a: 79) treats language 
planning as ‘the organised pursuit of solutions to language problems’. Rubin (1973) 
notes that a proper implementation of language planning depends upon access to the 
right kind of information about the sociolinguistic habits of the target population and 
about the social basis for language policy in order to project productive directions of 
change. It is generally recognised that when linguistic differences are mirrored in 
religious, social and economic differences, the selection of a language may be 
fraught with dangers (see Das Gupta 1971). Rubin and Jernudd’s (1971b) collection 
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raised the question of whether a language can be planned at all. Fishman (1974b) 
believes that: 
Members of the language–sciences community have passed beyond 
wondering whether language should be planned. Obviously, language 
has been planned, in one way or another, for a good long time … 
Obviously, too, it has at times been planned with considerable success. 
Finally, it will clearly continue to be planned in the future, both in 
connection with the further cultivation of previously modernised 
languages, as well as in connection with the modernisation of languages 
thus far utilised for traditional pursuits alone. (Fishman 1974b: 25–26, 
emphasis in original)  
Critical linguistic researchers, and particularly critical language planning researchers 
(an intellectual orientation developed by Pennycook 2001, 2006; Tollefson 2006), 
situate the practice of language planning and policy within social theory, and 
problematise the foundations upon which traditional language planning is based. 
Wright (2004) has argued that language planning and policy should be placed within 
broader social and political contexts. She has contended that ‘language planning 
plays a crucial role in the distribution of power and resources in all societies’ and it is 
‘integral to such activity and deserves to be studied explicitly from this political 
perspective’ (Wright 2004: 1). A similar view is provided by Tollefson: 
Language planning–policy means the institutionalisation of language as 
a basis for distinctions among social groups (classes). That is, language 
policy is one mechanism for locating language within social structure so 
that language determines who has access to political power and 
economic resources. Language policy is one mechanism by which 
dominant groups establish hegemony in language use. (Tollefson 1991: 
16) 
Another charge against mainstream language planning is that it aimed at projecting 
European notions of the nation–state in postcolonial African states in which people 
are unified around one standard language (Ferguson 2006: 3–4). Bamgbose (1994) 
expresses the same charge when he argues that nation–builders in Africa were 
preoccupied with number ‘one’:   
In Africa, it seems that we are obsessed with the number ‘one’. Not 
only must we have one national language, we must also have a one–
party system. The mistaken belief is that in such oneness of language 
and party we would achieve socio–cultural cohesion and political unity 
in our multi–ethnic, multilingual and multicultural societies. (Bamgbose 
1994: 36) 
Another criticism levelled against traditional language planning is that it intends to 
objectify and naturalise language i.e., treat it as a natural entity (see Pennycook 
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2001). To avoid this view of language as a fixed–given object, a number of 
researchers have conceptually reframed language or replaced it with another dynamic 
notion (e.g., discourse). Researchers in critical applied linguistics (i.e., a critical form 
of linguistics proposed by Pennycook 2001) interrogate the view of languages as 
ontological entities with their natural fixed structural properties (Pennycook 2006: 
66). Proponents of postmodernism urge us to reconceptualise the ontology of 
language as a colonial/modernist construction (see Pennycook 2006; Tollefson 
2006). Harris (1996, 1997) suggests an integrationalist approach to language in 
which languages are seen not as bounded or isolated entities but rather as placed 
within a much wider system of multimodal semiotics. Gafaranga and Torras (2001) 
contend that the traditional sociolinguistic notion of language cannot adequately 
account for speakers’ language choices in bilingual interaction, and suggest the term 
‘medium’ instead. Joseph (2002, 2004: 10) has proposed reconceptualising 
‘language’ as a ‘process’ noun, hence stressing the dynamism of the semantic 
features. Ruiz (1984) suggests a typology of orientations to language policy which 
consists of language–as–problem, language–as–right, and/or, language–as–resource 
(see Churchill 1986 for a comparable typology of language policies). Joseph (2004: 
125, 2006a) has suggested that languages, whether standard or non–standard, should 
be viewed as political inventions. More importantly, linguists reject the classical 
language thesis that languages are equal. Hymes (1992: 1) holds that although 
languages are structurally and potentially equal, they are not socially so because 
‘social meaning includes evaluation of languages themselves’. The same view was 
held by Joseph (1987: 88) when he condemned as extremist the relativistic 
pronouncement by modern linguistics that ‘all dialects are equal’. Canagarajah 
(2006: 156) has expressed the same proposition when he has argued that languages 
are ‘positioned unequally in power relations’. 
 
Luke et al. (1990: 28) argue that what is missing in classical language planning is an 
‘exploration of the complex theoretical relationship between language, discourse, 
ideology and social organisation’, and these are the exact concerns of neo–Marxist 
social theorising, critical discourse analysis, and post–structuralist and critical theory. 
Social elites have social, political and economic power, and thus may be able to 
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control the language planning processes for their own benefit. Haugen (1983: 286) 
points to the possibility that language implementation can be part of a ‘political 
constellation’. According to Fishman (1994a), the thrust of the neo–Marxist and 
post–structuralist arguments against classical language planning is based on five 
points: 1) Classical language planning is conducted by elites who are driven by their 
own self–interest; 2) It reproduces sociocultural and econotechnical inequalities 
rather than overcomes them; 3) It counteracts multiculturalism; 4) It supports 
westernisation and modernisation resulting in new sociocultural, econotechnical and 
conceptual colonialism, and 5) Only ethnography can save the field (for a detailed 
reaction to these charges see Fishman 1994a: 98). Spolsky (2004: 14) states that 
language ideologies can count as a language policy which can be intended to modify 
or confirm language practices (for a detailed discussion of language ideologies see 
Joseph and Taylor 1990; Blommaert 1999; Woolward and Schieffelin 1994). 
Shannon (1999: 185) points out that in the absence of a language policy in the 
southwestern region of the USA, bilingual teachers pattern their practice after the 
dominant language ideology. Spolsky and Shohamy (2000) distinguish between the 
language practice of a community and its language ideology. While the language 
practice of a community defines ‘its ethnography of community or patterned use of 
its linguistic repertoire’, its language ideology refers to ‘the consensus on what 
varieties are appropriate for what purposes’ (ibid.: 1). 
 
3.1.2 The context of language planning and policy   
According to Kaplan and Baldauf (1997: 5), language planning and planners should 
be situated in their sociopolitical context since ‘resources for language planning 
should compete with the demands made by other planning areas for funds’. 
Language planning in its macro (larger) sense is identified as an aspect of national 
resource development planning. National resource development planning is said to 
fall into two main categories: human resource development planning and natural 
resource development planning (for the difference between these two types of 
planning see Kaplan and Baldauf 1997: 4–5). Figure 3.1 contextualises the language 





Figure 3.1. Context and Elements of the Language Planning Process 
(Source: Kaplan and Baldauf 1997: 6) 
 
Kaplan and Baldauf (1997: 5) identified four main areas concerned with language 
planning: 1) governmental bodies; 2) the educational sector; 3) quasi–governmental 
or non–governmental bodies, and 4) individuals and organisations. Broadly speaking, 
language planning is a function of governments and their bureaucratic systems which 
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can penetrate a number of sectors of society (ibid.: 122). Joseph (1987: 111) notes 
that governmental bodies employ certain linguists and educationalists as language 
planning experts, or as members of language planning boards, or in similar positions 
with different titles. The Scandinavian countries are a typical example of countries 
with permanent commissions or committees (see Haugen 1976). Joseph (1987: 111) 
writes that some governments jointly sponsor international commissions on specific 
languages. The East African Swahili Committee founded in 1930 and the Hausa 
Language Board founded in 1955 are cases in point (see Whiteley 1969; Paden 1968: 
202).  
 
According to Kaplan and Baldauf (1997: 8), the education sector has to make a 
number of language planning and policy decisions among which are the following: 
1) It must decide on the languages to be taught within the curriculum; 2) It has to 
prepare and train, at both pre–service and in–service stages, teachers who will teach 
the new language in the curriculum; 3) It has to determine the level of students who 
will learn the languages and has to get parental and community support for teaching 
the planned languages; 4) It has to decide and prepare the language teaching 
materials included in the curriculum, and to determine the methodologies that will be 
used to teach the curriculum languages; 5) It has to define the assessment procedures 
to measure students, teacher and system performance, and 6) It has to determine the 
financial source for funding and maintaining the language education programme in 
the short and long–terms.   
 
The non/quasi governmental sector includes language agencies, national language 
academies, and Language Planning Boards (see Joseph 1987: 110–115; Kaplan and 
Baldauf 1997: 9). The Goethe Institute for German (see Ammon 1992), the British 
Council for English and the Japan Foundation for Japan (Hirataka 1992) are 
examples of language agencies. The function of these bodies is the preparation of 
grammar books, dictionaries, and lexical development, with the aim to preserve the 
purity of their national languages. National language academies were instrumental in 
the spread and the preservation of the purity of what was planned to be the national 
language. Examples of countries with such national language academies are Italy 
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(Accademia della Crusca 1582), Spain (Real Academia Espanola 1713), and Portugal 
(Institute de Alta Cultura) (see Kaplan and Baldauf 1997: 10; for language academies 
in the Middle East see Altoma 1974).  
 
According to Joseph (1987: 112), language academies and Language Planning 
Boards differ primarily in terms of the qualifications for membership and the 
intellectual orientation under which they are established. Members of language 
academies in most countries are selected on the basis of literary achievement, and 
their pronouncements point to a belief that language is decaying and should be 
restored. Language Planning Boards, on the other hand, show a commitment to 
principles of scientific research, although they have an advisory status. It is worth 
noting that the most widely spread language (English) did not have a language 
academy and that may be attributed to the fact that the emergence of Samuel 
Johnson’s uniquely authoritative Dictionary of the English Language in the 1755 
rendered the attempt to found an academy unnecessary (ibid.). Ricento (2006: 20) 
has noted that although it is difficult to regulate language on the internet, official 
bodies such as universities and language academies continue to control ways in 
which language should be used on the internet. Certain organisations with a core 
function that is not–language related nevertheless play a role in the process of 
language planning, the United States Postal Service and the Immigration and 
Naturalisation Service being cases in point (Kaplan and Baldauf 1997: 12). Joseph 
(1987: 114) observes that editors play a significant role in the process of controlling 
and planning a language.  
 
3.1.3 A typology of language planning processes and activities  
Language planning researchers draw a significant distinction between language 
planning processes/steps which involve a series of activities and language planning 
goals/functions (see Hornberger 1990; Nahir 1984). Nahir (1984: 297) illustrates the 
distinction between the two conceptual categories with the following example: ‘when 
the Canadian Public Service Commission provides French or English training to 
public servants, it is seeking the goal of Language Spread. The same type of activity, 
however, could be related to other goals, such as Language Revival or Language 
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Maintenance’. The point here is that language planning activities do not in 
themselves point to a sociopolitical orientation; rather ‘it is the goals that are 
assigned to the language–planning activities that determine the direction of change 
envisioned’ (Hornberger 1990: 21). The language planning goal which is sought by a 
particular language planning activity/process represents the intention of the language 
planning body (see Section 3.1.2 for the different language planning elements 
involved in the process of language planning). Scholars of language planning have 
suggested various typologies of language planning activities to carry out specific 
language functions. For example, Kloss’s (1969) dichotomy contains status and 
corpus planning. Haugen’s (1983) typology consists of selection, codification, 
implementation, and elaboration. Neustupný’s (1974) classification is composed of 
policy approach and cultivation approach. This section discusses four types of 
language planning activities: status planning, corpus planning, language–in–
education planning, and discourse planning. I have combined status and corpus 
planning under one sub–heading since ‘corpus planning, in itself, is an expression of 
a status planning agenda, albeit in more muted, disguised, or indirect terms than 
those openly avowed in governmental or other authoritative declarations’ (Fishman 
2000: 48).  
 
3.1.3.1 Status planning and corpus planning 
Kloss (1969) was the first to introduce the terms status and corpus planning in the 
literature of language policy and planning. Status planning is intended to address the 
functions of language(s) in society and it typically refers to the assigning of 
languages to official domains of language use such as those of the government and 
education (Ferguson 2006: 20). Status planning is rarely assigned to language 
experts, but rather it is viewed as the job of politicians. The output of status planning 
is laws, clauses in constitutions and regulations prescribing the official standing of 
languages, and their use in social domains of public administration (Lo Bianco 2004: 
742). Kale (1990: 185–186) suggests five selectional criteria for using a social 
variety for official purposes: political neutrality, dominance, prestige, a great 
tradition, and a real affinity.  
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Corpus planning, on the other hand, is intended to change the code or the form of the 
selected language (Ferguson 2006: 21). Corpus activities are usually undertaken by 
languages experts resulting in the production of grammars, dictionaries, literacy 
manuals, and writing style and pronunciation guides (Lo Bianco 2004: 742; Ferguson 
2006: 21). However, like status planning, corpus planning is also driven by political 
considerations extending beyond the code itself (Ferguson 2006: 21). Haugen (1983) 
proposes a four–way matrix of language planning processes yielding four processes: 
selection of norm, codification, elaboration of function, and implementation (i.e., 
acceptance/propagation in Haugen 1966, 1969 respectively). Selection and 
implementation are viewed as status planning activities, whereas codification and 
elaboration are seen as corpus planning processes. Although Ferguson’s (1968: 28–
33) typology of language development (i.e., graphisation, modernisation, and 
standardisation) corresponds roughly to the functions of corpus planning activities 
(see Hornberger 2006: 30), modernisation may be interpreted to partake in status 
planning and corpus planning (i.e., modernisation partly includes Haugen’s selection 
at the status planning level, see Ferguson 1968: 29). Drawing mainly on Nahir’s 
(1984) work, Hornberger (1990: 20) listed the following sociopolitical goals or 
functions of status and corpus planning activities: officialisation, nationalisation, 
status standardisation, vernacularisation, revival, spread, maintenance, interlingual 
communication, purification, reform, corpus standardisation, lexical modernisation, 
terminology unification, stylistic simplification, auxiliary code standardisation (e.g., 
unifying the rules of transliteration), and graphisation (for definitional issues see 
Nahir 1984; Hornberger 1990, 2006).   
 
Standardisation, which is generally perceived as a corpus planning activity, has 
received much attention in the literature of language planning. A crucial part of the 
standardisation process is ‘codification’. Codification is ‘the process of giving 
explicit definition to the norm, principally through the production of authoritative 
grammars, dictionaries, spellers, and the like’ (Ferguson 2006: 21). It is usually 
performed by a single individual who ‘decides to give explicit, usually written, form 
to the norm he has chosen’ (Haugen 1983: 271). Codification is always tied to 
prescription (Fairclough 2001: 48). The aim of codification is to minimise variation 
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in form and to maximise variation in function (Haugen 1966). That is to say, 
language planners should work with the goal of minimising misunderstanding and 
maximising efficiency (Milroy and Milroy 1985). Joseph (1987: x), who provides a 
detailed historical investigation of the nature of language standardisation, draws a 
distinction between ‘language standards’ and ‘standard languages’: ‘While “language 
standards” exist in every linguistic community, “standard languages” represent a 
specifically European concept, whose defining criteria are based on the attributes of 
European languages and on European cultural values’ . Thus, evaluating non–
European languages by the same standardisation extent (e.g., codified grammars) 
would have serious implications for these languages (for a detailed discussion of the 
different conceptualisations of language standardisation in modern linguistics see 
Joseph 1987: 11–16). Ferguson (2006: 21) has defined standardisation as ‘the 
construction – and subsequent dissemination – of a uniform supradialectal normative 
variety’. Milroy and Milroy (1985) identify standardisation as a strategy employed to 
suppress the internal variability of a language. Joseph (1987: 63) shares the same 
opinion when he notes that standardisation is intended to ‘overcome dialectal 
diversity by providing the ideal medium for communication among all members of 
the unit of loyalty’. Wright (2004: 54) argues that ‘standardisation is in part a 
fiction’. Milroy (1999: 18) states that standard languages ‘are fixed and uniform–
state idealisations – not empirically verifiable realities’. Ferguson (2006: 22) has 
stated that standardisation is an ideological process since the language selected to 
play the role of the standard legitimates and consolidates the social and economic 
dominance of a group of elites. Kaplan and Baldauf (1997: 123) identify the standard 
language as ‘a set of discursive, cultural and historical practices – a set of widely 
accepted communal solutions to discourse problems’. Fairclough (2001: 47) equates 
the process of standardisation with the ‘process of colonisation’, whereby the 
standard language develops at the expense of other languages and gradually takes 
over major social institutions. Fairclough remarks that there is ‘an element of 
schizophrenia’ about standard languages (e.g., English), in the sense that the selected 
variety ‘aspires to be (and is certainly portrayed as) a national language belonging to 
all classes and sections of the society, and yet remains in many respects a class 
dialect’ (ibid.: 48). 
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3.1.3.2 Language–in–education planning 
According to Kaplan and Baldauf (1997: 122), language–in–education (Cooper’s 
1989 acquisition planning) substantially involves the educational sector of the 
society. The educational arena is usually chosen as an implementation site for 
language policies. Since educational institutions deal with the standard versions of 
language, and standard languages are considered a symbol of cultural unity, it 
follows that the role of education is to induct individuals into the dominant culture of 
the society (see Kaplan and Baldauf 1997: 122; 2006: 46–49).  
 
Kaplan and Baldauf (1997: 125) list five steps which form the major considerations 
for language–in–education policy and implementation: curriculum, personnel, 
materials, community, and evaluation. Critical language theorists draw a distinction 
between language training and language education. One of the objectives of language 
teaching in schools is the achievement of some degree of bilingualism in the target 
language among the target population within a limited period (see Romaine 1989, Li 
Wei 2000 for a detailed definition of bilingualism). Fairclough (2001: 197) notes that 
language training concentrates on the ‘transmission of knowledge and skill, whose 
content is assumed to be unproblematic and whose social origins are ignored’. 
Fairclough argues that it is exactly this alienating concept of language that was 
traditionally transmitted in schools. Fairclough refers to this view as the 
‘instrumental ideology of language’: ‘Language as a tool for getting things done’ 
(ibid.: 96). Language education by contrast focuses on the raising of children’s 
critical awareness of their environment and the development of their capabilities to 
participate in the shaping and reshaping of their social world.  
 
A number of concerns have recently dominated the agenda of language teaching and 
particularly teaching English as a second language (ESL). One concern addresses the 
inequalities in the relation between the constructs of ‘native’ and ‘non–native’ 
speaker (see Leung, Harris and Rampton 1997; Cook 1999; Davies 2003). Another 
theme investigates the issue of social identity and ways of teaching languages. For 
example Ibrahim (1999) has investigated the social identity of a group of French–
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speaking immigrant and refugee continental African youths attending an urban high 
school in Ontario. Ibrahim (1999: 349) has found out that these students ‘become 
Black’ as they enter a ‘social imaginary–a discursive space in which they are already 
imagined, constructed and thus treated as Blacks by hegemonic discourses and 
groups’. Ibrahim (ibid.) concluded that ‘ESL is neither neutral nor without its politics 
and pedagogy of desire and investment’. Lin (1999: 411) has discovered that 
particular ways of teaching English in Hong Kong might lead to the reproduction or 
transformation of social worlds. 
 
The questions of gender, sexuality and sexual identity are among the themes that 
have received careful consideration in recent years in the area of ESL. Nelson (1999: 
388) argues that ‘within ESL, learners, teachers, teacher educators, and material 
developers need to be able to refer to and discuss not just straight but also lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, transgenderal, or queer identities’. Drawing on Freire’s participatory 
education as a critical pedagogy, Frye (1999: 512) maintains that the first step 
towards women’s liberation is that individual women should start to wrestle with the 
dominant social norms that have oppressed them. 
 
Within the field of the sociology of education a new critical approach to the 
curriculum called the ‘new sociology of education’ was developed by a neo–Marxist 
group of sociologists to examine the taken–for–granted educational practices (for a 
critique of this approach see Young and Whitty 1977; Young 1971; Esland 1971; 
Kiddie 1971; Whitty 1977; Heyman 1981). This orientation is mainly concerned with 
the analysis of the mechanics and causes of the social and economic reproduction 
through education (Heyman 1981: 457). An alternative form of theorising, which can 
be seen as a mirror image of the new sociology, is advocated by Althusser (1971) 
who defines education as the main ‘ideological State apparatus’ for capitalism. For 
Althusser (ibid.: 128), the school teaches the ‘know–how’ but in ways which ensure 
submission to the ruling ideology or submission to the mastery of its practice. This 
perspective which is widely held by classical Marxists has been heavily criticised. 
Young and Whitty (1977: 20) argue that Althusser’s theorising is naïve since it 
‘stimulates an unfortunate form of quietism’ among teachers. Althusser’s (1971: 140) 
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stance is that the struggle is rooted not in ideology but rather in the infrastructure and 
production relations that are exploitative and constitute the foundation for class 
relations.  
 
3.1.3.3 Discourse planning 
Discourse planning as an analytic category is suggested by Lo Bianco (2004). Lo 
Bianco (ibid.: 751) holds that the theorisation of language planning and policy 
demands the inclusion of a category of ‘discourse planning’ to account for a policy 
action in which language is the focus of attention, particularly in domains where 
there is conflict, dispute, and contest. The primary objective is to explain the 
language of politics in language planning practice, the way in which language 
problems are interpreted discursively for policy attention, a process which leads to 
selective elevation of some linguistic issues for policy treatment, while disregarding 
alternative claims.  
 
The addition of the political discursive strand within the domain of language 
planning and policy aims to understand the construction of language problems as a 
performative practice, engaging the persuasive language, traditional concepts of 
rhetoric, and the actual achievement of goals of language policy through ideological 
structuring (ibid.). In spite of the fact that discourse is inherently dialogical, 
contestable and negotiable in the sense that it exists in intertextual relations with 
other discourses, discourse planning is concerned with ‘the efforts of institutions and 
diverse interests to shape, direct, and influence discursive practices and patterns’ 
(ibid.: 743). Lo Bianco believes that discourse planning is reflexive in the sense that 
it aims to influence the way in which people think, behave and value language itself.  
 
3.1.4 Models and frameworks of language planning and language policy  
To begin with, language planning should not be seen as a one–off activity. Rather, it 
should be viewed as an on–going activity. There are a number of models and 
frameworks of language planning and policy in the literature. The list of the 
frameworks and models of language planning, which is by no means exhaustive, 
includes: Haugen (1966, 1969, 1983); Ferguson (1968); Kloss (1969); Stewart 
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(1968); Fishman, Das Gupta, Jernudd and Rubin (1971); Rabin (1971); Jernudd 
(1973); Haarmann (1990); Cooper (1989); Neustupný(1974); Nahir (1984); 
Chumbow (1987); Spolsky (2004); Kaplan and Baldauf (1997), and Hornberger 
(2006). In what follows I focus on Hornberger’s (2006) integrative framework of 
language planning. My selection of this model is guided by two reasons: first it is an 
up–to–date contribution which incorporates most of the above mentioned 
frameworks, thus it allows an easy reference to and interaction with other 
frameworks including Haugen’s (1983) canonical fourfold matrix in an integrative 
and continuist manner. Secondly in addition to the goals of language planning, 
Hornberger’s model includes interpretive explanations (see Figure 3.2). It should be 
remarked that Haugen’s model theorised nothing about the goals of language 
planning processes, rather ‘it provides a description of what language planners have 
done, but it does not tell us why they have done it, nor what goals they have hoped to 
attain’ (Haugen 1983: 274). 
 
Hornberger’s (2006) integrative model of language planning is composed of two 
main axes (see Figure 3.2) which point to a conceptual distinction made between 
language planning types (e.g., status planning), and language planning approaches 
which focus on the form or/and function of language (e.g., corpus planning). On the 
one hand, the vertical axis presents a distinction between three types of language 
planning activities: status planning, acquisition planning and corpus planning. 
Cooper (1989) proposes the category of acquisition planning (see language–in–
education planning, Section 3.1.3.2).  
 
The horizontal axis, on the other hand, shows a typological distinction made by 
Neustupný (1974) between ‘policy’ and a ‘cultivation’ approach to language 
planning. The policy approach, which corresponds to the status planning at the 
societal level, deals with language matters of a nation ‘emphasising the distribution 
of languages/literacies, and mainly concerned with standard languages’ (Hornberger 
2006: 28). The cultivation approach, which is interpreted as being equivalent to 
corpus planning, is concerned with matters of language and literacy at the 
microscopic level. Haugen (1983) combined the two binary distinctions of 
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status/corpus and policy/cultivation into a fourfold matrix that can be viewed either 
from a societal or a linguistic focus of attention. The societal perspective, which is 
designated ‘status planning’, refers to the selection and implementation of the 
selected language. The linguistic perspective (corpus planning), on the other hand, 
refers to the codification and elaboration of the form. Drawing on Haugen’s work 
and Cooper’s (1989) acquisition planning, Hornberger has designed her integrative 
model as a matrix with six dimensions of language/literacy planning (see Figure 3.2).  
Drawing on Nahir (1984) and other scholars, Hornberger (2006: 30) has included 30 
goals in her integrative framework. Hornberger’s integrative model incorporates 
Ferguson’s (1968: 28–33) typology of language planning activities (i.e., 
standardisation, graphisation, and modernisation) that comes under corpus policy and 
cultivation planning (see Section 3.1.3.1 for a detailed discussion of standardisation). 
Hornberger (2006: 30) has defined standardisation of corpus as the ‘development of 
a literacy norm which overrides regional and social literacies’. Graphisation is 
concerned with ‘the provision of a writing system for a hitherto unwritten language’ 
(ibid.). Modernisation involves ‘the lexical and stylistic development of a 
language/literacy for its expansion into hitherto unused domains’ (ibid.).  
 
In Hornberger’s integrative framework, standardisation and graphisation focus on the 
form of language, while modernisation concentrates on the function of language. In 
Figure 3.2 we find that revival (cf. Fishman’s 1991 reversing language shift), 
maintenance, spread and interlingual communication constitute the activities of 
cultivation of a language’s status (cf. Haugen’s implementation 1983: 272). 
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Figure 3.2. Language Planning and Policy Goals: An Integrative Framework  
(Source: Hornberger 2006: 26. Note: LPP types are in plain typeface, approaches in 
italics and goals in bold).  
 
Lexical modernisation, purification, reform, stylistic simplification, and terminology 
unification exemplify corpus cultivation activities (cf. Haugen’s 1983: 273–276 
elaboration of functions). Adopting Cooper’s (1968) category of ‘renovation’, 
Hornberger has divided it into fours sub–goals: purification, reform, stylistic 
simplification and terminology unification.  
 
In the integrative framework of language planning, status standardisation is defined 
as ‘language planning activities that accept or impose a language as the standard’, 
and corpus standardisation as ‘language–planning activities that codify the linguistic 
forms of that standard as a uniform norm’ (Hornberger 2006: 31). Standardisation of 
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corpus involves Nahir’s (1984) standardisation of auxiliary code. Nahir (1984: 318) 
defines auxiliary–code standardisation as:  
Standardising or modifying the marginal, auxiliary aspects of language 
such as signs for the deaf, place names, and rules of transliteration and 
transcription, either to reduce ambiguity and thus improve 
communication or to meet changing social, political, or other needs or 
aspirations. (Nahir 1984: 318) 
In addition to the status standardisation, the status–policy dimension of planning (cf. 
Haugen’s 1983 selection) includes three functions: officialisation (cf. Stewart 1968), 
nationalisation and proscription (see Hornberger 2006: 32). Cooper’s (1989) 
acquisition planning attends to the users of language in contrast to the status planning 
which focuses on the use of a language. Cooper (1989) lists the following as possible 
functions of acquisition planning: maintenance, foreign/second language acquisition, 
and reacquisition (see Kaplan and Baldauf 1997: 14–26 for comparative definitions 
and discussion of terms such as foreign/nation/regional language). Hornberger (2006: 
32) has added ‘language shift’ as another possibility to Cooper’s list of goals of 
acquisition planning. Hence each goal in the acquisition–cultivation dimension has a 
corresponding goal in the status–cultivation dimension i.e., revival–reacquisition, 
maintenance–maintenance, spread–shift, interlingual communication–foreign/second 
language acquisition (see Hornberger 2006: 32). For the acquisition–policy 
dimension, Stewart’s (1968) typology of goals, as revised by Cooper (1989), 
includes the six foci of this dimension: group, education/school, literature, religion, 
mass media, and work (see Hornberger 2006: 32). In short, Hornberger (2006: 33) 
has suggested that ‘LPP [language policy and planning] will be most effectively 
carried out if all the six dimensions depicted in the framework are attended to’.  
 
3.1.5 Approaches to language planning and policy 
I start with two broad competing analytic approaches to language planning and 
policy: the Neoclassical approach (Tollefson’s 1991 term for traditional language 
planning) and the historical–structural approach (see Tollefson 1991: 22–42, 2006: 
48–49; Wood 1982; Bach and Schraml 1982). The differences between the two 
approaches can be considered in terms of the conceptual and methodological basis of 
each approach; the unit of analysis employed, and the historical specificity of the 
investigation (see Wood 1982: 299). According to Tollefson, the conceptual 
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differences between the two approaches reflect the underlying ideological 
orientations of the supporters of the two perspectives, and their different stances on 
the relative importance of individual choice and collective behaviour in social 
research. On the one hand, the historical–structural approach draws its conceptual 
inspiration from Marx’s historical materialism as well as from social theory (Wood 
1982: 302). It conceptualises language planning as an historical process inextricably 
bound with structural considerations including class–based structures. The historical 
structural approach aims at examining the historical basis of language policies and 
revealing the structural pressures and mechanisms by which policy decisions serve or 
undermine specific socioeconomic interests (Tollefson 1991: 22–42; for the 
implementation of this approach see McCarty 2002). On the other hand, the 
Neoclassical approach is ahistorical and concentrates primarily on the rational 
calculus of the individual actor (Wood 1982: 300). The historical–structuralist rejects 
this conception on the grounds that it is reductionistic and precludes analysis of the 
underlying causes of the structural parameters within which individual choices are 
made (ibid.: 303). The historical structural perspective assumes that individual 
variables such as motivation have some hidden explanation, and views it as a 
historical product rather than as a primary factor in language acquisition. With 
origins firmly rooted in Marxist tradition, the historical–structural approach locates 
the individual within classes or class fractions which constitute a specific social 
formation (ibid.). Critics of the historical–structural model reject the historical data 
on class and class struggle as metaphysical concerns (ibid.: 308). The proponents of 
the historical–structural perspective charge that traditional language planning and 
policy gives no insight into the structural and ideological basis of language policies, 
nor their relationship with power, dominance, and hegemony, or their role in 
exploitation and struggle (Tollefson 1991). Bach and Schraml (1982: 320, 321) note 
that the supporters of the two approaches ‘have become essentially separate 
intellectual communities’, because the opposition between them is ‘a clash of 
paradigm, a conflict of world visions that preclude meaningful dialogue’. 
     
A third approach to the field of language planning and policy has been marked by the 
emergence at the end of the cold war of a critique of the Anglophone dominance 
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termed linguistic imperialism by Robert Philipson (1992, 2006). Phillipson’s (1992: 
1) critique of linguistic imperialism states that ‘whereas Britannia ruled the waves, 
now it is English which rules them’. Linguistic imperialism is a sub–type or an 
example of ‘linguicism’, a term coined by Phillipson to refer to ‘ideologies, 
structures and practices which are used to legitimate, effectuate and reproduce an 
unequal division of power and resources, both material and immaterial, between 
groups which are defined on the basis of language’ (ibid.: 47). Working exclusively 
within the context of English linguistic imperialism, Phillipson argues that the 
English language has been aided by ideological support to be made the dominating 
language in the world. Phillipson identifies English linguistic imperialism as the 
process whereby ‘the dominance of English is asserted and maintained by the 
establishment and continuous reconstitution of structural and cultural inequalities 
between English and other languages’ (ibid.). Furthermore, Phillipson argues that the 
expansion of the English language is promoted by organisations and institutional 
bodies including: TESOL (especially its American and British variants), 
globalisation, language experts and teachers, the World Bank, and the 
‘McDonaldisation’ of the world through commercial firms and media.  
 
The critique of linguistic imperialism has sparked a heated controversy (see Davies–
Phillipson debate: Davies 1996, 1997, Phillipson 1997; the Crystal–Phillipson 
debate: Phillipson 1999, Crystal 2000). The reaction of the English Language 
Teaching (ELT) establishment was that they were not ‘doing politics’ and that they 
were simply implementing research–oriented methodologies (see Joseph 2006a: 51). 
For Phillipson (1992: 48), professionalism is not a rationale for not taking part in 
rectifying the problem of the domination of English. Joseph (2006a: 50) has 
contended that the historical basis on which the critique was based is fundamentally 
flawed. Joseph has constructed his argument upon the historical fact that the colonial 
practices of Britain, in contrast to, France promoted the use of local vernaculars: 
‘The British colonial administration in London did not support having colonial 
subjects educated in English’ (ibid.). Brutt–Griffler (2006: 37) has made the same 
argument that the British Empire implemented linguistic exclusionist strategies as 
part of a containment policy where it constructed indigenous languages as national 
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languages to separate the non–English masses from the English speaking elite. 
Joseph (2006a: 53) has noted that part of the problematic character of Phillipson’s 
thesis of linguistic imperialism lies in the fact that it portrays eloquent scholars from 
Third World countries as suffering from a false consciousness or as traitors of their 
local societies. Canagarajah (1999a; 1999b) is strongly critical of Phillipson’s 
theorisation of linguistic imperialism. Canagarajah (1999b: 207) argues that 
linguistic imperialism pictures people as passive to be converted to new languages: 
‘People are not always passive or blind to be converted heart and soul to new 
discourses’. Canagarajah maintains that the critique is insensitive to ‘the ways of 
modifying, mixing, appropriating, and even resisting discourses’ (ibid.). Rajagopalan 
(1999a: 200) tries to invalidate the conditions of linguistic imperialism when he 
argues that ‘the whole thesis is based on premises that no longer hold good in a 
world marked by cultural intermixing and growing multilingualism at a hitherto 
unprecedented level, leading to unstable identities and shifting conceptual contours’. 
Rajagopalan believes that ‘it is in the very nature of human languages, all of them, to 
be riven by power inequalities’ (1999a: 205), and consequently that ‘viewing 
language as an arena of permanent conflict entails that there will always be losers as 
well as winners’ (1999b: 115). It is beyond the capacity of English language 
teachers, Rajagopalan (1999a: 205–206) continues, to do anything about the loss of 
local languages as a result of the spread of the English language: ‘Language planning 
and language teaching necessarily entail rehashing of existing power relations simply 
because power is exercised in and through language’. Canagarajah (1999b: 210) 
counters the stance of Rajagopalan by arguing that: ‘We are urged to bury our eyes 
ostrich–like to the political evils and ideological temptations outside. Divorcing our 
moral sensibility and social consciousness from our profession’. Spolsky (2004: 91), 
another opponent of the Phillipson critique, contends that the spread of English is not 
a product of direct or covert language policy, and that any language policy of any 
nation should take into account the global place of the English language. Pennycook 
(2001: 62) notes that language for Phillipson is only a reflection of global relations, 
and that the thesis of linguistic imperialism lacks ‘a view of how English is taken up, 
how people use English, why people choose to use English’. As an alternative, 
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Pennycook (2000, 2001) has proposed the theorising of ‘postcolonial performativity’ 
that focuses on the concept of appropriation and resistance.   
 
The thesis of linguistic imperialism has direct implications for language–in–
education planning. Joseph (2006a: 51) has remarked that (English) linguistic 
imperialism is ‘embedded in the very structure of the education system and even the 
set–up of the classroom’. According to Ricento (2006: 16), the critique of linguistic 
imperialism raised a number of questions about the morality of teaching international 
languages such as English in developing countries, and about the privileging of 
native speakers over non–native speakers in employment opportunities (for more 
details on how the critique of linguistic imperialism informs the practice of language 
planning see Phillipson 2006).  
 
Another development in the field of language planning and policy is inspired by the 
systemic–functional linguistics of M. A. K Halliday (see Halliday 1985, 1993). 
Halliday differentiates between institutional and systemic language planning. On one 
hand, systemic language planning is based on sema–history concepts: historical 
stages and the connections between language and materialism, sex, class, and race. 
The main distinction between systemic language planning and policy and 
conventional language planning is that semantics is given priority over form in 
Halliday’s systemic– functional approach. Halliday’s conceptualisation of the 
relationship between language structure and the semiotic system of a given 
community (culture) generates an approach to language planning which views 
language as a system of signs (meaning) which is part of ‘a set of systems of 
meaning, all of which interrelate’ (Halliday and Hasan 1985: 4). According to 
Halliday, the grammar should be able to accommodate the diversity of discourses 
and identities that coexist in the postmodern community. A concrete illustration of 
this line of argumentation is the emergence of ‘New Varieties of English’ (NVEs), 
which have appropriated and remoulded the system of English to serve the semiotic 
needs of their speakers who belong to non–European or ‘non–modernist’ cultures. 
Halliday criticises the inability of the practice of traditional language planning to 
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intervene, and particularly to import some design into these inevitably historical 
processes.  
 
Institutional language planning, on the other hand, is concerned not with the formal 
system of language, but rather with the relationship between a language and users of 
the language. The main task here is to ensure that people in a society have access to 
the languages they need. This strand of language planning involves making policies, 
implementing them, and providing measures to ensure their implementation. 
Educational measures provide the institutional context for second language teaching, 
language maintenance, and vernacular literacy (Halliday 1993: 142). For systemic 
planning, on the other hand, the objective is to design the language itself in order to 
enlarge its potential for meaning. This type of planning is usually undertaken to 
create new functional domains (i.e., new registers) for a language undergoing 
development. Planning at this level involves the establishment of principles for the 
creation of new words, and the application of these principles in order to develop 
technical typologies in specific registers defined by the discipline (Halliday 1990: 
142). Apart from the grammatical processes used in the creation of new terms, 
Halliday argues that language planning has devoted little attention to the 
development of the language itself. Halliday (ibid.) holds that the effort in traditional 
language planning is dedicated to the ‘standardisation and correction of errors’, 
rather than to the development of novel grammatical patterns (for various views on 
the evolutionary changes to grammar see Halliday 1990: 144–171). Hence, most of 
the activities of traditional language planning are institutional rather than systemic 
(Halliday 1993: 225, 1990: 142–143).  
 
Halliday (1993: 221) argues that the practice of classical language and educational 
planning were paralysed by what he called ‘first failed try’ (FFT), in the sense that if 
a theory–driven practice in language planning failed on the first attempt, people 
would abandon it or reintroduce it with a new understanding. According to Halliday, 
any attempt to introduce design into the system of language can succeed under the 
right conditions, and that we have to understand the process we are intervening in. 
For instance, if corpus planners want to design a grammar, then they need to 
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understand how grammars operate, and this presupposes the existence of some 
theory of grammar, or ‘grammatics’ (ibid.: 222). The fact that what Halliday called 
‘language design’ involves intervention into a naturally evolving system places the 
enterprise of language planning at the intersection of two very different and 
potentially oppositional themes: semiotic and design (Halliday: 1990: 142). A 
concrete example of systemically inspired education planning research are the 
Sydney–based programmes which have been developed by, among others, Jim 
Martin, Joan Rothery, and Frances Christie. The work produced by this group has 
involved developing ethnographies first for primary school children, and recently for 
secondary school–based curriculum and workforces. The work of these language 
educators in the area of literacy education has shown ‘how a grammatics can open up 
access to the elaborated discourses of education and employment’ (Halliday 1993: 
228). Since the Hallidayan–based language planning and policy is, in the terms of 
Halliday (1993: 223), ‘a mode of intervention in critical social practices’, it is then 
partial. Halliday’s (1993: 224) stance is that a theory is partial does not necessarily 
entail that every metalinguistic practice is ideologically charged or that all the users 
of a theory share a homogeneous political orientation.    
 
Another approach to language planning derives from critical approaches to language 
study. The term ‘critical’ has a number of definitions in the literature (see Scollon 
2001: 141–142; Wodak 2001: 9). According to Tollefson (2006: 42), the concept 
‘critical’ has three interrelated sense in language planning: 1) It refers to work which 
is critical of traditional approaches to language planning research; 2) It includes work 
which aims at social transformation, and 3) It describes research that draws on the 
insights of critical social theory. Critical social theory involves work by prominent 
figures such as Bourdieu (1991), Foucault (1970, 1972, 1979), Gramsci (1988), 
Habermas (1974, 1979, 1983, 1984, 1987, 1988), and Giddens (1971, 1982a, 1982b, 
1984, 1985, 1987). According to Tollefson (2006: 43–50), much of the research in 
critical theory, which embodies a rethinking of Marxist theory and critiques of 
Marxist and neo–Marxist analysis, has directly inspired critical language planning 
research (e.g.,  Ndhlovu 2006 has examined the marginalisation of the Ndebele 
language in Zimbabwe using Gramsci’s 1988 theory of hegemony).  
 82 
 
Critical linguistics was developed in the 1970s and 1980s at the University of East 
Anglia by Roger Fowler, Tony Trew, and Gunther Kress (see Wodak 2001; 
Blommaert and Bulcaen 2000). Research in critical linguistics has been influenced 
by the writings of prominent thinkers such as George Orwell (1903–1950) who 
focused on how language can be used to persuade and influence the masses (see 
Fowler 1995; Joseph et al. 2001: 29–42). The work of Fowler and his colleagues led 
to the development of ‘critical discourse analysis’ (CDA henceforth) (Wodak 2001: 
3).  
 
Wodak (2001: 4) has traced the intellectual genealogy of CDA to the aftermath of a 
symposium in Amsterdam in January 1991. By accident and through the support of 
the University of Amsterdam, Norman Fairclough, Teun van Dijk, Gunther Kress, 
Theo van Leeuwen and Ruth Wodak confronted each other with their very diverse 
approaches to the analysis of discourse (see Fairclough and Wodak 1997). The 
emergence of CDA is also marked by the publication of van Dijk’s journal Discourse 
& Society (1990). Wodak (2001: 2) defines the enterprise of CDA as a committed 
interdisciplinary approach that ‘aims to investigate critically social inequality as it is 
expressed, signalled, constituted, legitimised and so on by language use (or in 
discourse)’. Fairclough (2001: 4) treats CDA as  the analysis of ‘social interactions in 
a way which focuses upon their linguistic elements, and which sets out to show up 
their generally hidden determinants in the system of social relationships, as well as 
hidden effects they may have upon that system’. Most scholars of CDA would 
endorse Joseph’s (2006a: 17) declaration that ‘language is political from top to 
bottom’. A similar view held by Gee (1999: 1) notes that CDA conceptualises 
language as ‘everywhere and always’ political. Wodak (2001: 2) remarks that CDA 
takes the ‘larger discursive unit of text’ to be the basic unit of analysis. Fairclough 
(2001: 73) argues that a text whether written or spoken in CDA is both a site of and a 
stake in social struggle, and that ideological struggle occurs in discourse. CDA pays 
particular attention to the intertextual and interdiscursive relations i.e., relationships 
between texts (Meyer 2001: 15; Wodak 2001; Fairclough 2001: 127–129). 
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According to Fairclough (2001: 34), CDA views language as ‘social practice 
determined by social structures’. Trappes–Lomax (2004: 146) comments that CDA 
problematises the concept of ‘context of culture’ in terms of discourses and orders of 
discourse in a way which reveals the power and ideologies that lie behind them and 
which are covertly encoded in them. The expression ‘orders of discourse’ refers to 
the linguistic elements of social practices in Fairclough’s (2001) version of CDA. 
Trappes–Lomax (ibid.: 140) identifies the political agenda of CDA as non–
conformist, neo–Marxist, anti–elitist, and anti–neo–liberal. Meyer (2001: 23) has 
pointed out that it is imperative that CDA should be perceived of not as ‘a well–
defined empirical method but rather as a cluster of approaches with a similar 
theoretical base and similar research questions’. Examples of critical approaches to 
discourse analysis include: French discourse analysis (the work of Foucault, 
Pêcheux, and others); Fairclough’s (2001; 1995) CDA; Wodak’s (1996, 2001, 2006; 
Wodak et al. 1999) discourse–historical approach; van Dijk’s (2001) socio–cognitive 
discourse analysis; Scollon’s (2001) mediated discourse analysis (for the differences 
between these approaches see Wodak and Meyer 2001; Fairclough and Wodak 
1997). 
 
Despite the theoretical diversity in the approaches to discourse analysis that operate 
under the banner of criticality, three basic concepts figure invariably in all 
approaches to CDA: power, history and ideology (Wodak 2001: 3). Fairclough 
(2001: 3) views language as the primary domain of ideology, and ideology as the 
favoured vehicle to power in its capacity as ‘a prime means of manufacturing 
consent’. Tollefson (1991: 10) defines ideology as ‘normally unconscious 
assumptions that come to be seen as common sense’. Common–sense assumptions 
are part of what Fairclough (2001) refers to as ‘members’ resources’ (MRs) (i.e., 
interpretative procedures). Fairclough (2001: 117) points out that common–sense 
notions are the focus of CDA because they ‘incorporate ideologies which accord 
with power relations’. Wodak (2001: 10) states that CDA sees ideology ‘as an 
important aspect of establishing and maintaining unequal power relations’.  
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It should be noted that CDA is not without opponents. For instance, Pennycook 
(2001: 85) strongly criticises the theorising of CDA for its inability to problematise 
its status of scientific knowledge, and for its lack of an element of self–reflexivity. 
Another source of criticism stems from what has come to be known as the 
Widdowson–Fairclough debate (Widdowson 1995, 1996; Fairclough 1996). 
Widdowson condemned the term ‘discourse’ as vague and fashionable: ‘Discourse is 
something everybody is talking about but without knowing with any certainty just 
what it is’ (Widdowson 1995: 158). Widdowson (ibid.: 169) contended that CDA 
‘cannot provide analysis but only partial interpretation’. Fairclough (1996: 51) 
replied that that Widdowson’s definition of the term ‘analysis’ reflects ‘a very 
narrow view of analysis’. Fairclough (1996: 51-52) defines analysis as ‘any 
reasonably systematic application of reasonably well–defined procedures to a 
reasonably well–defined body of data’. Fairclough argues that Widdowson’s 
argument is based on a classical liberal view which draws a distinction between 
ideology (partiality) and science (objectivity). In Fairclough’s view (ibid.: 52–53), 
‘we are all – including Widdowson – writing from within particular discursive 
parties entailing interest, commitments, inclusions, exclusions, and so forth’. 
Pennycook (2004: 792) thinks that language planning and policy require ‘a critical 
approach to social relations’. Pennycook has explained that the practice of language 
planning and policy falls easily into the scope of critical (applied) linguistics ‘since it 
would appear from the outset to operate with a political view of language’ (ibid.). A 
CDA–inspired practice of planning and policy would treat texts of national language 
policies as sites of, and stakes in power and ideological struggle (see Tollefson 
2006). 
 
Another critical approach to language planning is critical ethnography (Canagarajah 
1993, 1994, 2006; Braine 1994). The ethnographic perspective can be applied in the 
different stages of language planning. For instance, in status planning ethnography 
suggests that competing languages in different social domains in a multilingual state 
should be given attention. In corpus planning ethnography can help people 
understand its valuation of competing language varieties and select the variety most 
effective for education and other official purposes (Canagarajah 2006: 158).  
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Another type of theorisation that has informed the practice of language planning and 
policy comes from the field of ‘language rights’, ‘linguistic rights’ and/or ‘linguistic 
human rights’ (the three terms are commonly used interchangeably; for the 
intellectual genealogy of these concepts see Joseph 2006a: 55–58; Paulston 1997; 
Spolsky 2004: 114–132). The leading proponents of this approach are Robert 
Phillipson and Tove Skutnabb–Kangas (Skutnabb–Kangas and Phillipson 1994; 
Phillipson and Skutnabb–Kangas 1995). Phillipson and Skutnabb–Kangas (1995: 
483) considered the field of linguistic human rights (LHRs) as one branch of human 
rights, an aim of which, among other things, is to encourage education in the mother 
tongue. Skutnabb–Kangas (2001: 201, 2006: 285) has stated that linguistic human 
rights might be one of the means to: 1) prevent linguistic genocide; 2) promote social 
integration and to defend people against forced assimilation; 3) promote positive 
state policies toward minority languages; 4) promote conflict prevention and self–
determination, and 5) promote linguistic diversity (for a critique of this approach see 
Paulston 1997; Brutt–Griffler 2006; Joseph 2006a: 54–58).  
 
Another facet of language planning is ecolinguistics which was introduced by 
Haugen (1972) with the aim of protecting linguistic diversity using an analogy with 
the need to preserve diversity in nature. Spolsky (2004: 8) argues that it is social 
changes that influence linguistic diversity, so it is social policy rather than language 
policy that should protect it. According to Wright (2004: 12), ecolinguistics has been 
developed from a concern for the disappearance of indigenous ways of making 
meaning. Wright contends that ecolinguistics remains metaphorical, and that it is 
hard to support a case of linguistic diversity on the basis of preserving the diversity 
of species.   
 
Another kind of linguistics that would produce a radically original orientation to 
language planning is provided by Le Page and Tabouret–Keller (Le Page 1988; Le 
Page and Tabouret–Keller 1985). This approach is firmly founded on the 
methodological assumption that language, which is defined as ‘a repertoire of 
socially marked systems’, is ‘essentially idiosyncratic’ (Le Page and Tabouret–Keller 
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1985: 2, 16). The scholars hold that a language and a social group are created 
through acts of identity which individuals make within themselves and with each 
other (ibid.: 2). 
 
Another perspective to language planning is psycho–sociological analysis (Baker 
2006). This approach seeks to provide an analysis and understanding of the effects of 
language policies on individuals and speech communities with the aim to develop 
effective and more realistic language planning strategies and goals. Psycho–
sociological research on language policy draws on academic constructs such as 
language attitudes, on political and bureaucratic mechanisms such as language 
censuses, and on the insights of action research (ibid.: 210).  
 
Drawing on Giles, Bourhis and Taylor’s 1977 ‘structural analysis of ethnolinguistic 
vitality’, Cartwright (2006) has proposed using geolinguistics as an approach to the 
analysis of language policies. This approach is concerned with ‘the investigation of 
historical processes that have contributed to the development of current patterns of 
human contact and interaction between and among different cultural groups’ 
(Cartwright 2006: 194). One of the basic assumptions of the geolinguistic analysis is 
that: ‘Cultural domains are significant to the retention of ethnic identity, and as 
cultural space between ethnic groups erodes through domain sharing as opposed to 
domain exclusion, it is possible to anticipate demands for cultural protection’ (ibid.).   
 
A recent pair of approaches to language planning that operate from a critical 
perspective are postmodernism and governmentality (see Pennycook 2001, 2006; 
Moore 2002; Tollefson 2006). Dean’s (1994: 4) definition of postmodernism as ‘the 
restive problematisation of the given’ underlies the postmodernist approach to 
language and language planning. A postmodernist approach to language planning is 
concerned with the reframing, disinvention and reconstruction of the ways we think 
about language planning and policy (Pennycook: 2006: 69–70). The postmodernist 
understanding of language planning and policy involves: 1) raising significant 
concerns about how power operates in connection with the different forms of social 
integration; 2) emphasising situated, local and contextual ways of understanding 
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language policies; 3) reframing languages as social constructions, and 4) questioning 
grand narratives (ibid.: 64). The notion of ‘language governmentality’, which was 
introduced by Foucault (1991), examines the techniques and practices by which 
government power operates at the micro–level (Pennycook 2002, 2006: 64–65; 
Tollefson 2002, 2006: 49–50). Language governmentality is a critical way of 
investigating the ways in which language policy decisions regulate thought and 
action of different forms of social grouping (Pennycook 2006: 65). Stroud’s (2001: 
339) conception of linguistic citizenship as ‘away of capturing how issues of 
language may be accorded a central place on the arena of education and politics’, 
embodies the relationship between language and governance (see Stroud and Heugh 
2004; McGroarty 2002). 
 
3.2 Language planning and policy and power  
According to Luke et al. (1990), language planning should go beyond the acritical, 
abstract or rhetorical identifications of sociolinguistic problems of those whose 
language is undergoing planning. The writers suggest that language planning should 
explore the complex theoretical relationships between language, ideology, discourse 
and social organisation. Haugen (1983: 286–287) proposes that the scholarship of 
language planning should examine ‘how much influence can be consciously exerted 
by the manipulation of sources of power and how much linguistic change is due to 
underlying and uncontrollable social forces’. There is no agreement among linguists 
on the definition of power. This is evident from the titles of books written on the 
subject including: Foucault’s (1980) Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and 
other Writings 1972–1977; Joseph’s (1987) Eloquence and Power: The Rise of 
Language Standards and Standard Languages; Honey’s (1997) Language Is Power; 
Fairclough’s (2001) Language and Power; Bourdieu’s (1991) Language and 
Symbolic Power, or Lakoff’s (1990) Talking Power: The Politics of Language.  
 
Critical discourse analysts take into consideration the role of discourse in the 
production and reproduction of relations of power within social structures 
(Fairclough 2001; Wooffit 2005: 138). Tollefson (1991: 9) defines power as ‘the 
ability to achieve one’s goals and to control events through intentional actions’. CDA 
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is based on the premise that it is capable of ‘capturing the “dynamic” nature of both 
power relations and text production by uncovering the hegemonic structures within 
texts’ (Joseph: 2004: 58, 2006a: 127). For critical linguists such as Wodak (2001: 
10), language is by no means powerful on its own, but rather it acquires power by the 
use that is made of it by powerful people. Some linguists such as Honey (1997) take 
a different position when they claim that standard versions of languages are in 
themselves powerful, and thus can divide equal opportunities between different 
classes of people.  
 
Tollefson (1991: 10) remarks that power is central to both social structure and 
individual actions, and that there is a dynamic relation between structure and power. 
There is a dialectical relationship between human agency which produces social 
structures, and the social structures which provide meaning for their actions (ibid.: 
13). Despite the fact that power denotes dominance, it produces resistance in the 
sense that people in subordinate positions in social relations can never be completely 
powerless (ibid.: 10). This may be illustrated by the fact that individuals can hold 
their labour in highly centralised bureaucratic systems. Tollefson (ibid.: 10) noted 
that ‘language policy is one of the key mechanisms for state control of labour’.  
 
3.2.1 Language planning and policy, class and the state  
The way critical accounts of language employ the term ‘class’ differs almost 
completely from the one in traditional sociolinguistics. In mainstream 
sociolinguistics, class is used in the non–Marxist sense to refer to ‘social strata – 
groupings of people who are similar to one another in occupation, education or other 
standard sociological variables’ (Fairclough 2001: 8). Critical theorists of language 
and education deal with social class as a structural category of analysis from a 
classical Marxist perspective, and define it as an ‘expression of a relationship to the 
means of production’ (Young and Whitty: 1977: 16). Fairclough (2001: 6) provides a 
similar definition of social class as ‘social forces which occupy different positions in 
economic production, which have different and antagonistic interests, and whose 
struggle is what determines the course of social history’. Social groups identified by 
class, ethnicity or language continuously struggle with each other to gain and sustain 
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power. Critical versions of linguistics define the term ‘struggle’ not as a transitional 
period such as a physical conflict, but rather as ‘the process whereby social 
groupings with different interests engage with one another’ (Fairclough 2001: 28).  
 
Luke et al. (1990) contend that classical language planning has intended to avoid 
addressing larger political and social problems such as class and power. The writers 
hold that the powerful class can ‘decide what language(s) uses can be deemed to be 
politically correct, should be encouraged and furthered, respectively demoted and 
discouraged’ (ibid.: 28). The researchers quoted the existence of examples such as 
low and high prestige languages or pidgin and standard languages as indication of 
class relations. They observed that extreme cases of linguistic oppression include 
‘the total or partial criminalisation of the use of local or vernacular idioms’ (ibid.). 
Wright (2004: 44) has refused to accept that the development of a standard language 
can be presented as a vehicle of class differentiation. For Wright ‘class 
differentiation was always there’ (ibid.). 
 
Tollefson (1991: 10) states that language planning and policy is instrumental in the 
control and reproduction of power by the state and the groups controlling its policy, 
and therefore it is ‘fundamentally rooted in the rise of modern state’. Viewed in this 
way, a language policy might be interpreted as both a component in social struggle 
and a product of it. That is, particular language policies in some states lead to and 
contribute to class relationships (Tollefson 1991: 14). The perception of a language 
policy by different individuals is constrained by their position within the system of 
class relations in which they contribute. One way in which a language policy can 
block consciousness of inequality and class relations is by being expressed as 
commonsensically natural, and this is the realm of ideology (ibid.).  
 
3.2.2 Top–down planning vs. Bottom–up policy 
Broadly speaking, the distinction between top–down and bottom–up approaches to 
language planning and policy is understood to point to the ‘relationship between state 
authored policy and the community affected by language policy’ (Johnson 2004: 93). 
The concept of ‘top–down’ planning is used to refer to ‘people with power and 
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authority who make language related decisions for groups, often with little or no 
consultation with the ultimate language learners or users’ (Kaplan and Baldauf 1997: 
196). Part of the historical development of ‘language planning’ embodied the sense 
of being a top–down process (cf. language engineering) since it was viewed as ‘the 
normative work of language academies and committees’ (Haugen 1969: 287) to 
determine ‘all forms’ (ibid.) of language cultivation and ‘all proposals’ (ibid.) for 
language standardisation. The term ‘planning’ in itself is indicative of this one–street 
relationship since it is concerned with ‘official policy formation by authorities in 
control of power’ (Fishman 1974a: 79). This historical denotation of the term 
‘language planning’ has now substantially changed in the sense that the term can 
now be collocated with impossible–to–plan social practices, such as discourse 
planning. Spolsky (2006) has become convinced that language planning 
conceptualised as ‘an effort by someone with or claiming authority to change the 
language practice (or ideology) of someone else’ (Spolsky and Shohamy 2000: 1) 
has failed in the empowerment of speakers of marginalised languages, and in the 
protection of threatened languages. The death of a number of Jewish varieties points 
to the dark side of the language management (Spolsky’s 2004 term for language 
planning) in Israel. Kaplan and Baldauf (1997) charge that the literature of traditional 
language planning does not mention the agency of the language policy decision, and 
that the agent is typically disguised through the use of passivisation. Being 
influenced by the scientific neutrality of the mainstream linguistics, language 
planning has been represented in empirical terms as objective, ideologically natural 
and technologically informed practice. The identity of language planners within this 
conceptualisation of language planning is of little value as long as they have the 
technical qualifications needed (ibid.: 196). It is generally observed that the top–
down approach has been used by governments for nation and state–building purposes 
in postcolonial countries. 
 
Luke et al (1990) maintain that the problematisation of authority involved in the 
process of language planning goes beyond the class which controls the language to 
implicate the linguists and social planners employed. Luke et al. (ibid.: 30) used the 
term ‘supply side’ ideology to describe the type of planning which regards people 
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whose language is undergoing planning as ‘manipulable objects of economic, 
political and educational engineering’. The researchers add that the supply side of 
planning is a job undertaken by social scientists that possess the cultural and 
linguistic capital which is to be desired. As a consequence, supply side planners 
ignore the interests of the powerless plannees, phrasing the interest of the powerless 
in a series of abstractions such as equality and sociolinguistic rights rather than 
presenting a concrete analysis of their relationship to social structures of power and 
employment (ibid.: 31). The scholars observe that labouring people, particularly in 
East Asian states, have no say on the content of a language plan: 
In the case of such South East Asian states … the ‘clients’ of a language 
plan have limited, if any, effective electoral franchise, and insofar as the 
illusion of franchise exists, legislators’ options are delimited by the 
authoritarian mandates of a ruling class, party or elite. (Luke et al. 
1990: 29–30) 
The essence of the argument of Luke et al. (1990) lies in their claim that the type of 
language planning that lacks a bottom–up element in the sense that it does not 
involve the masses is essentially authoritarian. The danger here is that the social 
institutions, particularly the educational ones, can be turned into a site of social 
conflicts. Calvet (1998: 203) argues that ‘all planning is carried out by a handful of 
planners possessing all the power over a people who are planned’ (cf. Tollefson’s 
1981 ‘centralised language planning’). Calvet warns that language planners should 
exercise caution since all planning presupposes the policy of those in power, and this 
confronts the language planner with a deontological problem: ‘By intervening in the 
languages, he becomes part of the power game’ (ibid.). Freire’s concept of ‘banking 
education’ which is a ‘top to bottom’ communicative approach illustrates the kind of 
top–down planning in language education (see Mayo 1999: 84). However, Ricento 
(2006: 19–20) has noted that educators, legislators, and businesses are largely 
influenced by bottom–up social practices and change. The women’s movement has 
been instrumental in changing attitudes to sexist language in English and other 
languages. The efforts made by the Civil Rights movement in the USA led to the 
abandonment of English literacy as a requirement for voting in the south and the 
provision of bilingual ballots where more than 5 percent of the electorate cannot vote 
in English. The Mother Tongue Movement in Taiwan led to two historical events: it 
led to the review of the Broadcast Bill of 1993, under which local languages were 
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allowed as languages of domestic broadcasts, and it resulted in the reformulation of 
the language–in–education policy which sanctioned the teaching of Taiwanese local 
languages in primary schools (see Chen 2006: 323). The Bafu, Kom, and Nso’ 
language committees in Northwest Cameroon have acted as a bottom–up agency in 
the development of minority languages (Trudell 2006; for other cases in which local 
language speakers acted as bottom–up agents of language planning see Hornberger 
1996). The resistance to dominant language policies and construction of alternative 
language practices by marginalised groups can be a case of language planning from 
below (Canagarajah 2006: 154, 160). Scholars of critical language planning express a 
concern about the role ethnolinguistic societies play in the process of making and 
evaluating language policies. Some critical linguists went so far as to argue that only 
ethnography–based research can save the scholarship of language planning (see 
Fishman 1994a). Canagarajah (2006) has noted that ethnography can provide a 
bottom–up component to the top–down language planning:  
While LPP [language planning and policy] largely works in a top–down 
fashion to shape the linguistic behaviour of the community according to 
the imperatives of policy–makers, ethnography develops grounded 
theories about language as it is practised in localised contexts. 
(Canagarajah 2006: 153) 
It is a moral and democratic imperative for language planners to ‘accept the political 
principle that people who experience the consequences of language policy should 
have a major role in making policy decisions’ (Tollefson 2006: 45). Johnson (2004: 
93) rejects the binary distinctions of top–down and bottom–up language planning and 
policy by contending that they ‘obfuscate the multiple levels of context which 
influence language policy decisions and ignore how policy making power can be 
differentially allocated within the community’.  
 
3.2.3 Language rights  
The concept of ‘language rights’ has a resonance with the critique of linguistic 
imperialism (for a comparative analysis see Joseph 2006a: 54–58; Pennycook 2006: 
67–69). Skutnabb–Kangas (2001: 201) claims that languages are being killed off 
faster than ever before. According to Paulston (1997: 74), language rights are 
primarily about the legislation or lack of legislation for the privileges and rights of 
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languages and their speakers. Turi defines language legislation in the following 
terms: 
The fundamental goal of all language legislation is to resolve, in one 
way or another, the linguistic problems arising from those linguistic 
contacts, conflicts and inequalities, by legally determining and 
establishing the status and use of the languages in question. (Turi 1994: 
111)                                                                                         
According to Joseph (2006a: 54), the concept of language rights begins with the 
claim that communities have the basic human right to use their first language in 
public domains and to have their children educated in it even though it is not the 
majority or official language of the place where they live. Joseph has noted that 
language rights are recent claims which imply that language rights exist in natural 
law and consequently should be enshrined in statue or constitutional law (for the 
historical development of the language rights movement see Joseph 2006a: 55).  
   
More recently some researchers of political science/theory and philosophers have 
intervened into the field of language rights and language policy to produce a 
perspective from a normative political theory to the issue of linguistic diversity (see 
Taylor 1994; Kymlicka 1989, 1995, 2001; Patten 2001; Kymlicka and Grin 2003; 
Kymlicka and Patten 2003; Schmidt 2006). One of the central issues dominating 
political debates over language policy is how to achieve justice and equality among 
ethnolinguistic groups (for the debate between assimilationists and pluralists see 
Schmidt 2006: 104). Kymlicka (1995, 1989, 2001) provides a liberal view of 
minority rights, and suggests principles for the evaluation of the legitimacy of 
different kinds of claims by minority groups within a liberal–democratic model. The 
essence of Kymlicka’s (1989: 164) argument is that individual choices about what is 
good are necessarily made within a ‘context for choice’ which provides them with 
different ways of life. Kymlicka states that the processes by which individuals 
evaluate choices and options are linguistic and historical: ‘Our language and history 
are the media through which we come to an awareness of the options available to us, 
and their significance; and this is a precondition of making intelligent judgements 
about how to lead our lives’ (ibid.: 165). Kymlicka contends that liberals should 
protect cultural structures because ‘it is only through having a rich and secure 
cultural structure that people can become aware, in a vivid way, of the options 
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available to them, and intelligently examine their value’ (ibid.). Kymlicka rejects the 
‘benign neglect’ argument that the state should not promote or inhibit the survival of 
any specific language or culture: 
Government decisions on languages, internal boundaries, public 
holidays, and state symbols unavoidably involve recognising, 
accommodating, and supporting the needs and identities of particular 
ethnic and national groups. The state unavoidably promotes certain 
cultural identities, and thereby disadvantages others. Once we recognise 
this, we need to rethink the justice of minority rights claims. (Kymlicka 
1995: 108) 
Luke et al (1990: 29) counter–argue that by resorting to universal laws of justice and 
equality which are strictly applicable under idealized circumstances, state 
governments ‘allow the rich man to get away while they string up the sheep thief and 
the poacher’ (for a critique of the liberal notion of language rights see Coulmas 1998; 
Pennycook 1998; Phillipson 1998; Chen 1998; Annamalai 1998; Rasool 1998; 
Abdussalam 1998). In the following sub–sections I briefly outline the different 
regimes of language rights in the literature. 
 
3.2.3.1 Tolerance–oriented vs. promotion–oriented rights 
Kloss (1971; 1977) proposed a distinction between tolerance–oriented and 
promotion–oriented rights with reference to the language rights of minority 
immigrants. Kloss (1971: 259) points out that a declaration about language rights of 
minority immigrants should be based on this distinction. A government or any 
official body is said to promote a given dominant or non dominant language if they 
make use of it in their activities including the teaching of a language in state schools, 
the purchasing of minority language books by local libraries; using it in legal 
proceedings, or using it in street signs. Kloss states that all of these rights allow for 
various degrees of intensity. For example, there is a large difference between 
whether a law is printed in a minority’s language for information only or for actual 
use by courts of justice.  
 
Tolerance–oriented or acquiescent rights, on the other hand, grant members of a 
minority group the freedom to use their language in private sociocultural domains 
including establishing of newspaper and periodicals, holding meetings, setting up 
private libraries and educational institutions, running commercial establishments, and 
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using their languages over the phone and in the street. The fact that Kloss was a Nazi 
party member can explain the ultra-fascist notion that a government could 
conceivably have any right even to contemplate regulating how people talk in the 
street or over the phone (see Joseph 2006a: 25). Kloss suggests that tolerance–
oriented rights should be given whenever a minority group indigenous or not wants 
to cultivate their linguistic and cultural practices on condition that they are ready to 
make a concession not to claim any promotion–oriented rights. In return, it is the 
public fund that should incur the costs of protecting these rights, and not the 
members of minority groups or their associations. For Kloss (1971: 260), an 
immigrant minority can make a claim of promotion–oriented rights only ‘after the 
language can be held to have taken root’, or, in the terms of Paulston (1997: 77), 
after ‘three generations of human rights’. It should be stressed that this distinction 
applies only to immigrant groups and not national groups (for the difference between 
the two social groups see Kloss 1971). Drawing on the work of Kloss, Macias (1979) 
proposes two categories of language–related rights: 1) the right to freedom from 
discrimination on the basis of language, and 2) the right to use your language in the 
activities of communal life.  
 
3.2.3.2 Norm–and–accommodation vs. official language rights 
According to Patten and Kymlicka (2003), the norm–and–accommodation approach 
refers to the domination of some language as a means of public communication. That 
is, a particular language is selected to be used in the courts, in the delivery of public 
services and as a medium of public communication. But what about the minority 
group that lacks proficiency in the majority language? The answer, according to this 
approach, is that a special kind of accommodation is made for those who lack 
fluency in the majority language. The accommodation may involve the provision of 
translators or hiring of bilingual staff. The official–language rights approach, on the 
other hand, refers to the selection of some languages and granting them a form of an 
official recognition. In other words, ‘this approach typically involves a degree of 
equality between the different languages that are selected for official status’ (Patten 
and Kymlicka 2003: 28).  
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3.2.3.3 Personal vs. territoriality rights 
Generally speaking, officially bilingual or multilingual states adopt either personal or 
territoriality principles of language rights in their legislation (see Paulston 1997; 
Turi: 1994). According to Cartwright (2006: 202–203), the principle of territoriality 
refers to the situation ‘under which an individual has the right to receive services in 
the language of the majority in a given area’, whereas the principle of personality 
describes the situation where ‘every person is free to obtain services in the language 
of his or her choice throughout a nation or designated area within a nation’. 
According to Patten and Kymlicka (2003: 29), the personality principle refers to the 
‘principle that citizens should enjoy the same set of official language rights no matter 
where they are in the country’. That is, persons have the right to speak a particular 
language wherever they desire to live in the state. Personal rights are portable and 
belong to the individual wherever he or she goes and interacts with bodies of the 
state (Schiffman 1996: 29). The territoriality principle, on other hand, states that 
‘language rights should vary from region to region according to local conditions’ 
(Patten and Kymlicka 2003: 29). In this sense, language rights rely on what part of 
the territory of the country people find themselves in. But to avoid any essentialism, 
Joseph (2006a: 55) reminds us that ‘languages belong to people, not to places’.  
 
It is strongly believed that the territoriality principle refers to an attempt to divide a 
polylingual country into a series of sublingual regions in which only the local 
majority language gets used in a wide range of situations. Van Parijs (2000: 218) 
believes that ‘if weaker languages are to survive, the countries in which they are 
spoken will have to insist on the linguistic territoriality principle’. The widely cited 
example of a country which applies the personal principle is Canada. The federal 
Canadian legislation asserts the right to services in English or French regardless of 
territory (see Nelde et al. 1992). For the territoriality principle, Belgium and 
Switzerland are cases in point (see Patten and Kymlicka 2003; Schmidt 2006). 
 
3.2.3.4 Universal and group differentiated rights 
In 1995 Phillipson and Skutnabb–Kangas (1995: 483) argued a case for the 
‘formulation and ratification of a Universal Declaration of Linguistic Human Rights’. 
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This argument was accepted and turned into a reality in 1996 in Barcelona when a 
World Conference on Linguistic Rights signed a Universal Declaration of Linguistic 
Rights submitted to the UN to render it into a convention of the United Nation with 
Skutnabb–Kangas acting as one of the consultants representing the International 
Association of Applied Linguistics (see the Universal Declaration of Linguistic 
Rights). Researchers distinguish between individual and collective rights, although 
the Universal Declaration covers both dimensions of language rights (see Patten and 
Kymlicka 2003). Universal rights may be defined as ‘rights that everyone in the 
relevant jurisdiction has, irrespective of the particular language group to which they 
belong’ (Patten and Kymlicka 2003: 30). In contrast, group–differentiated rights 
involve ‘rights that can be exercised only by members of designated language 
groups’ (ibid.). A good example of a region that applies this principle of language 
rights option is Quebec in Canada. Moreover, this type of language rights decides 
whether a person has a right to claim a linguistic accommodation at all. 
 
3.3 Educational planning and literacy: Critical approaches to literacy 
According to Kaplan and Baldauf (1997: 149) the formulation of literacy policy 
depends on the way the term ‘literacy’ is conceptualised. For instance, yesterday’s 
literacy in the sense of encoding and decoding written information has changed 
significantly in today’s society (ibid.). Today literacy may refer to that ‘set of skills 
required, by any given society, of individuals who wish to function above the 
subsistence level’ (ibid.: 145). Archer (2006: 449) has contended that the 
visual/verbal divide should be problematised and a multimodal approach to language 
education and communication should be endorsed. March (2006) has investigated the 
type of understanding and knowledge of multimodal texts developed by nursery 
children. March has concluded that ‘early childhood educators need to understand 
the nature of new authorial practices if they are to provide appropriate scaffolding for 
children’s learning in the new media age’ (ibid.: 493). Drawing on Gee’s (1990) 
distinction between primary (e.g., informal home discourse) and secondary (e.g., 
university lecture) discourses, Gough and Bock (2001: 95) have found that 
traditional communities in South Africa have both historically–rooted primary and 
secondary discourses  
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Critical linguists use the expression ‘literacy myth’ to refer to a view which confers 
on literacy many profound sociopolitical effects (Pennycook 2001: 76). The 
development of critical approaches to literacy in 1970s and 1980s has marked a 
significant and evolving orientation to literacy education. This led to a shift away 
from individualist and psychological frameworks of reading and writing towards 
those approaches which use cultural, sociological, and discourse theory to reframe 
textual practices, the literate subject, and classroom pedagogy (Luke 1997: 143). In 
Australia, Canada, and the US, critical approaches to literacy have been productively 
allied with other social theorisations (e.g., neo–Marxist cultural studies, post–
structuralist discourse theory, and postcolonial and feminist studies) to develop new 
pedagogical approaches to the teaching of textual representation and practice, action 
and agency (ibid.). Clark and Ivani (1997: 20) argue that the values attached to 
writing are ‘all essentially political and bound up with the way in which a social 
formation operates’. Joseph (2006a: 29) states that ‘the maintenance of even a 
minimally distinctive writing system is a potent way of performing a distinct national 
identity’. 
 
The critical view of literacy does not see literacy as a monolithic entity, rather as ‘a 
set of contextualised social practices’ (Pennycook 2001: 77). Although critical 
approaches to literacy share an orientation towards viewing literacy or literacies as 
social practices related to wider social and political concerns, there is some variation 
between them (see Luke 1997; Luke and Freebody 1997: 1). Critical approaches to 
literacy investigate literacy as plural social practices situated within their social 
environment, examples of which include: literacy practices (Baynham 1995), social 
literacies (Gee 1990; Street 1995), multiliteracies (Cope and Kalantzis 2000; New 
London Group 1996), multilingual literacies (Martin–Jones and Jones 2000), and 
situated literacies (Barton, Hamilton and Ivani 2000). Clark (1992: 137) points out 
that a significant aspect of critical literacy awareness is to enable learners to 
emancipate themselves by developing alternatives to dominant conventions. 
Pennycook (2001: 78) states that it is not sufficient to socially contextualise literacy 
practices but also to ‘offer a political critique of those contexts or an adequate vision 
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of change’. According to Luke (1997), there are a number of different orientations to 
critical literacy, including Freirean–based critical pedagogy, text analytic approaches, 
and feminist and post–structuralist approaches. In the subsequent space I shall try to 
outline the main theoretical principles of each of these critical approaches.  
 
Critical pedagogical approaches to literacy have emerged predominantly from the 
North American context, and have been primarily concerned with the ‘voices’ of 
marginalised learners (Pennycook 2001: 100). Scholars of critical pedagogy argue 
that ‘the dominant curriculum and teaching practices of mainstream schools silence 
the ideas, cultures, languages, and voices of students from other backgrounds’ (ibid.). 
The term ‘voice’ here does not refer exclusively to oral language, it refers to the 
opening up of a possibility for the marginalised to talk, read, or write, so that the 
voicing of their social conditions might change both their lives and the social system 
that excluded them. (ibid.: 101). Paulo Freire (1970), who is generally associated 
with this line of critical literacy, views literacy as away of empowering and liberating 
the oppressed. Freire defined the ‘illiterate’ in the following terms: 
The illiterate is no longer a person living on the fringe of society, a 
marginal man, but rather a representative of the dominated strata of 
society, in conscious or unconscious opposition to those who, in the 
same structure, treat him as a thing. Thus also teaching men to read and 
write is no longer an inconsequential matter of ba, be, bi, bo, bu, of 
memorising an alienated word, but a difficult apprenticeship in naming 
the world. (Freire 1994: 255) 
Freire (1970: 58) uses the concept of ‘banking education’ (cf. Luke et al’s 1990 
supply side ideology; Reddy’s 1979 conduit metaphor) to describe the kind of 
pedagogy in which a teacher is viewed as a depositor and students as depositories. 
The alternative is a dialogic character of education as a practice of freedom. Freire 
(1970: 69) writes: ‘Education as the practice of freedom – as opposed to education as 
the practice of domination – denies that man is abstract, isolated, independent, and 
unattached to the world; it also denies that the world exists as a reality apart from 
men’. Freire’s widely cited book the Pedagogy of the Oppressed(1970) embodies a 
view of a ‘pedagogy which must be forged with, not for, the oppressed (whether 
individuals or peoples) in the incessant struggle to regain their humanity’ (ibid.: 33). 
Freire (ibid.: 40) states that the pedagogy of the oppressed, as a humanist and 
libertarian pedagogy, consists of two stages. In the first stage, the oppressed discover 
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the world of oppression and through praxis (i.e., reflection and action upon the world 
to change it) commit themselves to transforming it. In the second stage, in which the 
reality of the oppression has already been changed, this pedagogy becomes pedagogy 
of all people in the process of permanent liberation. The product of this process is the 
emergence of a ‘new man’ who is neither oppressor nor oppressed (ibid.: 42). The 
pedagogy of the oppressed as a form of libratory education deals with the local 
concerns and social conditions of the people from which a list of thematic and 
generative words are developed. Freire views literacy education as a form of 
conscientisation that would lead people to understand that their social conditions are 
alterable by cultural actions. Freire holds that ‘it is only the oppressed who, by 
freeing themselves, can free their oppressors’ (ibid.: 42). Luke (1997: 146) 
comments that this intellectual stance reframes literacy as ‘a site of dialogue, 
ideology critique and productive cultural action’.  
 
Another critical orientation to literacy is embodied in those feminist and post–
structuralist approaches which draw on the work of Michel Foucault, Jacques 
Derrida, and others. The main theoretical premise is that classroom contexts should 
be restructured to encourage a critical understanding of how discourse constructs 
cultures and identities, life worlds and trajectories (Luke 1997: 146). Rockhill writes:  
The politics of literacy are integral to the cultural genocide of a people, 
as well as the gendering of society. The construction of literacy is 
embedded in the discursive practices and power relations of everyday 
life – it is socially constructed, materially produced, morally regulated, 
and carries a symbolic significance which cannot be captured by its 
reduction to any one of these. (Rockhill 1994: 247) 
Post–structuralist and feminist educational approaches to literacy concentrate on the 
investigation of the ways in which dominant discourses and texts define and position 
human subjects in relations to knowledge and power (Luke 1997: 147). This led to a 
classroom focus on the critical deconstruction of discourses of literary and popular 
culture, concentrating on the ways in which power relations operate through 
discourse. Luke characterises the objectives of these approaches in these terms: 
Poststructuralist and feminist educational work sets as its goal a critical 
deconstruction of master narratives, of patriarchal discourses and 
‘regimes of power’ at work in everyday life. Its normative goal, then, is 
neither utopian nor revolutionary, but entails the provision of pedagogy 
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conducive to the critique of fixed meanings, and the generation of new 
and different kinds of texts, identities, and voices. (Luke 1997: 147) 
According to Luke (ibid.), post–structuralist and feminist educational approaches aim 
at providing students with critical perspectives on identity in modern society, a 
critical understanding of how modes of discourse construct and position viewers and 
readers. Deconstructive analyses have become the primary practice for revealing 
ways of constructing texts and identities in contestation with taken–for–granted 
classifications and categories of popular texts. One of the criticisms against post–
structuralist and Freirean–based approaches to literacy is that their focus on text 
deconstruction and ideological analysis might fail to provide marginalised students 
with extensive knowledge about how texts work (ibid.).  
 
A third critical perspective to literacy is ‘genre’ approaches. Unlike post–structuralist 
and feminist approaches, supporters of genre approaches to literacy argue for an 
explicit teaching of the canonical discourse and texts which are associated with 
institutional power and access in capitalist economies (see Cope and Kalantzis 1993). 
For instance, the genre approach to literacy which emerged in North America 
through the work of Delpit (1995), calls for the explicit exposition of Black and 
minority students to the culture and language of power. Although North American 
approaches to genre focus on the need for social power, they do not address directly 
questions of ideology critique or the teaching of literacy as a means for the 
redistribution of material resources (Luke 1997: 148). A similar genre–based 
approach to critical literacy was developed in Australia. This genre–based literacy 
movement, which emerged as a reaction to the weakness of student–centred 
approaches, holds that the implicit teaching of liberal progressivism marginalises 
students form minority backgrounds. Alternatively, this approach proposes a form of 
critical literacy based on overt teaching of genres (Pennycook 2001: 96). This 
approach has drawn on the insights of systemic–functional grammar, and has been 
implemented in a number of states (see Halliday and Martin 1993; Halliday 1996; 
Hasan 1996). Systemic– functional approaches define critical literacy as ‘the 
demystification of how specialised academic texts and scientific discourses work, 
and the provision of a flexible repertoire of functional linguistic tools that will enable 
broader and expanded access to dominant social institutions’ (Luke 1997: 148).  
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A fourth approach to critical literacy is CDA and critical language awareness 
(henceforth CLA) (see Fairclough 2001; 1992; Section 3.1.5 and next section). These 
models teach students how to use the tools of discourse analysis to critically 
evaluate, challenge and reconstruct a range of literacy and popular texts. These 
approaches have been implemented in areas of English as a second language 
teaching, adult basic education, postcolonial education, literary studies and early 
childhood literacy programmes (e.g., Hamilton, Barton and Ivani 1994). These 
models focus on the explicit teaching of students how discourses of domination work 
in connection to particular linguistic markets (Luke 1997: 148). Fairclough (2000: 
162) remarks that the way in which language is framed has a pervasive effect both on 
views of literacy education and on theories of semiosis. Fairclough suggests that the 
notions of ‘order of discourse’ (i.e., linguistic social practice) and ‘intertextuality’ 
can provide ‘a means of systematically mapping properties of society and culture on 
to properties of texts by way of intertextual analysis’ (ibid.: 174).  
 
A recent approach to critical literacy is ‘applied postlinguistic approach’ developed 
by Pennycook (2001). The main theoretical premises of this approach are that 
language and literacy are always political and that literacy practices and texts are 
always embedded in social contexts. The focus is on the production and reception of 
texts. It aims at explaining power, and uses textual analysis as a means for doing so, 
while developing ways in which students can resist and transform discourses (ibid.: 
112). 
 
3.4 Language planning and language education: Critical language awareness 
According to Tollefson (1991: 7), language education is fundamental to 
understanding a number of aspects of social organisation including ethnic and 
linguistic conflicts, the allocation of economic resources, and the structure of labour 
force. Tollefson (1991: 13) notes that education is the arena in which social struggle 
is the most obvious. Dominant and subordinate groups often get involved in struggle 
over recognition of various cultures and languages in the educational curriculum. 
Fairclough (2001: 54) maintains that ‘the educational system has the major 
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immediate responsibility for differentials in access’. Tollefson (1991: 8) believes that 
whenever individuals are required to learn a new language to have access to 
education, language becomes a cause in the creation and maintenance of economic 
and social divisions. Educational institutions, particularly in Africa, act as 
gatekeepers for the work force, determining which different kinds of jobs are open to 
different groups and individuals. Joseph (1987: 43) points out that in the past 
educational and cultural institutions widened the gap between power holders and the 
masses through controlling access to language of power. 
 
Pennycook (2001: 94–96) states that CLA is developed as a critique of liberal 
pedagogies, and is intended to bring CDA into the classroom as a pedagogical 
device. CLA is sometimes thought of as a combination of critical discourse analysis 
and critical literacy (ibid.: 12). Fairclough (2001: 198–202) provides a model of CLA 
based on the insights of his critical form of discourse analysis, which I reproduce 
below. The model is based on two guiding principles: 
1. Marrying awareness and practice: developing children’s potential language 
capabilities relies on a marriage of purposeful discourse practice and critical 
language awareness. This principle suggests that awareness may best be 
achieved through the development of children’s self–consciousness about 
their own purposeful discourse, and that the range of purposeful discourse 
available to children should be enhanced as their awareness develops. Two 
levels in the development of CLA should be distinguished: 
Level 1: Awareness of MRs (members’ resources) in the production and 
interpretation: this level corresponds to the stage of interpretation of the CDA 
procedure as suggested by Fairclough (2001).   
Level 2: Awareness of the social determinants of MRs: this level corresponds 
to the stage of explanation of the CDA procedure. It involves investigating 
the social origins and the ideological effects of relations of power upon MRs, 
and the ways in which both MRs and the social relations underlying them are 
reproduced and transformed in discourse. The task here is to develop the 
capabilities of children to the level where the common–sense practices of 
dominant orders of discourse are challenged and ultimately transformed. 
 104 
2. Building on experience: CLA should be based on the experience of children 
and their existing language capabilities. 
Fairclough suggests a cyclical metalanguage model to enable children to talk about 
texts, interaction, and social contexts (i.e., principle 2). This model shows how 
children should be taught about language: 
(i) Reflection on experience: children are asked to reflect on their own 
discourse and their experience of social constraints upon it, and to share 
their reflections with the class. 
(ii) Systematising experience: the teacher intervenes to show students how 
they can express their reflections in a systematic form, giving them the 
status of knowledge.  
(iii) Explanation: this knowledge is subjected to further collective reflection 
and analysis by the class, and social explanations are sought (level 2 of 
CLA)  
(iv) Developing practice: the awareness resulting from (i)–(iii) is employed to 
develop the child’s capability for purposeful discourse (Principle 1). 
Children at this stage should be able to produce ‘emancipatory’ discourse 
which goes outside the dominant conventions in some ways (for a 
concrete illustration of the whole model see Fairclough 2001: 201)  
 
3.5 Language planning and the construction of national languages and identities 
Fishman (1968) draws a distinction between four types of social integration, each 
having particular language needs: nation, nationality, nationalism, and nationism. 
The term ‘nation’ is defined as a ‘politico–geographic entity’ (ibid.: 39), and it does 
not have to have a high degree of sociocultural unity. Nationality is conceptualised as 
a ‘sociocultural entity’ (ibid.), which may possess no corresponding politico–
geographic accomplishment. The term ‘nationalism’ is used in three different senses 
in political science and social anthropology. First, ‘nationalism’ describes the process 
through which nationalities successfully acquire a politico–geographical entity (i.e., 
becomes a nation with state). In this sense ‘nationalism’ describes the ‘driving or 
organising dynamic’ process which transforms nationality into nation (ibid.: 40). 
Secondly, the term ‘nationalism’ is used to describe the process whereby ‘nations 
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have constantly gone on to absorb and consolidate territories peopled by quite 
different nationalities’ (ibid.). Thirdly, the term ‘nationalism’ is also operationalised 
by some researchers to identify the processes through which nationalities were 
themselves established, out of prior tradition–bound ethnic groups (ibid.). As a result 
of symbolic elaboration, the daily social practices which constitute traditional 
ethnicity (e.g., ways of speaking and celebrating), turn out to be seen not as 
ideologised, particularised and localised practices, but rather as representations of 
common values, history, goals, etc. A number of postcolonial countries in Africa and 
Asia have gone through this ideological transformation from tradition–bound 
ethnicity to homogenising nationality. This change is reflected in language because 
the differences between the national, the local, and the marginal obtain, and because 
the actual range of varieties in the nationality–conscious speech elaborates (ibid.: 
41).  
 
Fishman proposes the term ‘nationism’ (political integration within an established 
nation–state), which he defines in the following way: ‘Whenever the boundary of the 
nation, however, is more ideologised than that of the nationality we may also begin 
to find pressure building up for “authentic” cultural unification or intensification. 
These are the nationalistic consequences of nationism’ (ibid.: 42–43). Each of these 
forces (nationalism or nationism) produces specific language problems. For example, 
for a population actively seeking the sociocultural unification to suit those whose 
common nationality is manifest, the selection of a national language is not a goal 
because it is already a saliently ideologised sign. The language problems for this type 
of nationalism are language maintenance, modernisation (including codification and 
elaboration) and reinforcement so as to cultivate the nationalistic superiority of the 
vertical sociocultural entity. Nationism (i.e., the geographical boundaries are far in 
advance of sociocultural unity), by contrast, faces a different type of language 
problems. Problems related to horizontal sociocultural integration including an 
immediate language and widespread literacy become imperatives for the functional 
existence itself of the nation (ibid.: 43). Nationalism views language as one of its key 
markers of both self identity and group identity, i.e., sociocultural integration, 
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whereas nationism sees (a standard) language as a vehicle for operational efficiency, 
i.e., political integration (ibid.: 43– 44). 
 
Ferguson (2006: 17) has noted that language planning is historically associated with 
the state formation and nation–building in Europe. Ferguson has added that the 
newly emerged states of African and Asia were considered the appropriate arena for 
language planning and policy because their patterns of language allocation were 
viewed as less fixed than those of the European counties (ibid.: 1–2). France 
instituted the principle of ‘one nation, one language’ which has ever since governed 
the language ideologies of nation–states (Spolsky 2006: 89). Kedourie (1960: 9) 
describes nationalism as ‘a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century’. Gellner (1997: 10–11) rejects Kedourie’s view that nationalism 
is just an ideological construction, rather he believes that it emerged out of particular 
social conditions, though he agrees it is not a natural development. Baycroft (1998: 
3) argues that ‘the history of Europe from 1789 to 1945 is synonymous with the 
history of the growth and development of modern nations’.  
 
Two broad approaches to the study of nationalism are generally recognised: the 
primordialist and the modernist (or constructionist) approaches (see Fishman 2002). 
Primordialism is used to refer to researchers who believe in the antiquity and 
naturalness of nations (Ozikirimli 2000: 64). Language is among the objects of ethnic 
attachments which define an ethnic nation. Edward Shils (1957) and Clifford Geertz 
(1973) are generally identified with primordialism. Unlike the primordialist approach 
to language, the constructionist approach deals with language and identity as 
historical and ideological constructs. According to Joseph (2004: 84), the 
constructionist paradigm treats identity as a ‘process in which individuals construct 
categorical belonging, both for themselves and for others with whom they come in 
contact’. The contributions of Eric Hobsbawm (1983) Benedict Anderson (1991) are 
examples of a constructivist interpretation. Hobsbawm (1983) asserts the role of 
‘invented traditions’ in the production of feelings of belonging and solidarity. 
Anderson (1991: 6) defines a nation as ‘an imagined political community’. Anderson 
focuses on the role of print language and its products such as newspapers in the 
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forging of national consciousness by promoting standardisation of vernacular 
languages. Carmichael (2000: 282) strongly criticises Hobsbawm and Anderson’s 
focus on the constructedness of national identities when she notes that even if 
national identities are constructed, the construction derives from some actual 
historical past. Joseph (2004; 2006c: 262) has remarked that there is a shift in the 
study of social identities from an essentialist to a constructionist perspective; 
however, he has warned against losing sight of the fact that linguistic identities 
themselves function in an essentialising way by allowing us to identify who people 
are according to the way they speak— a function of enormous importance regardless 
of whether the identifications made are well-founded. Joseph (2004: 13) charges that 
Anderson does not consider the relationship between language and identity from a 
dialectical perspective: ‘Anderson gives all his attention to how national languages 
shape national identities and none to how national identities shape national 
languages, which they do very profoundly’.  
 
Ivani (1997) has examined the discoursal construction of identity in academic 
writing and surveyed the different terms employed by different scholars to describe 
identity. Ivani comments on the problematic character of the term ‘identity’: 
The term ‘identity’ is useful, because it is the everyday word for 
people’s sense of who they are, but it doesn’t automatically carry with it 
the connotations of social reproduction and constraint which are 
foregrounded by the terms ‘subject’ and ‘subjectivity’. It is also a 
misleading singular word. The plural word ‘identities’ is sometimes 
better, because it captures the idea of people identifying simultaneously 
with a variety of social groups. (Ivani 1997: 10–11) 
Wright (2004) has reviewed the history of language planning from nationalism to 
globalisation, and she has made a distinction between state–nations and nation–states 
according to the different state building processes they have undergone. On one 
hand, in state–nations such as France, boundaries were first fixed and then a long–
term process of homogenising the people began. Religious unity was the main 
concern of the European leaders, who believed that ‘national identity would develop 
in part from this unity of populations in religious practice’ (ibid.: 27). The 
nineteenth–century nationalist projects encouraged deliberate linguistic unification in 
terms of corpus planning within a national community of communication, and 
divergence or differentiation from other speech communities (ibid.: 42). The latter 
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function (i.e., differentiation) may explain why mutually intelligible dialects such as 
Czech and Slovak, or Croatian and Serbian, were differentiated by nationalist 
movements. In other words, linguistic differentiation was one of the effective 
political strategies that can be employed to achieve the project of a separate national 
community or statehood. Thus, corpus planning has two missions: it differentiates a 
particular language from its neighbours and reinforces internal cohesion and unity. In 
nation states (e.g., Germany), on the other hand, the existence of a particular 
nationalist discourse of an ethnic group based on a belief in the primordial unity, 
common history, and language motivated them to have their own state. The 
connection of language to nation furnished language with a foundational role in 
European nationalism (ibid.: 17–18). According to Wright, the nineteenth–century 
nationalists believed that both missions can be accomplished by constantly policing 
the language, i.e., preserving a language in its purest form (for different types of 
‘purism’ see Thomas 1991).  
 
Kloss (1967) introduces the terms ‘Abstand’ and ‘Ausbau’ to identify the type of 
linguistic dimension of difference among languages (e.g., the difference between a 
dialect and a language). ‘Abstand’ varieties are those languages which are clearly 
identifiable as languages separate from those around them in linguistic terms. 
Abstand or structural difference grants the designation of ‘language’ to a given idiom 
on a non–political basis (Joseph 1987: 2). Speakers of Abstand languages are on 
linguistic islands (Wright 2004: 48). For a social dialect to be identified as a separate 
language ‘the idiom must show a considerable amount of internal disparity from all 
related “languages” under which it might conceivably be subsumed’ (Joseph 1987: 
2). Examples of Abstand languages include the Basque which is one of the few pre–
Indo–European idioms to have survived in the West, and Albanian which is an Indo–
European language but in a separate branch on its own (Wright 2004: 48). These 
Abstand languages have played a significant role in claims for a separate national 
identity by their speakers (ibid.). ‘Ausbau’ languages, on the other hand, emerged as 
dialects on a continuum and then later were recognised as distinct languages as a 
result of the application of corpus planning processes of codification and elaboration 
(ibid.). The Ausbau process which may be defined as ‘differentiation through 
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elaboration and development’ was instrumental in the realisation of a number of 
nineteenth–century nationalist projects (ibid.). Fishman (2000: 45) defines Ausbau as 
‘autonomy–motivated distancing’. Ferguson (2006: 21) has remarked that conscious 
differentiation through the Ausbau process of the national language variety from 
other related varieties is one aspect of linguistic unification. Joseph (1987) charges 
that the explanatory power of the Klossian concepts is limited, and that they focus 
almost entirely on variables related to language and its use, ignoring language–
external political variables which may overrule the linguistic variables: ‘When a 
linguistic criterion comes into contact with a political one, the latter is likely to 
dominate’ (ibid.: 3). Another aspect of linguistic unification is standardisation (see 
Section 3.1.3.1). Fairclough (2001: 47) contends that standardisation plays an 
ideological role in the establishment of nationhood, and ‘nation–state is the favoured 
form of capitalism’. Wiley (2006: 135) has pointed out that linguistic standardisation 
is a key constituent of the nation–building projects: ‘Linguistic standardisation and 
dialect homogenisation through the promotion of mass literacy are recipes from the 
nation–builder’s cookbook that can be reduced to a step–by–step formula of status 
and corpus planning’. It should be mentioned that the opposite process of Ausbau is 
Einbau which has as its objective ‘the drawing of two languages closer together, so 
that they may become more similar to each other and, perhaps, ultimately, fuse into 
one’ (Fishman 2000:45). 
 
Critical linguists inspired by the work of Foucault and Bourdieu treat identity as a 
product of discourse and intersubjective product of the social (Benwell and Stokoe 
2006: 8). The turn to post–structuralism led to the rejection of essentialist accounts in 
favour of ‘constructionist’ modes of thinking (ibid.). This led to the emergence of a 
number of theories and approaches to the study of identities including discursive and 
ideological approaches rooted in social theory and theories of performativity (ibid.). 
Pennycook (2006: 64) has stated that postmodernism raises a number of questions 
for language planning about the ways in which power operates in relation to nation–
state and about the way governance is achieved through language. Joseph (2004, 
2006c, 2006d) has commented that identity itself is a performative function of 
language. Billig (1995) introduces the term ‘banal nationalism’ to describe the daily 
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use of national symbols such as flags and coins in the continuous reproduction and 
reinforcement of national sentiments in a population. According to Tollefson (1991: 
9), national languages serve the interests of dominant groups by controlling access to 
political institutions of power. Tollefson concludes that ‘national languages, which 
restrict access to decision making in the name of nationhood, are inherently 
ideological’ (ibid.). Joseph (2004, 2006c: 262) has argued that identity is a double–
edge sword: while it productively functions to provide us with a sense of belonging, 
it does so by distinguishing an ‘us’ from a ‘them’ which becomes quite easy to 
demonise. 
 
3. 6 Language planning and language policy in Africa: The case of Nigeria  
To round off this chapter, the present section examines language policy and planning 
in an African country with a history broadly similar to that of Sudan in certain 
respects, in order to provide a comparative counterpoint for the Sudanese case that 
will form the subject of the rest of this thesis. The comparison will help us to gauge 
which aspects of the Sudanese situation are unique and which represent more general 
trends. This in turn will allow for a better informed choice regarding possible and 
likely outcomes and solutions.  
 
Nigeria as a geographical political entity came into being in 1914 when the British 
colonial regime merged the Northern and Southern Protectorates into a single 
administrative entity (Aguolu 1979: 517). A number of culturally diverse ancient 
kingdoms were amalgamated to establish the new nation that came to be known as 
Nigeria. These are the Hausa–Fulani and Kanem empires of the north, and the Benin, 
Oyo and Igbo (or Ibo) Kingdoms of the south (Attah 1987: 400). Hence, the 
enormous ethnolinguistic, religious, and cultural diversity of Nigeria is traceable to 
the arbitrary colonial partitioning of Africa which was incompatible with the 
precolonial politico–linguistic and socio–ethnic groupings. With an area of 356,669 
square miles, Nigeria contains some 250 ethnic groups, the Hausa–Fulani, Yoruba, 
and Ibo (or Igbo) being the dominant ones (Aguolu 1979: 513). The Hausa–Fulani 
are concentrated in the north, the Yoruba in the west and the Ibo in the eastern part of 
the country. Muslims who dominate in the north are said to make up over 45% of the 
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national population; Christians who dominate mainly in the south constitute around 
35%, and followers of traditional religions or animists compose the rest. Northern 
Nigeria adopted Islam as far back as the eleventh century when West Africa was 
invaded by the Arabs from North Africa (a similar distribution of global religions 
obtains in Sudan, where Islam dominates in the north and Christianity in the south, as 
will be seen in Chapter 4).  
 
The number of languages listed in Ethnologue for Nigeria is 521, of which 510 are 
living languages, and two are second languages without native speakers, and nine are 
extinct languages (see Ethnologue, Languages of Nigeria; Map 3.1). Of the four 
language phyla into which Greenberg (1963a) classifies African languages, three are 
represented in Nigeria. The language family that is not represented in Nigeria is 
Khoisan (the same linguistic representation obtains in the Sudan—Chapter 2). 
According to Aguolu (1979: 516), because of the sizeable number of Nigerian 
languages, post–independent governments kept the colonial language English as the 
official language of the country. 
 
It is generally believed that ethnic and cultural diversity acted as a barrier to national 
unity, and was among the forces behind the Nigeria–Biafra war (1967–1970). 
Peshkin (1967: 323) points out that ‘colonial and military force and administration 
created a semblance of peace and unity over diverse tribal territories’.  
 
Peshkin argued that British colonial policies hindered the development of national 
consciousness in Nigeria. First, the British colonial administration introduced 
separate government structures for different parts of the country, particularly for the 
northern and southern provinces, from 1900 to 1922 (cf. the Closed District Order in 
the Sudan, Chapter 4). Education in the Northern and Southern Provinces of Nigeria 
was separately managed until 1928 (Peshkin, ibid.). Secondly, the colonial 
administration implemented the principle of Indirect Rule, which led to the rejection 
of Western education, particularly by the Hausa–Fulani tribal leaders in the north (cf. 
the effects of the Indirect Rule in the Sudan, Chapter 4). Aguolu (1979: 517) argues 
that ‘the colonial officials discouraged, in fact, debarred the diffusion of Christianity 
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and Western education in the Moslem North, which the northern leaders considered 
deleterious to their traditional beliefs, customs, and deeply entrenched interests’. 
 
 
Map 3.1. Languages of Nigeria (Source: Ethnologue, Languages of Nigeria, 
http://www.ethnologue.com/show_map.asp?name=NG&seq=20. Accessed 23 
January 2007). 
 
According to Aguolu (1979: 517), the 1951 Constitution led to the establishment of 
regional governments in 1952. Each of the three regions of the North, East, and West 
was dominated by a particular ethnic group: the Hausa–Fulani in the north, the 
Yoruba in the West, and the Ibo (or Igbo) in the East. The year 1954 witnessed the 
introduction of federalism. The Eastern and Western Regions gained self–
government within the federation in 1957, and the Northern Region in 1959. Nigeria 
achieved its independence in 1960. A military decree of May 1967 divided the 
regions into twelve states (for detailed information about Nigeria’s federalism see 
Afigbo 1991; Olowu 1991; Adamolekun 1991; Osaghae 1991). The aim of the 
twelve–state structure was to protect minority ethnic groups from the domination of 
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powerful ones (similarly the present–day Sudan has adopted a federal system to 
ensure an equal distribution of power and material resources).   
 
Aguolu (1979: 515) maintains that ‘ethnicity is the most powerful determinant of 
access to education’, and that ‘cultural, values and personality traits’ led to different 
level of educational attainment among ethnic groups. Some scholars blame the 
educational apparatus for failure to cultivate a unified cultural identity over the 
whole country. Peshkin (1967) argues strongly that it is the broader social structure 
within which education is embedded which should be held accountable for the 
disunity between the south and the north. Peshkin (ibid.: 331) writes: ‘schools do not 
usually create beliefs, attitudes, or values; they communicate them from sources 
outside the school’. The words of Alhaji Ahmed Bello (1909–1966), the late Prime 
Minister of the Northern Region, may lend support to Peshkin’s argument: 
We had no sentimental illusions about leaving the others [the 
southerners]: they had acted in such a way that it was abundantly clear 
to us that they would sooner see the back of us … We must aim at a 
looser structure for Nigeria while preserving its general pattern – a 
structure which would give the Regions the greatest possible freedom of 
movement and action; a structure which would reduce the powers of the 
Centre to the absolute minimum and yet retain sufficient national unity 
for practical and international purposes. (Bello 1962: 136) 
The fact that Nigeria’s federalism is an inherited practice from the colonial period 
has led a number of scholars who are sympathetic to the cause of Nigerian 
nationalism to blame it for the postcolonial sociopolitical divisiveness in the country 
(Afigbo 1991: 13). Afigbo notes that one methodological problem in the study of 
Nigerian federalism is the tendency to examine it through a synchronic analysis of 
the sociopolitical conditions of Nigeria, when the decision to federate was made as 
far back as 1946–1954. Afigbo argues for the importance of adopting a historical 
approach to show the forces that moulded the Nigeria’s political history and 
constitutional structure (ibid.: 13–14). The adoption of a federal system in Nigeria 
has affected the practice of language planning and policy. Although there has been 
substantial disagreement on the number of state units, there is a general consensus 
among three dominant linguistic groups (Yorubas, Hausa–Fulanis, and Igbos) that 
their languages should be granted constitutional recognition as national languages 
(see Olowu 1991: 166–167). The Articles on the language policy in the 1979 
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Constitution, which have been retained in the 1989 Constitution (see Olowu 1991: 
167; UNESCO, Most Clearing House, Linguistic Rights), stipulate:  
 
Article 5  
3. Every person who is arrested or detained shall be informed in writing within 24 
hours, and in a language that he understands, of the facts and grounds for his arrest or 
detention.  
Article 6  
Every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be entitled:  
(a) To be informed promptly in the language that he understands and in detail of the 
nature of offence;  
(f) To have without payment the assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand 
the language used at the trial of the offence.  
Article 19  
4. Government shall promote the learning of indigenous languages.  
Article 53  
The business of the National Assembly shall be conducted in English and in Hausa, 
Ibo [or Igbo] and Yoruba when adequate arrangements have been made therefore.  
Article 95  
The business of a House of Assembly shall be conducted in English, but the House 
may in addition to English conduct the business of the House in one or more other 
languages spoken in the state as the House may by resolution approve.  
 
According to Olowu (1991: 166), two considerations dominated debates on language 
in Nigeria. The first is that some people oppose the use of English on the grounds 
that local languages are systems of cultural representations, and that the majority of 
the population are illiterate. The second consideration is that the use of a lingua 
franca is inevitable since it can act as a symbol of cohesion throughout Nigeria. 
However, those who agree on the importance of having a lingua franca argue that 
English, as an inheritance from the colonial rule, should not play this role (for the 
powerful status of English in Nigeria see Wolf and Igboanusi 2006). Alternatives that 
have been suggested as the lingua franca include: Swahili and Wazobia (i.e., a newly 
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constructed language from Hausa, Yoruba and Ibo). In conclusion, Nigeria, as one of 
the few African countries with long experience of federalism, and particularly 
linguistic federalism, can furnish a model experience for other African states in 
similar circumstances and with similarly complex sociolinguistic structure. 
 
3.7 Summary 
In this chapter the key concepts and terminology in the scholarship of language 
planning and policy have been surveyed. The different and contestable definitions of 
key terms in language planning have been reviewed. The key actors and elements 
involved in the process of language planning have been identified, as have the key 
theoretical and analytic approaches. The relationship between language planning and 
power has been examined; the various language rights regimes in the literature have 
been analysed; the different critical approaches to literacy education with special 
focus on the concept of critical language awareness in educational planning have 
been reviewed. The role language planning has played in the construction of national 
identity has been discussed. Finally, the language situation in Nigeria has been 













CHAPTER FOUR: LANGUAGE PLANNING AND POLICY IN 
SUDAN, 1898–2005 
 
This chapter is concerned with the investigation of two major themes: the first is the 
historical development of language policies and language planning in the Sudan from 
1898 (the beginning of the Anglo–Egyptian rule) to 2005; and the second is the 
Arabisation policy in the Sudan. Before commencing the survey, some points 
concerning the scope and the organisation of the chapter should be made. The first 
point regards the chronological periodisation of the language policies. Following 
other researchers, I will approach the historical development of official language 
policies in the Sudan by periodising it into two stages: colonial and postcolonial. By 
the colonial period here I mean the Anglo–Egyptian rule of Sudan (or the 
Condominium, 1898–1956). A detailed and complete review of the historical 
evolution of the language planning and policies beyond the Anglo–Egyptian period is 
beyond the capacity of this chapter, though an occasional mention will be made 
where necessary. The reason for this is quite simple: most of the language plans and 
policies at the state level (i.e., in the sense of modern state nation) have been made 
from the British colonial period onward. Another point relating to the scope is that 
although the colonial and postcolonial language policies have impacted on the whole 
Sudan, with its four different directions, much of the attention in this chapter is paid 
to the south/north relation. My emphasis is in no way to imply that other regions of 
the Sudan are not equally worth scholarly attention. In fact, multilingualism, as the 
discussion of the distribution of languages (Chapter 2) has shown, is inherently a 
defining feature of the whole country.  
 
However, there are, in my view, good reasons for this particular restriction. The first 
relates to the fact that until the mid 1980s, the linguistic conflicts that spanned the 
colonial and postcolonial periods mainly reflected the south/north polarisation 
(Miller 2006: 1). The second reason for my focus on the south/north relation is that 
the conflict over the national language policy was a constituent cause of one of the 
longest wars in African history, between the north and the south of the Sudan (Miller 
2003a: 163). Hence, the historical narrative of how the new linguistic configuration 
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of the whole Sudan as foreseen in the Naivasha language policy was constructed 
should be told critically from the perspective of the south-north relationship. A third 
point that should be clarified here is that a reasonable understanding of the logic and 
rationalisation behind the language policies and educational programmes in the 
Sudan requires situating them within their social–political environment. This is 
accountable for by the fact that language policies and ‘formal educational systems in 
all countries are related to the political institutions of the societies concerned’ 
(Sanderson 1976: 72). The Sudan is no different since ‘language issues cannot be 
separated from other political and social issues as linguistic policies stem directly 
from the ideological choices of the State’ (Miller 2003a: 160). And ‘conflicts about 
language issues and language planning in the Sudan have accompanied the Sudanese 
political life since the early twentieth century’ (ibid.: 1). However, only the historical 
conditions that supply a meaningful context to the language policy under 
consideration will be provided. A final point has to do with the internal structure of 
the historical review (i.e., the way the content is structured). Few studies have been 
devoted to a systematic analysis of the sociopolitical context of the language policies 
in the Sudan as a free–standing topic. Therefore, any attempt to survey the 
development of the language policies in the Sudan must undergo a textual process of 
three stages: a general analysis of the contextual information involving language 
issues in general books of history and political science; synthesis of the different 
information collected from the different sources; and then systematisation into a 
coherent meaningful whole. The chapter is divided into three main parts: colonial 
period, postcolonial period, and the Arabicisation policy in the Sudan.  
 
4.1 The colonial period 
The colonial period began with an agreement signed on 19 January 1899 between 
Great Britain and Egypt to co–rule the Sudan. In reality, however, it was the British 
who governed single–handedly, with more attention paid to the southern part of the 
country (Albino 1970: 16). To understand the language policies exercised during the 
Anglo–Egyptian era, I shall focus on what is called the ‘Southern Policy’ of the 
British government. The first remark about the early years of the Anglo–Egyptian 
rule (1900–1928) is that there was no official language policy, not only in the south 
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but in the whole Sudan. This can be accounted for by the fact that the British policy 
in the African colonies was driven by the theory of ‘laissez–faire’ in education. This 
held that educational policies should be made by private and voluntary bodies such 
as Christian missionaries, and that the state should not intervene in the making of 
such policies (Beshir 1969:25). For the southern Sudan, no language or educational 
policies were made at this earlier time given the fact that the British could not bring 
the whole southern region under tight control.  
 
According to Sanderson (1962), the educational policy was rather negative in 
character during this period. In 1898 the question was not what kind of education to 
make available, but rather whether there could be any education at all in the southern 
regions. Therefore, the policy of British colonial rule was to ‘tolerate rather than to 
encourage education and to see what resulted’ (Sanderson 1962: 105). The southern 
tribes that were ruled by chiefs vowed to resist to the death any incursions by 
foreigners. The task of the British government was ‘the imposition of the Pax 
Britannia upon a land that had not known peace since the coming of the ivory 
traders, and this occupied the Government for the best part of twenty or thirty years’ 
(Albino 1970: 17).  
 
The early periods of the Condominium rule were characterised by the return of 
missionaries to the south. It was these Christian missionaries who made the 
education policies during the period from 1900 to 1926 (Sanderson 1962: 105). 
Although the British government allowed Christian missionaries to develop their 
own education polices, they were restricted to operating exclusively in the south. 
This is attributed to the fact that Lord Cromer, who laid down the fundamental 
principles upon which educational development was to rely, was profoundly 
suspicious of the Christian missionaries. As a result of his Egyptian administrative 
experience, he was completely aware of the dangers to the condominium rule posed 
by the fanatical Islamic insurrections in the northern part of the country. This 
awareness made him state categorically that the Arabic language would be the 
medium of instruction at the elementary school level, and that religious education 
would be in the Islamic faith in the north (Sanderson 1976: 72–73).  
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The educational missions established by Christian societies were that of the Italian 
Roman Catholic Verona Fathers to the Shilluk in 1901, that of the Anglican 
Missionary society to the Malek in 1905, and that of the American United Mission to 
peoples of the Sobat River in 1902. Australian and New Zealand missionaries took 
part starting in 1913 (Albino 1970: 17; Beshir 1968: 31). To control the Christian 
missions’ activities, the British government assigned each Christian denomination a 
‘sphere of influence’; hence, each area was dominated by one mission and one 
pattern of education. This division had negative consequences on the type of 
education and the distribution of economic resources in the different parts of the 
south (Albino 1970: 18). The quality and amount of education in each area were 
determined by the economic resources and the educational policy of each mission. 
For instance, the Roman Catholics, who had greater financial resources and longer 
historical ties with the land than their Anglican and Protestant counterparts, were 
capable of providing more schools and churches (Beshir 1968: 31). The medium of 
instruction in these schools were the various vernaculars and the English language at 
least in the higher classes, and a significant amount of time was devoted to Christian 
education (ibid.). 
 
According to Beshir (1968: 32), four major problems confronted Christian education: 
1) the fact that the conceptualisation of education by some tribes acted as a barrier to 
Christian education, 2) the fact that Arabic and English had to be used as media of 
instruction until local languages were to be learned by missionary teachers and 
writing systems were developed for them, 3) the shortage of teachers, 4) the lack of 
financial resources. The division of the south into spheres of influence as part of the 
governmental educational policy did not allow the Catholics to expand their activities 
beyond their sphere, and led to cultural separation between the different areas within 
the south, and between the south and the north. The actual missionary education in 
the south began with the establishment of some schools by the Verona Fathers in the 
three southern provinces: in the Upper Nile province at Lul and Detwok in 1901, in 
Bahr al–Ghazal province at Kayango, and Wau in 1905, and in Equatorial province 
in 1913. The American Presbyterian mission started educational work in Upper Nile 
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province at Doleib Hill in 1902. The Sudan United Mission established a small 
boarding school for male students at Rom and Paloich and a co–educational school at 
Melut in 1913. The Church Missionary Society opened one school at Bor in 1905, 
another at Malek in 1906 and a third in Yei in 1917. The educational schools were 
divided into four types: village or bush, elementary, intermediate and trade schools. 
Bush schools differed in size and academic standards and used the vernacular as the 
medium of instruction. The elementary schools provided a four–year programme, 
and English was the medium of instruction for all subjects except religion, which 
was taught in the vernacular. There were a few bush and elementary schools for girls 
and they were taught hygiene and domestic sciences. It should be mentioned here 
that the education of girls was recognised as important and given serious attention.  
 
During the colonial period significant development was made in the production of 
dictionaries and grammar books in Zande, Dinka, Shilluk, Bari, and Nuer. According 
to the report on ‘The Progress of Southern Education’ prepared in 1933 by Mr. 
Hickson, Resident Inspector for Southern Education, the linguistic research 
conducted by missionaries on these languages ‘represents much hard work and a 
great advance in the amount of literature available’ (for the full text of the report see 
Said 1965: 176–184). In short, the missionary societies succeeded in laying the 
foundations of the educational system in the south but failed to achieve a unity in the 
system. Educational policies and practice in the south were different from that in the 
north. Education in the north was geared to employment, while in the south it was 
equipped to spread Christianity and suppress Islam (Beshir 1968).  
 
To do justice to the topic, it is important to know the view of northern Sudanese and 
non–Sudanese scholars towards the Christian educational activities. Some scholars 
such as Abu Bakr charge that Christian education by its very nature did not favour 
the existence of Arabic in the southern Sudan. Abu Bakr made the following 
criticism: 
As in many African countries, the foundation of present education in 
the southern Sudan was laid down by Christian missionaries. Since the 
aim of the missionaries was conversion and the introduction of 
Christian cultures, one can then understand why language policy had 
removed completely and firmly the Arabic language from the sphere of 
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education in the multilingual southern Sudan … No Arabic was ever 
taught in the southern schools during the first half of this century. (Abu 
Bakr 1975: 13)  
Another broadside against the Christian education is provided by the Kenyan–
American social scientist Ali Mazrui, who contends that that there was a ‘profound 
incongruence’ at the heart of the ‘imported educational system’ in the colonies in 
Africa. Christian missionaries were bringing into Africa a sectarian feature of 
Western civilisation in a form which most Western states had already abandoned in 
the course of their modernisation. Put in simple terms, Mazrui is arguing that the 
entire foundation upon which education was built in the southern Sudan by the 
Christian missions was fundamentally faulty: 
The wrong western values were being provided as an infrastructure for 
the wrong Western skills. This gap between norms and techniques may 
be called the ‘techno–cultural gap’ of western heritage in Africa and 
parts of Asia. A major reason for this gap in the field of education lies 
in the paradoxical role of the missionary school. On the one hand, the 
missionary school was supposed to be the principal medium for the 
promotion of ‘modern civilisation’ especially in Africa. On the other 
hand, western civilisation on its home ground in Europe was becoming 
increasingly secular. In the colonies the missionaries were propagating 
a concept of Christian religiosity which was already anachronistic in the 
West. (Mazrui 1979: 33) 
 Here Mazrui is not defending an Islamic type of education since the same rebuttal 
can be made of this education. Mazrui is advocating the teaching of technically 
advanced skills required for industrialised communities. The core of Mazrui’s 
argument against the educational policies of the missionaries is that technical skills 
were given a religious infrastructure (Mazrui 1979: 35). In the face of these 
criticisms, some scholars have been far from silent. To subvert Mazrui’s claim that 
Christian missions were propagating the wrong Western values, the educationalist 
Lillian Sanderson made the following counter–argument: 
Some ‘Western’ progress had come as a result of Christian evangelistic 
confidence and from the concept of the moral value of hard work. The 
cultivation of ‘obedience’ in school did not necessarily stifle initiative 
any more in the southern Sudan than elsewhere. Had there been more 
secondary and post–secondary education before independence there 
would have been more people with more initiative, at independence. 
Even by 1956 a few Southern Sudanese had succeeded in reconciling 
personal aspiration with social obligation. (Sanderson 1980: 169) 
Another argument in support of the educational policy of the missionaries is 
provided by Albino. Albino (1970: 18) argues that ‘if it were not for the churches, 
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there would have been no education in the south’. By 1926, there were twenty–two 
boys’ intermediate, and one boy’s trade school, in addition to numerous village 
vernacular schools’. After the First World War, the British rule adopted what came to 
be known as the ‘Southern Policy’, intended to separate the south from the north. 
The Southern Policy was officially declared in 1930. In a secret memorandum on 
Southern Policy (for the full text of the memorandum see Beshir 1968: 115–118; 
Abdel–Rahim 1969: 244–249; Abdel–Rahim 1965: 19–25), the then Civil Secretary 
of the Sudan stated: 
The policy of the Government in the Southern Sudan is to build up a 
series of self–contained racial and tribal units with structure and 
organisation based, to whatever extent the requirements of the equity 
and good government permit, upon indigenous customs, traditional 
usage, and beliefs… Apart from the fact that the restriction of Arabic is 
an essential feature of the general scheme it must not be forgotten that 
Arabic, being neither the language of the governing nor the governed, 
will progressively deteriorate. The type of Arabic at present spoken 
provides signal proof of this. It cannot be used as a means of 
communication on anything but the most simple matters, and only if it 
were first unlearned and then relearned in a less crude form and adopted 
as the language of instruction in the schools could it fulfil the growing 
requirements of the future. The local vernaculars and English, on the 
other hand, will in every case be the language of one of the two parties 
conversing and one party will therefore always be improving the other.  
The most scathing refutation of the above quoted formulation of the colonial 
Southern Policy has been made by the French political scientist Gerard Prunier. 
Prunier strongly criticises the British colonial policy for choosing tribal 
administration as a way of governing the whole Sudan. Prunier (2005: 32) argues 
that tribal organisation was ‘a poor model for the future of an independent Sudan; 
indeed this benign neglect and glorification of tribal ways and days was exactly the 
kind of romantic “nativism” which led to the problems of Southern Sudan and 
Northern Nigeria’. Probably the most telling succinct argument against the colonial 
educational policy was furnished by J. S. R. Duncan when he dubbed it the policy of 
the ‘zoo mentality’: 
There is something in this of the ‘Zoo’ mentality, a little pompous and 
out of touch with reality. What is more the pity; it was completely out 
of balance with the race for education, as an end in itself, that was 
beginning in the northern Sudan and which was to leave the south far 
behind. ‘Happiness’ in this race for education cannot, in the very nature 
of the development, find any prominent place. In the second or third 
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generation, when educated parents exist, there may be some chance of 
happiness for the children, but it is impossible for the first generation to 
avoid being embittered; to have their inevitably unbalanced dreams of 
self–importance shattered; and to be perhaps: expendable. (Duncan 
1952: 217)  
The question that immediately arises is: What were the causes that lay behind this 
policy? There were a number of developments and political events that led to the 
adoption of the policy. One salient development was the emergence of the League of 
Nations, and the debating of the affairs of the colonies shed light on the need to 
develop local societies. Another critical event was the rise of Sudanese nationalism 
in 1924 which was a source of alarm to the British administration. A third 
development was that the policy of Indirect Rule had become the principle of the 
Sudan administration since the end of the Wold War I (Beshir 1968: 40). It was 
Frederick Lugard (1965) who in the 1920s provided the theoretical base for the 
policy of ‘Indirect Rule’ that Britain implemented in the Sudan and the African 
colonies. In educational terms, the policy of Indirect Rule initiated a period of less 
financial assistance for Gordon Memorial College (now the University of Khartoum) 
and primary school boys, and more support for religions instruction at elementary 
level in the most remote rural territories. A logical result of this was that Arabic and 
Islamic culture would have to be eliminated from the southern Sudan, and it was this 
line of thinking that dominated the famous Southern Policy (Albino 1970: 19–20). 
Collins notes: 
In order to encourage indigenous, African customs in the South, all 
Northern Sudanese, Moslem, Arab influences were to be eradicated, for 
African traditions, already weakened by a century of chaos, could 
hardly hope to flourish in the face of the dynamic and expansive culture 
of the northern Sudan. (Collins 1966: 381) 
However, the form of Indirect Rule which was implemented by the British colonial 
administration to protect the local languages and cultural traditions is not without 
opponents. The Sudanese intellectuals, especially the graduate of Gordon College, 
viewed this policy as a strategy to exclude them from power and participation in the 
running of the Sudan (Sanderson 1976: 75). Sanderson (2005: 29) states that the 
British Government’s reply was that it was accommodating the needs of the 
Sudanese people as a whole. Prunier contends that the policy of Indirect Rule was a 
guise for what he describes as a ‘colonial benign neglect’. Mazrui (1971: 252) argues 
that the suppression of Arabic in the south during the colonial period was ‘part of the 
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presumed competition between the Islamic culture and British civilisation’. Caught 
up in this battle of civilisation, Mazrui continues, was the issue of the means of 
education. It was widely perceived that ‘the British and missionary policy was to 
encourage the use of English rather than Arabic, and there was favouritism toward 
Christian mission education’ (Shepherd 1966: 199–200). Northern elites viewed 
these educational changes as a product of the implementation of the principle of 
Indirect rule, and not of the 1924 nationalist movement, which in their view had 
meant to divide the country into two. Sanderson (1976: 76) argues that the 
educational modifications that followed 1924 were a direct result of the revolution, 
and not of the policy of Indirect Rule. She argues that although there is no material 
evidence to prove the causal relation between the 1924 revolution and the changes in 
the quality and quantity of education, the fact that they followed the 1924 
disturbances points to that conclusion.   
 
On the whole, these developments and events marked and defined the colonial 
Southern Policy (i.e., the colonial administrative policy in the south), an aim of 
which until 1946 was to separate the south from the north. In the following sub–
sections, I shall briefly discuss the major measures taken to implement this policy.  
 
4.1.1 Rejaf Language Conference 1928 
According to Beshir (1968: 44), one of the significant measures intended to separate 
the south religiously, culturally and politically was the Rejaf Language Conference. 
The conference took place at Rejaf in Mongalla province, southern Sudan, in April 
1928, under the chairmanship of Mr. J.G. Mathew, Secretary of Education and 
Health for the Sudan (Werner 1929: 426). The conference was sponsored by the 
colonial government and attended by missionary representatives from the Congo, 
Uganda, and the International Institute of African Languages and Cultures (Beshir 
1968: 44). The aims of the Rejaf language conference were: 
1. To draw up a classified list of languages and dialects spoken in the southern 
Sudan;  
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2. To make recommendations as to whether a system of group languages should 
be adopted for educational purposes, and if so, which of these languages 
should be selected, for the various areas; 
3. To consider and report as to the adoption of a unified system of orthography; 
4. To make proposals for co–operation in the production of text–books; and the 
adoption of skeleton grammars, reading book, and primers for general use. 
The deliberations of the conference were greatly facilitated by the attendance of 
Diedrich Westermann, Professor in the International Institute of African Languages 
and Culture, as a linguistic expert (Werner 1929: 426). Westermann conducted a 
special study of the Shilluk language, which is an essential language in the area 
under discussion. It was decided that Westermann should draw up a revised list of 
languages because the preparation of the teaching materials for vernacular 
elementary education was urgent (Sanderson 1980: 114). But the great number of 
languages and dialect spoken in the south constituted a challenge to the conference 
which had to select some representatives of them. This problem was solved by 
dividing the languages into groups, and then selecting a principal member of each 
group as a representative language (for the list of language groups see Tucker 1934: 
30).  
 
The resolution concerning the chosen languages read as follows: 
The conference is of the opinion that the following group languages are 
suitable for development and that the preparation of the text–books in 
these languages for use in the elementary vernacular schools of the 
southern Sudan is a matter of urgency: Dinka, Bari, Nuer, Lotuko, 
Shilluk, Zande. Acholi and Madi are in a different category, as only a 
very small proportion of the people speaking these languages live in the 
Sudan. Literature for these languages must, therefore, be drawn from 
elsewhere. It is recognised that in sub–grade schools the use of other 
vernaculars may still be necessary. Colloquial Arabic in Roman script 
will also be required in certain communities where the use of no other 
vernacular is practicable. (Report of the Rejaf Language Conference, 
1928, cited in Tucker 1934: 31) 
A number of sociolinguistic observations have been made about this resolution. The 
first observation is that no immediate provision was made for the Ndogo group, the 
Bongo–Baka group, or the large Moru–Avukaya section of the Madi group. This was 
because the Conference more or less understood that the Zande language, which had 
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already been used as a means of instruction in these areas, could continue in that 
capacity. Accordingly, missionaries who had been teaching in Ndogo had to change 
over to the Zande language (Tucker 1934: 31–32). Another observation is that no 
representation was made of the Didinga and Beir group since they were remote from 
the educational centre to receive any attention at the time from the Conference 
(ibid.). Werner (1929: 426) also noted that the Acholi language is almost a dialect of 
Shilluk, and it may have seemed clear that the existing Shilluk language literature 
could be used for it.   
 
According to Tucker (1934: 31), the implementation of the Conference resolutions 
faced a number of difficulties. Chief among them was that the tribes and areas over 
which some of the standard languages were supposed to apply were not clearly 
defined; therefore, the possibility of rival standard languages was to be expected. To 
define the language boundaries, the policy of the government involved returning 
migrating tribes to their original area. The new provincial repatriation policy led to a 
great majority of Zande being returned to the south. Consequently, the teachers who 
were working in the Ndogo had to learn the Zande language from Zande–speaking 
European missionaries or from imported Zande colleagues. In Wau itself, where 
Ndogo is widely spoken, government officials found the Zande language relatively 
difficult to apply to their Ndogo people. And to resolve this language barrier, they 
had to resort to pidgin Arabic or Zande interpreters. So the repatriation of the Zande 
group, which is primarily an invading group, led to language confusion (Tucker 
1934: 32).  
 
Moreover the Conference stipulated that colloquial Arabic in Roman script was to be 
used where no other vernacular was workable. The alphabet adopted by the 
conference followed the system proposed in the Memorandum of the International 
Institute of African Languages and Cultures (Werner 1929: 426). Tucker (1934: 33) 
noted that the issue of developing a standard orthography was not completely settled 
at the Rejaf Conference. This led to a situation where two or more missionary 
societies were involved in writing a single language, and any two mission societies 
that were engaged on any one language almost always had different views 
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concerning the way in which the Rejaf alphabet should be implemented. Tucker 
argues that the national identity of a mission society might have a shaping influence 
on the type of written symbols it chooses for developing a new language, and this led 
to a conflict between mission societies over the writing system. 
 
 A Textbook Committee was set up and its report was adopted for the planned co–
operation of the government and missions in the production of teaching materials. 
This resulted in the appointment of Archibald Tucker, a South African with a 
doctorate from the University of London, as advisor to the southern Sudan on the 
preparation of teaching materials from 1929 to 1931 (Sanderson 1980: 114). The 
languages were introduced in the first two years of schooling, with English as a 
subject. When learners reach the third year, they used only English as a means of 
instruction (Abu Bakr 1975: 13). The Juba Arabic that had been the lingua franca of 
the south was rejected and abandoned (Albino 1970: 18). The policy of the 
government also required that all southern administrators should speak the language 
of the people of their district or alternatively English, but never Arabic. They were 
also directed to acquaint themselves as closely as possible with local traditions and 
beliefs. The following citation from the Civil Secretary’s memorandum on the 
Southern Policy serves to illustrate this principle (for the full text of the 
memorandum see Beshir 1968: 115–118; Abdel–Rahim 1969: 244–249; Abdel–
Rahim 1965: 19–25): 
It can not be stressed too strongly that to speak the natural language of 
the people whom he controls is the first duty of the administrator. 
Arabic is not that language, and indeed to the bulk of the population of 
the south it is a new, or partly new, tongue. Officials should avoid the 
error of thinking that by speaking Arabic they are in some way 
conforming to the principle that the administrator should converse with 
his people in their own language. (emphasis in original) 
Some scholars argue that the Report of the Rejaf Language Conference was not 
value–neutral. For instance, Abu Bakr argues that the main aim of writing local 
languages in Roman script was to ‘ensure the isolation of the south from the impact 
of Arabic language and culture’ (Abu Bakr 1975: 13). Sanderson (1980: 113) 
provides the counter–argument that an authoritative language conference was needed 
to consider educational media of instruction. Abu Bakr’s (1975: 13) stance, which 
can be interpreted as a reply to Sanderson’s argument, is that the diversity and 
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multiplicity of languages in the south complicated the problem of choosing the media 
of instruction. Sanderson’s (1970: 158) response was that ‘this would seem 
unplausible [sic] contention to most educationalists: it can hardly be accepted 
without convincing positive evidence’. Tucker argues that the people who could 
speak Arabic before the Rejaf Language Conference were in a minority, and this had 
affected the life of the people and led to institutional racism and injustice. For 
example, Tucker notes that Arabic in the south had: 
A great prestige as being the language best calculated to win favour 
with the police, for the native police are not, as a rule, recruited from 
the tribes among which they function, but from neighbouring or even 
distant tribes, speaking totally different languages. Ultimately, of 
course, it was a useful language to know, should one’s case come 
before the District Commissioner, since it enabled the plaintiff to evade 
the court interpreter, who was not always to be trusted to translate fairly 
unless well bribed. It was with the idea of putting an end to this lingua 
franca and getting into closer touch with the people that the government 
initiated its language policy. (Tucker 1934: 29) 
Tucker points out that the conference encouraged missionaries and linguistic experts 
to research local languages, and to write and publish textbooks, grammars, and 
dictionaries for these languages (for the full list of post–Rejaf Language Conference 
publications in the group languages see Tucker 1934: 37–39). It is in the light of this 
linguistic work that the report is seen by Werner (1929: 427) to have marked ‘a 
distinctive advance in the organisation of African linguistic research’.   
 
4.1.2 The creation of no–man’s land 
The British authorities had implemented much tighter measures and procedures from 
1930 to 1945 before it shifted its policy position towards the south–north 
relationship. As mentioned above, the policies and measures adopted during this 
period were intended to separate the south from the north culturally, socially and 
politically, and came to be known as the ‘Southern Policy’ of the British rule. One of 
the measures adopted by the British government to restrict the spread of the Arabic 
language in the south was the creation of what has come to be known as ‘the no 
man’s land’. The policy of creating this ‘no man’s land’ is embodied in the following 
statement which is worth quoting in full: 
Another aspect of the implementation of the Southern Policy required 
that contact between the southern tribes and their neighbouring Arab 
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tribes should be discouraged. Tribes such as the Banda, Dongo, Kreish, 
Feruge, Nyangulgule and Togoyo, which had been greatly influenced 
by Islam and Arabic culture and were in constant contact with the Arab 
tribes in Darfur and Kordofan, were removed from their regions and 
rehabilitated in other areas away from the influence of their Northern 
Arab neighbours. The indigenous inhabitants of the western district who 
lived in and around the administrative post of Kafia Kinge were 
grouped together according to tribe and resettled south of the Raga–
Kafia Kingi road so that no Southern Sudanese lived more than ten 
miles north of the River Boro. This created a vast ‘no–man’s land’ 
between the tribes of the southern Sudan and the Arab Nomadic tribes 
North of the Bahr al Arab River in Darfur, which acted as a barrier 
between the two. (Beshir 1968: 50–51, my emphasis) 
 
4.1.3 The Closed District Order 1929 
This regulation was intended to exclude the Egyptians, the northern Sudanese, and 
Muslims from the south (Beshir 1968: 42). The ultimate target was to protect the 
south from the influence of the Arabic language and culture. As a result, northerners 
were prohibited from entering the south without the prior consent of the British 
authorities. This measure also demanded that tribal leaders and their followers should 
abandon Arabic dress and the use of Arabic names (Beshir 1968: 52; Albino 1970: 
21; Gray 1963: 2).This colonial policy was strongly challenged not only by northern 
intellectuals but also by some southerners. For instance, Alier counters: 
The prohibition of Arabic, the abolition of Arab names, the wholesale 
accusations against all Northerners of being slave dealers, and the 
advantage given to Christian missionaries over Moslem preachers, 
made the whole policy somewhat ridiculous … As for names, it is the 
private business of the father and the mother to choose a name for their 
child and for a grown–up to change his. A Government which thus 
engaged in the prohibition of particular names betrayed its own inherent 
democracy. (Alier 1973: 15)  
Another remark about this policy is that ‘the suppression of Islam went hand–in–
hand with the suppression of the Arabic language’ (Beshir 1968: 53). Put in another 
way, the British colonial government was the first to clearly fuse the Arabic language 
and Islam in its linguistic policy (Miller 2003a: 165). The aim of the policy has been 
characterised in the following terms: 
The colonial policy from 1900–1946 was by and large to develop the 
two parts of the country as different entities. In that regard, the Closed 
District Act … was imposed, virtually putting the south and the western 
parts of the country off limits to Northern Sudanese. Visas were 
required to travel from the north to either the west or the south and vice 
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versa. The purported justification for the act was, among other things, to 
keep out Arab influence and Islam from these regions in order to protect 
the indigenous cultures and languages from ‘corrupting’ influence of 
Islam and the Arabic language. (Nyombe 1997: 106) 
To protect the indigenous languages and cultures of the south from the influence of 
Islam and the Arabic language, the policy of the British government from 1930 up to 
the 1946 had been to develop the three southern provinces of Upper Nile, Bahr al–
Ghazal and Equatoria along distinctively Negroid and African lines, and to exclude 
northern and Arabic culture as much as possible. This stance constituted the core of 
the British ‘Southern Policy’ that was summed up by the Governor–General in 1945 
as follows (Khartoum Secret Despatch No. 89, August 4, 1945, cited in B.V. 
Marwood, Governor Equatoria, to M. B. Stubbs, District Commissioner, Western 
District, December 23, 1946, Bahr al–Ghazal, 1/1/2, SGA, cited in Beshir 1968: 
122): 
The approved policy is to act upon the fact that the people of the 
Southern Sudan are distinctly African and Negroid, and that our 
obvious duty to them is therefore to push ahead as fast as we can with 
their economic and educational development on African and Negroid 
lines, and not upon the Middle Eastern and Arab lines of progress 
which are suitable for the northern Sudan. It is only by economic and 
educational development that these people can be equipped to stand up 
for themselves in the future, whether their future lot be eventually cast 
with the northern Sudan or with East Africa (or partly with each).  
To recapitulate, the educational system in the south during the colonial period was 
intentionally committed to the suppression of the Arabic language as far as possible 
(Mazrui 1971: 253). Nyombe (1997: 105) defends the British colonial policy by 
arguing that the essence of the policy up to 1946 was to return the traumatised 
southerners to the use of indigenous languages. It should be pointed out that a 
number of northern Sudanese scholars and politicians do not see the disruption of the 
spread of Arabic during the colonial period in a positive way. In his argument against 
the colonial policy, the northern scholar Said affirmed that the colonial policy did 
indeed obstruct the spread of Arabic: 
Until 1945 the policy was to build up in the southern Sudan a series of 
self–contained racial or tribal units based on indigenous customs, 
traditional usage and beliefs. A firm barrier to Arabicisation was 
created. Everybody, administrator and missionary, acted upon the fact 
that the peoples of the south provinces were distinctly African and 
Negroid. (Said 1965: 152, my emphasis) 
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Another criticism levelled against the Southern Policy was provided by Beshir. 
Beshir (1968: 54) argues that ‘missionary education was as disrupting to tribal life 
and values as Muslim influence was’. It should be remarked here that it is not only 
northern Sudanese researchers and politicians and some British officials who 
opposed the colonial policy which was preoccupied with task of the elimination of 
the Arabic language from the southern Sudan. Some southern intellectuals have been 
critical of the colonial Southern Policy. For example, the southern Sudanese writer 
and statesman Abel Alier strongly argues that the prohibition of the Arabic language 
by the colonial Southern Policy made, among other things, the whole policy look 
ridiculous. Alier explains:  
It is in the interest of anyone (and the southerner is no exception) to 
know as many foreign languages as he is able to learn. The prohibition 
of the Arabic in the southern Sudan was not in any conceivable manner 
in the interest of the people, whether they were ultimately to be 
independent, or to throw their lot with the north or East Africa. (Alier 
1973: 15) 
Another criticism of the separatist Southern Policy was provided by the Graduates’ 
Congress which was founded in 1938 in the north of the Sudan. In a note on 
education submitted to the British government in 1939, the Graduates’ Congress 
expressed its strong opposition to the educational policy in the south and demanded 
the unification of the educational system in the whole country, and the removal of 
restrictions on northern merchants (for the full text of the memorandum see Beshir 
1969: 237–253). These developments made the British government rethink its 
separatist policy. Nyombe (1997: 106) argues that when Britain changed the 
Southern Policy it was acting in its best interest. Britain was bargaining for a more 
lucrative strategic international position to retain control over the Suez Canal, hence 
had to gain the support of the northern and Egyptian nationalists. Another factor that 
caused the British to change their policy was that Arab nationalism in the Middle 
East was at its extreme. For all these factors and developments, the colonial policy 
was to change radically in 1946 (Albino 1970: 23). Now the new British policy was 
to treat the south and the north as one country (Nyombe 1997: 106). In a letter 
addressed to Governors of southern Provinces and Directors of Departments (Civil 
Secretary’s Office, Circular Letter No. CS/SCR/I.CI. – 16.12.1946; for the full text 
of the memorandum see Beshir 1968: 119–121; Abdel–Rahim 1969: 253–256; Said 
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1965: 162–165; Abdel–Rahim 1965: 29–32), Mr Robertson, the Civil Secretary 
announced the official end of the Southern Policy: 
The policy of the Sudan Government regarding the southern Sudan is to 
act upon the facts that the peoples of the Southern Sudan are 
distinctively African and Negroid, but that geography and economics 
combine (so far as can be foreseen at the present time) to render them 
inextricably bound for future development to the middle–eastern and 
arabicised Northern Sudan; and therefore to ensure that they shall, by 
educational and economic development, be required to stand up for 
themselves in the future as socially and economically the equals of their 
partners of the northern Sudan in the Sudan of the future.  
In 1949, the Legislative Assembly, which was made up only of northerners, passed a 
resolution that made Arabic the official language of the whole country (Nyombe 
1997: 107). The English language was replaced by Arabic in many official domains 
in the south. A number of anxious northern officials in Juba established evening 
classes for the Arabic language, though Arabic was introduced in intermediate 
schools (Albino 1970: 78). The ending of the Closed District Act in 1946 witnessed a 
huge migration of northern traders into the south, and mosques and Quranic schools 
were hastily established (Nyombe 1997: 107). This is considered the most important 
period of interaction and contact between the southern and northern cultures, 
languages and religions. Nyombe (ibid.: 107) points out that ‘after so many years of 
isolation and oversentimentalisation of their historical past by both parties, the initial 
contacts were bound to be far from spontaneous and easy’. The change of the 
language policy from English to Arabic in the south did not go without resistance 
and resentment in that region. The results of the change in language policy were 
twofold: first, two patterns of education were created, one in the north and the other 
in the south. For the south, the first two years of elementary education were to be 
conducted in the vernacular as a means of instruction. English replaced the 
vernacular as a means of instruction from elementary three, with Arabic introduced 
as a subject. In the north, on the other hand, Arabic was used as a means of 
instruction from the first year of elementary education onward. These two tiers of 
education ‘added to further strain on relations between the two parts of the country’ 
(Nyombe 1997: 107). The second result of the shift in language policy is that many 
southern intellectuals who could only function in English became economically and 
socially disadvantaged because of the shift to Arabic. Despite the southern 
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objections, the British government continued its plan ‘for joint independence for the 
two halves of the country, regions it had taken great pain to keep apart for nearly half 
a century’ (Nyombe 1997: 108).  
 
4.2 The post colonial period 
Upon the adjournment of the Juba conference which was held in 1947 to decide the 
fate of the southern Sudan, a joined Legislative Assembly Ordinance representing the 
whole Sudan was drafted in 1948, and the Assembly was officially opened on the 15 
December of the same year. The laws and resolutions of the Legislative Assembly 
were subject to the Governor General’s approval (Albino 1970: 26). Some 
assurances were sent to the southerners that their rights were still under the 
protection of the British government. The life span of this legislative body was from 
1948 to 1953. The years 1948 to 1950 marked an instant change in the educational 
policy of the southern Sudan (ibid.: 28). For instance, financial assistance to 
Christian schools was raised, and in 1948 the first secondary school was opened at 
Atar (in the Upper Nile), and then transferred to Rumbek (in Bahr al–Ghazal). The 
tradition of sending students to Makerere College for higher education was 
abandoned and Gordon College in Khartoum (now University of Khartoum) was 
used instead. But the most crucial change was the introduction of Arabic in 1950 as 
an academic subject in all schools above the primary level, with the ultimate goal of 
making it the means of instruction. This was accomplished in 1957, when all 
Christian schools in the south came under the control of the central government, and 
all private schools were prohibited (though they were still operating in the north). It 
was remarkable that the number of southerners in the Legislative Assembly was very 
low (thirteen southerners out of ninety-five members). Decisions in the Assembly 
were carried out by simple majority. Southern politicians requested to be allowed to 
run their own affairs, and by 1950 they were firm on their demand for federal status 
within a united Sudan (Albino 1970: 31). To avoid southern opposition to 
independence from Britain, northern politicians promised their southern counterparts 
that their demand for a federal system of government would be paid serious 
consideration (Deng and Khalil 2004: 2). As it became clear in the beginning of 1958 
before the general elections for Parliament (the Constituent Assembly), the 
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southerners were positive about the kind of federalism they were seeking. In fact, a 
member of the Liberal Party Parliamentary Group, Mr. Ezbon Mondiri, not only 
described what kind of federalist system was demanded by the southerners, but also 
drafted a constitution on U.S.A lines for presentation to the Parliament. Mr. Mondiri 
was imprisoned for seven years for his determined pursuance of the southern 
demands (Albino 1970: 4). Federalism meant to the uneducated southerners 
protection against the domination of Arab northerners. Segal notes: 
The demand for ‘federation’ had, however, spread widely, beyond the 
small educated elite to the Chiefs, village headmen and their followers, 
since it reflected the general Southern – and Black African – fear of 
Arab Northern domination. (Segal 1961: 448)  
On 26 March 1951, a Constitution Commission was selected to advise the Governor–
General on steps to be taken for granting the south self–government. The 
representative of the south in the Commission, Mr. Buth Dui, demanded a federal 
constitution, but his proposal was rejected by the northern members of the 
Commission. He walked out of the meeting, and finally withdrew from the 
Commission as a result of the uncompromising stance of the northerners (Albino 
1970: 30). It was this breach of the promise to consider the southerners’ demand for 
a federal rule that deeply ‘aggravated southern fears and mistrust’ (Deng and Khalil 
2004: 2). Thus, northerners and some British officials were left to determine the fate 
of the south within the context of a united Sudan. The southern struggle continued 
during and after the fall of the military regime of Aboud (1958–1964). The caretaker 
government, which was described as ‘the people’s government’, under the leadership 
of the Prime Minister Sir el Khatim el Khalifa openly acknowledged that the problem 
of the southern Sudan is cultural as well as political. In his opening address to the 
Round Table Conference on 16 March 1965 (for the full text of the speech see Beshir 
1968: 167–173; Abdel–Rahim 1965: 39–47), which was intended to discuss the 
southern problem, Mr. Khalifa said: 
The Government is determined to admit with courage and full 
understanding the failures of the past and face up to its difficulties. It 
also recognises fully the ethical and cultural difference between North 
and South which have been brought about largely through geographical 
and historical factors.  
The Round Table Conference provided a healthy forum to discuss the southern 
problem, a situation for which southerners were grateful (Albino 1970: 50). The 
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common theme of proposals made by northern parties was that ‘the system of 
government shall be based on principles that guarantee the continued existence of the 
Sudan as one sovereign entity’ (for the full text of the scheme of proposals made by 
the northern political parties see Beshir 1968: 174–178). The stance of the southern 
parties that participated in the conference was that ‘the people of the Southern Sudan 
must decide their future’ (for the full text of the scheme of proposals and views made 
by southern political parties see Beshir 1968: 179–182; Abdel–Rahim 1965: 48–52). 
More significantly, the southern delegates proposed a plebiscite in the southern 
Sudan to give the southerners the right to choose one of the following three options: 
1. Federation;  
2. Unity with the north; 
3. Separation (to become an independent state). 
Northern political parties strongly rejected the southern proposal for establishing a 
federal system of government in the Sudan: ‘There is no place in the Sudan for a 
federal system of Government’ (for full text of the scheme of proposals made by 
northern political parties see Beshir 1968: 174–178). Some of the distinguished 
southern politicians emphasised the linguistic and cultural differences between the 
north and the south to argue the case for self–determination at the Round Table 
Conference. For instance, Mr. Aggrey Jaden, the President of the Sudan African 
National Union (SANO) expressed this point in bald terms (cited in Shepherd 1966: 
195): 
The Sudan falls sharply into two distinct areas, both in geographical 
area, ethnic group, and cultural systems. The northern Sudan is 
occupied by a hybrid Arab race who are united by their common 
language, common culture, and common religion; and they look to the 
Arab world for their cultural and political inspiration. The people of the 
southern Sudan, on the other hand, belong to the African ethnic group 
of East Africa. They do not only differ from the hybrid Arab race in 
origin, arrangement and basic systems, but in all conceivable purposes 
… There is nothing in common between the various sections of the 
community; no body of shared beliefs, no identity of interests, no local 
signs of unity and above all, the Sudan has failed to compose a single 
community.  
Although the Round Table Conference did not achieve any conclusive results, it did 
adopt some resolutions (the resolutions of the conference are fully reproduced in 
Beshir 1968: 183–185). The resolutions included ‘Southernisation’ of the public 
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services, freedom of religion, freedom to open private schools, the appointment of 
head teachers whether southerners or northerners, and the establishment of a 
university in the southern Sudan. A twelve–man committee was set up to carry on the 
work of the conference with special focus on the possible constitutional solutions, 
and to look after the implementation of the resolutions. But the committee never 
worked satisfactorily and none of the resolutions was implemented (Albino 1970: 
58).  
 
The situation in the southern Sudan continued to escalate from bad to worse 
politically, especially after the defeat of the southern self–assertion. What started as a 
rebellion in 1955 developed into a fully–fledged war of liberation and continued for 
17 years to come (Nyombe 1997: 108). The new power holders exerted planned 
efforts to bring the south into the mainstream of ‘Sudanese way of life’ (ibid.): a 
Sudan with one language, one religion, and one culture. This view was enforced by 
the Islamic Constitution that was drafted by a Constitution Committee in December 
1956. This Constitution was approved later by the Parliament ignoring the demands 
of the southern members of the Committee for a federal constitution (Albino 1970: 
41). The explanation provided by the government of the time (1956–1957) was that 
federation could not work in the Sudan (ibid.). Upon this rejection, southern 
representatives withdrew from the General Assembly. Hence, the northerners were 
left to draft their one–sided unitary constitution in which Islam was declared the 
religion of the state and Arabic the national language (Oduho and Deng 1963: 35). 
Oduho and Deng describe the language situation in the southern schools as a result of 
these political events in the following terms: 
Since independence the introduction and compulsory use in the south of 
the Arabic language as the medium of education has wiped out the solid 
foundations of the educational system laid down by British 
administration, thus Southern elite is now considered ‘illiterate’ by 
Sudanese standards, and one of the main difficulties confronting 
Southerners in finding jobs is a lack of how to read and write Arabic. 
(Oduho and Deng 1963: 47) 
The preoccupying concern of northerners at independence was to rectify the divisive 
effects of the separatist policies of the British rule. To achieve this purpose, the 
Government selected the path of the forced assimilation of the south through 
Arabicisation and Islamisation. Southerners viewed these policies as an attempt by 
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northerners to replace the British colonisation with Arab hegemony (Deng 1995: 12). 
The education system was nationalised in 1956, and the missionary societies were 
expelled in 1964. Therefore, the term nationalisation signified to the southerners the 
confiscation of Christian schools in the south by the Government to spread Islam. 
This sense of the term ‘nationalisation’ as it was experienced by southern politicians 
and scholars is not entirely without justification. Addressing the second sitting of the 
first session of Parliament in 1958 (cited in Albino 1970: 98), Mr. Ali Abdul 
Rahman, the then Minister of Interior in an Umma–PDP (People’s Democratic Party) 
coalition stated: ‘It is my government’s concern to support religious education, and 
that is clearly shown by the progress by the Religious Affairs Department and the 
development of Ma’hads [Islamic Schools] under its aegis’. Deng and Khalil (2004: 
2) point out that the determination of successive northern governments to promote 
national unity and integration in the south by recourse to state–sponsored measures 
of Arabicisation and Islamisation aroused fear of religious and cultural assimilation. 
Again this fear is not without basis since it is quite easy to provide them with proof 
in the form of concrete documentary evidence. For instance, in 1957 the Minister of 
Education made an official statement in the Parliament on the new educational policy 
for schools. Although the Minister assured the southerners that religious education, 
local needs, and freedom of faith would be provided and protected (for full text of 
the speech and the debates that followed it see Said 1965: 190–198), the following 
aim of his new policy justifies the southerners’ fear of assimilation: 
One major advantage is that the new policy enables the Ministry to 
develop and expand the Southern system of education according to one 
co–ordinated plan for the whole country. It also enables the Ministry to 
step up the assimilation of the Southern educational system to its 
Northern counterpart so that a single unified and national system of 
education is established throughout the country … A major objective is 
to iron out all the big differences in the existing system of education in 
the Southern Provinces, weld it into one coherent set–up and assimilate 
it to its Northern counterpart so that there may be one unified system of 
education for the whole Sudan.  
Consequently, the policy of Sudanisation in the south meant in practical terms nearly 
denying the southerners education, since Islamic educational institutions were set up 
without taking the needs of the local people into account. For example, the Ma’had 
(Islamic school) established in Yei (Equatoria Province) was of no practical value to 
the local population of the area since all the pupils in it were Christians (Albino 
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1970: 98). For the southerner, the government would spread education in the south 
provided that they submitted to Arabicisation and Islam, and gave political support to 
the government. Alier condemns this policy since it would have disastrous 
implications on local languages: 
Post–independent development of languages and cultures in the South 
has been stopped. Not only that, these languages have been abolished in 
schools and replaced by Arabic, English and French. Teachers who 
could only teach in Southern languages lost their jobs if they did not 
pass a course in Arabic. (Alier 1973: 16) 
Mazrui (1971) makes much the same point when he notes that since independence 
there has been a more concerted effort by northern governments to grant Arabic a 
new status in the south. Northern teachers, an increased promotion of the teaching of 
Arabic, and a new Arabic curriculum are all major aspects of the entire Arabicisation 
policy pursued in the southern Sudan since independence. The position of the 
northern Sudanese politicians was that the Christian missionaries were the tools for 
implementing the colonialist policy of divide and rule. Southern scholars such as 
Nyombe disagree that the inequality between the north and the south is entirely a 
product of the British policy of divide and rule. Nyombe maintains that although it is 
true that the British language (educational) policy in the south resulted in overt class 
differences, marked by socioeconomic disparity and political inequality between the 
two parts of the country, all northern governments went out of their way to 
exacerbate them instead of eradicating the perceived injustices after independence. 
The new language policy of the 1950s was made to introduce Arabic as a subject 
immediately in all southern schools. This new policy has led to the emergence of two 
patterns of education that would be run side by side in the south for two decades to 
come (Abu Bakr 1975: 13). The two patterns are: 1) the local pattern of the south in 
which local languages were used as means of instruction in the first two years with 
English as a subject in the same level and as means of instruction from the third year, 
together with Arabic as a subject throughout all levels, and 2) the national pattern or 
system in which Arabic was used as the means of instruction from the first year with 
English as a subject from the fifth year (ibid.). Some commentators such as Nyombe 
argue that ‘these were not bad objectives in themselves, but immoderate northern 
zeal to convert southerners into Moslems and Arabic language speakers in the 
shortest time possible often drifted into extreme and intolerant policies’ (Nyombe 
 139 
1997: 109). Oduho and Deng charge that ‘the efforts made and the money spent for 
the Islamisation of the south is perhaps the most preoccupying concern of the 
Sudanese Arabs both as Government and individuals’ (Oduho and Deng 1963: 54).  
 
To recap, the language situation in the southern Sudan changed immediately after 
independence. The national government confiscated all missionary–run educational 
institutions including schools, nurseries, kindergartens, and maternity hospitals. 
Nyombe describes the social effects of the new language policy in Sudan: 
From 1985 to the present, the Sudan has become a de facto theocratic 
state, run by religious zealots. Knowledge of the Arabic language is 
now mandatory in the Sudan. Islam is being imposed on non–Muslims. 
All education in the country, including university education, has been 
changed to Arabic–medium without ample preparation. University 
professors who have no workable knowledge of the Arabic language are 
being forced to either retire or undergo further tutoring in the Arabic 
language. It goes without saying that the people affected by this come 
mostly from the non–Arab parts of the country, especially the southern 
Sudan. (Nyombe 1997: 109–110)  
The northern Sudanese scholar Said (1965: 151) strongly rejects the accusation that 
the north has always wanted to dominate the south: ‘The north is ready and 
determined to extend all help it can afford to its fellow citizens in the south. Nobody 
wishes to dominate southerners; nobody could even if they wanted to’. Nyombe 
argues that the adoption of the monolingual and monocultural system of education in 
support of one nationality to the exclusion of all others is to motivate social and 
political upheaval. Nyombe (1997:111) points out that ‘assimilating the educational 
system to its counterpart in the north in reality meant assimilating it to an Arab–
Islamic way of life’. One way to achieve this assimilatory project of Sudanisation 
was by discouraging the use of local languages by non–Arab peoples of the Sudan. 
Another mechanism of implementation of this policy was to run the mass media such 
as radio, the press, and television exclusively in the Arabic language. During Ibrahim 
Aboud’s military regime (1958–1964), and other subsequent northern governments 
especially from the period of 1958 to 1969, there was a definite policy to Arabise the 
south (ibid.: 112). The strategies of Arabicisation and Islamisation were deployed 
more vigorously to achieve this goal (Deng 1995: 12). For the south, military 
regimes meant the silencing of any demands for federation (Albino 1970: 44). A 
recurring theme in Nyombe (1997) is that the introduction and enforcement of 
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Arabic as a national language in the south of Sudan had far–reaching educational, 
political and socioeconomic effects. This view reflects a wide consensus, at least 
among southerners. Many southern teachers in the village schools were made 
redundant because the local languages that had been once emphasised under the 
British colonial policy had lost their significance in the new linguistic order. The 
same paralysis extended to cover English–educated southern elites who lost their 
jobs, since they lacked the required functional literacy in the newly imposed Arabic 
language (Nyombe 1997: 114).  
 
The implementation of the Arabicisation policy in the southern Sudan came into 
force on the eve of Independence. Addressing the National Assembly in 1953, the 
first Minister of Education made the following declaration (cited in Nyombe 1997: 
112): 
As the Sudan is one country sharing one set of political institutions, it is 
of great importance that there should be one language which is 
understood by all its citizens. That language could only be Arabic and 
Arabic must therefore be taught in all schools.  
In this context, Nyombe argues that while the colonial Southern Policy from 1930 to 
1945 could be viewed as ‘de–Arabisation’ of the people of the southern Sudan, the 
new postcolonial policy could be construed as ‘recolonisation’ of the south by the 
north. Nyombe states that closing down the publishing houses in the south marked 
the end of producing materials for educational or literary purposes. Indigenous 
languages were completely discarded in the educational system, and the Arabic 
language was now to be taught in all schools including rural ones. Some attempt was 
made to change the writing system of vernaculars by rewriting them in Arabic 
instead of the Roman script. The languages selected to undergo this process were 
Bari, Dinka, Lotuho, Zande, Nuer and Shilluk. This language project was not 
achieved for a number of technical and social problems. On the social and cultural 
implications of the use of Arabic script to write a local language, Oduho and Deng 
had the following to say on the conflict over the written symbol in the south: 
The insistence by the Sudan Government on Arabic and Arabic 
characters has gone to the extent of bringing pressure to bear on 
Christian churches not to impart Christianity in writing except in Arabic 
letters. In 1960 a Christian centre was closed down and the instructor 
imprisoned because a blackboard with Roman characters (numbers) was 
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found in the chapel by the District Commissioner of Yei. (Oduho and 
Deng 1963: 48) 
Bell and Haashim (2006: 4) reiterate the same theme when they said that ‘each script 
has its own rationale. The Arabic script is associated with a belief in its role for 
national unity’. And this conviction has led some scholars such as the Egyptian 
language expert Khalil Asakir and the northern Sudanese scholar Yusuf Abu Bakr to 
develop educational materials in the Arabic script for the southern Sudan languages. 
Their goal was to ‘provide a bridge into Arabic as the principal language of the 
independent Sudan’ (ibid.). In his report of 1953 on the teaching of Arabic in the 
south, Abd Allah Al–Tayyib, the Professor of the Arabic language at the University 
of Khartoum, suggested a programme to help southern students to have their Sudan 
School Certificate examinations in Arabic in 1973 (Abu Bakr 1975: 14). Since 1966 
no local language was used as a medium of instruction for education in government 
schools. Christianity began to be taught in the Arabic language in all southern 
schools that were run on the national pattern from 1970. In 1971, all southern 
students in junior secondary schools in the Upper Nile Province had their final 
examinations in Arabic to enter Malakal Senior Secondary School (national pattern – 
Arabic). The Senior Secondary School of Malakal began to award the Sudan School 
Certificate for entrance into university education in Arabic studies for the first time 
(ibid.). In May 1972, all southern students sat their final examination in Arabic in the 
final year of primary education (class six) competing with their northern 
counterparts. The desire to implement the Arabicisation policy has reached its 
extreme with the current Islamic military regime (1989 – present) who signed the 
peace agreement with SPLM/A (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, the 
major southern opposition). A blueprint of the National Islamic Front’s (NIF) vision 
of the Sudan called the ‘National Charter for Political Action’ (cited in Nyombe 
1997: 115) declares that: 
The adoption of Islamic Sharia and the federal system within the 
framework of comprehensive national unity is a further enrichment of 
our national experience pioneered by the nation’s loyal sons who 
steadfastly sacrifice their souls for the sake of its protection throughout 
the decades.  
It should be noted that the difference between the NIF and the previous governments 
is the focus of the former on the element of religion. While previous ruling northern 
governments have used language overtly and religion covertly as means of 
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implementing the project of Arab nationalism in the Sudan, the NIF has openly 
declared Islam as a means of national unity (Nyombe 1997: 115). In other words, the 
NIF, which adopts an Islamist discourse, views Arabic as a means to Islam, whereas 
the majority of other northern parties, which adopt a nationalist discourse, look at 
Arabic as an end in itself (Miller 2003a: 152–153). The unilateral imposition of 
postcolonial policies by the north led to the unfortunate war that broke between the 
south and north in 1955, and which was to last until 1969. The war ended in March 
1972 following the Addis Ababa Agreement between Nimeiri’s military regime and 
Anya–Nya Two, the major southern Opposition at the time (for the full text of the 
Addis Ababa Agreement see Beshir 1975: 158–177). Some scholars strongly argue 
that the ‘conflicting views on the respective roles of Arabic, English and the 
vernacular languages were an element in the 17–year struggle which ended in the 
accord of Addis Ababa’ (Hurreiz and Bell 1975a: 1). This war changed the southern 
educational theatre and the institutions massively. During the course of the fight, the 
northern army destroyed the schools, libraries, and churches. Southern educated 
intellectuals were pursued for elimination, since they were seen as the most 
antagonistic to the spread of Arabism and Islam in the south of Sudan (Nyombe 
1997: 116). A significant number of southerners were made to leave the country. 
While abroad, southerners reorganised into an army of freedom fighters known as 
Anya–Nya. Far from the control of the central government, the Anya–Nya 
established its schools in the southern areas that came under their control. These 
schools were run according to the old pattern of education: vernacular as medium in 
the first and second year of primary education with English as a subject in these two 
years, and as a medium of instruction from the third year onward (Abu Bakr 1975: 
14). It should be mentioned that this war stopped the spread of the Arabic language 
and Islam in the south because life and education were frequently disrupted. In fact, 
during times of war southerners had the chance to communicate in their own local 
languages. Children also had the opportunity to be taught in the local language. 
Hence, southerners have resisted assimilation by adopting strategies ranging from 
direct war to the use of ‘avoidance tactics’ (Nyombe 1997: 121). 
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The first Regional Assembly passed a bill in 1974 that reversed the language 
situation in the south, returning it to the 1928 British colonial position (Nyombe 
1997: 116). An educational conference was organised. At the meeting, the Regional 
Minister of Education advised the conference to tackle the language situation in the 
south from the educational point of view and not to be influenced by old attitudes 
towards the Arabic language (ibid.). A regional institute was established to train 
vernacular instructors and to prepare educational language and literacy materials for 
schools. Languages were chosen and grouped into two categories: A and B. The 
languages included in category A were: Bari, Dinka, Kresh, Lotuho, Moru, Ndogo, 
and Nuer. Those selected for category B were: Anuak, Baka, Banda, Didinga, Forge, 
Jur–Luo, Kaliko, Shilluk, Zande, Mundari, Murle, Toposa, Acholi, Jur–beli, Kakwa, 
and Mad. The languages in the first category were to be used as means of instruction 
in primary schools (grades 1–3), whereas those in the second category were targeted 
for literacy purposes. It is worth mentioning that this categorisation of languages is 
not fixed in the sense that functions can be shifted from group A to B and vice versa 
when the need emerges. Some scholars believe that if the 23 selected languages were 
employed for writing and reading, it would be at least possible that every southern 
child could have access to education through a familiar language (ibid.: 117). In the 
rural educational schools, the vernacular is the means of instruction from primary 1–
3, while English and Arabic are taught as subjects. In Primary 4–6, Arabic becomes 
the medium of instruction. English is taught as a subject, and the vernacular is 
dropped. The same policy applies to Junior 1–3. In the secondary school, English 
becomes the medium of instruction while Arabic is taught as a subject. The 
educational situation in urban schools is the same as that of the rural schools, except 
that the vernacular is not taught in urban schools (ibid.). 
 
The reintegration of vernacular languages into the southern educational system 
caused what Nyombe (1997: 118) described as a ‘constitutional controversy’ 
between the regional government in Juba and the central government as a result of 
the different interpretations of some articles in the Addis Ababa Agreement and the 
Sudan National Constitution. Neither the Addis Ababa agreement nor the southern 
Regional Self–Government Act of 1972 contained items on language–in–education 
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policy (Abu Bakr 1975: 13; Nyombe 1997: 118). Nevertheless, there are some 
general points on educational planning and on language in administration. The 
Regional Self–Government Act, Chapter 2, Section 5 stipulates that: 
Arabic shall be the official language for the Sudan and English the 
principal language for the Southern Sudan, without prejudice to the use 
of any language or languages which may serve the practical necessity 
for the efficient and expeditious discharge of executive and 
administrative functions of the region.  
This stipulation is contradicted by Chapter 2, Section 6 of the same accord, which 
goes on to stipulate that ‘neither the People’s Regional Assembly nor the High 
Executive Council shall legislate or exercise any powers on matters of national 
nature which are … [including among others] Educational Planning’. Another 
observation is that other parts of the same agreement confuse the previous 
contradictory sections. Chapter 5 gives the Regional Assembly and the executive 
apparatus of the regional government of the southern Sudan the right to legislate on 
matters of education (Nyombe 1997: 119). Chapter 4 on the Legislature stipulates 
that:  
The People’s Regional Assembly shall legislate for the preservation of 
public order, internal security … and in particular in the following: 
[among others] … Establishment, maintenance and administration of 
the public schools at all levels in accordance with national plans for 
education and economic and social development, promotion of local 
languages and cultures.  
The Constitution of the Sudan of 1973, on the other hand, stated that Arabic is the 
official language of the country (Nyombe 1997: 119). Thus, there is a clear 
contradiction between the Constitution, which does not mention English, and the 
southern Regional Self–Government Act. There was an attempt to amend this 
constitutional article during the debate in the People’s Assembly by including the 
preservation of local languages, but it did not succeed (Abu Bakr 1975: 15). English 
is considered the principal language of the southern Sudan as sanctioned by the 
Addis Ababa Agreement and some parts of the Regional Self–Government Act of 
1972. But the introduction of English as a means of instruction in the southern 
schools would be a violation of Chapter 2 of the Regional Self–Government Act of 
1972, which granted the jurisdiction of the central government the right to legislate 
on matters of educational planning (Nyombe 1997: 119). The central government did 
not discuss this contradiction because ‘the transitional period through which the 
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south is passing might have necessitated this solution’ (Abu Bakr 1975: 16). 
Therefore, this educational policy represented the view of the central government, 
since language planning was not the responsibility of the southern Regional Self–
Government. Apart from the above contradictions and confusion, the new 
educational language policy in the southern Sudan reconsidered local languages as 
media for teaching, and allowed English and Arabic to be used in some situations.  
 
Hurreiz and Bell (1975a: 1) charge that ‘there have been only limited attempts to 
define the role of vernacular languages in the life of the nation’. The question of 
identity also drove the southerners to oppose the imposition of Arabic as the national 
language of the country. The fear was caused by the fact that Arabic is not a widely 
used language in south of the Sudan. If southerners were to be made to speak only 
Arabic, they would be alienated from the rest of the Africans, and would instead 
identify themselves further with the Arab world. These fears were confirmed later by 
the national government’s over–identification with Arab nationalism, and 
particularly its preoccupation with the imposition of Islamic Sharia on the whole 
country. In 1985 President Jaffar Nimeiri (leader of a military regime, 1969–1985) 
proclaimed the Sudan to be an Islamic state run by Islamic Sharia (Nyombe 1997: 
120). In earlier years, observers had applauded the regime of Nimeiri for bringing an 
end to the long southern armed struggle through the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 
(see above). Peace and order were restored in the whole Sudan, and an elected 
autonomous administration was established in the city of Juba. Some years later, 
President Nimeiri completely changed his ideology from secularism to sectarianism, 
and assumed the role of an Islamic head of state. As an implication of this dramatic 
shift in his state policy, the South was rendered incompatible with his new ideology. 
So Nimeiri started to curtail the authority of the southern Regional government by 
dividing it into regions with fewer powers than those enjoyed under the peace 
accord. As a result, Nimeiri abrogated the Addis Ababa peace agreement, triggering 
the formation of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (the SPLM/A, this is the 
movement which later signed the Naivasha peace agreement with the current Islamic 
ruling regime). The declared objective of the SPLM/A was the creation of a new, 
democratic, secular and pluralistic Sudan (Deng 1995: 13). The tension reached its 
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extreme when in 1983 Nimeiri implemented what came to be known as the 
‘September Laws’, which was ‘a programme aimed at Islamising the legal 
system’(Deng and Khalil 2004: 3). The implementation of this Sharia-based law led 
southerners to believe that peaceful coexistence was no longer possible. President 
Nimeiri was accused by opposition parties of exacerbating the south-north problem 
and extending the civil war. Abbas (1991) points out that the NIF (now NCP) allied 
itself to the military regime of Nimeiri from 1978 to 1985 in order to get control over 
two important areas: economy and education. Nimeiri’s decision to Islamise the 
economy granted the NIF an unprecedented opportunity to control the Sudan 
economically through the new Islamic banking system. The NIF then manipulated its 
economic power to infiltrate all the networks of elites through the use of patronage. 
In education, Nimeiri’s military rule granted the NIF a free hand in higher education 
in return for the NIF’s pledge to maintain control in universities. Consequently, the 
voice of the members and supporters of opposition parties was silenced not only by 
the regime’s security apparatus but also by the violent tactics employed by the NIF 
supporters. Thus the NIF exercised a complete monopoly over political activity in the 
educational institutions, whereas opposition parties had to operate secretly. The 
NIF’s obsessive preoccupation with the student movement stems from two factors: 
first from the elitist nature of its political philosophy; and secondly from its failure to 
dominate trade unions and professional associations that are entirely opposed to its 
policies. By now non–Arabic speaking groups in other areas of the northern parts 
including the Darfurian region became partially aware of their linguistic rights 
(Miller 2006: 1). Not only did the language awareness spread, but also the culture of 
federalism became fashionable especially among northern political parties which 
previously resisted it (Miller 2003a: 163).  
 
A public uprising led to the fall of Nimeiri’s military regime, and marked the 
beginning of a new democratic era. According to Deng and Khalil (2004: 3), when 
the Umma Party and Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which are both northern 
political parties, came to office as a result of the general elections of 1985–1986, 
they did not take any meaningful measures towards the resolution of the south–north 
conflict, partly because they feared the rising power of radical Islamist movements 
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such as the NIF (now NCP: National Congress Party, the current ruling partner). 
However, a sizeable number of politicians, trade unions, and professional 
associations started to speak openly in support of the southern cause. A few weeks 
before the end of democratic life, more than fifty organisations, including all political 
parties except the National Islamic Front (NIF), signed a national programme calling 
for the government to enter into a peace agreement with the SPLM/A. The poor 
administration of the government speeded up the end of the democratic era when 
Brigadier Omar al Bashir seized power on 30 June 1989 by a military coup d’état on 
behalf of the National Islamic Front (NIF). It is generally argued that the NIF’s 
military coup was timed to prevent the implementation of that national programme, 
and went on to declare the whole Sudan an Islamic state (ibid.: 3). At the end of 
1989, some presidential decrees were issued concerning the policy of the regime on 
higher education. One was about the establishment of five new public and private 
universities. The second stated that Arabic should be the main and only medium of 
instruction at the higher education level. The question of using the Arabic language 
as a means of teaching in university education has long been considered by the older 
universities (with the obvious exception of the Islamic University of Omdurman, 
which has used Arabic since its establishment). The policy of Arabicisation stirred 
much debate over its moral principles, the timing, and the preparations required. The 
NIF–controlled regime held a conference in September 1990 to discuss the problems 
of general education; however, university education was the focal point of its 
deliberations. Abbas criticises this educational conference on the grounds that its 
hidden agenda was to Islamise the general and higher education in the Sudan: 
There is no emphasis in NIF discourse on the pedagogical arguments 
which the advocates of Arabicisation usually advance – e.g., that 
students learn better in their own language. There is also very little 
emphasis on the need to improve standards or on the educational and 
pedagogical problems involved. The stress is rather on the need to root 
education in the ‘culture’ and ‘traditions’ of Sudan – as interpreted by 
the NIF. (Abbas 1991: 25) 
On the other side, the war in the southern Sudan continued leading to more 
destruction, misery, and chaos. The resources of the country were being severely 
depleted; a generation of children went without education or care. Around two 
million persons died on the battlefield or as a result of war–related causes or famine, 
and a great many were displaced to the northern towns and to other countries. Even 
 148 
the north has suffered from the way in which the country has been run. By now the 
struggle for a new Sudan has acquired its own momentum in other areas of the 
country. The concept of ‘New Sudan’ offers a counterforce to the concept of Arab–
Islamic hegemony pursued by General Bashir’s government and its fundamentalist 
supporters (Abbas 1991: 14).  
 
Under the influence of African and international pressure, two rounds of peace 
negotiations (Abuja 1 and Abuja 2) were held in the Nigerian capital of Abuja in 
June 1992, and April–May 1993. The peace negotiations broke down over, among 
other things, the issue of the southern demand for a federal system. The SPLM/A 
(representing the south) was adamant in its demand for confederation, which the 
government of Sudan rejected outright. In September 1993, the Africa’s 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (henceforth IGAD) undertook the task 
of mediating between the two parties. After consultations with the two sides of the 
conflict, IGAD suggested a proposal that came to be known as the ‘Declaration of 
Principles’ (henceforth DOP) (see also Deng and Khalil 2004: 4). The DOP of the 
IGAD achieved little success despite the fact that both parties agreed to accept it as a 
basis for negotiations. The failure of DOP to achieve any real progress was due 
partly to the uncompromising position of the two parties at the negotiating table, and 
partly to the lack of clarity in non–IGAD documents, such as the 1994 Asmara 
Declaration of the National Democratic Alliance (henceforth NDA). The IGAD 
initiative excluded all the NDA member parties other than SPLM/A in the peace 
negotiations (ibid.: 5). Peace talks between the two parties were resumed through the 
IGAD initiative under the pressure of the international community, especially of the 
USA. The peace process began to achieve some progress and led to the Machakos 
negotiations, which in turn led to the signing of the Machakos Protocol on 20 July 
2002 (ibid.). This protocol confirmed the status of the Sudan as a united state, but 
granted the south the right to self–determination after a six–year Interim period. All 
the northern political parties now were convinced that the south should be given the 
right to determine its fate through a referendum, with variation on the length of the 
Interim period. The Machakos Protocol provided six years for such a decisive 
referendum to be held in the southern Sudan. Most importantly, Machakos provided 
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a framework for future meetings and negotiations. On the 26 May 2004 the 
Government of the Sudan and the SPLM/A signed key peace protocols in the Kenyan 
town of Naivasha. And on the 9 January 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) was signed, bringing to an end the 20-year war between the two parts of the 
country.  
 
The Protocol on Power Sharing contains an important section on language policy. 
The new language policy is considered a landmark in the history of the Sudan, since 
it provides the constitutional infrastructure for a multilingual language policy (see 
Abdelhay 2004, 2006; Miller 2006). In October 2005, a new national Interim 
Constitution was ratified, and a new government was sworn in (with the dominance 
of the NCP, the Islamic ruling partner). A new autonomous government was formed 
in the southern Sudan, and it has drafted and ratified its own constitution. More 
significantly, the southern Sudan Constitution contains a section on language (see 
Chapter 5). A referendum will be held in six years’ time to decide the status of the 
southern Sudan, either to be separate or to be part of a united Sudan. In language 
planning terms, the state government, especially the dominant NCP, is changing its 
political rhetoric, which previously glorified the monolingual policy of Arabicisation, 
to embrace instead, at least theoretically, a new political discourse. This shifting of 
positions can be attributed to, among other things, the external forces that have direct 
bearing on language issue. Miller writes: 
In Sudan, the last decade has witnessed a progressive shift from a 
dominant state discourse and an active state policy supporting a pro–
Arabicisation policy to a new emerging discourse supporting (at least 
theoretically) a multilingual policy. This shift occurs in a world–wide 
context where linguistic rights tend to be more and more considered as 
one of the basic universal human rights. It occurs also in an African 
Horn–regional context where new political powers (like in the case of 
Ethiopia and Eritrea) tend to implement an ethno–regional linguistic 
policy, each region being associated with a dominant ethno–linguistic 
group. (Miller 2006: 2)  
A summary of the developments of language policies and language planning during 
the colonial and postcolonial period is provided in a tabular form. Table 4.1 presents 
an overview of the language policies during the period from 1920 to 2004. The Table 
also contains an interpretation of the ideologies behind the language policies, 
subsequent results and other factors that have influenced the present linguistic 
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situation in Sudan (see Idris 2006: 1–2). Table 4.2 provides a chronological evolution 
of language policies in Sudan, including the different measures implemented by 
different political regimes (see El Rayah 1995: 4–7). 
 
Period  Policy Language policy  Results/ 
Other factors 
1920–1950 Colonial ‘divide–and– rule’ 
policy:  native administration. 
Southern Sudan: Closed district, 
anti–Islam/anti–Arabic policy. 
Promotion of several southern 
Sudanese languages and English 
in southern Sudan. Wide use of 
Arabic in northern Sudan. 
In spite of British 
efforts:  
Spread of Arabic as 
lingua franca all over 
the country. No 
regional languages 
developed.  
1950–1956 Preparation for Independence in 
1956. 






1956–1972 National unity by Arabisation 
and Islam. 
Arabic was the only official 
language. Attempts to transcribe 
southern Sudanese languages into 
Arabic script. 
Civil war in the south. 
Arabic and northern 
Sudanese political, 
cultural and economic 
domination. 
1972–1989 Addis Ababa Peace accord: 
Recognition of the cultural and 
linguistic diversity of Sudan, but 
still no defined roles for the 
Sudanese languages (besides 
being part of cultural heritage 
and as MOI in primary school).  
Arabic the only official language, 
but English has a special status ‘as 
principal language’ in the south. 
Primary education in some 
southern Sudanese languages. 
Civil war in the south 
and droughts in the 
1980’s lead to mass 
migrations and 
urbanization, that 
resulted in increasing 
use of Arabic. 
1989–2004 Promotion of Arabic and Islam.  
Arabisation of higher education. 
Anti–Western and nationalistic 
sentiments. 
 Arabic the only official language. 
 
Continued civil war in 
the south and other 
regional armed conflicts 
resulted in migrations 
and urbanization, i.e., 
an increasing use of 
Arabic. Linguistic 
awareness awakened as 
a reaction against 
Arabisation.  
2004– Peace agreement: Recognition of 
the cultural and linguistic 
diversity. 
Arabic and English are official 
languages, and all other Sudanese 




              ? 
Table 4.1. A Chronological Overview of Language Policies in Sudan 1920–2004 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.3 Arabicisation policy in the Sudan: Definitions 
Having described the postcolonial policies, I will focus in the remaining part of this 
chapter on the policy of Arabicisation in the Sudan. Since the term ‘Arabicisation’ is 
the nub of the following discussion, it will be useful to specify a few definitions 
distinguishing the different kinds of meaning. There is a good cause justifying the 
dedication of a complete section to the exposition of the different implementations of 
this term. While the word ‘Arabicisation’ (or Arabisation) has extensive 
contemporary currency, it suffers from variable usage and conceptual ambiguity. The 
concept of ‘Arabicisation’ necessarily differs in individual instances, since it is 
interpreted in a variety of ways due in some cases to the ideological orientation of the 
user: nationalist, pluralist, Islamist, Marxist, melting pot adherent, etc. So wide is the 
variation that at times it seems difficult to discover the common denominator, which 
may be linguistic, racial, ideological or some combination of the three. Before 
proceeding, however, two points relating to the themes of this section should be 
clarified. The first of these concerns the relationship between the Arabic language 
and the question of national identity in the Sudan. As the discussion will show, the 
question of the status of the Arabic language is always associated with the debate 
over nationalism in the Sudan. Yet, it is beyond the scope of this section to provide a 
detailed critical review of the different types of nationalism in the Sudan. The second 
point that needs to be mentioned is that although the Arabic language constitutes the 
main topic of the section, I will be primarily concerned with its political and social 
status in the Sudan. A discussion of the grammatical system (in the full Chomskyan 
sense of the term grammar) of the Arabic language is immaterial here, though a 
casual reference will be made where appropriate. This section will be mainly 
restricted to the definition of the term ‘Arabicisation’, and the last two sections will 
examine its implementation in the north and the southern Sudan. 
 
To begin with, the word ‘Arabicisation’ has several meanings. In one sense, the term 
is used to refer to the ‘process of racial, religious and cultural assimilation of 
indigenous ethnic groups of the northern Sudan, for example, the Nubians, Beja and 
other Negroid peoples by the Arabs’(Yokwe 1984: 155). In this sociocultural sense, 
the process of Arabicisation led to the Islamisation and Arabicisation of the six 
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former northern provinces (Sudan is now divided into 25 states), leaving the south 
almost untouched by these influences (Abdel–Rahim 1971: 230). Similarly, Bell 
notes that anchoring Arabic to Islam led to linguistic hierarchisation in Sudan. The 
essence of Bell’s argument is contained in the following quotation:  
From the point of view of Islam there was not then, nor will there ever 
be any justification for considering any other language equal to Arabic. 
Both because of its religious position and because of its utility as a 
lingua franca, Arabic can be described as nothing less than the primary 
language of Sudan. (Bell 1989: 192) 
Miller (2003a: 164) points out that the language policies which reflect the ideological 
choices of the rulers have an extremely important symbolic effect. She explains that 
the southern Sudanese resisted the official Arabicisation policy because it is a clear 
sign of northern political and cultural domination. Southern Sudanese see in the 
Arabicisation policy the association between Arabic and Islam, and between Arabic 
culture and Arabic racial hegemony. A majority of researchers and politicians reject 
completely the Arabicisation policy in its racial sense. Gray (1963: 1) argues that 
‘often it is not colour or facial features which distinguish a Northerner from a 
Southerner, but speech, mannerisms and upbringing’. Antagonists of the racial and 
cultural policy of Arabicisation claim that the Sudanese sociocultural system is the 
product of a mixture of multifarious ethnic groups. This line of thinking, referred to 
in the literature as a melting pot argument, holds that the contact between different 
ethnic, linguistic and cultural groups led to the production of a new Sudanese blood. 
Abdel–Rahim (1971: 237) joins this line of argument and states that ‘Arabism and 
Africanism have become so completely fused in the northern Sudan that it is 
impossible to distinguish between the two even from the most abstract point of 
view’. The melting pot argument opposes the organisation of distinctly ethnic 
political bodies and interest groups. Supporters of this line of thinking believe that 
the cultural and linguistic boundaries between disparate groups in the Sudan would 
eventually disappear. The adherents consider it a matter of time before southern 
Sudanese minorities – the cultural and linguistic groups which remain defiant to the 
assimilationist policies of the Khartoum–based elites – assimilate and become part of 
the larger Sudanese cultural totality. However, this argument was demolished by 
another referred to in the literature as the ‘cultural pluralism argument’, which holds 
that ‘Sudan is a patchwork of ethnic enclaves’ (AbdelSalam 1989: 34). Supporters of 
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this school of thought argue that the persistence and continuous resistance of 
linguistic minorities of the south have invalidated the melting pot theory. Wai (1979: 
74) writes:  
The southern Sudanese have no crisis of identity: they know they are 
African and feel so racially and culturally. They have no objection to 
the northern Sudanese identifying themselves as Arabs, but they resent 
being included in this category.  
The argument here is that linguistic, cultural, and ethnic variations do exist in Sudan 
and can never be wiped out. Supporters of this argument including Sudanese 
communists, socialists and the SPLM/A consider Sudan to be ‘a democracy of 
nationalities, cooperating voluntarily and autonomously but within a united Sudan in 
the enterprise of self–realisation through the perfection of men according to their 
own kind’ (AbdelSalam 1989: 34). Other progressive forces under the banner of the 
National Democratic Alliance endorsed the pluralist option to counteract the present 
Islamic regime (Miller 2003a: 1963). Marginalised and minority groups embrace this 
argument and see in it their liberation from the centrally based power of the elites. 
Adherents strongly argue that Sudanese society still retains ‘long–standing ethnic 
distinctions which are operative in the country’s social and political life, and which 
show every evidence of persisting’ (ibid.). The protection of local languages, 
promotion of bilingualism, and the various cultural and conventional practices are 
always the objective of any language planning based on this line of thinking. This 
point can be illustrated with reference to the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement. 
Although the Addis Ababa agreement was not signed for the good of all Sudan, it 
could still be considered a voice against the assimilatory policies of power holders 
(Abdelhay 2004: 31). Mazrui (1973: 72) notes that ‘it becomes possible to envisage a 
situation when more and more Sudanese become linguistically and by claimed 
descent, Arab Sudanese’. Miller (2003a: 161) expresses the same point that local 
ruling elites in the Sudan elaborated and claimed Arab genealogies.   
 
According to Deng (1995: 4), in the south, the remaining third of the Sudan in land 
and population, the African identity both in its racial and cultural composition has 
survived the onslaught of Arabism and Islam. Miller (2006: 8) argues that 
Islamisation in the Sudan was not the primary force behind the monolithic policy of 
Arabicisation, and that the two should not essentially be linked. She argues that 
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Arabicisation is a form of linguistic nationalism that emerged as a reaction to the 
colonial Southern Policy of divide and rule. Language conflicts in the Middle East, 
including Sudan, have little to do with Islam, and more with the emergence of 
nationalist movements such as Arab and Turkish ones (Miller 2003a: 152–153). It is 
remarkable that the controversy over Sudanese national identity stems partly from 
definitional problems, the resolution of which depends on providing an all–inclusive 
identification of the different peoples in the country. Stevenson defines (1971: 11) 
Sudan as a ‘crossroads of Africa’, since it is ‘rich in the variety of its peoples, 
languages and cultures’ which ‘are part of the total heritage, to be welcomed as 
contributing, each in its particular way, to the pattern of national life’. Another 
similar definition comes from Abdel–Rahim (1971: 228) who views Sudan with all 
its physical, cultural, and ethical diversity as ‘a microcosm of Africa’ because it 
constitutes ‘a unique meeting point of Arabism and Africanism’. Another similar 
view is held by Mazrui (1971: 251) who views Sudan as a place of ‘multiple 
marginality’. Mazrui employs the term ‘marginality’ with special sense to denote 
‘specific traits in the Sudan which place it significantly in an intermediate category 
between two distinct sectors of Africa’. Mazrui notes that the ‘fascination about 
Sudan is that it signifies a borderline case between English–Speaking Africa and 
Arabic–speaking Africa, a rarer phenomenon than the Franco–Arabic duality’ (ibid.).  
 
A second sense of Arabicisation is political. The concept of Arabicisation in this 
political sense refers to ‘a deliberate attempt by the northern politicians to identify 
and shape the future goal of the country toward Arab nationalism instead of African 
nationalism’ (Yokwe: 1984: 155). Champions of this line of thinking assume that 
‘there is a core culture pattern in the Sudan, composed of essentially Islamic Afro–
Arab values, life styles, and identifications, to which a great number of ethnic 
cultures except perhaps for the south – are in some way related’ (AbdelSalam 1989: 
36).  
 
Proponents of this line of thought, including the National Islamic Front (NIF), 
believe that Islam coupled with the Arabic language should be the unifying force of 
disparate ethnic groups. This way of representation considers that the southern Sudan 
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had been separated by force from the rest of the country by the colonial policy. 
Supporters of this school argue that ‘Arabicisation and Islamisation of the southern 
people would counteract the colonial policy and enhance national integration’ (Miller 
2003a: 162). Viewed from this perspective, the conflict that emerged between the 
south and north is then attributed to the fact that the ‘Arab policy of political 
assimilation is clearly not aimed at a union between equals, but is calculated to nip 
African aspirations in the bud in order to upgrade Arab nationalism’ (Albino 1970: 
6). Albino is not resistant to the idea of having an Arab nationalism in the Sudan. He 
argues that the two nationalisms could coexist, and the problem aroused when the 
state attempted to suppress the African nationalism in favour of the Arab one. Gray 
(1963: 1) confirms this point by pointing out that ‘the fact is that one group looks 
primarily towards the Arab Middle East and the other mainly towards Africa South 
of the Sahara’. Another criticism of the policy of Arabicisation is provided by Deng 
(1995: 3) who argues that Islam and the assimilationist Arab culture permitted the 
northern Sudanese to view their Arab–Islamic identity as superior, and accordingly 
they strongly resist any attempt by the non–Arab groups to identify the country with 
black Africa.  
 
According to Yokwe (1984: 157), the existing language policy in the north of Sudan 
was decided on the basis of the policy of Arabicisation. That is, the promotion of 
‘Arab nationalism’ as the future goal of the Sudan. Arab nationalism was being 
promoted and transformed into the national language policy by the government to the 
exclusion of the rest of the cultures and languages of local polities (ibid.). The 
insistence by the northerners on directing the whole country towards the Arab world 
could be clearly seen in the political speeches of many northern leaders. For 
example, Mr. Ali Abdel Rahman, then Minister of the Interior in a People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP) – Umma coalition, was reported to have said: ‘The Sudan is 
an integral part of the Arab world, and as such, must accept the leadership of the two 
Islamic leaders of the Sudan … Anybody dissenting from this view must quit the 
country’ (Parliamentary Proceedings: Second Sitting of the First Session of 
Parliament, 1958, P. 3, cited in Albino 1970: 6).   
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Nyombe (1997: 112) argues that Arab nationalism was endorsed and rendered into a 
national language policy, to such an extreme degree that the rest of the languages and 
cultures of the indigenous peoples were excluded. Nyombe (1997: 114) points out 
that it is this essential desire to build an Arab identity in the Sudan on the basis of 
religion and language that has cultivated hatred and tensions between the Arabic and 
non–Arabic speaking peoples. Miller (2006: 8) shares a similar view by stating that 
attempts to mobilise the Arabic language by politicians to achieve the nationalist 
project of Arab nationalism have unfairly disadvantaged other non–Arabic speaking 
groups. 
 
A third conception of Arabicisation policy is concerned with ‘the linguistic role of 
the Arabic language as a means for achieving national integration and unity of the 
Sudanese people’ (Yokwe 1984: 156). This linguistic definition was thought to have 
provided the country with a stable and unifying national identity. It holds that ‘a 
person is an Arab if his mother tongue is Arabic’ (Mazrui 1973: 55). This linguistic 
definition depends not on biological integration but on cultural and linguistic 
assimilation. Proponents of this view believe that national integration and unity may 
easily be achieved by the adoption and enforcement of a single national language. It 
is the Arabic language that was assigned this nationalistic role in the Sudan (Yokwe 
1984: 156). A significant number of northern scholars emphasise the linguistic 
definition of Arab. For example, Abdel–Rahim argues: 
Arabism is a cultural, linguistic and non–racial link that binds together 
numerous races: black, white, and brown. Had Arabism been anything 
else but this, most modern Arabs, whether Africans or Asian, including 
the entire population of the northern Sudan, would cease to be ‘Arab’ at 
all. And just as Arabism is a cultural and non–racial bond, Africanism 
also is a geographical, political and cultural, but a non–racial link which 
binds together the various peoples of Africa irrespective of differences 
of race, colour or language. Hence the close association between 
Arabism and Africanism not only within the bounds of Africa itself, but 
on inter–regional and international levels as well. (Abdel–Rahim 1971: 
237) 
Miller (2003a: 160) points out that ‘while linguistic diversity reminds us that Sudan 
is an African country, it shares with the Arab world the emotional investment 
towards the Arabic language’. She went on to point out that Islamist and nationalist 
discourses pursued the same monolithic policy of Arabicisation. Yet, there is a 
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difference of hierarchy between the Islamists and nationalists. For the former, 
Arabicisation is perceived as a means to reach Islamisation. For the latter (including 
Christians) Arabicisation is an end in itself. The French scholar reminds us that ‘we 
should not forget that in the Muslim world, some of the harshest linguistic policies 
towards minorities have been endorsed by secular states’ (Miller 2003a: 153). It is 
not only local languages that would be victimised to implement the Arabicisation 
policy, but also the colloquial varieties of the Arabic language. Both ideologies 
refuse to come to terms with the fact that the Arabic language is ‘not a fixed–given 
idiom, it is a human language on a par with other human languages’ (Abdelhay 2006: 
1).  
 
Southern politicians and scholars reject outright the linguistic concept of the policy 
of Arabicisation as a defining criterion for the identity of the whole Sudan. This does 
not necessarily mean that they are against the Arabic language, but rather they want 
‘a language policy that is comprehensive enough to include the vernaculars in its 
structure and yet promote Arabic language as a national language’ (Yokwe 1984: 
157). Yokwe (ibid.: 156) points out that the declaration of Arabic as the national 
language is ‘bound to affect the outlook of the self–identification of the Sudanese 
nation as a whole’. This is exactly the notion of the Arabicisation policy upon which 
language policy is based in the Sudan (ibid.). Hence, it is no accident that the 
national language policy of the Sudan ignores the local languages, particularly in the 
northern Sudan where Arabic is widely used as an official working language and as a 
lingua franca as well.  
 
Yokwe argues that the tireless pursuance of the Arabicisation policy in this 
exclusionary sense by different northern governments forced the African tribes in the 
north to give up their African traditions, and to abandon the idea of promoting and 
preserving their local languages. Southern politicians such as Nyombe (1997: 115) 
reject the whole package of the Arabicisation policy whether in its linguistic or 
religious sense. The core of Nyombe’s argument is that language and religion were 
manipulated by northerners to claim a majority status. Accordingly, issues of religion 
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and languages will continue to dominate the Sudanese political arena so long as the 
north continues to conceptualise its identity in terms of language and religion.  
 
4.3.1 Arabicisation policy in the north 
According to Yokwe (1984: 157), the existing language policy in the north of Sudan 
was made on the basis of the policy of Arabicisation, that is, the promotion of ‘Arab 
nationalism’ as the future goal of the Sudan. At Independence, the question of 
national identity stirred much debate between two main trends. The debate, which is 
still very much with us today, was over the definition of the Sudan as either a 
Muslim–Arab or Afro–Arab country (Miller 2003a: 162). The northern political 
parties which dominated the political arena were of two types. The first type was 
created from religious groups such as Ansar and Khatmiyya. Whereas the second 
type is influenced by the pan–Arabist movement (some of the parties have some 
religious affiliation) such as Nasserist, Baathiste, and Muslim Brotherhood 
movements (these movements have a religious affiliation in addition to its pan–
Arabist identity). For these political parties, the Sudan was indisputably an Arab and 
Muslim nation and the selection of Arabic as the official language was a rational 
choice. The post-Independence Sudanese government followed suit when it chose to 
implement the Arabicisation policy including the Arabicisation and Islamisation of 
the southern Sudan. This is evident from the fact that the 1956 National Constitution 
stipulated that Sudan is a united country (article 1), with Islam as the state religion 
(article 5), and Arabic as the official language (article 4). The Arabicisation policy 
was both linguistic in the sense that the speaking of Arabic by the whole population 
became imperative, and cultural in its orientation. The cultural and social practices of 
the central Sudan became the standard and dominant values that were to be spread 
throughout the whole country by the vehicles of education and urbanisation (Miller 
2003a: 162). The Muslim Arab nationalists, rather than the Islamists, have dominated 
the Sudanese political arena from 1956 up to the present day, with the exception of 
some short intervals during which the defenders of cultural pluralism fought to get 
their voice heard at least in public debates. The cultural pluralism argument 
expressed itself in the revolutionary movement of 1964 up to the first earlier years of 
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Nimeiri’s military regime (1968–1972), and the last democratic period of 1985–1989 
(ibid.: 163). 
 
According to Miller (2003a: 163), non–Arabic minorities in the northern Sudan did 
not at first oppose the Arabicisation policies despite the fact that not a single 
vernacular language was officially recognised. The first claims made by the newly 
created regional groups such as the Beja Front or the Nuba Front in 1965 were more 
economic and socio–political, concentrating on better political representation and 
economic equity (ibid.). But since the mid–1980s, more and more cultural demands 
have appeared on the agenda of the northern regional groups. Today, the issue of 
cultural diversity within the whole country has become a focal point of debate. The 
northern regional groups have adopted more or less the ideological discourse of the 
SPLM/A. Now even major northern political parties have no choice but to embrace 
the same discourse: 
Even the more religious formations like the Umma Party or the 
National Islamic Front (NIF) have had to recognise that the dream of a 
monocultural Sudan is totally inadequate. All the Sudanese Newspapers 
published daily papers, columns and letters discussing the issue of the 
Sudanese cultural diversity and many books, conferences, symposium 
have been dedicated to this issue. (Miller 2003a: 163) 
 
From 1958 onward, the Arabic language has become the means of instruction from 
primary level right up to the secondary level of education in the north. The English 
language is taught as a subject from the intermediate level of schooling onward, and 
it has become the most common second language (ibid.). Attempts to Arabicise 
secondary education continued until 1965 when the first Conference of Secondary 
Schools Teachers was held (Mugadam 2002: 56). The conference made a decision 
that the Arabic language would be the medium of instruction in secondary schools 
from June 1965. To guarantee the immediate compliance of the Ministry of 
Education, the members of the conference demanded that their decisions be approved 
or they would not mark the Sudan School Certificate examinations. Although the 
Ministry of Education had grave concerns for the drawbacks an abrupt 
implementation of the policy might produce, it approved the decision of the 
conference. The government started implementing the policy without an ample 
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preparation of teachers or materials. After the Arabicisation of the secondary schools, 
prominent voices began demanding the implementation of the Arabicisation policy in 
the university education. In 1970, the Ministerial and Technical Committee of the 
University of Khartoum held a conference with the aim to discuss the problem of the 
Arabicisation at the university level (ibid.). After a discussion the conference was 
convinced that there was no logical ground for continuing to use English as a 
medium of instruction in the university. The conference made the following 
recommendations: 
1. The Arabic language should be used as a means of instruction in the 
University, and that no other language is allowed to be used without a prior 
permission from the University Senate; 
2. The University should work in collaboration with Arab universities to find 
effective solutions to the problems concerning textbooks, references and 
teacher training; 
3. A living language should be introduced as a subject in order to help students 
with their research work; 
4. Arabic should be the University official language, and that all 
communications, meetings of the University Senate and academic committees 
should be made in the Arabic language. 
Although none of the above recommendations was implemented due to many causes 
including hesitation and delay, the language policy of Arabicisation was later 
reinforced by the permanent constitution of the Sudan of 1973. This constitution, 
referred to as ‘The southern Self–government Act, 1972’ or ‘Addis Ababa 
Agreement, 1972’, became a constituent part of the national constitution and allowed 
the south to form an autonomous regional government within the united Sudan. 
Yokwe (1984: 159) shares with Nyombe (1997) the view that ‘this constitution is one 
of the brakes against absolute Arabicisation policy, including language policy’. 
Yokwe points out that the central government had no language policy for the north at 
the time in the technical sense of assigning to language social functions within the 
respective communities. What the central government did, Yokwe (ibid.) continues, 
was that it stated the obvious: ‘The Sudan is an Arab country and so Arabic is the 
language for every function. No consideration is given to the other African languages 
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spoken in the north’. Bell and Haashim subscribe to the same view when they note 
that: 
Arabic was the ‘official’ language of the Sudan. Other Sudanese 
languages were widely regarded as an inconvenience: ‘Are they lugat 
‘languages’ or lahjat ‘dialects’’? There was no effective language 
policy aiming to achieve equilibrium among Sudanese languages. (Bell 
and Haashim 2006: 2) 
In 1976,  a committee was formed by the Faculty of Arts at the University of 
Khartoum with the aim of preparing a detailed report about the departments that 
could be Arabicised and about the effects of Arabicisation on students’ academic 
performance, including a review of the Arabicisation policies implemented in the 
Arab world (see Mugadam 2002: 57). In 1980 a national committee for Arabicisation 
was set up by a ministerial decision. Yet, no practical progress was made for the 
actual implementation of the policy of Arabicisation at the university level. In 1990, 
a presidential decree was issued stating that Arabic should be adopted as the medium 
of instruction in all universities starting from the academic year 1990/1991. This 
language policy was part of what the National Islamic Front (NIF) called the Higher 
Education Revolution (El Rayah 1995: 2). The decision was immediately 
implemented without any concern for the availability of Arabic reference works and 
textbooks and teacher training. An Arabic language academy was established to help 
implement the Arabicisation policy. Later, the High Commission of Arabicisation 
was formed with the aim of supplying the universities with Arabic reference works 
and textbooks in different disciplines. Yet, little has been achieved by this planning 
body, and even the Arabic texts that have been brought in from other Arab 
universities suffer from problems concerning terminology and translation. El Rayah 
(ibid.) notes that the post-independence period changed the language situation by the 
adoption of the Arabic language as the official and national language of the whole 
country, and the gradual Arabicisation of secondary and higher education 
institutions. 
 
Miller (2003a: 163–164) points out that since Independence the cultural situation in 
the Sudan has become worse and is now chaotic. Arabic has dominated the whole 
country and members of many minority groups are losing their mother tongues. 
Arabicisation, whether in its linguistic or cultural aspect, has failed to achieve the 
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expected social cohesion. National integration has been torn apart since the mid–
1980s. Ethnic cleavages are widening and civil war is looming large over the western 
part of the country (the Nuba Mountains and Darfur) and the south east (the 
Ingessana area). Social groups which once lived peacefully side by side are now at 
war with each other. Miller attributes the failure of the Arabicisation project to 
achieve social cohesion in the north Sudan to economic and political inequities. 
   
4.3.2 Arabicisation policy in the south 
The question of language has never been far from the surface of politics in the south 
of Sudan (Hurreiz and Bell 1975a: 11). Vernacular languages especially in the 
southern Sudan pose one of the most critical questions facing the country as a whole. 
One question regards their role alongside Arabic in the nationwide network of 
education and communication. Few would disagree with Yokwe (1984: 159) that 
Arabicisation, with its aim of national integration by the process of sociocultural 
assimilation of the southern polities did not succeed. In other words, the linguistic 
and sociocultural assimilative policies that were implemented in the northern Sudan 
in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries had very little success in the south. 
This is evident from the fact that southerners still remain a socially, linguistically, 
and culturally distinct community. Yokwe (1984: 159) observes that ‘nobody has 
come up with a definite answer based on solid research as to why this gap between 
Northerners and Southerners is still so wide and deep’. Yokwe believes that the 
long–standing problem between the two parts of the country stems from their distrust 
of one another. Miller attributes the lack of trust between the two regions to the 
colonial period. Miller (2003a: 161) argues that the harshness of the colonial period 
‘for the southern tribes must not be forgotten for it sowed the seeds of distrust and 
fear between Southerners and Northerners, seeds that the British used to their 
maximum benefit’. This feeling of distrust is deepened by the attempt of northern 
governments to extend the Arabisation and Islamisation to the southern Sudan.  
 
In the same line of thinking, Beshir (1968: 80) notes that ‘when the parliamentary 
system disappeared, and political parties were suppressed, the advocates of 
compulsion and integration of the North and South by force of arms had the upper 
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hand’. The military rule of 1958 that was considered by most southern officials as a 
result of a conspiracy by the northerners was indeed dominated by the Arab 
northerners. The military regime suppressed the political opposition in the whole 
country and continued to implement the policy of Arabicisation on the full scale in 
the south (Yokwe 1984: 159). Beshir (1968: 81) argues that the military regime of 
1958 ‘stepped up the spread of the Arabic and Islamisation, in the belief that this was 
the only way to achieve unity in the future’. Yokwe notes that the assimilative 
policies were chosen and imposed on the south by Khartoum government under the 
pretext that it was the only option to achieve unity in the future. Consequently, the 
southern people found themselves confronted with ‘a clear and conscious choice 
between two rival religious, ethical and cultural systems’ (Sanderson et al. 1981: 
394).  
 
Framing the conflict between the south and the north in terms of the struggle and 
monopoly of power may explain why ‘even with the very best intentions, no Arab 
Government will consciously devote its time to a development programme in the 
south that may result in a seizure of power by the Africans’ (Albino 1970: 5). So, 
politically, the northerners have looked towards the Arab Middle East as the home of 
their political aspirations and pan–Islamic culture, while southerners have looked 
towards the rest of Africa as their locus of origin (Albino 1970: 6). The conflict over 
the monopoly of the national language was at the heart of both the civil wars and 
peace between the south and north. In short, although the sociocultural policy of 
Arabicisation failed to replace the historically–rooted local languages in the south, 
the Arabic language still retains its status as a symbol of political power. 
Nonetheless, ‘it is not and never will be a substitute for the vernaculars which are 
still serving very important communicative roles, especially among the families in 
the rural areas of the Sudan’ (Yokwe 1984: 152).  
 
4.4 Summary 
In this chapter I have surveyed the diachronic development of the institutional 
practice of language planning in the Sudan from the Anglo–Egyptian rule of 1898 to 
the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the south and 
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the north in 2005. The analysis has shown that the colonial language policy was 
intended to separate the south from the north. A number of measures were 
operationalised to linguistically differentiate the south from the north including the 
Rejaf Language Conference of 1928, the construction of no–man's land, and the 
creation of the Closed District Order. These measures taken together constitute what 
came to be known as the Southern Policy. The chapter has paid considerable 
attention to the postcolonial policies of Arabicisation in the north and the south. The 
analysis has shown that Arabic was instrumental in the attempt to build a unified and 
homogeneous nation–state. This state–declared policy of Arabicisation has been 
strongly resisted by the southerners. The refusal of the northern power holders to 
accommodate the needs of the southerners in postcolonial Sudan has led to the 
eruption of civil war between the two parts of the country. The civil war has recently 
been settled by the CPA. The CPA contains a significant language policy. The next 
chapter will provide a critical examination of the Naivasha Language Policy (NLP), 

















CHAPTER FIVE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NAIVASHA 
LANGUAGE POLICY (NLP) 
 
 5.1 Data and methods of data analysis 
The aim behind producing a new language policy as part of the CPA is to reconfigure 
the sociolinguistic order in the Sudan. It is intended to deal with the problematic 
character of the Pre–Naivasha sociolinguistic order in which only one language (the 
Arabic language) is constitutionally and institutionally honoured. The NLP is 
embedded in the Protocol of Power–sharing which is one of the six constitutive 
protocols of the CPA. The data for this chapter are composed of the text of the NLP, 
which contains five main statements embodied in the Protocol of Power–sharing in 
addition to other language–related statements scattered in other protocols of the 
CPA. Political speeches, public announcements, and national and international 
documents and reports also form part of the data upon which the critical analysis will 
be based. Another source of data is ethnographic observation conducted during my 
visit to the Nuba Mountains (known in Arabic as Jibal Al–Nuba) in the Southern 
Kordofan State and to the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research in 
Khartoum in December 2006.  
 
A critical analysis of the NLP requires a historical understanding of the colonial 
language policies, particularly the Southern Policy (see Chapter 4). The linguistic 
policies of Arabicisation reviewed in Chapter 2 and 4 will also be drawn upon in the 
analysis of the historical forces that led to the emergence of the NLP. Greenberg’s 
(1963a) typology of Sudanese languages will be drawn on to understand the ‘politics 
of linguistic indigenousness’ in the NLP (see Chapter 2 for an overview of 
Greenberg’s work). I operationalise the critical approaches to language planning 
reviewed in Chapter 3 in the analysis of the Naivasha language policy.  
 
It will be useful to clarify some of the key conceptual terms used in the analysis. I 
should note that there is a lack of common consensus in academic writings about the 
definition of terms such as ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’. Guibernau (1996: 47) defines 
‘nation’ as ‘a human group conscious of forming a community, sharing a common 
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culture, attached to a clearly demarcated territory, having a common past and a 
common project for the future and claiming the right to rule itself’. The term 
‘nationalism’ is used to describe ‘political movements seeking or exercising state 
power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments’ (Breuilly 1993: 2). A 
nationalist argument or an ideology of nationalism, according to Breuilly (ibid.), is 
the political doctrine which holds that: 1) there exists a nation with an explicit and 
peculiar identity; 2) the interest and values of a nation take precedence over all other 
values and interests, and 3) a nation should be independent, and this demands at least 
the achievement of political sovereignty (for a comparable definition see Smith 1994: 
379). A ‘nation–state’ is identified by the confluence of the nation and the state in 
Gellner’s (1983: 1) understanding of political/ideological nationalism: ‘Nationalism 
is primarily a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit 
should be congruent’. The building of a nation–state is conducted principally through 
the formation and imposition of a common language and civil culture, and through 
state agencies including education (May 2001: 56). This position is termed modernist 
(alternative terms include instrumentalist/social constructionist) in the literature. 
Social constructionism/constructivism emphasises ‘the contingent, fractured, 
ambivalent and reflexive nature of culture and identity as these are played out in the 
context of power and domination’ (Werbner 1997: 226). The modernist perspective 
views nation–state (and national identity) as a product of political nationalism (i.e., 
nation–state congruence) and modernity (see Kedourie 1960; Hobsbawm 1992a: 4; 
Nairn 1981; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Anderson 1991; Breuilly 
1993). Modern sovereign nation–states, according to modernist commentators, are a 
direct product of the eighteenth–century ideology of nationalism and post-
Enlightenment political rationalism (May 2001: 62; for a detailed review of the 
various approaches to nationalism see Ozkirmili 2000: ch. 3; Breuilly 1993: 404–
424; Smith 1971: 153–230). For some modernist writers (e.g., Hobsbawm 1992b), 
ethnicity and nationalism are quite different things. The modernist model is 
contrasted with the primordialist one which recognises the existence of 
ethnic/cultural nations (e.g., indigenous populations) that are not represented by 
corresponding boundaries of a particular state of their own (see Geertz 1963, 1973; 
Shills 1957, 1981; van den Bergh 1981, 1995). Guibernau (1999: 16) terms these 
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ethnic groups ‘nations without states’ (cf. Hroch’s 1998: 91 ‘smaller nations’; 
Keating’s 1997, 2001 ‘stateless nations’; Smith’s 1995a: 57 ‘ethnies’; for the 
ethnicist model to nationalism see Jenkins 1995; May 2001: 70–80; Fishman 1989; 
Hutchinson 1994: 7–9; 1998: 190–198). Bentley (1987) defines ‘ethnicity’ as 
follows: 
At base ethnicity involves a claim to be a particular kind of person. 
Whether the impetus to such a claim lies in an innate tendency to favour 
kin (even fictive kin), ecological adaptation, shared positions in 
structures of production and distribution, or emotional sustenance, 
ethnic–identity claims involve symbolic construal of sensations of 
likeness and difference, and these sensations must somehow be 
accounted for. (Bentley 1987: 27) 
The late eighteenth–century ‘German Romanticist’ movement of Humboldt, Herder 
and Fichte advocated ‘organic’ or ‘linguistic nationalism’. The German Romantics 
considered nations as ancient/natural (continuous) forms of human organisation, with 
particular emphasis on race (or blood), soil, and language as central to the essence of 
the nation. This resulted in the emergence of the ideology of ‘one language, one 
nation, one state’ as a linear principle of linguistic/organic nationalism (the reverse 
holds true as a principle of political nationalism, May 2001: 91; for a review of the 
German Romantic theory see Joseph 2004: 42–46). Although it is obvious that this 
intellectual position is both essentialist and determinist, it should be put in 
perspective as a reactionary theorising against the totalising and universalising 
discourse of the political nationalism of the French Revolution (May 2001: 58). 
 
A number of alternative models have been developed to transcend the primordialist–
constructivist dichotomy (for a review of various models see Ozikirimli 2000; May 
2001). One of the ways in which both approaches are effectively incorporated is 
through Bourdieu’s (1977, 1990a, 1990b; Bourdieu and Passeron 1990) ‘theory of 
practice’, particularly his notion of ‘habitus’ (for the implementation of ‘habitus’ or 
the notion of ‘practice’ as analytic tools see May 1999; Bentley 1987; Wicker 1997; 
Lin 1999; Moore and Carling 1982). Bourdieu defines the habitus as follows: 
The structures constitutive of a particular type of environment (e.g., the 
material conditions of existence characteristic of class condition) 
produce habitus, systems of durable transposable dispositions … The 
habitus is the product of the work of inculcation and appropriation 
necessary in order for those products of collective history, the objective 
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structures (e.g., language, economy, etc.) to succeed in reproducing 
themselves more or less completely, in the form of durable dispositions, 
in the organisms (which one can, if one wishes, call individuals) 
lastingly subjected to the same conditionings, and hence placed in the 
same material conditions of existence (Bourdieu 1977: 72, 85, emphasis 
in original).  
Following her ethnographic analysis of four classrooms in Hong Kong, Lin (1999: 
407) defines habitus as ‘the language use, skills, and orientations, attitudes, 
dispositions, and schemes of perception that children are endowed with by virtue of 
socialisation in their families and communities’. Collins (1993: 116) notes that 
‘language and power are linked in Bourdieu’s work, embedded in a larger dynamic 
of material conditioning and symbolic power’. For Bourdieu, all areas of human 
activities are socially charged ‘fields’ which are in turn instances of the habitus 
(Joseph 2004: 74). The notion of ‘fields’ may be conceptualised as ‘the arenas of 
social life and struggles’ (Collins 1993: 116). The material conditions of existence, 
which are mediated by symbolic systems of representations, generate in different 
individuals dispositions to act in different ways (Bentley 1987: 27). The generation 
of the practices by a given habitus is regular without being governed by any rule 
(Joseph 2004: 74). However, the relationship between the habitus and the material 
structural conditions of existence is dialectical (Bourdieu 1977: 82–83). Collins 
(1993: 116) remarks that ‘Bourdieu problematises our usual ways of thinking about 
couplets such as necessity/freedom, structure/practice, and 
determination/contingency’. Joseph (2004: 74) comments that ‘the habitus is 
inhabited by an active human agent who is defined by the system but, crucially, not 
merely its passive object’. It should be noted that theories of practice, including 
Bourdieu’s, originated from the Marxist imperative to relate class consciousness to 
structural conditions of existence (Bentley 1987: 27; for a detailed account on the 
relationship between ‘class consciousness’ and ‘practice’ see Lukacs 1971). 
According to Joseph (2004: 74), Bourdieu tried to ‘reconnect the Marxist and 
structuralist lines by renouncing the structuralist dismissal of the human “subject”’. 
As Thompson (1991: 29) notes, the weakness of most versions of Marxist analysis in 
Bourdieu’s understanding is that they tend to deal with the social world as a one–
dimensional space in which developments are accounted for with reference to the 
unfolding of the economic modes of production and class antagonisms resulting from 
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it. For Bourdieu, the social world is ‘a multi–dimensional space, differentiated into 
relatively autonomous fields determined by the quantities of different type of capital 
they possess’ (ibid.). It is the different contexts mediated by power relations that 
determine the value of the capital in different social fields (Pennycook 2001: 123). 
Unlike the classical Marxist view of political economy, Bourdieu recognises 
different forms of capital including economic, social, cultural, linguistic, and 
symbolic capital (ibid.). On the relevance of symbolic capital to other forms of 
capital, Pennycook (ibid.: 123–124) points out that ‘one’s ability to use differential 
access to material goods only relates to power to the extent that it is combined with 
cultural, linguistic, social, and symbolic capital’. In Bourdieu’s (Bourdieu and 
Passeron 1977) work, linguistic capital is understood as basically a matter of class 
dialects (see Collins 1993: 118). Despite the fact that practices produced by habitus 
are determined by productive historical conditions, this determination is not 
mechanical, but rather dialectical (Bourdieu 1977: 72–73). The habitus is not open to 
the consciousness, nor is it a ‘product of genuine strategic intention’ (ibid.: 73).   
 
With respect to ethnicity and national identity, the notion of habitus can effectively 
be applied to the analysis of ethnicity and national identity when it is used as a social 
method rather than as a social theory (May 2001: 47). According to May (ibid.), 
‘ethnicity as socially constructed and as a material form of life is addressed by the 
concept of habitus’. The concentration of Bourdieu is on ‘regional’ and ‘ethnic’ 
identity (see Joseph 2004: 13). According to Bourdieu, although these classifications 
and categories essentialise the arbitrary boundaries between peoples, once defined 
they become real as if they were part of the natural order (ibid.) Bourdieu writes: 
Struggles over ethnic or regional identity – in other words, over the 
properties (stigmata or emblems) linked with the origin through the 
place of origin and its associated durable marks, such as accent – are a 
particular case of the different struggles over classifications, struggles 
over the monopoly of the power to make people see and believe, to get 
them to know and recognise, to impose the legitimate definition of the 
divisions of the social world and, thereby, to make and unmake groups. 
(Bourdieu 1991: 221, emphasis in original) 
Bentley (1987: 27) shares the same conviction when he notes that ‘this proposition 
[habitus] finds substantial support in the existing literature. It provides the objective 
grounding for ethnic subjectivity sought by both primordialists and instrumentalists 
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and, in addition, it accounts for phenomenon they cannot’. The concept of habitus is 
intended primarily by Bourdieu to explore power inequalities between dominant and 
dominated groups, with the habitus of the former recognised as ‘cultural capital’ 
(socially valuable), while the habitus of the latter is downgraded (May 2001: 48). 
Bourdieu uses the notion of the habitus as an analytic tool specifically in relation to 
the standard language as a product of ‘normalisation’ by pointing to the ways in 
which they construct possibilities for symbolic domination/violence (Joseph 2004: 
74; for the definition of these concepts see Bourdieu 1991: 51). Collins (1993: 117) 
notes that the ‘concepts of capital, field, and habitus have been useful in thinking 
about the role of language in the reproduction of class positions’ (for a critique see 
Luke 1996; Pennycook 2001: 123–130; Joseph: 2004: 75).  
  
Drawing on Bourdieu’s notion of ‘habitus’, I would contend that the British colonial 
rule in collaboration with key local figures (whose authority itself is a colonial 
invention) in the Sudan constructed the political national identity out of the habitus 
of the northern riverain social groups, while others’ habitus was misrecognised. This 
process partly involved ‘invention of traditions’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983), 
construction of languages, (re)creation of tribal boundaries, and racial typology of 
people in both the south and the north (for critical accounts on the invention of 
tribes/ethnicities and/or languages see Vail 1989; Harries 1988; Nagel 1994; Sollors 
1989; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Irvine and Gal 2000; Joseph 2006a; Brutt–
Griffler 2006; Makoni and Pennycook 2006). Postcolonial governments 
instrumentally manipulated this habitus in service of collective political mobilisation 
and material interests. 
 
In order to engage in a sequential and systematic presentation, the structural 
organisation of this chapter is ordered in terms of the salient theme(s) each language 
policy statement seems to designate. With respect to the first policy statement, I 
examine the concept of the politics of linguistic indigenousness. My working 
hypothesis here is that the use of the technical phrase ‘indigenous languages’ is a 
politically motivated act intended to function as a metaphorical strategy of symbolic 
differentiation of African groups in the southern Sudan from the Arabised ones in the 
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northern Sudan. The argument here is that what are called ‘indigenous languages’ in 
the Sudan are colonial creations. The aim of these colonial constructs is purely 
ideological and pragmatic. Employing their European conceptual apparatuses, the 
British colonial rule invented ‘indigenous languages’ out of the existing linguistic 
resources (habitus), created artificial tribal boundaries, established ‘imperial 
families’ in the north, and constructed different racial hierarchical classifications of 
the populations. The process of the colonial construction of linguistic differences led 
to the situation where Arabic and Islam were communicated and interpreted as 
congruent boundary system markers in the north. The focus here is not so much on 
the authenticity/falsity of national identity, rather it is on the ‘mode of generation of 
practices’ (Bourdieu 1977: 72), and the ways in which these practices are 
constructed/imagined; and the role played by language as a practice in the production 
and maintenance of social order. Drawing on Irvine and Gal (2000), I broadly 
examine the semiotic processes of the colonial construction of social and linguistic 
differentiation of the south from the north. The researchers identify three semiotic 
processes involved in the construction of the ideological representations of linguistic 
differences: iconisation, fractal recursivity, and erasure (ibid.: 37). Iconisation 
describes a ‘transformation of the sign relationship between linguistic features (or 
varieties) and the social images with which they are linked’ (ibid.). Fractal 
recursivity refers to the ‘projection of an opposition, salient at some level of 
relationship, onto some other level’ (ibid.: 38). Erasure describes the ‘process in 
which ideology, in simplifying the sociolinguistic field, renders some persons or 
activities (or sociolinguistic phenomena) invisible’ (ibid.). According to Wallman 
(1978: 205), social boundaries are symbolic though they can be marked by real 
things (cf. Armstrong’s 1982: 6 ‘symbolic border guards’). In other words, once 
national communities (and national languages) are constructed, they become 
communities of culture and power, Durkheimian ‘social facts’ (Smith 1995b: 4). If 
‘indigenous languages’ are colonial inventions in the Sudan, then the assumption of a 
one–to–one correspondence between ethnic identities and languages is an 
ideologically motivated practice. Such a practice, which amounts to cultural and 
linguistic determinism, is part of the power struggle in the Sudan over material 
resources. There is no inevitable connection between a given language and a given 
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ethnic/tribal identity in such a multilingual society as Sudan. However, as May 
(2001: 129) rightly notes, ‘to say that language is not an inevitable feature of identity 
is not the same thing as saying it is unimportant’. Ethnic identifications within the 
north itself and between the north and the south should be largely viewed as a 
product of social interaction which incorporates unequal relations of power (cf. 
situational ethnicity, see Eriksen 1992: 18–19; May 2001: 30–32; Barth 1969).   
 
The empirical concentration on the colonial/neo–colonial invention and reinvention 
of ethnic boundaries can avoid us the essentialist trap of commonsensically viewing 
the ‘northern’ and the ‘southern’ identities as unproblematically and statically fixed–
given. Conceptualising ethnic boundaries as contextually dynamic and interactively 
dialogic can permit us to visualise the role of the ‘ideologies of linguistic 
differentiation’ (Irvine and Gal 2000) in the processes of fixing and ‘naturalising’ 
ethnolinguistic boundaries. Arabic and Islam are among the significant boundary 
resources through which the north is categorically defined (and self–defined) by 
colonial/postcolonial rules in relation to the south. Viewing language as a resource 
(Ruiz 1984) can help us understand the ideological use of Arabic as a boundary 
marker in the struggle over national identity and ultimately political power. For 
instance, viewing Arabic as a resource boundary marker can lead us to reject the 
essentialising monolithic view of Arabic as a ‘property’ of the north. There is solid 
ethnographic evidence pointing to the fact that southern Equatorials do invoke ‘Juba 
Arabic’ to signal their southern identity in the capital Khartoum (see Miller 2003b).  
 
For the second policy statement, my working hypothesis is that the NLP is intended 
to act as a corrective to the divisive ideology of monolingualism by contributing to 
the emancipatory project of ‘New Sudan’. There is a piece of ethnographic evidence 
showing that GOSS and its people regard education as a liberating tool from the 
cultural control of northern governments (see Breidlid 2006). The philosophy of 
‘New Sudan’ aims at a material and discursive transformation of the current 
inequitable social order. With respect to the third statement, the focus is on the type 
of language rights sanctioned by the policy statement at the federal level. The 
argument here is that the notion of language rights, and particularly the right to use 
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mother tongue education should be viewed as part of the ‘habitus’ of speakers of a 
given community. Seen in this way, the embodied discursive practices of a given 
number of native students are a constituent part of their identity. This understanding 
of language rights can help us avoid the political polarisation of the south and the 
north along essentialising linguistic lines (Arabic–north vs. English/local language–
south). Viewed in this way, Juba Arabic can be viewed as part of the embodied 
cultural identity of the (Equatorial) southerners; it partly defines who they are.  
  
With respect to the fourth policy statement, I focus on the analysis of the political 
structural system which is compatible with the discourse of the NLP. I perform a 
comparative analysis between the types of federalism underlying the Arabicisation 
policy of the NCP and the NLP. My argument here is that a faithful implementation 
of the NLP within a multinational democratic federation informed by the principle of 
active citizenship can contain not only the divisive monolingualism but also the 
southern nationalism. The other language–related statements scattered in the 
protocols of the CPA will be dealt with as part of the analysis of the key language 
policy statements. I have underlined the NLP statements to distinguish them from 
other language policies. International and regional conventions on the rights of 
indigenous peoples are stated in tabulated form.  
 
 
5.2. Data analysis 
5.2.1 The NLP and the politics of linguistic indigenousness 
The first policy statement stipulates: 
All the indigenous languages are national languages which shall be respected  
developed and promoted. 
 
I shall start with a broad description of the functional organisation of the above 
policy statement in terms of Halliday’s (2004) systemic functional analysis. Firstly, 
the field of discourse of the statement (which is encoded in its experiential meaning) 
embodies a particular representation of a sociolinguistic reality in the Sudan: ‘all the 
indigenous languages are national languages’. The situational category of the field 
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also includes processes and activities such as ‘respecting’, ‘developing’, ‘promoting’, 
‘national languages’, and ‘indigenous languages’.  
 
Secondly, the tenor of discourse (which is activated by the interpersonal value of the 
text) encompasses the social relations between the political forces which signed the 
CPA. This social relationship which is reflected interpersonally incorporates unequal 
power relationships between these political forces. But this tenor is grammatically 
disguised through the textual organisation of the text (the use of passivisation).  
Thirdly, the mode of discourse of the policy formulation (which is realised in its 
textual value) is a written language belonging to the genre of language polices. Part 
of this policy announcement has the speech function of asserting a particular 
linguistic reality as objective and true without any further qualification by using the 
epistemic non–modal present tense ‘are’.  
 
The categorical commitment to the truth of the claim that ‘all’ indigenous languages 
‘are’ national languages is grammatically encoded by the non–modal present tense. 
The second part of the policy formulation which contains firm decisions is expressed 
through the deontic use of what is called the ‘legal shall’. The actions of ‘respecting’, 
‘developing’ and ‘promoting’ are obligatory (directives) and this obligation is 
expressed through the deontic use of modality (‘shall’ here is more or less equivalent  
to ‘must’). The use of passive here is significant: the policy statement does not 
specify who will be responsible for ‘respecting’, ‘developing’ and ‘promoting’ the 
‘indigenous languages’. It is implied that it is the responsibility of all people to 
‘respect’ local languages, the responsibility of a small group of people to ‘develop’ 
them, and the responsibility of a governmental office to ‘promote’ them. However, 
the strategic use of the passive can enable the agents of these processes to evade 
responsibility. 
 
At the lexical level,  the terms ‘national’, ‘indigenous’ and ‘language’ are collocates, 
and that they are part of a lexical set which includes other terms such as  ‘promote’ 
and ‘develop’. Another observation about the lexical organisation of the first policy 
statement is that the drafters deployed the rhetorical strategy of vagueness as we will 
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see in detail. For instance, it is unclear how a language can be ‘respected’. At the 
level of pragmatic analysis, there are presuppositions or assumptions of various 
types. For instance, the expression ‘indigenous languages’ is an existential 
presupposition in that local varieties of communication are ‘languages’ in the 
sociolinguistic sense of the term, and are ‘indigenous’ to Sudan. This way of 
texturing status–planning decisions is commonsensical, and thus can be ideological. 
The point here is that evaluations, whether explicit or implicit, can be viewed as a 
‘halfway house between statements and demands’ (Fairclough 2003: 112). Yet this 
interpretation relies on a specific understanding of the term ‘indigenous’, and a 
detailed examination of the sociohistorical relationship between the south and the 
north. But, the term ‘indigenous’ is in itself a source of ambiguity, since it opens a 
complex web of possibilities of interpretation. For example, is Arabic an indigenous 
language in the Sudan? Hence, a discussion of the first policy statement should begin 
by defining the word ‘indigenous’.  
 
Generally speaking, ‘indigenous’ people are identified as ‘ethnic minorities’ (for 
typologies of social minorities see Eriksen 1993: ch. 7; May 2001: 82–89; Churchill 
1986: 6–8; Fenton 1999: 32–42; Ogbu 1987). The Minority Rights Group (1990) 
provides the following definition of ‘minorities’: 
A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, in a 
non–dominant position, whose members – being nationals of the state – 
possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from 
those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense 
of solidarity directed towards preserving their culture, tradition, religion 
or language. (Minority Rights Group 1990: xiv) 
The term ‘minority’ here highlights the limited access to rights and power, rather 
than just the numerical size of the social group. According to May (2001: 83), 
sociological minorities (or ethnic minorities) are defined by a history of 
sociopolitical marginalisation and/or exploitation by dominant ethnic groups (see 
also Eriksen 1992, 1993: ch. 7; Hechter 1975; Dench 1986; Thornberry 1991). 
According to Eriksen (1993: 125–131), the term ‘indigenous people’ is employed in 
anthropology to refer to non–state people (or nonsecessionist) who are always linked 
with a non–industrial mode of production. In other words, indigenous people 
represent a way of life that makes them vulnerable with respect to the state and 
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modernisation (Eriksen 1993: 125). Kloss (1971: 253) draws a distinction between 
two categories of social formation: indigenous and immigrant groups. An indigenous 
group is ‘every group a majority of whose adult members are natives of native 
parentage’. For Kloss, the designation ‘indigenous’ obtains a particular type of 
language rights (promotion–oriented rights). Commonly cited examples of 
indigenous groups include, but need not be restricted to: Sami (Lapps) in Norway, 
Inuit (Eskimos) and Native Canadians in Canada, Maori in Aotearoa/New Zealand, 
and Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders in Australia (May 2001: 79). Some of 
these groups have been granted by their states varying degrees of educational, 
linguistic, and administrative autonomy partly as a consequence of indigenous 
advocacy at the national/international level for greater autonomy within their nation–
states (ibid.). In what follows I broadly examine international, regional, and national 
contexts in which the term ‘indigenous’ is used.  
 
5.2.1.1 The definition of ‘indigenous’ in the international legal discourse 
Regarding the international context in which the term indigenous is used, Macias 
(1979: 86) points out that prior to the set up of international organisations in the 
nineteenth century, the international legal protection of linguistic minorities was 
minimal. The first international constitutional protection of linguistic minorities 
emerged with the establishment of the League of Nations. A significant number of 
nations:  
 ... undertook to ‘assure full and complete protection of life and liberty’ 
to all their inhabitants ‘without distinction’ of ‘language’, and to assure 
all their nationals equality before the law and enjoyment of the ‘same 
civil and political rights’ without distinctions as to ‘language’. 
(McDougal et al. 1976: 161)  
A number of specialised international and regional agencies, non–governmental 
organisations (NGOs), and advocacy groups are devoted to the human rights 
concerns of indigenous populations (for a review of the various specialised agencies 
see Hannum 1987–1988). In what follows I focus on the legal definition of the word 
‘indigenous’ by international bodies such as the UN. The International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) adopted in 1957 the first binding international instrument 
(Convention No.107) on the rights of indigenous and tribal peoples (for a detailed 
review of this Convention see Barsh 1986; for the full text of the Convention No.107 
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see http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi–lex/convde.pl?C107). ILO was founded in 1919 
and is the only surviving major formation of the Treaty of Versailles which brought 
the League of Nations into existence. ILO became the first UN specialised agency in 
1946. The ILO revised its Convention No.107 by Convention No.169 in 1989 (came 
into force in 1991, for full text of the Convention No. 169 see 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm; for a comparative analysis see May 
2001: ch. 8; Barsh 1987). Convention No.169 makes an explicit mention of 
‘indigenous languages’ (Convention No. 107 of 1957, by contrast, used ‘mother 
tongue’ and ‘vernacular language’). Article 28 in Convention No.169 is concerned 
with the issue of mother tongue education for children of ‘indigenous’ communities.  
 
1. Children belonging to the peoples concerned shall, wherever practicable, be 
taught to read and write in their own indigenous language or in the language 
most commonly used by the group to which they belong. When this is not 
practicable, the competent authorities shall undertake consultations with these 
peoples with a view to the adoption of measures to achieve this objective.  
2. Adequate measures shall be taken to ensure that these peoples have the 
opportunity to attain fluency in the national language or in one of the official 
languages of the country.  
3. Measures shall be taken to preserve and promote the development and 
practice of the indigenous languages of the peoples concerned. 
Table 5.1. ILO Convention No. 169, Article 28 (Source:  
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm) 
 
Convention No.169 (Article 1.1) provides a definition of ‘indigenous peoples’ upon 
which the above language-in-education policy should be based. 
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a) Tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic 
conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and 
whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions 
or by special laws or regulations;  
(b) Peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on 
account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a 
geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or 
colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, 
irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, 
economic, cultural and political institutions.  
2. Self–identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a fundamental 
criterion for determining the groups to which the provisions of this Convention 
apply.  
 
Table 5.2.  ILO Convention No. 169, Article 1.1 (Source 
(http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm) 
As the above article shows, the Convention highlights the right of ‘self–
identification’ of indigenous people ‘irrespective of their legal status’. As a way of 
refusing to recognise the indigenous groups in their territories, states such as India, 
Malaysia, Burma, and Bangladesh claimed that all social groups were indigenous and 
no group is hence entitled to any special treatment (see de Varennes 1996; May 
2001: 275). The Convention is intended to protect the cultural practices that 
distinguish tribal systems of social order (including language). In the context of 
Australia, May (2001: 274) argues that the protectionist policies towards the 
aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders have simply been employed as a 
variant of assimilation. In a similar vein, Fishman (1991) attacks this form of 
protectionism by noting that  
Even in such settings indigenous populations are robbed of control of 
the natural resources that could constitute the economic bases of a more 
self–regulatory collective life and, therefore, robbed also of a possible 
avenue of cultural viability as well. (Fishman 1991: 62) 
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1. Education programmes and services for the peoples concerned shall be 
developed and implemented in co–operation with them to address their special 
needs, and shall incorporate their histories, their knowledge and technologies, 
their value systems and their further social, economic and cultural aspirations.  
2. The competent authority shall ensure the training of members of these 
peoples and their involvement in the formulation and implementation of 
education programmes, with a view to the progressive transfer of responsibility 
for the conduct of these programmes to these peoples as appropriate.  
3. In addition, governments shall recognise the right of these peoples to 
establish their own educational institutions and facilities, provided that such 
institutions meet minimum standards established by the competent authority in 
consultation with these peoples. Appropriate resources shall be provided for 
this purpose. 
 
Table 5.3. ILO Convention No. 169, Article 27 (Source: 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm) 
Regarding language planning and policy, the ILO’s Convention No.169 Article 27 
(Table 5.3) encourages a bottom–up approach in the sense that the design of 
pedagogical programmes should be carried out in cooperation with and consultation 
with indigenous peoples (see de Varennes 1995). Another international instrument is 
the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations (henceforth Working 
Group). The Working Group was established by the UN Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC) in 1982 (see de Varennes 1995). Membership of the Working 
Group includes five international legal experts drawn from the UN Sub–commission 
on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (see Williams 1990: 
665). The effort of the Working Group in coordination with other bodies has led to 
the (1993) UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (see May 2001: 
276). On 29 June 2006 the Human Rights Council adopted the ‘Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ and recommended its adoption by the General 
Assembly. The General Assembly has adopted Declaration on the 13 September 
2007 (for full text of the Declaration see 
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http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/indigenous/declaration.htm). Article 3 grants 
‘indigenous’ people the right to self–determination (Table 5.4)  
Indigenous peoples have the right of self–determination. By virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development. 
Table 5.4. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2006), 
Article 3 (Source: http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/indigenous/declaration.htm) 
 
What is at stake here is the issue of ‘national identity’. Articles 6 and 9 in the 
Declaration deal with this question (Table 5.5). 
Article 6: Every indigenous individual has the right to a nationality. 
Article 9: Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right to belong to an 
indigenous community or nation, in accordance with the traditions and customs 
of the community or nation concerned. No discrimination of any kind may 
arise from the exercise of such a right. 
 
Table 5.5. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2006), 




In language planning terms, Article 14 in the Declaration states that indigenous 
groups and individuals have the right to run their own educational institutions in their 
languages. The same article directs that states, where possible, should provide 
education for indigenous children living outside of their communities in their own 
languages. In other words, the Declaration encourages bilingual education in the 
dominant and indigenous languages at the early years of education (Table 5.6).   
 
One of the United Nations comprehensive surveys of the status of indigenous 
peoples in the world is Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous 
Populations (known as the Indigenous Study). Jose Martinez Cobo was appointed as 
Special Rapporteur. This detailed survey carried a comparative study of the various 
defining criteria of ‘indigenous populations’ contained in the legal and constitutional 
documents of the countries surveyed (see Vol. 2, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.1). 
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Article 14: 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to establish and control their educational 
systems and institutions providing education in their own languages, in a 
manner appropriate to their cultural methods of teaching and learning. 
2. Indigenous individuals, particularly children, have the right to all levels and 
forms of education of the State without discrimination. 
3. States shall, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, take effective measures, 
in order for indigenous individuals, particularly children, including those living 
outside their communities, to have access, when possible, to an education in 
their own culture and provided in their own language. 
Table 5.6. The UN Declaration on Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, 2006, Article 14 
(Source: http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/indigenous/declaration.htm) 
 
The Special Rapporteur notes that ‘several governments have stated explicitly that 
there are no legal definitions of indigenous populations in their countries’ (for the 
names of these countries see Vol.2, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/2/Add.6, p. 44). Even 
countries which have legal definitions differ with respect to the scope of application 
and purposes of these definitions. The Indigenous Study considers vernacular 
languages as one of the defining characteristics of indigenous communities, and it 
treats them as separate criteria (Vol.2, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/2/Add.6, p.32) (Table 
5.7). 
172. The use of a vernacular language by an individual group or community 
has always been considered one of the criteria for classifying them as 
indigenous. 
173. Language or tongue is one of the cultural elements, but deserves particular 
mention because of its special importance. It must be separated from the rest of the 
cultural elements and regarded as a separate criterion. 
Table 5.7. Indigenous languages in the Indigenous Study (Source: Martinez Cobo 
1986/7: 32) 
 
It is clear that the term ‘indigenous’ is deeply vague and ambiguous in the discourse 
of international law. In practical reality it becomes hard to draw a demarcation line 
between ‘tribal population’ and ‘tribal people’. Beteille rightly notes: 
There are of course regions of the globe where the tribal population is 
the indigenous population and this can be clearly established by 
historical evidence. There are other regions, very large ones at that, 
where this is by no means the case, and the blanket use of ‘indigenous 
people’ is misleading. (Beteille 1998: 188)   
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It should be noted that the terms ‘people’ and ‘population’ have significant 
implications in international law (for a detailed analysis of the historical development 
of indigenous rights in international law see Stamatopoulou 1994; Tennant 1994). It 
is generally agreed that the former emphasises the associated rights of self–
determination, whereas the latter does not (May 2001: 278; notice that the ‘P’ in the 
SPLM/A refers to ‘people’ and not ‘population’). The ILO’s Convention 107 of 1957 
completely avoided the expression ‘indigenous peoples’ and used instead 
‘indigenous populations’. The Working Group was made to replace the term 
‘peoples’ with ‘populations’ in the first draft of the ‘UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples’ following the opposition of, among others, the UK, the USA, 
and France to the use of the word ‘peoples’ (Barsh 1996: 797). This terminological 
problematic may be the reason behind the fact the ILO’s Convention 169 not only 
contained both terms in its title, but also had to add the caveat that: ‘The use of the 
term peoples in this Convention shall not be construed as having any implications as 
regards the rights which may attach to the term under international law’ (Article 1:3). 
It is worth mentioning that the 1945 United Nations Charter (Chapter 1, Article 1, 
Part 2; for full text see http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/ch–cont.htm) 
unambiguously recognises ‘the self–determination of all peoples’. The right to self–
determination for ‘people’ is reiterated by the (1966) International Convent on Civil 
and Political Rights (Article 1:1; for full text see 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm) which clearly outlines that ‘all 
people have the right to self–determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development’. Yet, the meaning of the term ‘people’ is not precisely defined by the 
UN. Rather, it has been interpreted as recognition of the right of colonised nations to 
establish their own states, rather than of national minorities, including indigenous 
peoples, within nation states (May 2001: 277). Kymlicka (1999: 284) comments that 
the scope of the term ‘people’ has been restricted by the so–called ‘salt–water thesis’: 
‘People who are subject to colonisation from overseas have the right to 
independence, but national minorities within (a territorially contiguous) state do not 
have the right to independence’. According to May (2001: 278), some countries 
called for a more restricted concept of self–determination termed ‘internal self–
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determination’ or ‘autonomy’. Internal self–determination focuses on ‘negotiated 
power–sharing both through constitutional reform and within existing institutions, 
and extends well beyond the desultory measures of local autonomy already 
established for some indigenous groups’ (ibid.: 279).  
 
At the regional level, one of the legal instruments that has attended to the issue of 
cultural and linguistic diversity is the African Union (AU). The point which concerns 
us here is the reason behind the inclusion of the Arabic, English, and Portuguese 
languages in the list of its working languages (for the full text of the Constitutive Act 
see http://www.africa–union.org/root/au/AboutAU/Constitutive_Act_en.htm). 
Article 25 in the Constitutive Act of the African Union lists the working languages of 
the AU (Table 5.8).  
Article 25:  
The working languages of the Union and all its institutions shall be, if possible, 
African languages, Arabic, English, French and Portuguese. 
Article 33: 
5. This Act, drawn up in four (4) original texts in the Arabic, English, French 
and Portuguese languages, all four (4) being equally authentic, shall be 
deposited with the Secretary–General of the OAU and, after its entry into force, 
with the Chairman of the Commission who shall transmit a certified true copy 
of the Act to the Government of each signatory State. The Secretary–General 
of the OAU and the Chairman of the Commission shall notify all signatory 
States of the dates of the deposit of the instruments of ratification or accession 
and shall upon entry into force of this Act register the same with the Secretariat 
of the United Nations. 
Table 5.8. The Language Policy of the African Union (Source http://www.africa–
union.org/root/au/AboutAU/Constitutive_Act_en.htm) 
 
Some researchers have justified the adoption of English and Arabic in the category of  
‘indigenous African languages on the grounds that Arabic is indigenous to the Arab 
nations of North Africa and Sudan, while English is native to the white settlers in 
Zimbabwe, South Africa and Kenya’ (Ajulo 1997: 35; Afolayan 1982). The AU 
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language policy grants Arabic, English, French and Portuguese ‘equal validity’ (legal 
texts in these languages are original) (Table 5.8). 
 
The point here is that the word ‘indigenous’ again is shrouded in vagueness in legal 
documents of regional instruments such as the African Union (for a critique of AU 
language policy see Ajulo 1997). Having examined the use of the word ‘indigenous’ 
in international and regional contexts, I move now to consider the way in which the 
term ‘indigenous’ is viewed and understood in the Sudan at the national level. I focus 
on the British colonial policy which is known as the ‘Southern Policy’, since the 
historical context in which it was produced affords insights into the disambiguation 
of the term ‘indigenous’.  
 
5.2.1.2 The colonial Southern Policy and the invention of indigenous languages 
As explained in the preceding chapter, after the First World War, the British rule 
adopted what came to be known as the ‘Southern Policy’, which intended to 
ideologically construct the south and the north as separate social identities. In 
essence, the Southern Policy is a colonial project of inventing ideological 
representations of social and discursive differences between the south and the north. 
The Southern Policy was officially declared in 1930 (see Chapter 4).   
 
The colonial intention to construct ‘racial and tribal units’, ‘indigenous customs’, and 
‘traditional usage’ (in the European conceptual representation of these terms) is 
evidenced. Irvine and Gal (2000: 50) describe the colonial and academic 
representations of speakers of African languages in the nineteenth century:  
‘Tribes’ or ‘races’ reflect, among other things, Africans’ loss of 
political autonomy – or at least their right to political autonomy in 
European eyes. Although some of those ‘tribes’ are best understood as 
the population subject of a particular precolonial policy, to describe 
them in terms of language and customs made it possible to imply that 
indigenous political structures were epiphenomenal and dispensable. 
(Irvine and Gal 2000: 50) 
The Southern Policy aimed at inventing two social identities in the Sudan: an African 
south with local languages/English and an Arabised north with Arabic and Islam. 
The discursive features (e.g., religion, language, etc.) employed in this colonial 
invention of monolithic social identities are interpreted as indexical. The indexical 
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representation of the south in terms of Christianity and English on the one hand, and 
the north in terms of Islam and Arabic on the other, has shaped and strengthened the 
essentialising interpretation of necessity.  
 
The Southern Policy as a colonial project of inventing social and linguistic 
differences involved the semiotic process of ‘erasure’ (Irvine and Gal 2000: 38). That 
is, the representation of the north as inherently heterogeneous was/has been 
ruthlessly suppressed, since it was incongruent with the colonial invention of two 
incompatible social identities (the north vs. the south). The same process was 
employed in the invention or imagination of a homogeneous southern identity. 
Language policy and planning was instrumental in this colonial construction. 
Through the language planning processes of Ausbau (i.e., differentiation through 
development, see Chapter 3), the colonial regime invented ‘indigenous’ languages 
out of the ‘tribalised material’ (Makoni and Pennycook 2006: 13) in the south. The 
Southern Policy validated southern ethnic practices with English and Christianity in 
local idioms as valuable forms of life. In order to routinise and perpetuate these 
selected languages, the colonial government exercised a kind of geopolitical and 
ethnolinguistic control where Arabic and Islam were to be stamped out of the 
educational and administrative system in the whole of southern Sudan.  
 
In his attempt to obtain the approval of the British Foreign Secretary on the 
elimination of Arabic from the southern Sudan, the Civil Secretary MacMichael 
asserted the potential political dangers behind this move (cited in Woodward 1979: 
10–11):  
To encourage the spread of Arabic in the south would be to sprinkle 
gunpowder in the neighbourhood of a powder magazine or to sow 
weeds because they grow more quickly than corn … [the Southerners 
should be encouraged in] the cultivation of their languages, 
conservation and sublimation of all that is of value in their customs and 
institutions … in the process a solid barrier will be created against the 
insidious political intrigue which must, in the ordinary course of event, 
increasingly beset our path in the north.  
The invention of ‘indigenous languages’ by the colonial ideological apparatus is 
dialectical with the process of inventing a ‘distinctly African and Negroid’ identity in 
the southern Sudan. In other words, the relationship between the two processes is 
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dialectical and not a one–way street as Anderson (1991) argues in his seminal work 
(for a critique of Anderson’s 1991 view of language see Joseph 2004: 13). To protect 
the constructed ‘indigenous’ southern ways of life, the colonial government deployed 
coercive measures such as the construction of a ‘no–man’s land’ as well as the 
physical removal of northern Arabic–speaking groups from the southern Sudan (for a 
discussion of measures taken by the colonial rule see Chapter 4). The focus of the 
colonial rule from 1930 up to 1946 had been to construct the three southern 
provinces of Upper Nile, Bahr al–Ghazal, and Equatoria along distinctively African 
lines and the north across Arabic ones.  
 
It should be mentioned that the ostensible objective of the Rejaf Language 
Conference was purely instrumental, but the real goal was political. The conference 
was intended to invent a number of ‘indigenous languages’ in the southern Sudan 
using the processes of Ausbau i.e., differentiation through development and 
elaboration and Einbau i.e., the drawing of two or more languages together (cf. 
Chapter 3). The naming of the languages by the colonial administration coincided 
with the naming of the ethnicities residing in the southern Sudan. These linguistic 
processes of Ausbau and Einbau were not value–neutral, and this is reflected in the 
language groups formed by the conference. For instance, Werner (1929: 426) notes 
that the Acholi language is almost a dialect of the Shilluk language, and it may have 
seemed clear that the existing Shilluk language literature could be used for it. The 
point here is that the ‘epistemic violence’ (Makoni and Pennycook 2006: 16) over the 
recognition/misrecognition of language boundaries points to the arbitrariness of the 
process of ‘invention of traditions’. The Rejaf Language Conference is a politically–
motivated measure intended to (discursively) construct a sense of social homogeneity 
and political solidarity among southerners vis–à–vis northerners, hence the conflict 
between linguistic and ideological criteria. In this connection, I entirely agree with 
Joseph (1987: 3) that ‘when a linguistic criterion comes into contact with a political 
one, the latter is likely to dominate’.  The work of Greenberg (1963a) is insightful 
here, since it points to the fact that the linguistic boundaries between the southern 
and northern linguistic resources are colonial creations. Greenberg’s (1963a) 
linguistic typology of Sudanese languages lends linguistic support to the fact that the 
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majority of ethnic communities in the Sudan share key cultural ties. Suffice it to say 
that the Nilo–Saharan language family provides evidential basis for the fact that the 
languages (by extension the people) of the ‘Nile Nubian’ in the very north (e.g., 
Mahas–Fadidja and Kenuzi–Dongola), the languages of ‘Kordofanian Nubian’ in the 
west (e.g., Dilling, Dair, Gulfan, Teiman), and the ‘Nilotic languages’ in the south 
(e.g., Shilluk, Anuak, Dinka, Nuer) are structurally related (see Greenberg 1963a; 
Stevenson 1971: 10–12; Chapter 2). 
 
In corpus planning terms, the colonial government encouraged and funded the study 
of dialectal variation in Sudanese Arabic. The production of bilingual dictionaries in 
English and Arabic as well as the study of social practices of local peoples are 
strongly supported. For instance, among the studies published during the colonial 
regime we find H. F. S Amery’s Sudan Arabic: English–Arabic Vocabulary 
(Hillelson 1930); Sudan Arabic Texts (Hillelson 1935); Sudan Courtesy Customs: A 
Foreigner Guide to Polite Phrases (Griffiths and Taha 1936), and Sudan Colloquial 
Arabic (Trimingham 1946). In this connection, I would contend that Phillipson’s 
(1992) critique of English linguistic imperialism does not quite fit the British 
colonial context in the southern Sudan, where English served alongside local 
languages in the resistance to Arabicisation. On the contrary, the colonial 
government had no quarrel with the dominant distribution of Arabic in the southern 
region from the period of 1899 to the early 1920s. Sanderson and Sanderson note: 
To the ordinary Southerner, the [Anglo–Egyptian] Condominium 
Government presented itself as an Arabic–speaking institution. Apart 
from the occasional British inspector, remote or Olympian, all the 
officials whom he was likely to meet (including the warders if he went 
to jail) spoke Arabic either as their mother–tongue or as an effective 
second language usually acquired early in life. A Southerner who 
wished to be considered ‘civilised’ took these men, and especially the 
Arabised and Islamised Blacks in the Army, as his models; and for a 
Southerner to function as a ‘chief’ or notable under the administration, 
some ability to communicate in Arabic was virtually indispensable. 
(Sanderson and Sanderson 1981: 78) 
More importantly, the teaching of English was considered in the early years of the 
Condominium as just dangerous. Warburg (2003: 68) writes: ‘The principle guiding 
the British government in Sudan, as in its colonies, was that the teaching of English 
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or the establishment of a modern educational system was not only superfluous but 
potentially harmful’.  
 
I would suggest that the interpretation of the colonial status of English in the 
southern Sudan accords with Pennycook’s (2000, 2001) theorising of ‘postcolonial 
performativity’. However, we should exercise caution when considering the 
historical status of English during the colonial regime with reference to Pennycook’s 
discourse of performativity. English was sanctioned by the British colonial regime as 
an official administrative language in alliance with what would later come to be 
known as ‘indigenous languages’, to resist not the dominant modernist discourses of 
the West but rather the spread of Arabicisation in the south. The point here is that 
Pennycook’s theorising of ‘postcolonial performativity’ should not be viewed as a 
project intended to deal exclusively with the hegemony of European languages, since 
this essentialising understanding may run the risk of escaping the hegemony 
exercised by other international, regional, or local languages.  
 
Christian missionaries’ control over the educational system in the southern Sudan led 
to the emergence of a language ideology that connects English and Christianity 
(hence language and religion). Arabic and Islam in the north were viewed as the 
constituent elements of the Muslim identity. A one–to–one correspondence between 
religion and language was established and reproduced during the period of the 
colonial Southern Policy. Malwal (1981: 15) states: 
There is no one dominant language in the southern Sudan. Each tribe 
has its own language irrespective of its size. Because of the domination 
of Arabic as a language in northern Sudan, and because it is the 
language of Islam, the colonial authorities in the Sudan did not interfere 
with it, and indeed encouraged it as a lingua franca for the north; it was 
however, discouraged in southern Sudan, where both tribal languages 
and English were fostered and taught in schools. Along with the English 
language, the colonial authorities officially encouraged Christianity, in 
southern Sudan. As a result, most of the educated Southerners at 
Independence were Christians whose only working language was 
English. Not only differences in language but also differences in 
religion came to play an important role in the South–North conflict. 
(Malwal 1981: 15–16) 
This essentialist understanding of the relationship between language and religion is a 
colonial inheritance that has been manipulated by northern religious bourgeois 
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parties to serve their own material interests in the postcolonial period. I use the term 
‘essentialism’ here to refer to the process by which particular social groups come to 
be defined on the basis of fundamental, immutable, and fixed characteristics (see 
May 2001: 18; Werbner 1997). Miller (2003a: 165) points out that the British 
colonial government was the first to clearly fuse the Arabic language and Islam in its 
linguistic policy. Postcolonial practice of language (education) planning has inherited 
this essentialist view of the relationship between language and religion.  
 
It is worth mentioning that the colonial Southern Policy (1928–1945) succeeded in 
the removal of Arabic from the southern educational system; however, it failed to 
control the everyday discoursal practices of the southern people during the first half 
of the nineteenth century. Miller (2003a: 164) states that ‘the Sudanese case shows 
the relative ineffectiveness of planned language policies on daily language use’. 
Apart from a few studies on the Juba Pidgin Arabic (e.g., Mahmud 1983; Miller and 
Rendyang 1984; Miller 2003a, 2003b, 2006), the early practice of language planning 
paid scant attention to the folk discursive practices of the southerners outside of the 
educational arena. It is generally agreed that language is inherently dialogical, 
contestable, and negotiable in the sense that it exists in intertextual relations with 
other discourses. The argument that the Southern Policy in its linguistic dimension 
failed to plan the everyday use of Arabic in the south can be supported by a number 
of pieces of textual evidence. For instance, the Report of the Commission of Inquiry 
into the Disturbances in the southern Sudan during August 1955 hinted at the 
conclusion that the Southern Policy could not replace Juba Arabic by English as a 
lingua franca in Equatoria in the southern Sudan:  
In Equatoria there are not less than forty different tribes, each with their 
own traditions, beliefs and customs. The most numerous of these are 
Azande and the Baria. They speak different languages and dialects. A 
very crude form of Arabic serves as a lingua franca. Attempts to 
introduce English or other languages as a lingua Franca have failed. 
(Report of the Commission of Inquiry 1955: 4, my emphasis) 
The argument here is that Juba Arabic in the southern Sudan has become an 
‘appropriated’ marker of the communal identity of the Equatorian. Miller and 
Rendyang (1984) point out that Juba Arabic is more than a common instrument of 
communication in Equatoria. Rather, it is a symbol of the Equatorian identity:  
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JA [Juba Arabic] is considered as a local language, carrying African 
cultural values. JA is not linked with Arabic culture, it’s a symbol of the 
Equatorian feeling … At the end of the civil war, people coming from 
different ethnies were regrouped in Juba town. They were all sharing a 
common refusal toward Islamisation and Arabicisation and claiming 
their African origin. But none of the vernacular languages could 
succeed in becoming a common medium … So little by little JA 
appeared as a symbol of the Equatorian identity and people start to 
consider it as an Afro–Arab language.  (Miller and Rendyang 1984: 4, 
5) 
Miller and Rendyang’s statement was made more than two decades ago, and it can 
hardly be accepted at face value as a descriptive account of the present–day status of 
Juba Arabic in Equatoria. Miller (2003b) has recently found out that Juba Arabic is a 
way of signifying the southern Sudanese identity not just in the southern Sudan but 
also in the capital Khartoum. Suffice it here to say that the dialectical variability of 
Sudanese Arabic has contributed and continues to contribute to the reproduction and 
maintenance of a hierarchical social order not only among tribal groups in the Sudan 
but also between the northern Sudanese and their Middle Eastern counterparts. 
Halliday (1978: 179) points out that ‘the social function of dialect variation is to 
express, symbolise and maintain the social order; and the social order is an 
essentially hierarchic one’. For instance, southerners are discursively positioned 
within a social system of national relations in the same discursive way in which 
northerners are positioned within the system of Middle Eastern (Arab) relations. The 
social system at national, regional, and international levels is essentially hierarchic 
and multilayered.  The point I am trying to make here is that the historical genealogy 
and the social conditions within which Juba Arabic has emerged lead to the 
conclusion that it can be viewed as a southern property. Although Juba Arabic might 
be understood as a product of the historical subjugation of southerners (through the 
slave trade; see Miller 2003a: 161), it can still be viewed as a counter–hegemonic 
language to the nationalist discourse of northern governments, as well as an identity 
boundary resource as the case of the Equatorian musical group in Khartoum has 
shown (Miller 2003b). But the question that immediately arises is: if Juba Arabic is 
viewed as a property of the south, is there any possibility to see it instated by the 
Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) as an official working language within the 
framework of the NLP? One legitimate criticism that can be levelled against the 
southern elites who controlled the southern region during the 1970s (a peaceful 
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period following the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement 1972) is: Why did they 
not recognise Juba Arabic and further strengthen the official status of local 
languages? Mahmud (1983) strongly criticises the southern elites for the 
overestimation of English and underestimation of the role Juba Arabic and local 
languages could have played in the power struggle: 
Language–related problems plague the southern Sudan. The fifty 
vernacular  languages and the Arabic pidgin–creole varieties that are 
spoken by the overwhelming majority of the people have virtually no 
place in the context of political power distribution and of access to the 
socio–economic resources – controlled and organised by the state 
mainly through the medium of English. Under this arrangement, 
structural inequalities continue to reproduce themselves and are 
continually maintained and guarded by a constellation of hegemonic 
forces, one of which is language. (Mahmud 1983: 1) 
I have so far discussed the colonial invention of ‘indigenous’ languages in the 
southern Sudan. I proceed now to broadly consider the colonial practice of ‘inventing 
traditions’ in the north. The northern part (which is itself a colonial construct) has 
been subjected to the process of invention of traditions during the 
colonial/postcolonial period. Colonial invention of the northern identity vis–à–vis the 
southern one was conducted along strictly ethnolinguistic lines. The colonial 
government represented and validated the north as an ‘anti–society’ to the south, and 
its  discursive practices as ‘anti–languages’ to its southern counterpart (the terms are 
Halliday’s 1978: 154). Put in crude terms, the ‘north and the ‘south’ as part of a 
present–day sovereign Sudan nation–state are colonial creations. Wakoson (1980) 
states that: 
It was under the Anglo–Egyptian Administration of 1898–1956 that the 
boundaries of the Sudan were formally drawn. The British being the 
stronger partners in the Condominium rule, created perhaps the most 
artificial of many administrative political units ever created in the 
course of European colonisation of Africa. (Wakoson 1980: 87) 
With this in mind, the ideology of ‘New Sudan’ encapsulated in the CPA is intended 
to ‘disinvent’ (Makoni and Pennycook 2006) the old terms of this 
colonial/neocolonial construction and to reinvent/reconstruct a new democratic 
Sudan on new terms. The late John Garang comments that: 
 The reality of the Sudanese society is that modern Sudan is a product 
of historical development before, during, and after the alternate colonial 
rule of the Turks, the British and the Egyptians. In this we are not alone. 
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Like other nations, nations and states are products of history. At present 
our immediate task is to form a new Sudan. (Garang 1992: 127) 
It is significant to point out that the institutionalisation of Arabic and Islam as the 
policy of the northern Sudan is a colonial invention. O’Fahey (1996: 260) states that 
‘a consciously institutionalised Islamic policy in the Sudan is a British invention’. 
The British colonial rule imported to the Sudan policies fashioned in India. 
Ultimately the legal system in the Sudan with respect to Muslims emanated from the 
Indian Penal Code of 1837 and the later Indian Civil Procedure Code (Mahgoub 
1974: 35; see Warburg 1971: 124–136; Johnson 2003: 13; Fluehr–Lobban 1985). In 
respect of Islamic practices in matters of personal status such as marriage, divorce, 
and inheritance, the Sharia law was implemented. In criminal matters, as under the 
Funj and Darfur Sultanates, secular or state law was applied (see O’Fahey 1996: 
260). According to O’Fahey (ibid.:261), ‘an important British legacy was the 
institutionalisation of law; the creation of institutions for training “qadis”, the 
formalisation of distinctions between state and private–status law, and a recognition 
of the potentiality for a conflict of laws’.   
 
Furthermore, ‘the Powers of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance’, informed by the Lugardian 
project of ‘Indirect Rule’ (see Sanderson 1976: 74–75, Lugard 1965; Ibrahim 1985: 
31–32; MacMichael 1934: 243–257; Johnson 2003: ch. 2; Chapter 4) regulated the 
power of ‘tribal’ leaders. The ‘village Courts Ordinance’ 1925, was also invented to 
grant ‘Omdas’ [tribal leaders] the power to impose limited amount of fines (see 
Sanderson 1989: 74). The principle of Indirect Rule (known also as the native 
administration or devolution, see Woodward 1979: 8; MacMichael 1934: 243–257; 
Johnson 2003: 11) was primarily invented to act as an ‘anti–nationalist strategy’ 
against the nationalist aspirations of the intelligentsia and against the potential rise of 
the Neo–Mahdism (Mahdism is the religious movement [1881–1898] which ended 
the Turco–Egyptian rule in 1885, see Sanderson 1989: 81; for a detailed review of 
the Mahdist state in the Sudan see Holt 1970).   
 
The Nigerian style of Indirect Rule was set as an example to be emulated in the 
Sudan (for a comparative analysis see Chapter 4; Sanderson 1989). The words of 
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John Maffey (Governor–General, 1926–1933) clearly assert the main objective 
behind the invention of this tradition, which is (cited in Sanderson 1989: 81): 
To frustrate the development of nationalism by partitioning the rural 
Sudan to genuinely viable native states, autocratically ruled by the 
natural leaders of the people. In this way the country will be parcelled 
out into nicely balanced compartments; protective glands against the 
septic germs (of nationalism) which will inevitably be passed on from 
the Khartoum of the future. 
According to Sanderson (1989: 82-83), the invention of ‘truly native and traditional’ 
tribal groups has been obstructed by a number of difficulties. For instance, large 
tribal units invariably were composed of enclaves of tribally alien inhabitants. The 
solution taken was to amalgamate certain tribes into territorial units. This led to 
mutually hostile social groups being cobbled together into units that were far from 
being ‘truly native and traditional’ (ibid.). Sanderson (bid.: 83) comments that ‘it was 
from the outset very unlikely that these heterogeneous and artificial creations could 
ever achieve the authority, and generate the loyalties, which would make them 
effective “protective glands” against nationalism’. The point here is that, as Nagel 
(1994: 166) notes, the ‘British conception of “tribes” and “tribal” shaped many of 
their colonial policies, such as geographic administrative boundaries, education 
policies, and hiring practices’. The editorial policy of the Sudan Notes and Records 
(a periodical established by colonial government in 1918) ‘favoured notables and 
tribal chiefs, rather than the intelligentsia, by allotting space in this periodical to 
articles “written” by Sudanese sheikhs, a phenomenon occurring at a time when the 
policy of Indirect Rule figured most prominently in the calculation of the 
administration’ (Hamad 1995: 239).   
 
Moreover, the British colonial regime contributed to the invention of political 
bourgeois parties along strictly demarcated ethnolinguistic and religious lines. The 
dominant political parties ‘were based on supra–ethnic avowedly Islamic 
organisation’ (O’Fahey 1996: 261). The colonially established tribal structure 
directly shaped the type of power relations between the major northern bourgeois 
political parties on the one hand, and southern social groups. Apart from the NCP 
which emerged in the 1960s under the name of Islamic Charter, the major 
agricultural/commercial political forces and revolutionary socialist formations were 
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formed during the Second World War (see Mahmud 1983: 110). The Ashiqqa 
(literally blood brothers) Party was established in 1943; the Umma Party was formed 
in 1945, and the Communist Political Party was founded in 1946. The two large 
bourgeois political forces which would dominate the northern political arena for 
several decades to come are closely aligned with major Islamic sects in the Sudan: 
the Umma with the Mahdists and the Ashiqqa with Khatmiyya (Mahmud 1983: 110; 
Morton 1989: 63). The Mahdist Movement ended the Turco–Egyptian rule in the late 
nineteenth century, whereas Khatmiyya is a Sufi order introduced into northern 
Sudan in the early nineteenth century (see Morton 1989: 63). Each religious order 
‘has a large following in the rural areas, where allegiance to an order tends to go 
hand in hand with tribal identity’ (ibid.).   
 
The colonial strategy of ‘inventing traditions’, which involved the processes of 
codification of the power of tribal people, is among other things, intended to contain 
potential nationalist movements. It is this new class of religious masters (the term 
‘Sayid’ as a social title in Arabic means ‘master’ in English) who colluded with the 
colonial government in constraining the nationalist aspirations of the educated elite. 
To abort any other potential nationalist sentiments by educated elites or by Neo–
Mahdists, and to control regional interaction between the south and the north, the 
British colonial government started to institutionalise and glorify the tribal styles of 
life, and by extension the power of religious leaders and tribal chiefs. This 
administrative strategy of ‘romantic nativism’ (in the terms of Prunier 2005: 32) was 
part and parcel of the colonial Southern Policy which is intended to construct 
southern and northern Sudan along distinct cultural lines.   
 
The 1920s witnessed various anti–colonial demonstrations in the Sudan. For 
instance, the ‘White Flag League’, founded in 1924 by a military officer from the 
south, was one of the significant anti–colonial formations in the north (for a detailed 
historical review of this nationalist movement see Kurita 1989). At this time, the 
Sudanese agricultural capitalists were in complete alliance with the colonial rule, and 
were antagonistic to this anti–colonial movement. The editor of ‘Hadara’ (a pro–
British newspaper established in 1920, see Woodward 1979: 6) which was owned by 
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Sayid Abel Rahman Almahdi, Sayid Ali Al–Mirghani and Sayid Shareif Al–Hindi 
attacked the anti–colonial movement of 1924. The words used in the textual assault 
point clearly to the already socially and racially–stratified nature of the northern 
society at the time (cited in Mahmud 1983: 110): 
The White Flag League should know that it is embarrassing the entire 
country. Those who demonstrated were the poorest and of the lowest 
strata of unrecognised members of the Sudanese Society … The storm 
created by the scum of society disturbed people of status, merchants, 
businessmen and the men of good origin.  
In 1946, the colonial government decided to radically change its policy (for a 
discussion of the reasons behind this change in policy see Chapter 4). The new 
position adopted by the government is now to unify the south and the north into one 
nation–state (see Albino 1970: 23; Nyombe 1997: 106). In a letter addressed to 
Governors of Southern Provinces and Directors of Departments, Mr Robertson, the 
Civil Secretary announced the official end of the colonial Southern Policy (for the 
full text of the memorandum see Beshir 1968: 119–121; Abdel–Rahim 1969: 253–
256; Said 1965: 162–165; Abdel–Rahim 1965: 29–32; Chapter 4): 
 
The British colonial government selected the habitus of the dominant northern group 
(the riverain culture) as the ‘Staatsvolk’, in Connor’s (1993) terms, upon which the 
new nation–state was planned to be constructed.  Colonial constructs such as ‘the 
Muslim north’ and the ‘Christian south’ have been inherited and maintained by 
postcolonial governments in the modern Sudan. Thus, the riverain habitus along with 
the social practices it produces has come to constitute ‘cultural capital’ with Arabic 
as its ‘linguistic capital’. Arabic has become a symbol of oppression. The end 
product is that we have a ‘nation’ constructed (or rather, unsuccessfully constructed) 
on a culturally homogeneous and ethnically exclusive basis that is directly opposed 
to the material and discursive realities. It is the postcolonial governments that 
continued the effort of building a homogeneous nation through the normativisation of 
riverain habitus as the standard cultural frame of reference, and through 
institutionalisation of its social practices in the social system. The educational system 
was and still continues to be largely counted on as a primary socialising agency to 
internalise the values of the dominant groups into individual personalities. Joseph 
(2006a: 46) reminds us that ‘if language and politics were a country, education 
 197 
would be its capital, the great centralised and centralising metropolis that everyone 
passes through, from which the country is run and where its future course is 
determined’. Hence, the centrality of the discourse of Arabicisation is more visible. 
The definition of ‘national’ identity has become, in the words of Deng (1995: 11) ‘an 
internecine war of visions’. This ideological struggle which is largely discursive is 
encoded in the structural system of the NLP. Political nationalism in the Gellnerian 
sense and citizenship are not necessarily equivalent (see May 2001: 77). This 
conceptual distinction may explain the endorsement by the CPA of differentiated 
‘citizenship rights’ including language rights, rather than ‘the nation’s rights’, as the 
collective common base upon which a sense of belonging to the state should be 
constructed.  What is at stake here is, in the terms of Wimmer (1997), ‘who owns the 
state’. It is within this context that the project of the ‘New Sudan’ can be interpreted. 
The words of the late John Garang (the founder of the SPM) can summarise the 
colonial and neocolonial invention and maintenance of the social order/identity by 
colonial and postcolonial governments: 
The history of the Sudanese people from time immemorial has been the 
struggle of the masses of the people against internal and external 
oppression. The oppressor has time and again employed various 
policies and methods of destroying or weakening the just struggle of 
our people, including the most notorious policy of ‘divide and rule’. To 
this end the oppressor has divided the Sudanese people into Northerners 
and Southerners; Westerners and Easterners, Halfawin and the so–
called Awlad et Balad who have hitherto wielded political power in 
Khartoum; while in the south, people have been politicised along tribal 
lines resulting in such ridiculous slogans as ‘Dinka Unity’, ‘Great 
Equatoria’, ‘Bari Speakers’, ‘Luo Unity’ and so forth. The oppressor 
has also divided us into Muslims and Christians, and into Arabs and 
Africans. (Garang 1992: 19)   
Given the historical relationship between the northern Arabised cultural practices 
and, in Halliday’s words (1978: 154), their southern ‘antilanguages’ and 
‘antisocieties’, the first policy statement can be interpreted as a rejection of the 
existing social order within which only Arabic is viewed as a national language. An 
antilanguage ‘arises when the alternative reality is counter–reality, set up in 
opposition to some established reality’ (Halliday 1978: 171, emphasis in original). In 
this sense, the Dinka language in the southern Sudan, the Beja language in the 
eastern Sudan, and the Fur language in the western Sudan, to name a few, can be 
considered, in Halliday’s (1978: 185) terms, as ‘protest languages’ of ‘social conflict 
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– of passive resistance or active opposition’, as well as media of articulating and 
maintaining the ‘structure of the antisociety’.  
 
One can counter–argue that the first policy statement is merely symbolic in the sense 
that it is rhetorically constructed to accord with the principle of ‘ethnolinguistic 
democracy’ (Fishman 1994b). But ‘ethnolinguistic democracy’ does not necessarily 
entail or mean ‘ethnolinguistic equality’ (Fishman 1994b: 51). Symbolic ethnicity is, 
as Gans (1979: 9) defines it, ‘characterised by a nostalgic allegiance to the culture of 
the immigrant generation, or that of the old country; a love for and pride in a 
tradition that can be felt without having to be incorporated in everyday behaviour’ 
(cf. ‘instrumental ethnicity’, see Fenton 1999; May 2001: 35–38). This argument is 
not completely unfounded. For example, in Peru, the phrase ‘national languages’ 
designates all indigenous languages of the nation (Heath 1978: 53). According to this 
interpretation, the term ‘national languages’ in the context of the first policy 
statement refers to languages ‘symbolic of national identity’ (Ruiz 1990: 20). This 
conception is contrasted with the definition of a ‘national language’ as a language the 
use of which is functionally and geographically widespread (ibid.). It is in this sense 
that language ideologies in the north have represented Arabic as the national 
language of the whole country by virtue of its function as a lingua franca, and then 
has been institutionally enforced and declared by central governments as the official 
language of the country (for a detailed discussion of language ideologies see Joseph 
and Taylor 1990; Woolward and Schieffelin 1994; Blommaert 1999 (ed.); Thompson 
1984; Dorian 1998). So this argument goes on to claim that the language policy 
statement assigns local languages a non–instrumental value, since there is practically 
no state that can grant all its local languages the functional status of a national 
language (for a definition of non–instrumental language rights see Rubio–Marin 
2003; for a typology of language policies in relation to language status see Ruiz 
1990). I argue that a symbolic recognition of the ‘indigenousness’ of some languages 
(and by extension their language users) can itself have significant political 
implications.  I have shown above that some international legal bodies such as the 
ILO and the Working Group sanction self–determination as an automatic human 
right for indigenous peoples. The legal discourse of Machakos Protocol i.e., one of 
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the constituent protocols of the CPA, accords well with this international human right 
of ‘indigenous peoples’ (the targeted words are emphasised). Thus, the Machakos 
Protocol fixes the interpretation of the term ‘indigenous’ in the NLP as a designation 
of the southern Sudan: 
The Parties [SPLM and NCP] have reached specific agreement on the 
Right to Self–Determination for the people of South Sudan, State and 
Religion, as well as the Preamble, Principles, and the Transition Process 
from the Draft Framework, the initialled texts of which are annexed 
hereto, and all of which will be subsequently incorporated into the Final 
Agreement. 
The Protocol on Power–Sharing, i.e., another constituent protocol of the CPA, refers 
to the mechanism through which the right of southerners to self–determination will 
be granted. Hence, the Protocol of Power-sharing reinforces the specific 
interpretation of the word indigenous in the NLP (see the Appendix):  
2.10.1.5 An ad–hoc Commission to monitor and ensure accuracy, 
legitimacy, and transparency of the Referendum as mentioned in the 
Machakos Protocol on Self–Determination for the People of South 
Sudan, which shall also include international experts.  
Chapter 2 in the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan which has been ratified in 
2005, has used the principle of ‘indigenousness’ as one of the central defining 
criteria for granting a person the right to vote on the referendum that will be held in 
four years time (for full text of constitution see http://www.cushcommunity.org). In 
short, the term ‘indigenous’ is intended to designate the cultural identity of the 
southern Sudanese, and the way in which it is employed in the CPA is compatible 
with the legal discourse of some international instruments on the human rights of 
indigenous peoples (the right to self–determination, see for example ILO’s 
Convention No.169). The point here is that the focus of southern politicians is not on 
the indigenousness of their African race/ethnicity per se, but rather on the 
international legal implications of being recognised as ‘indigenous’. Put bluntly, the 
focus here is on the right to external self–determination. Viewed in this way, the 
expressions ‘indigenous languages’ and ‘national languages’ not only signify a 
symbolic sense of belonging but also an instrumental one, since they constitute the 
base for the claim to have access to the rights associated with ‘indigenousness’ (e.g., 
right to external self–determination). A referendum will be held in four years’ time 
for the southerners to determine whether to be part of a united Sudan or to have their 
own independent nation–state. A historical analysis of the power relations between 
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the south and the north can reveal that the difference–blind statist (linguistic) 
nationalism of northern governments is the prime cause, if not the only cause, behind 
the emergence of the southern voice for self–determination as the route to social 
emancipation. For instance, in a 1963 petition to the United Nations on behalf of the 
people of southern Sudan, the Sudan African Closed District National Union 
(henceforth SACDNU Petition) stated:  
Reason for the petition: To ask the United Nations to investigate 
political conditions in the southern Sudan and to enable the southern 
Sudanese to decide their political future in accordance with the 
principle of self–determination. (SACDNU Petition 1963: 2) 
It should be noted that the very naming practice adopted by the major southern 
opposition (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, SPLM/A), who signed the CPA 
with the NCP points to the conclusion that southern Sudanese are a ‘people’ who are 
entitled to ‘external self–determination’.  
 
Be that as it may be, the argument that the referent of the term ‘indigenous 
languages/peoples’ are the southern Sudan languages and people requires an 
immediate qualification to avoid any essentialising interpretations (e.g., southerners 
are the only ‘indigenous’ population). The fact that the peace agreement is signed by 
two parties (NCP and SPLM/A) with unequal power relations (the former has much 
more political power than the other), and with unequal discursive rights (Arabic is 
dominating in official domains) supports the above interpretation of the term 
‘indigenous’. I have shown above that the Machakos Protocol and the Protocol of 
Power–sharing have explicitly assigned the south, and not the north, the right to self–
determination. However, this does not necessarily suffice to exclude Arabic from the 
‘fictive’ list of ‘indigenous’ languages of the Sudan, nor does it preclude the 
potential demand of the right to self–determination by Arabic speakers. Although 
self–determination is always claimed by structurally marginalised communities, it 
does not mean that dominant groups are naturally denied this ‘indigenous’ right. 
 
The point here is that if the very definition of the term ‘indigenous’ in international 
law always holds true, then the same indigenous human rights to self–determination 
should be extended to northern Sudanese Arabic speaking communities. This 
rationalisation is not completely hypothetical. A new (religious) nationalist 
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movement with an openly secessionist approach has emerged in the north demanding 
self–determination from the south. This nationalist movement is called the ‘Just 
Peace Forum’ (henceforth JPF), and was founded by Al–Tayeeb Mustafa (the uncle 
of President Beshir and a member of the NCP). The ethnicist discourse of the JPF is 
based on stereotypic representations of the north as predominantly Muslim with the 
Arabic language as its primary tongue in contrast to the Christian, non–Arabic 
southern. The nationalist discourse of the JPF considers the CPA as a threat to the 
‘Sharia’ (Islamic law) in the north (see Young 2005: 537). The JPF is using different 
discursive spaces (e.g., a newspaper) for mobilising northerners around its separatist 
objectives. The JPF exploits the discourse of religious diversity between the south 
and north as a reason for rejecting the philosophy of the ‘New Sudan’ (the social 
construction of a new social order in the Sudan pending a faithful implementation of 
the CPA). The nationalist ideology of JPF is constituted out of a set of essentialist 
categorisations that describes the north (including the east and the west) as inherently 
Muslim and Arab on the one hand, and the south as indexically Christian and anti–
Arab on the other hand. The JPF, I would suggest, is the illustration of ‘ethnicism’ in 
the present day Sudan, i.e., a culturally/ethnically argued racism (see Skutnabb–
Kangas 1998: 16–18; May 2001: 33–35). The JPF has indirectly uncovered the 
‘banality’ of a historical triumph of a specific culture and language (the riverain 
Arabic culture) over other cultures and languages as a product of a process of 
attempting to construct a homogeneous nation (cf. Connor’s 1993 ‘Staatsvolk’). 
Billing rightly states: 
The battle for nationhood is a battle for hegemony, by which a part 
claims to speak for the whole nation and to represent the national 
essence. The achievement of national hegemony is well illustrated by 
the triumph of official national languages and the suppression of rivals 
— a triumph which has so often accompanied the construction of 
statehood … The triumph of a particular nationalism is seldom achieved 
without the defeat of alternative nationalisms and other ways of 
imagining peoplehood. (Billig 1995: 27–28)   
Figure 5.1 points to the ways in which this nationalist ideology has capitalised on the 
colonially invented essentialising categorisations.  
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Figure 5.1. A  Board Announcement of the Just Peace Forum at the University 
of Khartoum, Sudan, December 2006 
Translation: 1. ‘Together …. Against the project of the New Sudan. The Just Peace 
Forum Students’ (Left–hand side announcement), 2. ‘Separation is the ideal option 
for the peoples of the south and the north. The Just Peace Forum Students’ (right–
hand side announcement). 
 
5.2.2 The NLP as a corrective to the nationalist policy of Arabicisation 
The second Naivasha language policy statement stipulates: 
 Arabic language is the widely spoken national language in the Sudan. 
The way in which the second policy statement is written warrants a brief comment. 
Systemically speaking, the field of discourse of the statement (the experiential 
metafunction of the text) is about the status of Arabic in the Sudan. The tenor of 
discourse (the interpersonal metafunction) points to the hierarchically structured 
relation of power between a group whose language is widely spoken and those whose 
languages are less spoken in the Sudan. With regard to the mode of discourse (the 
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textual metafunction), it is a written descriptive statement which has the speech 
function of categorically identifying the status of Arabic as ‘widely spoken 
language’. This categorical assertion is expressed through the epistemic use of non-
modal present tense (‘is’). That is, the status of the Arabic language is expressed in a 
categorical non–modal present tense ‘is’.  
 
The dominant distribution of the Arabic language is textually realised by the phrase 
‘widely spoken’. The expression ‘widely spoken’ might be seen as a euphemism for 
‘dominant’. Williams (1992: 127) points out that the expression ‘the language of 
wider communication’ is a depoliticised manner of referring to a single dominant 
language: ‘What is labelled the “language of wider communication” is little more 
than an agency of ideological control which facilitates world domination’. The 
reference ‘the’ is significant, since it implies that the spread of Arabic is a fact 
recognised by both the writer and the potential reader of this sentence.  
 
The immediate question is: why is the term ‘national’ repeated in juxtaposition with 
Arabic in the second statement? The term ‘national’ is already mentioned in the first 
policy statement in collocation with ‘indigenous languages’. This lexical repetition of 
the term ‘national’ in the NLP is ideological and asserts the aforementioned 
interpretation in respect of the first statement (that ‘indigenous’ designates southern 
languages). This statement is a confirmation of the current state of affairs: the Arabic 
language is a medium of wider communication (i.e., a lingua franca), since it 
dominates the official functional domains including education, legislature, business 
transactions, and political debating and deliberations across communities who 
primarily speak mutually incomprehensible languages. The question that may 
disclose other implications is that, if this is a simple statement of fact, why then need 
it be stipulated in such constitutional documents? At least part of the explanation, if 
not all of it, lies in the fact that the peace protocols are for settling a conflict not so 
much between two regions but rather between two almost completely different 
ideologies: the north, which is characterised by the Arabic language and Islam, and 
the south, which is characterised by English, local languages, and Christianity. 
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The dominant language ideologies underlying the (colonially constructed) 
relationship between Arabic and Islam entails that if the status of Arabic was to be 
challenged, the status of Islam would be challenged correspondingly. Hence, the 
implied message is one of social and linguistic security sent to Arabic speakers that 
the CPA would do no harm to their language or religious status in Sudan. It is 
remarkable to the observation that the Machakos Protocol is a compromise between 
Sharia (Islamic law) and right to self–determination for the south (see Young 2005: 
535).  
 
Put in crude terms, the first policy statement asserts the African character of the 
country’s national identity, while the second one asserts the Arabic/Arab identity of 
the same country. One prominent northern scholar went to the extreme of suggesting 
that the Sudan (which literally means Land of the Blacks) should change its name, 
since it is reminiscent of a racial banner (Deng 1995: 3)  
 
Race, a colonial principle of typology, is manipulated and mobilised by northern 
sectarian governments as a boundary marker of ‘us’ against ‘them’. It is in this sense 
that ethnicity is objectified and naturalised as a sociobiological phenomenon (van 
den Berghe 1981, 1995) culminating in an ethnic layering of populations into 
‘mondokoro’ (Arabs) and ‘abid’ (slaves) (see Miller 2003a: 166). The colour of the 
riverain people (the Arabised dominant groups) is socially constructed and 
interpreted as ‘brown’. The ‘brown’ skin colour has been represented as the standard 
stereotypical representation of the north, and by extension the whole state. This 
social construct has become an effective exclusionary boundary marker of the 
northern identity. Deng (1995) comments: 
Northern racial pride focuses on the right brown colour of the skin, 
considered the standard for the north and therefore for the Sudan. To be 
too light for a Sudanese is to risk being considered a foreigner, a 
khawajah (European), a Middle Eastern Arab, or worse, a Halabi, a 
term used for a Gypsy–type racial group, considered among the lowest 
of the light–skinned races. The other side of the coin is, of course, 
looking down on the black race as inferior, a condition from which one 
has mercifully been redeemed. Northern Sudanese racism and cultural 
chauvinism, therefore, condemns both the very dark and the very light. 
(Deng 1995: 5) 
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The social construction of the ‘non–brown’, ‘non–Arabic speaking’, and ‘non–
Muslim’ as the ‘Other’ has been instrumental in the contrastive identification of the 
riverain groups as the ‘master race’. Deng notes: 
Virtually all ethnic groups in the country have their primary roots in the 
black African tribes. Evidence of this fact is still visible in all the tribes, 
including those in the north who identify themselves as Arabs. Their 
identification with Arabism is, however, the result of a process in which 
races and religions were ranked, with Arabs and Muslims respected as 
free, superior, and a race of slave masters, while Negroes, blacks, and 
heathens were viewed as a legitimate target of slavery, if they were not 
in fact already slaves. Given a situation where non–Arabs were allowed 
to alter their lot dramatically by converting to Islam, learning to speak 
the Arabic language, intermarrying with the Arabs, and identifying 
genealogically with the master race, the move to assimilation was 
irresistible. (Deng 1995: 4–5)  
As the above argument of Deng shows, two sets of cultural and social representations 
have been essentialisingly operative to mark the social interface between the south 
and the north. The first set of cultural representations which includes ‘heathen’ 
‘African’, ‘slave’, ‘Negro’, and ‘black’ is ascribed to southerners, while the second 
set which contains features ‘Arab’, ‘Muslim’, ‘master’, and ‘Arabic–speaking’ is 
attributed to northerners. These essentialised cultural distinctions have given rise to 
new form of racism that define social groups in inherently or indexically cultural and 
ethnic terms (for a discussion of ‘New Racism’ or ‘ethnicism’ see Barker 1981; 
Skutnabb–Kangas 1998; Wetherall and Potter 1992; van Dijk 1993; May 2001: 33–
35). By contrast to a biologically argued racism, ethnicism has emerged as a 
culturally/ethnically argued racism, and ‘linguicism’ as a linguistically argued racism 
(Skutnabb–Kangas 1998: 16–18).  
 
The point here is that the policy statement that Arabic is the ‘national’ language 
points to a particular ideological stance. It is intertextual with the 1998 National 
Constitution language policy of the NCP. So we have two schemes of classification 
of the discursive social order in the Sudan; each is based on a specific ideological 
view. The first scheme (of the SPLM/A) refers to the linguistic human rights of all 
social groups in the Sudan and demands an equal social position with respect to their 
African identity, while the second scheme (of the NCP) indicates that local languages 
are not functionally equal (not widely spoken) with the Arabic language. In other 
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words, two forms of identities are textualised in the first two statements: the first 
sentence projects an African identity on Sudan (this view is mainly held by the 
SPLM/A), while the second sentence projects a dominant Arab identity. In other 
words, the first policy statement belongs to the scheme that views Sudan as 
inherently an African state whose local languages are part of its national resources 
(this pluralist view is championed by the SPLM/A). In contrast, the second scheme, 
which is textually represented in the second policy statement views Sudan as an 
‘Arab’ or ‘Arabised’ country (this nationalist view is endorsed by the NCP). That is 
to say, the first policy statement represents a pluralist discourse (the SPLM/A), while 
the second policy statement represents a mono–nationalist discourse (the NCP). Both 
of these antagonistic ideological representations are discursively encoded in the 
language policy. Hence, one can argue that the discourse of the language policy is 
structurally a site of, and pragmatically has a stake in, the ideological struggle 
between the socialist principle that conceptualises Sudan in pluralist terms, and the 
nationalist principle that frames Sudan as a monolingual nation–state. Or to say the 
same thing in a different way, we have two ideological frameworks: ‘left’ 
(represented by the SPLM/A) and ‘right’ (represented by the NCP) struggling over 
the definition of the sociolinguistic order in the Sudan. The social relations between 
the NCP and the SPLM/A are textually encoded in the relational values of the words 
of the policy (indigenous, national, widely spoken, major, etc.). This tension within 
the lexical system of the NLP points to the conclusion that the language policy is an 
arena of social struggle between the south and the north over the identification of the 
discursive character of the Sudan. In the terms of Deng (1995: 5), ‘in the Sudanese 
context, the more the North asserts its Arabness, the more the South asserts 
Africanness as a counter–identity’. In other words, the historical conflict over 
national identity between the south and north that inherently incorporates a conflict 
of power relations is enacted in the structural system of the NLP. The NLP should be 
viewed (and it partly is) as a product of a long process of meaningful negotiations 
between the NCP and the SPLM/A (as part of the peace negotiations) that ultimately 
led to the CPA.  
 
5.2.3 The NLP and university bilingual education 
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The third language policy statement stipulates: 
Arabic, as a major language at the national level, and English shall be the  
official working languages of the National Government business and languages of 
instruction for higher education. 
 
To begin with a systemic analysis of the policy statement, it can be noted that the 
field of this stretch of discourse (the experiential meaning) is the official status of 
English and Arabic as media of university education and governmental business. The 
field also includes contextual elements and processes such as ‘National 
Government’, ‘languages of instruction’ and ‘higher education’. With reference to 
the tenor of this discourse (the interpersonal meaning), the actors or players who are 
responsible for the implementation of this language policy are the NCP and 
SPLM/A. It is remarkable that again this tenor is disguised through the grammatical 
use of the passive construction (which is part of the textual meaning of the sentence). 
With respect to the mode of discourse (the textual meaning), the use of English and 
Arabic in higher education is obligatory. This sense of obligation is actualised 
through the deontic use of the ‘legal shall’. Another observation is that the third 
policy statement in the NLP consists of a matrix clause with embedded subordinate 
phrases. The subordinate phrase (a major language at the national level) is a 
rewording of the second policy statement (the widely spoken national language in the 
Sudan). Regarding lexical items, one can remark that the terms ‘major’ ‘national’ 
‘language’ ‘Arabic’ ‘higher education’ are collocates and that they are part of the 
same lexical set referred to above in the analysis of the first and second policy 
statement. There is also a collocational relation set up between Arabic as a ‘widely 
spoken language’ (second statement), and Arabic as ‘a major language’ (third 
statement) which evidentially carries a particular experiential view of this language. 
The terms ‘widely’ and ‘major’ are another synonymous wording of ‘dominating’ 
and ‘dominant’. Viewed in this way, the interpretation here is that the sociolinguistic 
domination by the Arabic language of ‘indigenous’ languages is textually disguised 
and reproduced by exploiting the lexical system of the language policy. The 
rewording and overwording of the status of Arabic point to a preoccupation of the 
NCP with a particular aspect of the sociolinguistic order in the Sudan. The 
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punctuation marks (e.g., syntactic markers of subordinate relations) and the thematic 
organisation of the third policy statement are ideologically significant. The 
subordinate phrase ‘as a major language at the national language’ is not the theme of 
the sentence; rather it is kept in the background. The test for this language ideology 
is provided by the way in which it is syntactically encoded in the sentence: it can be 
deleted without disturbing the semantic equilibrium of the sentence.  
 
Another significant observation about the third policy statement is that, 
constitutionally (at the status–planning level), it assigns Arabic and English equal 
official status. The term ‘official’ warrants some comment here. Generally speaking, 
there are two conceptions of the term ‘official language’ in the literature. The first 
conception defines official language with reference to authoritative policy 
statements. The second sense identifies official language by reference to use in 
specific domains such as education and media (see Conrad and Fishman 1977; Ruiz 
1990; Keller 1983; Cobarrubias 1983). Cobarrubias (1983: 43) distinguishes between 
three types of state with reference to official language: endoglossic, exoglossic, and 
mixed state. An endoglossic state is one in which the official language is an 
‘indigenous’ language (e.g., Welsh and Gaelic in the UK.). Here, an ‘indigenous’ 
language is understood to refer to a language that is ‘spoken natively by a sizeable 
segment of the population’ (ibid.). An exoglossic state is one where the official 
language is an imported language or excolonial language (e.g., Nigeria, Kenya, etc.). 
A mixed state is one in which the status of the official language is granted to both an 
indigenous and an imported language. As for the third policy statement, the term 
‘official’ refers axiomatically to the authoritative declaration of English and Arabic 
as official languages. The equal use of English and Arabic in official domains has yet 
to be seen. With respect to Cobarrubias’s (1983) typology of official language states, 
the third language policy shows Sudan to be of a ‘mixed’ type: Arabic is interpreted 
by its speakers as an ‘indigenous’ language (in the north) and English as an 
excolonial language. Yet, I would argue that Cobarrubias’s category of official 
languages imposes a deterministic and fixed typecasting of languages into 
‘endoglossic’ (or indigenous) and ‘exoglossic’ (or colonial/outside). First, it seems to 
have escaped the dynamic and social constructedness of official language situations 
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in countries such as the Sudan. I have already demonstrated the role the British 
colonial regime played in the invention of ‘indigenous’ languages in southern Sudan 
to antagonise the northern nationalist ideology. Secondly, if an ex–colonial language 
has undergone a strategic process of appropriation or Abstand planning, then its 
modified resisting form can become the property of its speakers (see Joseph 2006a: 
54). Historically speaking, Arabic is an ex–colonial language in the Sudan in the 
southern view (exoglossic in Cobarrubias’ 1983 terms); however, it has undergone a 
process of linguistic appropriation in the sense that it has become not only a native 
tongue but also a marker of collective identities in the north.       
 
Moreover, the subordinate phrase in the third policy statement can act as a 
rationalisation for selecting Arabic as an official language (because it is a major 
language in the Sudan). There is no rationalisation given for extending the same 
official recognition to English. In other words, the recognition of English is not 
qualified by any evaluative words to justify its selection as an official working 
language. This opens the door for a range of possible interpretations. For instance, 
some interpreters of the policy may be led to construct their own interpretation of 
English as a ‘neutral language’ in the social struggle between the two social forces 
(the NCP and the SPLM/A). This interpretation is implausible for two reasons. I have 
shown that the northern nationalist parties including the NCP strategically viewed 
English as an ‘antilanguage’ (in terms of Halliday 1978: 154) to the linguistic policy 
of Arabicisation. Hence with respect to the nationalist northern political parties, 
English ipso facto not a neutral language. In the discussion of the colonial Southern 
Policy above, I have demonstrated that English colluded with local languages in the 
resistance to the nationalist discourse of Arabicisation. The colonial Southern Policy 
can act as one of the intertextual contexts for rendering intelligible the historical 
cause behind the officialisation of English in the NLP. So for southerners, I would 
conclude, English is historically implicated in the southern struggle against any 
linguistic neo–colonisation.  
 
 More importantly, a historical analysis of the southern social struggle through 
organised political movements shows that the proposal to have English and Arabic as 
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official languages within a federal state is not a novelty. The Federal Party (a 
postcolonial southern party formed by Ezboni Mondiri, a graduate of the Faculty of 
Arts, the University of Khartoum), included in its manifesto a draft constitution for a 
federal state in the Sudan (Bob and Wassara 1989: 306–307; Sanderson and 
Sanderson 1981: 353–354). The manifesto demanded recognition of both English 
and Arabic as official languages. It also called for the recognition of both 
Christianity and Islam as state religions as well as a separate civil service for the 
south. The Federal Party demanded that the south control its own educational system 
and be crowned by a university. Another controversial demand by the Federal Party 
was ‘the transfer of Sudan from the Arab world to the African’. On this demand, 
Sanderson and Sanderson (1981: 354) comment that ‘extravagant as this demand 
may seem, it nonetheless articulated one of the deepest southern misgivings’. Ezboni 
Mondiri won the February elections of 1958; however, he was arrested before taking 
his seat in the parliament. The third policy statement in the NLP can rightly be 
interpreted as a product of the long social and armed struggle of SPLM for a federal 
system within which English and Arabic are equally weighted as official languages. 
The NLP can be viewed as a discursive (and interdiscursive) hybridisation of two 
historically conflicting ideologies in the Sudan (secular socialism by the SPLM/A vs. 
sectarian nationalism by the NCP). The thrust of the argument then is that the 
selection of English as an official working language in the NLP is not purely 
instrumental but also ideological. In a word, within the context of the NLP English is 
undergoing a dual process of decolonisation and ‘indigenisation’ in Sudan. The point 
here is that the NLP has to be historicised to have a meaningful historical context for 
understanding the language situation in the Sudan. 
 
Furthermore, the third policy statement has significant future ideological and 
political implications and ramifications for the linguistic social order in the Sudan: 
societal bilingualism without diglossia in Arabic and English is likely to emerge. In 
the course of doing so, the NLP can contribute to the creation of a democratic space 
for what Foucault (1980: 82) calls ‘subjugated knowledges’. Foucault defines 
‘subjugated knowledges’ as ‘a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified 
as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naïve knowledges, located 
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low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity’ 
(ibid.). The NLP focuses on bilingual education at university level and grants the 
regional states the right to structure non–university education in the way that suits 
them.  
 
It should be remarked that bilingual education in a non–official local language and 
Arabic/English is a rarity in the Sudan. An explanation for the lack of provision of 
education in other local languages has to invoke the historical relationship between 
the linguistic policies of Arabicisation and the ideology of nation building. It is not 
my purpose here to offer a detailed critique of the linguistic policies of Arabicisation. 
I have already touched on such a critique when I reviewed the relationship between 
the policy of Arabicisation and ‘Sudanisation’ as a postcolonial nationalist ideology 
in Chapter 4. Instead, I shall confine my attention to an examination of the role 
played by the social institutions of education in the social construction of a 
homogeneous Sudan.  
 
The official declaration of the Arabic language by the Ministry of Education in the 
early 1950s as the ‘only’ medium of instruction in all national schools cannot be 
understood as a value–neutral act. Blommaert (1999b: 429) rightly points out that 
‘whenever language is drawn into nationalist struggles, it becomes more than “just a 
language”’. The discussion of the 1947 Juba Conference in Chapter 4 has shown that 
the question of national identity (and national language) was a site of struggle 
between the south and the north (for a critical review of the Juba Conference see 
Loiria 1989). Postcolonial politicians have strategically reinforced the link between 
Arabic and Islam as a semiotic aspect of the Sudanese national identity.  
 
 
It is exactly the proponents of the above ideological view who have essentialised the 
link between ‘Arab nationalism’, ‘Islam’, and ‘the Arabic language’, and ultimately 
have rationalised the state monolingual policy of Arabicisation (for a detailed review 
of the religious politicisation of national identity in the Sudan see Deng 1995: ch. 2). 
A succinct reaction to the deeply exclusive and exclusionary ideology–regarding 
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view of the northern statist nationalism can be found in the SACDNU Petition 
(1963). The following reaction points to the stance of the SACDNU on the southern 
cultural identity: 
The people of the north tell us proudly that they are Arabs and as they 
are in control, they have declared the Sudan a member of the Arab 
league … We in the south have nothing against Arab unity but what we 
do object to is Arab interference in denying us freedom and making it 
impossible for us to choose our link which naturally will be with Black 
Africa with which we have blood ties. We are looked upon by the Arabs 
as inferior but we have nothing to be afraid of in our negro [sic] race. It 
is true nothing much has been written about Black Africa but this does 
not rule out the fact that the Black race has contributed and still 
contributes to the general progress of mankind. (SACDNU Petition 
1963: 3) 
It should be remarked here that the SACDNU adopted a nationalist separatist 
discourse when, among other things, the Liberal Party, the only party which 
represented southern political interests was dissolved by the military junta of General 
Ibrahim Aboud (for a review of the history of southern political movements see Bob 
and Wassara 1989; Wakoson 1980). The SACDNU Petition (1963: 1) bluntly stated 
its nationalist policy: ‘Our policy is Independence for Southern Sudan; Southern 
Sudan for Southern Sudanese within the framework of Black African Unity’. In 
arguing its case, The SACDNU drew on (colonially constructed) essentialising 
categories of the social groups (e.g., ‘Negro’, ‘Arab’, etc). The SPLM/A (formed in 
1983) which signed the CPA with the NCP has distanced itself from this determinist 
identification of the southern cultural identity. The ideological aim of the SPLM/A is 
not secessionism from the north (for a detailed review of the historical genealogy of 
the SPLM/A see Scott 1985). Quite the reverse; the SPLM/A endorses a socialist 
ideology which defines the Sudan on new terms, and which is incompatible with the 
sectarian nationalist ideology of the NCP. The following words by the late John 
Garang on the principles and objectives of the SPLM/A points clearly to the 
ideological orientation of movement: 
The anarchy in production, the separatist tendencies in the various 
regions of our beloved country, the moral decay and all the ills that I 
have enumerated can only be solved within the context of a united 
Sudan under a socialist system that affords democratic and human 
rights to all nationalities and guarantees freedom to all religions, 
beliefs and outlooks. The slogans of the SPLA are ‘National Unity’, 
‘Socialism’, ‘Autonomy’, where and when necessary, and ‘Religious 
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Freedom’. Our belief in and commitment to these slogans are 
irrevocable. The SPLA welcomes and embraces all Sudanese 
nationalities, patriots and socialists; in short, the movement belongs to 
the whole Sudanese people and will fight for their unity, peace and 
progress. (Garang 1992: 23, 25, emphasis in original) 
The above identification of the ideological orientation of the SPLM/A vis–à–vis the 
nationalist ideology of the NCP is a further substantiation of the argument that the 
discourse of the NLP is a site of social struggle between two diametrically 
oppositional ideologies. The argument here is that the nature of the ideological 
relationship, and ultimately the configuration of social relations of power, between 
the SPLM/A and the NCP are determinative of the way in which the NLP can and 
cannot be faithfully implemented. Tollefson (2002: 180) states that ‘ideologies of 
language are linked to other ideologies that can influence and constrain the 
development of language policies’. Arabic is not just a tool of mutual understanding 
but also a discoursal way in and through which regional and global Arab solidarity is 
constructed. Anderson (1991: 13) rightly notes that religious communities such as 
Islamic Ummah and Christendom are connected through ‘a sacred language and 
written script’. In the case of Islam, the ‘sacred text’ existed only in classical Arabic. 
Hence, ‘written Arabic functioned like Chinese characters to create a community out 
of signs, not sounds’ (ibid.: 13). Anderson (ibid.) points out that ‘the deader the 
written language – the farther it was from speech – the better’ since ‘in principle 
everyone has access to a pure world of signs’.  In Sudan, the Arabic script in itself is 
viewed by non–Arabic speaking groups as a force for social assimilation. It should 
be mentioned that one of the objectives of the colonial Southern Policy was to ‘de–
essentialise’ the link between Arabic and the symbols used in its writing. One of the 
recommendations of the Rejaf Language Conference is the rewriting of Arabic in the 
Roman script: ‘Colloquial Arabic in Roman script will also be required in certain 
communities where the use of no other vernacular is practicable’ (Report of the Rejaf 
Language Conference, 1928, cited in Tucker 1934: 31). 
 
As the above extract shows, the Rejaf Language policy considers colloquial Arabic 
as an optional extra in the southern resistance to Arabicisation; it is among the 
divide–and–rule strategies intended to construct and communicate a sense of social 
solidarity among the southerners. The point of emphasis here is on the social 
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functions each language is made to serve. The unequal distribution of the social 
functions between southern Arabic and Khartoum Arabic not only reflects the 
hierarchic character of the social system but also reproduces and maintains the same 
system of unequal relations. The social functions performed by southern Arabic vis–
à–vis northern Arabic are determined and determinative of the underlying social 
system and the historical relations between the south and the north. The discursive 
project of constructing a writing system for southern Arabic in Latin script (as an 
objective of the Rejaf Language Conference) may be interpreted as an attempt at 
fixing the ‘antisocial–system–indicating properties’ in southern Arabic, hence 
assigning a linguistic sense of continuity to the system of unequal class relations in 
the Sudan.   
 
It is worth noting that regional and international educational planning bodies were 
implicated in the marginalisation of local languages, and the imposition of the Arabic 
language as a unifying instrumental force. For example, the recommendations of the 
International Education Commission on Secondary Education in 1955 recommended 
the use of the Arabic language as a means of instruction in secondary education. The 
report was opposed to the use of local languages as media of instruction in the 
southern schools. The explanation for this antagonistic stance against the vernaculars 
is stated by the report as follows (cited in Yokwe 1984: 157): 
It would be a waste of time and energy to try to teach the children of the 
south in their own Vernaculars in which they will not be able to pursue 
any reading after they leave school: such vernaculars have no literature 
and cannot be used as cultural media.  
The above quoted representation of vernacular languages is clearly informed by the 
sociolinguistic structural functionalist conception of society ‘in which rational actors 
follow social norms for the general good of society and their own social welfare’ 
(Pennycook 2001: 50; Williams 1992: 7–8). The intellectual stance of the 
International Commission hints at the role played by the problem–oriented version of 
language planning (Ruiz 1984) in the construction of negative stereotypical 
representations of tribal/ethnic languages in the Sudan. This led to a language 
situation in which ‘the escape from little languages is viewed as liberating, as joyful, 
as self–fulfilling, as self–actualising’ (Fishman 1978: 47). The social representation 
of learning and teaching of local languages as ‘a waste of time’ is informed by a 
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variant of ‘social/sociolinguistic Darwinism’ (Ruiz 1985: 19; May 2001: 3; Williams 
1992: 7) where the fittest languages can and should only survive, and the ‘weak’ 
languages and cultures will be destroyed. Nation–building versions of language 
educational planning premised on this structural functionalist principle justified the 
marginalisation and the disappearance/destruction of local languages as a ‘necessary’ 
price of progress and modernity (see Hurreiz 1968: 8–10). The social Darwinist 
perspective as Williams (1992: 8) notes, ‘would appear to impose the blame for the 
disappearance upon the very form which disappears rather than upon that which 
survives’.  
 
The point here is that the ideology of nation–state educational planners in the early 
1950s and 1960s was compatible with Skutnabb–Kangas’s (1998: 17–18) three–part 
process of: 1) glorifying the language of the dominant group (e.g., by exclusively 
associating Arabic with modern education), 2) stigmatising/peripheralising/devaluing 
the languages of dominated groups (e.g., learning of tribal languages is a waste of 
time), and 3) ‘rationalising’ politically, psychologically, educationally, or 
sociologically this unequal relationship as ‘functional’ and ‘beneficiary’ to the 
speakers of dominated languages (e.g., vernaculars lack literature). The same 
recommendation of the International Commission is reiterated by a United Nations 
expert who was reported to have said at a conference on ‘Adult Education in the 
Sudan’ in the late 1963 (cited in Yokwe 1984: 158) that: 
The tribal languages of the south have no script of their own and even if 
the Latin alphabet is used for the different languages, there is no 
literature worth speaking of, which can be read with pleasure and profit.  
Pennycook (2001: 59) terms the above view of language as ‘colonial celebratory’, 
showing disdain for local languages and arrogant approval of international languages 
such as English. The process of rationalising the stigmatisation (e.g., lack of 
literature) of tribal languages in newly constructed nation–states is based on what 
Skutnabb–Kangas (1998: 18) calls ‘the ideology of monolingual reductionism’, 
which she identifies as: 
An ideology which is used to rationalise the linguistic genocide (in 
education) committed by states which ‘see’ the existence of 
(unassimilated) linguistic minorities as a threat leading to the potential 
disintegration of nation–states. (Skutnabb–Kangas 1998: 14) 
 216 
SACDNU which represented the southern opposition in the 1960s strongly opposed 
the educational policy which viewed and still continues to view tribal languages as 
inherently deficient: 
Children in the south are made to study their lessons in Arabic at the 
early stages of education because the idea is to make Arabic the mother 
tongue. This we think is wrong according to educational psychology 
principles. The child should begin with his native language not with a 
foreign one. (SACDNU Petition 1963: 15–16) 
The argument of the SACDNU is compatible with the UNESCO declaration on ‘The 
Use of Vernacular Language in Education’, 1953 (cited in McDougal et al. 1976: 
154): 
It is axiomatic that the best medium of teaching a child is his mother 
tongue. Psychologically, it is the system of meaningful signs that in his 
mind works automatically for expression and understanding. 
Sociologically, it is a means of identification among the members of the 
community to which he belongs. Educationally, he learns more quickly 
through it than through an unfamiliar linguistic medium.  
The point here is that the social stereotyping embodied in the academic and official 
commentary on the southern discursive and cultural practices has been influential in 
the construction of a hierarchical social system. Within this social system tribal 
languages are represented as inherently ‘primitive’ and dominant languages such as 
Arabic as intrinsically ‘rational’ (cf. ‘the mythology of monolingualism’; see 
Fishman 1978). The education system has been instrumental in the representation, or 
imagining, of Arabic as a political institutional language with no ideological bearing. 
For instance, addressing the National Assembly in 1953, the first Minister of 
Education made the following declaration (cited in Nyombe 1997: 112):  
As the Sudan is one country sharing one set of political institutions, it is 
of great importance that there should be one language which is 
understood by all its citizens. That language could only be Arabic and 
Arabic must therefore be taught in all schools.  
What the above extract clearly demonstrates is that the postcolonial nationalist 
project endorsed by northern power holders is based on the underlying principles of 
what Churchill (1996: 266) terms the ‘philosophical matrix of nation–state’. The 
nationalist ideology that was/has been current in the north was predicated on the 
Gellnerian principle of ‘nation–state congruence’. Gellner’s (1983: 1) definition of 
nationalism as ‘a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries 
should not cut across political ones’, distinctly explains the preoccupation of 
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northern politicians with cultural and linguistic homogeneity associated with the state 
policies of Arabicisation and Islamisation. Islamism/Islamisation refers to the 
‘organised expression of specific religious and political ideology’ (O’Fahey 1996: 
258–267). Consequently, the linguistic rights and cultural wants of the dominated 
ethnic groups in the south have been ignored. Coulmas (1998: 67) cogently states 
that ‘the nation state as it has evolved since the French Revolution is the natural 
enemy of minorities’. The political discourse of northern nation–builders evidently 
reflects a deep–seated obsession with the representation of Arabic as a homogenising 
tool (the key terms in the speech of the First Minister are ‘one country ’, ‘one set of 
political institutions’ and ‘one language’).  
 
The point here is that the educational system, particularly the pre–university one, was 
carefully designed to induct the masses in the whole Sudan into the ‘national’ 
culture. The speech of the First Minister of Education represents the way in which 
nation–builders conceptualised Arabic in the early years of Independence, and it 
hints at the way in which the educational institutions were discursively to be run in 
the decades to come. The Minister of Education employs the argumentation strategy 
of rationalisation to legitimate and institutionalise Arabic as a ‘national language’ 
(cf. Skutnabb–Kangas’s [1998: 17] process of glorifying the dominant language). 
The political discourse of the First Minister of Education is a rationalisation of the 
discursive domination of Arabic in the name of ‘modernisation’ and educational 
value–neutrality. Legitimation is used here to refer to the ‘formal recognition 
accorded to the language by the nation–state – usually by the constitutional and/or 
legislative benediction of official status’ (May 2001: 6). Institutionalisation is 
concerned with ‘the process by which the language comes to be accepted, or “taken 
for granted”, in a wide range of social, cultural and linguistic domains or contexts, 
both formal and informal’ (ibid.). Besides the argumentation and rhetorical 
strategies, other modalities of implementation such as coercion in different forms 
were operationalised to culturally homogenise the different parts of the country. One 
important conclusion to be drawn from the ideological discourse of postcolonial 
politicians is that ‘language planning emerged side by side with the theory of 
modernisation which not only was closely integrated with a specific theoretical 
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perspective – structural functionalism – but also involved a specific conception of the 
world’ (Williams 1992: 124; Tollefson 1991: ch. 4). With respect to Ruiz’s (1974) 
typology of orientations to language policy, it is evident that the early commentary of 
language planning in the Sudan has endorsed the fashionable at the time perspective 
of ‘language–as–problem’ which holds Karam’s (1974: 108) view that ‘theoretically, 
wherever there is a communication problem concerning language, language planning 
is possible’. 
 
5.2.4 The NLP and language rights as habitus within a federal system  
The fourth statement in NLP reads: 
In addition to Arabic and English, the legislature of any sub–national level of 
Government may adopt any other national language(s) as additional official working 
language(s) at its level’ 
 
With respect to the field of discourse (which is reflected in the experiential value of 
the text), the subject matter of the above policy statement addresses the use of an 
additional local language as an official language at the level of regional states.  The 
field of this discourse also contains references to activities, processes and states (e.g., 
government). The tenor of discourse (which is predicted by the interpersonal value of 
the text) can be said to include the SPLM, the NCP, and the legislature of regional 
states. For the mode of discourse, (which is activated in the textual value of the text), 
the policy statement is a written permission which allows regional states to use a 
third additional language. The granting of this permission is realised deontically 
through the use of the modal auxiliary ‘may’ (the policy states what is possible). 
With respect to the lexical organisation of the statement, the terms ‘Arabic’ 
‘English’, ‘language’, ‘official’, ‘working’, and ‘national’ are collocates. The terms 
‘legislature’, ‘Government’, and ‘sub–legislature’ refer to a particular type of genre: 
the state including its government and social institutions. The CPA suggests a 
specific structural system, which provides the right environment for the application 
of the language policy, namely federalism. I agree with Wright (2004: 70) that the 
appropriate structural system in such multilingual contexts is decentralisation or 
federalism, since it encourages linguistic pluralism and multiculturalism (for the 
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distinction between ‘centralised’ and ‘decentralised’ language planning see Tollefson 
1981). It should be remarked that the CPA, at least at the level of theory, is aware of 
this principle on which the language policy is based and could be implemented, and 
which could lead to the empowerment of minority groups. In the Protocol of Power–
sharing (see Appendix), the NCP and the SPLM/A who signed the protocols put it 
bluntly that: 
[The Parties are] convinced that decentralisation and empowerment of 
all levels of government are cardinal principles of effective and fair 
administration of the country. 
Yet, it should be noted that the NCP claims that it had already applied a federal 
system and had divided the country into regional states since the beginning of the 
1990s. If this is the case, then the question that imposes itself here is: what 
differentiates the two federalisms and how do they affect the linguistic map of the 
country? Before embarking on attempting a possible reply to this question, it should 
be made clear at the outset that any rhetoric on ‘decentralisation’, ‘empowerment’, or 
any linguistic project aiming at empowering the masses in the absence of freedom of 
speech is, in principle, truly infinitesimal. Freedom of speech and linguistic projects 
aimed at empowering masses go hand in hand, since the populace under utilitarian 
regimes, as Fishman (1994a: 95) puts it, ‘would be leery of giving information or 
expressing opinions that would enable survey researchers to gauge whatever 
oppositional and anti–hegemonic thought might exist under such regimes’.  
 
Generally speaking, political scientists draw a distinction among three concepts: 
federalism, federal political systems, and federations. Federalism is generally 
identified in scholarly literature as a normative political philosophy that combines 
both joint action and self–government (see O’Leary 2001: 277; King 1982; Watts 
1998). The second conceptual term, ‘federal political systems’, refers to a ‘genus of 
political organisation that is marked by the combination of shared rule and self–rule’ 
(Watts 1998: 120). The list of federal political systems include federations, 
confederations, federacies, unions, associated states, condominiums, leagues, and 
cross–border functional authorities (for definitions of these terms see Watt 1998; 
Elazar 1987). Watts provides the following definition for ‘federation’: 
A federation is a compound polity combining constituent units and a 
general government, each possessing powers delegated to it by the 
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people through a constitution, each empowered to deal directly with the 
citizens in the exercise of a significant portion of its legislative, 
administrative, and taxing powers, and each directly elected by its 
citizens. (Watts 1998: 121)  
According to Watts (1998: 123), one of the distinctive features of federal political 
systems is ‘the simultaneous existence of powerful motives for constituent units to be 
united (for certain shared purposes) and their deep–rooted desires for self–
government (for other purposes)’. What differentiates federations from decentralised 
unitary systems is not only the limit of decentralised powers but the ‘constitutional 
guarantee of autonomy for the constituent governments in the responsibilities they 
perform’ (ibid.: 124). Political scientific researchers categorise federations into two 
major categories: national federations and multinational/multiethnic federations (see 
O’Leary 2001). The United States illustrates a form of national federalism which has 
been emulated by some Latin American countries, namely Mexico, Venezuela, 
Brazil, and Argentina (ibid.: 280). The American national federalism played an 
instrumental role in the construction of an assimilated nation through the 
implementation of homogenising cultural practices (see Gordon 1964; Beer 1993). 
Mono–national federalism is compatible with Gellner’s (1983) theorising on 
nationalism as one nation one culture (see O’Leary 2001). O’Leary (ibid.: 284) 
points out that ‘integrationist nation–builders in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean have 
distrusted federalism precisely because it provides secessionist opportunities’.  
 
Multinational federalism, on the other hand, ‘seeks to express, institutionalise and 
protect at least two national or ethnic cultures, often on a permanent basis’ (ibid.: 
280). It rejects outright the assimilationist and integrationist aims of national 
federalism (ibid.). According to Williams (1992: 7), ‘integration’ refers to the 
‘mutual interdependence of the structurally differentiated parts and the coordination 
of their functions’. Social integration, as May (2001: 118) notes, should be 
understood as ‘a reciprocal process rather than a simple accommodation of ethnic–
minority groups to the majoritarian national culture’ (emphasis in original). 
Examples of multinational federal systems include, but with varying decrees of 
success, Canada, the Caribbean , Nigeria, South Africa, India, Pakistan, Malaysia, 
Belgium, and Spain (O’Leary 2001: 280; for a review of the Nigerian federalism see 
Chapter 3). With this broad theoretical background in mind, let us now move to 
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examine the federalist system within which the NCP’s linguistic policy of 
Arabicisation is embedded. 
 
The first remark is that the NCP started the Arabicisation process of higher education 
in the Sudan, willy–nilly, by a top–down presidential decree in the beginning of the 
1990s. This should not be surprising, for all nationalist linguistic policies in the 
Sudan have been imposed by various centralist (national) governments rather than 
developed systematically as an output of democratic deliberation and consultation. 
The result of the unilateral imposition of such hegemonic language policies is what 
Phillipson (1992: 47) calls ‘linguicism’: ‘Ideologies, structures, and practices which 
are used to legitimate, effectuate, and reproduce an unequal division of power and 
resources (both material and immaterial) between groups which are defined on the 
basis of language’. More importantly, another repercussion of this undemocratic 
linguistic situation is what Myers–Scotton (1993: 163) describes as ‘elite closure’, 
which is ‘accomplished when the elite successfully employ official language policies 
and their own nonformalised language usage patterns to limit access to nonelite 
groups to political position and socioeconomic advancement’. Concomitantly, the 
official Arabic language has become a symbol of power and prestige in the state and 
has impacted on the instrumental value and status of other vernacular languages. The 
point here is that the maintenance of a pluralistic society should afford linguistic 
minorities the opportunities for, wherever possible, meaning–making in local 
languages as well as in elite languages including world languages. 
  
The policy of Arabicisation seeks cultural assimilation, and has the planned goal of 
making all people into Arabic speakers; hence it is deeply hostile to any forms of 
accommodation that may obstruct this goal including federalism. The only type of 
federal political system, if any at all, that is clearly compatible with the policy of 
Arabicisation is a ‘mono–national federalism’. This would turn the nationalist project 
of the NCP into one that is ‘federal in form and centralised unitary in content’. This 
type of national federation was part and parcel of the NCP’s proselytising discourse 
of building a sectarian nation in the 1990s under the banner of ‘almashru alhadari’ 
(Islamist Civilisation Project). This argument can be evidentially supported by the 
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following extract from the NCP ‘National Charter for Political Action’ (cited in 
Nyombe 1997: 115): 
The adoption of Islamic Sharia and the federal system within the 
framework of comprehensive national unity is a further enrichment of 
our national experience pioneered by the nation’s loyal sons who 
steadfastly sacrifice their souls for the sake of its protection throughout 
the decades. 
The type of political organisation expressed by the above quote is completely 
incompatible with the SPLM/A, whose ideology belongs to a completely different 
philosophy of federalism. The kind of federal political system that is advocated by 
the SPLM/A and by the different ethnolinguistic groups is a ‘multiethnic’ or 
‘multinational’ federalism that unites ‘people who seek the advantages of 
membership of a common political unit [citizenship], but differ markedly in descent, 
language and culture’ (Forsyth 1989: 4). So, the congruent context for the 
implementation of the new language policy is a type of structural system that rightly 
adopts multiethnic federalism as a principle of political governing. This will lead us 
to the conclusion that the term ‘national languages’ (which is mentioned in the first 
statement and repeated in the fourth policy statement) holds two socio–politically 
incongruent implications in relation to the ideologies of the two political parties (the 
SPLM/A and the NCP). For the SPLM/A, which believes in social transformation 
and cultural pluralism, the implication is that the current supreme status enjoyed by 
Arabic–speaking nationality is rejected outright, since local languages equally grant 
their speaking ethnic groups the status of Sudanese nationals. The SPLM/A, 
Sudanese communists, and socialists consider, or aspire to see, Sudan as ‘a 
democracy of nationalities, cooperating voluntarily and autonomously but within a 
united Sudan in the enterprise of self–realisation through the perfection of men 
according to their own kind’ (AbdelSalam 1989: 34). Hence, this binary act of 
pluralizing and indigenising of national identity on the basis of linguistic diversity 
can be interpreted as a strategic recasting of the political concept ‘nations without 
states’ (Guibernau 1999: 16), which refers to ‘nations which, in spite of having their 
territories included within the boundaries of one or more states, by and large do not 
identify with them’ (ibid.). The potential of witnessing the southern Sudan as an 
independent sovereign state in the international system of nation–states lends support 
to this interpretation. 
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The new language policy can be said to apply, using the relevant technical 
terminology, the ‘territoriality and personality principle’ of language planning (see 
Kloss 1971, 1977). At its simplest, according to the territoriality principle the choice 
of official languages varies from region to region in terms of local conditions. For 
example, the western region could choose X as an official language according to its 
local conditions, thus the selected official language in that region may not be the 
same as the official language in the eastern or southern regions of Sudan. The 
‘personality principle’ signifies that English and Arabic are the official languages at 
the national level. The 1998 Constitutional language policy grants local languages a 
tolerance–oriented right i.e., ‘their existence is recognised but officially ignored’ 
(Cobarrubias 1983: 44). The tolerance–oriented stance endorsed by nationalist 
regimes since Independence amounts or leads in some social situations to linguistic 
genocide through passivity ‘to let a language die’ (Skutnabb–Kangas 1998: 13). This 
personality principle is protected by the last policy statement which grants the users 
of these languages the ‘right to freedom from discrimination on the basis of 
language’ (for a detailed discussion of this type of language right see Macias 1979; 
McDougal et al. 1976; Table 5.9 shows the types of language rights embodied in the 
NLP).  
 
The fifth policy statement stipulates:  
The use of either language at any level of government or education shall not be 
discriminated against. 
A systemic functional analysis of the above policy statement may show that the field 
of discourse (the experiential meaning) is about the imposition of a prohibition to 
discriminate against people on the basis of language. The tenor of discourse is 
disguised through the use of nominalisation (which is part of the textual meaning). 
Yet, it is not difficult to predict it: the tenor should include the government officials 
and language teachers/educationalists (this interpretation is lexically triggered by the 
terms ‘government’ and ‘education’). The mode of discourse is a written directive 
which performs the speech act of imposing a prohibition against linguistic 
discrimination. This prohibition is actualised by the deontic use of ‘shall not’ (in the 
 224 
legal use of ‘shall’). With reference to Ruiz’s (1984) typology of orientations in 
language planning, the NLP evidently endorses the positions of ‘language–as–right’ 
(but a contextualised right), and ‘language–as–resource’ (see Table 5.9). The 
officialisation of a local language(s) at the regional state level is based on the view of 
vernaculars in positive terms as ‘resources’ that can be mobilised to serve the 
concerned polity. By contrast, the linguistic policies of Arabicisation, unsurprisingly, 
conceptualise linguistic diversity as an obstruction to the nationalist project of 
building an Arab nation in the Sudan. Suffice it here to note that the embodiment of 
these language rights in the NLP, at least at the level of theory, is a watershed. 
However, a caveat should be added here. The concept of language rights embedded 
in the NLP should not be viewed in universalising and totalising terms (for a critique 
of the liberal notion of language rights see Stroud 2001; Stroud and Heugh: 2004; 
Coulmas 1998; Pennycook 1998; Phillipson 1998; Chen 1998; Annamalai 1998; 
Rasool 1998; Abdussalam 1998). The concept of language rights presupposes an 
essential connection between language and identity. I argue that the concept of 
language rights should be firmly based in Bourdieu’s notion of ‘habitus’, rather than 
being treated in a decontextualised manner as an abstract universal construct. 
Language is a practice that is embodied in the social structure through socialisation. 
The voice of the local agency should be taken into consideration in the sense that 
policy decisions should be founded on the wish of the language users to have their 
language institutionalised as a medium of instruction. The concept of ‘linguistic 
citizenship’ endorses a bottom–up approach which concentrates on local agency and 
voice (for a detailed definition of ‘linguistic citizenship’ see Stroud 2001; Stroud and 
Heugh 2004; McGroarty 2002; for a comparative analysis of ‘language rights’ and 
‘linguistic citizenship’ see Trudell 2007). The assumption that people are unaware of 
their rights, including those who are victims of false consciousness in the Marxist 
sense, as the thesis of English ‘linguistic imperialism’ (Phillipson 1992) holds, is 
misplaced (for a critique see Joseph 2006a: 49–58). This view of language rights is 
an illustration of top–down planning by educational policy makers on behalf of 
language speakers. Tollefson (2002: 328) notes that ‘while professional linguists, 
teachers, and other language specialists can contribute in many ways to the success 
of language programmes, the broad involvement of parents and other community 
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members is critical’. May (2001: 167) reminds us that ‘the fate of a language cannot 
be borne on the back of education alone’. The failure of the Irish language policies is 
a case in point (see May 2001: ch. 4). Postmodernist commentators who focus on 
local agency stress that ‘schools are far greater agents of social reproduction than of 
social change’ (Pennycook 2001: 121). Understanding language rights as part of the 
habitus of the concerned speakers can give them the right to have their mother 
tongue institutionalised and made official, in a form more legitimate, more 
primordial, more inalienable than if this right is treated as a merely legal provision 
within the gift of the regime in power. I am not arguing that language policy and 
planning should be a completely bottom–up practice. There must always be a top–
down element in the planning process, or there would be no ‘planning’ or ‘process’ 
at all, but the desire to operationalise a mother tongue as a medium of teaching 
should stem from its speakers. If the speakers of a given language view it as part of 
their habitus and share the desire to have their children taught in it, then their 
government is contractually bound to accommodate this collective wish.   
 
It is worth mentioning that the language rights recognised by the NLP are structurally 
grounded not only in the principle of multinational federalism, but also in the 
principle of citizenship. But the NCP in its 1998 National Constitution anchored 
tolerance–oriented rights for non–Arabic speaking groups in citizenship, among 
other forms of social integration. Article 27 in 1998 National Constitution (cited in 
the UNESCO, MOST Clearing House) stipulates that: 
There shall be guaranteed for every community or group of citizens the 
right to preserve their particular culture, language or religion and rear 
children freely within the framework of their particularity, and the same 
shall not by coercion be effaced. 
Marshall (1963: 87) defines citizenship as ‘a status bestowed on those who are full 
members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the 
rights and duties with which the status is endowed’ (for a review of citizenship as 
‘social practice’ see Lister 1998; Oldfield 1990). The relationship between 
citizenship as a status and as a practice is similar to that of social structure and 
human agency in that it is dialectical and dynamic (Lister 1998: 27). In language 
planning terms, citizenship rights can be contextualised or particularised for the 
affirmation of cultural and linguistic diversity (ibid.). Stroud (2001) points out that 
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the meaning of citizenship should be extended to address language diversity and 
equal political representation. Kymlicka (1995, 1989, 2001), an advocate of 
‘multicultural citizenship’ assigning special status to national minorities within a 
liberal theory of rights, contends that liberals should protect cultural structures 
because ‘it is only through having a rich and secure cultural structure that people can 
become aware, in a vivid way, of the options available to them, and intelligently 
examine their value’ (Kymlicka 1989: 165; see Chapter 3). 
 
With respect to language policies in the Sudan, the notion of citizenship in the 1998 
National Constitutional language policy is exclusionary and severely bedevilled by 
the strict pursuance and coercive implementation of the policy of Arabicisation as a 
ruling ideology across the whole country. Educated northern elites occupying the 
Nile Valley have constructed themselves as ‘Awlad Albalad’ (inheritors of the land) 
and ‘Awlad A’rab’ (children of Arabs; see Willemse 2006). 
The NLP statements Language rights 
The Government of National Unity shall implement an 
information campaign throughout Sudan in all national 
languages in Sudan to popularise the Peace Agreement, and to 
foster national unity, reconciliation and mutual understanding. 
 
 
Promotion–oriented language right 
 
All the indigenous languages are national languages which 
shall be respected, developed and promoted. 
 
Promotion–oriented language right 
 
Arabic, as a major language at the national level, and English 
shall be the official working languages of the National 
Government business and languages of instruction for higher 
education 
Personality–oriented language right 
 
In addition to Arabic and English, the legislature of any sub–
national level of government may adopt any other national 
language(s) as additional official working language(s) at its 
level. 
Territoriality–oriented language right 
The use of either language at any level of government or 
education shall not be discriminated against. 
The right to freedom from discrimination on 
the basis of language. 
The law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all 
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination 
on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status. 
The right to freedom from discrimination on 
the basis of language. 
Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, 
property or birth, the right to … measures of protection as are 
required by his/her status as a minor. 
The right to freedom from discrimination on 
the basis of language.  




Willemse (2006: 7) states that Sudan has been invented as both an Arab and Islamic 
state. The main objective of the state–declared ideology (Islamist Civilisation 
Project) was to construct a ‘new Sudanese citizen’ (ibid.: 8). This ideological project, 
which Willemse termed ‘a project of differentiating order’ was a (re)construction of 
a southerner as the ‘Other’.  Willemse (ibid.: 14) correctly points out that ‘the search 
for citizenship is one of securing boundaries of the Sudanese national identity 
whereby apart from women, “Blacks” are constructed as eternal “others”’. The point 
here is that the sectarian nationalism promoted by the NCP or other northern parties 
with a similar political orientation are founded on, using Mazrui’s (1975: 466) terms, 
‘a structure of domination and a structure of damnation’. The structure of damnation 
uses ‘the sanctions of religious experience as part of the process of obtaining 
obedience and submission’ (ibid.). Willemse (2006: 11) rightly notes that ‘a 
citizenship open to all Sudanese subjects was never part of the nationalist project’. 
Young (1989: 251) argues for ‘differentiated citizenship as group representation’ as 
‘the best way to realise the inclusion and participation of everyone in full 
citizenship’, which in turn requires ‘the articulation of special rights that attend to 
group differences in order to undermine oppression and disadvantage’. The notion of 
‘differentiated citizenship’ is compatible with the concept of language rights, which 
lies at the heart of the NLP.  
 
The point here is that the endorsement of the concept of habitus can help us avoid the 
essentialist trap of the mainstream ‘language–rights’ paradigm by asserting the social 
constructedness of languages and identities; hence it can help us uncouple language 
from religion/race (see Skutnabb–Kangas and Phillipson 1994; Skutnabb–Kangas 
1998). Willemse (2006: 14) notes that ‘the history of Sudan and the construction of 
Sudanese nationalism is [sic] related to processes of Islamisation and Arabisation’. 
But May (2001: 105) reminds us that ‘all nationalist histories are therapeutic to some 
extent and contain inevitable elisions and absences’. That is, nationalist histories 
require the forgetting of the constructedness of a nation out of contradictory histories, 
and the equal remembering of a common ‘undivided’ historical narrative or 
collective sense of history (see May 2001: 59–60).  
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I conclude this section by broadly reviewing two cases which have relevance to our 
discussion. The first case illustrates bottom–up engagement in the process of 
language planning in the Sudan. I broadly review the contribution of a language 
committee in the development of social literacies. The second example is a statement 
in the new language policy of the southern Sudan. It will be shown that the top–down 
discourse in which the statement is realised is misleading and problematic.  
 
The Tima tribe has set an example to be followed by other tribal communities with 
respect to the grassroots contribution in the development of local languages. The 
tribe of Tima is part of a multilingual area of the Nuba Mountains in western central 
Sudan. It administratively belongs to the State of the Southern Kordofan which in 
turn is ruled by the SPLM/A and NCP under the CPA. The tribe consists of four 
villages each with a leader called ‘sheikh algarya’ (village leader). The Tima people 
have expressed their desire to have Tima as a means of instruction in basic education. 
Some of them including the leaders have established the Tima Language Committee 
(henceforth the TLC). The academic attention to the Tima language has emanated 
from the tribal people themselves when they contacted the African and Asian 
Institute at Khartoum University. The TLC is basically dedicated to the task of 
developing a writing system for the Tima language. This collective body has 
produced two books in the Tima language using the Roman script. The tribe has two 
primary schools, one of which consists of 557 students of both sexes, with seven 
teachers, five of whom are men and two women. The means of instruction is English, 
and the curriculum is based on Kenyan materials (Abdelhay 2007: direct 
observation). One of the teachers said that they were seeking an educational 
curriculum in the Tima language. The social actions taken by the TLC in 
coordination with the majority of the tribal people of both sexes is transformative in 
the sense that it was initiated at the grassroots level. The books produced by the TLC 
have demonstrably problematised the dominant language ideology in which only 
Arabic is designated as a ‘language’ and the ‘Other’ as a ‘local dialect’ on the basis 
of whether a language has a writing system. More importantly, the linguistic work by 
the TLC provides an avenue into how tribal people can deconstruct essentialist views 
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of language and identity in the Sudan. The TLC has succeeded in mobilising the 
sectors of the Tima community around the first sociolinguistic survey on their social 
attitudes to Tima (Mugadam 2007). Natives, particularly young girls, have 
participated in the process of data collection by administering the survey 
questionnaires in the four Tima villages. The TLC has set an example of a kind of 
‘cooperative language planning’ (Ruiz 1984: 29) in which tribal people and academic 
researchers engage in resourceful joint sociolinguistic projects. The tribe has proved 
to be a genuine agent in the construction of its Tima language, and has practically 
shown how bottom–up inclusive language planning can work effectively. The 
conclusion to be drawn here is that the discipline of language planning should not 
only welcome tribal intervention in the working of languages but should draw on the 
insights of linguistic work carried out by local people. The case of the TLC is a 
reminder of the fact that ‘when the “expert” is an outsider to the culture under study, 
there is an important sense in which every insider to the culture is an expert in it, and 
the outsider is their student’ (Joseph 2006a: 26). 
 
It is worth stating that language has always been a site of intense social struggle 
between power holders in the centre and the tribal peoples in the Nuba Mountains 
over the national identity. This conflict is historical in the sense that the Nuba people 
have been involved in a social struggle against the assimilationist and unfair social 
policies of central governments for most of its postcolonial history (for the effect of 
the colonial Southern Policy on the Nuba Mountains see Ibrahim 1985; Chapter 4). 
For instance, the stance of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) (a major northern 
political party) on the south and Nuba Mountains as it was expressed in its ‘DUP 
Working Paper on the South 1986’ (cited in Nyombe 1997: 115) points to the 
discursive aspect of this social struggle:  
It is extremely important to spread the use of Arabic language in the 
southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains. Arabic is the most effective 
instrument for spreading Arabic Islamic culture. The spread of Arabic 
language in those areas [South and Nuba Mountains] is one for the most 
important arenas for struggle in the name of the God and the Arab 
nation. 
The ideological stance embodied in the above quote can at best be described, in the 
words of Fishman (1978: 44), as ‘cruel self–aggrandisement, sanctimoniously 
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masquerading as sanity and sanctity’. Dominated ethnies in the Nuba Mountains and 
southern Sudan strongly reject the above ostensible ‘instrumentalist view’, although 
latently ideological, upon which language policies are based in the Sudan. Language 
for them is not just ‘an instrument’ that can be regulated and replaced by ‘Arabic as a 
more effective instrument’ as religious leaders would have them (see Tauli 1974 who 
brazenly supported this orientation to language planning). Northern nationalist elites 
(and the early academic commentary) have failed to see that language holds 
symbolic purchase for the dominated ethnies in the Nuba Mountains and southern 
Sudan in the sense that it is a significant, thought not an essential, symbol of social 
identification.  
 
The situation in the Nuba Mountains is riddled with contradictions and tensions with 
respect to the educational policy (English curriculum), and the language used outside 
school in the community (Arabic–Tima–English). This observation should be 
supported by more ethnographic studies of classroom/community language practices 
to reveal the multilayered tensions and contradictions that are embedded within 
wider local, national, regional, and global contexts. For example, examination of the 
repercussions of globalisation as an international socioeconomic discourse in the 
Nuba Mountains should be given consideration by the practice of language planning 
in the Sudan. Globalisation refers to the ‘processes, operating on a global scale, 
which cut across national boundaries, integrating and connecting communities and 
organisations in new space–time combinations, making the world in reality and in 
experience more interconnected’ (Hall 1992: 299). One way of doing this is by 
conducting (critical) ethnographic or (critical) discourse–analytic research on the 
semiotic practices of the polities in the area. The analysis of the public notices in 
Dilling City (one of the biggest cities in the Nuba Mountains) points to the 
conclusion that globalisation is at work in the area. For example, locals in this area 
keep abreast with what is happening in the English Premier League (see Figure 5.1). 
Watts (1998: 129) is right to point out that ‘governments increasingly face the 
paradoxical desires of their people to be both global consumers and local citizens’ 
(cf. Courchene 1993 ‘glocalisation’). Watts (1998: 129) suggests that ‘various forms 
of federal relationships between different interacting levels of government seem to 
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provide a way to mediate the variety of global and local citizen preferences’. Under 
the banner of the NLP, it should be one of the objectives of language (educational) 
planning at different levels of state organisations in the Sudan to examine the 
tensions between these centripetal and centrifugal tendencies (Schermerhorn 1970: 
81), and the ways in which these tensions and contradictions are accommodated and 
appropriated in the discursive practices of ethnic groups. We need ‘linguistics of 
social contradictions’ (Collins 1993: 128) to understand the social situation in the 
Nuba Mountains. The concluding point here is that the negative stereotypical 
representation of the ethnolinguistic identities in the Nuba Mountains by dominant 
language ideologies is misleading and misplaced. The ethnolinguistic groups in the 
Nuba Mountains do not champion ethnic parochialism, monolingual chauvinism (the 
region is inherently multilingual), or tribal particularism (e.g., Figure 5.2 indicates 
that locals are not oppositional to globalisation). The tribe of Tima as a social group 
simply wants to be, following Fishman (1978: 49), ‘the master of its own house’: it 
wants to become modern but on its own terms, rather than the terms set by dominant 
nationalist groups at the centre of power, in its own Tima fashion, and in its own 
Tima language. Three conclusions can be drawn from the above discussion which 
has relevance to the aforementioned view of language rights as habitus. First, the 
language rights embedded in the NLP (see Table 5.1) should be historically, 
culturally, politically, and ideologically contextualised. They should be treated as 
part of the habitus of the people. Rasool notes: 
Societal language relations cannot be conceptualised outside a 
consideration of the speakers of different languages, their lived 
experience and their place within society. Neither can the question of 
language rights of different groups of people be analysed meaningfully 
without taking account of the dynamic and multi–layered interactions 




Figure 5.2.  A Public Announcement on the English Premier League (The Dilling 
City–Sudan, December 2006). Context: The announcement was posted on the closed door of a 
shop in the Market of the City of Dilling). Translation: English Premier League, Sunday 26.11.2006, 
Portsmouth x Newcastle, at 4 o’clock; Man United x Chelsea, at 7 O’clock. Can Chelsea do it to 
reverse dreams? Support and enjoy with Jalal Video. Jalal Video (The photo was taken in December 
2006).     
 
Secondly, the case of the Tima language has provided a bottom–up account of how a 
community in practice can resist top–down centralised state policies by being guided 
by a collective effort to standardise their language. Although basic school teachers 
and educationists can contribute to the project of social transformation in those areas, 
they are always constrained by a number of structural forces such as the lack of 
electrical power (there is no electricity in the Tima area), and lack of resources 
essential for establishing the necessary educational infrastructure (e.g., classrooms).  
Pennycook (2000: 19) reminds that that classrooms are ‘sociopolitical spaces that 
exist in a complex relationship to the world outside’.  
 
The second case is a statement in the new language policy of southern Sudan. The 
GOSS has recently ratified its regional Interim Constitution (ratified in 2005). The 
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southern Sudan language policy is designed within the framework of the NLP. The 
last statement in the southern Sudan language policy holds that ‘the Government of 
Southern Sudan shall promote the development of a sign language for the benefit of 
people with special needs’. This policy statement warrants a brief comment. Sign 
languages may workably be defined as the languages which are ‘used in 
communities of Deaf people for intra–group communication’ (Reagan 2006: 331; 
Lucas 2001; for the distinction between ‘Deaf’ and ‘deaf’ see Reagan et al. 2006: 
188). It is certainly a novel practice in the history of language planning in the Sudan 
to provide a constitutional right for users of other semiotic means of communication. 
Siegel (2006: 256) states that ‘deaf and hard–hearing children should have a 
constitutional right to communication and language’, since language is inextricably 
tied with the democratic process of voting and freedom of speech. However, the way 
in which the statement is drafted is not entirely unproblematic. There is an 
underlying misleading assumption that there are no existing sign languages in the 
region, and that the task of the GOSS will be to ‘promote the development of a sign 
language’. There is another assumption that the task–oriented objective of promoting 
the ‘development’ of ‘a sign language’ in the region can be done unproblematically. 
What does the term ‘development’ mean in this policy statement? When I asked 
Susan Fischer, one of the leading scholars in the field of sign language research, 
about the way in which language planning research can ‘develop’ a sign language in 
a multilingual region such as southern Sudan, she strongly reacted by asserting ‘we 
don’t develop sign languages’ (Fischer 2007: personal communication). Fischer 
believes that for a sign language policy to work it should involve grassroots native 
signing adults. The term ‘development’ may carry the historical baggage of the top–
down practice of language planning; and this may be the reason why Fischer strongly 
believes that ‘language planning works only when there is grassroots support’. The 
contentious policy statement could have been structured in away that it implies the 
government would resort to existing signing practices of deaf communities in the 
southern Sudan. For instance, one way would have been ‘the GOSS shall promote 
the development of one or two languages as necessary for people of special needs 
from the existing sign languages in the region’. Alternatively, the statement could 
have endorsed grammatical ambiguity as a strategy of opening a complex web of 
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different possibilities of interpreting the statement (for example by using ‘sign 
language’ as a mass noun). Drafters of the national language policy of South Africa, 
which is embedded in the National Constitution of 1996, have endorsed this strategy 
towards sign language: ‘A Pan South African Language Board established by 
national legislation must: a) promote and create conditions for the development and 
use of, [among other things], sign language’ (for full text see UNESCO MOST 
Clearing House; for a review see Aarons and Akach 2000). One crucial difference 
between the two sign language policy statements (of South Africa and southern 
Sudan) is that the South African policy creates the conditions where sign language 
develops by itself — that is, in the habitus of deaf South Africans— whereas the 
southern Sudanese policy statement implies top–down planning. The use of the term 
‘development’ in the South African context is compatible with Fischer’s view that 
we create the conditions for a language to develop on its own.  
 
5.2.5 The NLP and the configuration of power relations during the Interim Period  
I conclude the textual analysis of the NLP with the following two questions: 1) is the 
distribution of language rights in the NLP compatible with the division of political 
power in the Protocol on Power-sharing (see Appendix)? If there can be any 
language change at the status level, what is the most likely region to be affected by 
that change? It is worth mentioning that the social situation in the north (including 
the western part) in practical reality is dynamic and unpredictable given the current 
civil war in western Sudan. A broad review of the configuration of the political 
power relations in the CPA can assist us in predicting the likelihood of a particular 
trend with respect to the implementation of the NLP (Figures 5.3, 5.5).  
 
 
As can been seen from Figure 5.3, there is an uneven distribution of political power 
among the political forces in northern Sudan (including the west and the east). The 
NCP has the highest number of seats (52%), while the SPLM/A comes in second 
place with political power amounting to 28%. Northern political forces, including 
historically rooted political bourgeois parties with massive tribal loyalty, share 14%. 
Other southern opposition parties were only assigned 6%. It should be unnecessary to 
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point out that the dominant language in the northern part of the country is Arabic and 
the dominant ethnic group are the Arabised tribes (see Figure 5.4). 
 
Figure 5.3. Configuration of Political Power Relations in the Northern Sudan 
during the Interim Period (National Assembly and National Executive, based on 
the Protocol of Power–Sharing, 2004) 
 
For the distribution of political power in the southern Sudan, the two most salient 
observations to be drawn from Figure 5.5 are that, first, the SPLM/A has the highest 
amount of power in the GOSS (70%), whereas the NCP has a relatively small 
amount of power (15%). Secondly, with the exception of the NCP, other northern 
political forces have not been allocated any amount of power in the GOSS. With this 
background in mind, let us now return to the two questions posed above. The first 
concerns the implications that the allocation of political power at national and 
southern Sudan level has for the NLP.  
 
It is evident in Figure 5.3 that the NCP (the Islamic ruling party), which has 
Arabicised the university educational system, maintains domination in the north. 
Thus, the implication is that the NLP is unlikely to significantly change the linguistic 
situation of local languages in some of the major northern areas, particularly the 




























































Figure 5.4. Language and Ethnicity in the Northern Sudan 
(Including West and East, based on Miller 2006) 
 
Although English is granted the constitutional recognition as a co–official working 
language at the national level, it is the practice, or language ideologies, that will 
structure its ethoglossia (Cobarrubias 1983: 48) or social functions in the north. For 
the western part of the Sudan, the situation is dynamic and completely unpredictable 
due to the civil conflict in Darfur. Be that as it may be, one can speculate (‘but 
speculation is not a substitute for finding out’ in Halliday’s 1978: 177 cautious 
terms) that what is rejected by the ‘African’ tribes is not Arabic per se since the 
majority of the population of western Sudan are bilingual in Arabic. Rather, it is the 
imperialism that accompanies the language that is rejected by those people. The 
southern Sudan is expected to witness significant language change vis-à-vis the 
north. The expectation that there will be less language change in the north than in the 
south can be supported by the following observations: first, it will not be easy for the 
ruling elites to change their policy of Arabicisation, since they consider it as one of 
their great achievements. In the early 1990s, the NCP has established an 
Arabicisation unit at the University of Khartoum and an Arabic language academy to 
help implement the Arabicisation of higher education. Obviously these planning 
bodies will delay the implementation of bilingual education at the university level. 
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Yet English is more likely to dominate due to the fact that a sizeable number of 
private English–medium primary schools have emerged in Khartoum.  
 
The second observation is that local languages are more likely to emerge and occupy 
the southern territory. More than forty local languages are being developed in terms 
of corpus planning to meet literacy requirements (Gilley 2004: personal 
communication). 
 
Figure 5.5. Configuration of Political Power Relations in the Southern Sudan 
during the Interim Period (Southern Sudan Assembly and GOSS, based on the 
Protocol on the Power–Sharing 2004) 
 
A third observation is that local languages are more likely to be revived in the south 
because of the fact that southern political leaders themselves speak local languages 
as their mother tongues. It should be stated that as I write there is a war going on 
between the opposition in western Sudan and the NCP–backed militias, which may 
affect the distribution of power in the signed agreement if the ruling regime is to 
refuse to accommodate the needs of the western opposition in the same way as it has 
accommodated the needs of southern opposition. The point here is that the current 
war in western Sudan does not make the fate of the language policy easily 



















































always impact on the implementation of language policies in such multilingual 
contexts as Sudan, no matter how utopian such policies look in official documents 
and internationally recognised peace protocols. The NLP on its own cannot produce 
a social change. It has been my conviction that theses of utilitarian language policies 
that are imposed by a top–down diktat in a pluralistic society will always produce 
their antithesis, which may take the form either of peaceful struggle or of military 
conflict such as the current inescapable reality. 
 
5.3 Summary 
In this chapter I have reviewed the different definitions of the term ‘indigenous’, and 
I have argued that what are called ‘indigenous languages’ in the Sudan are colonial 
inventions. I have shown that the colonial Southern Policy, particularly in its 
linguistic dimension (e.g., Rejaf Language Conference), was an ideological project 
intended to construct social and discursive differences between the south and the 
north. I have demonstrated that the term ‘indigenous’ can have serious political 
implications in some social situations. In the case of the CPA, the implications and 
ramifications are textually encoded. The use of the expression ‘indigenous 
languages’ in the NLP is compatible with the right to ‘external self–determination’ 
stated in the Machakos Protocol. Thus, the use of the term ‘indigenous’ is 
ideologically motivated. I have examined the type of language rights embodied in the 
NLP. I have argued for the consideration of the language educational rights as part of 
the habitus of the people and not as an unsituated given. I have shown that the NLP 
gives English and Arabic equal constitutional status as official working languages at 
the national level. Trilingualism is likely to emerge in regional states in case the 
government at the regional state level chooses a third local language as an additional 
working language. I have also shown that the compatible structural system with the 
NLP is a federal political system. This compatibility is achieved at the status 
planning level, and its implementation at practical level remains to be seen with 
respect to the northern part of the Sudan.  I have compared the distribution of 
political power in the CPA and the distribution of languages in the Sudan. I have 
shown that the south is much more likely to witness (it partly has witnessed) 
significant language change vis–à–vis the north. 
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CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study set out to provide a critical analysis of the NLP in the CPA signed 
between the NCP (representing the government of the Sudan) and the SPLM/A 
(representing the southern opposition). To construct a historically informed 
understanding of the NLP, I have situated the linguistic resources of the Sudan 
within the African social context by surveying one of the most commonly quoted 
typological models of African languages, Greenberg’s (1963a) classificatory system 
of African languages.  
 
The work of Greenberg is particularly drawn upon to survey the distribution of 
Sudanese languages. This overview of the linguistic map of the Sudan through the 
descriptive model of Greenberg provides a necessary background to the 
understanding of the way in which linguistic differences between the south and the 
north were semiotically created by colonial and postcolonial language planning 
practice. The structural similarities shown by Greenberg between a significant 
number of languages in the south and the north have revealed the political 
inventedness of these linguistic differences. I have shown that the contribution of 
Greenberg provides a solid evidential basis against the view which frames the south 
and the north as linguistically unrelated parts.  
 
The critical review of the use of the Hamitic hypothesis in linguistic classifications 
has provided insight into understanding the ways in which the policies of 
Arabicisation were made to iconise a particular racial affiliation in the Sudan. The 
discussion of the Hamitic hypothesis has shown that the linguistic anthropology of 
Greenberg has refused to take ethnic attribution into account in the typology of 
African languages including the Sudanese languages. I have drawn upon the insight 
of the analysis of the Hamitic hypothesis to show that the postcolonial government 
discourse continues to operate on the basis of ethnic determinism (racial version of 
Arabicisation policy).  
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I have complemented the historical review of the distribution of languages in the 
Sudan by surveying the historical genealogy of Arabic in the Sudan. Since the 
analysis of the NLP requires understanding of the key analytic and methodological 
concepts in language planning, I have reviewed the major themes in the field 
including the various elements and actors in the process of language planning, 
critical approaches, descriptive and analytic models, and conceptual frameworks 
used in the analysis of language policy discourses.  
 
The notions of ‘language rights’ and ‘critical language awareness’ have been 
examined. The relationships between language planning and power; language 
planning and social class, and language planning and national identity have been 
identified. The various critical approaches to literacy education have been surveyed. 
The language situation in Nigeria has been examined in order to have a comparative 
yardstick for the analysis of the NLP.  I have operationalised the various critical 
approaches in the analysis of the NLP.  Bourdieu’s notion of ‘habitus’ has been used 
as a method of analysis of the language rights in the NLP.  
 
The institutional development of language planning in the Sudan has been reviewed 
to provide a historical context for the analysis of the NLP. I have surveyed the 
colonial and postcolonial practice of language planning in the Sudan through the 
analysis of official language policies. The various linguistic measures employed by 
the colonial rule to invent the ‘South’ and the ‘North’ as separate identities have been 
identified. I have shown that understanding the term ‘indigenous’ requires invoking 
the historiography of the way in which social space was divided by the colonial rule 
between the south and the north.  
 
I have constructed the interpretation that the colonial Southern Policy is an 
ideological project intended to invent different social identities in the Sudan. The 
semiotic processes involved in this colonial structuring of the differences between 
the South and the North were analysed. The interpretation of the colonial Southern 
Policy is important for disambiguating the term ‘indigenous’ in the NLP. I have 
demonstrated that the use of the term ‘indigenous’ in the NLP is politically 
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motivated, and that it is compatible with the right to ‘external self-determination’ 
stated in the Machakos Protocol (another constituent protocol of the CPA).  
 
The historical analysis has shown that the indexical relationship between Arabic and 
Islam on the one hand, and between English and Christianity on the other hand is a 
creation of colonial intervention. The relationship between structural political 
systems and language plans in the Sudan has been examined, and the compatible 
structural system with NLP has been defined. I have compared the configuration of 
political power in the CPA and the distribution of languages in the Sudan. The type 
of language rights regime embedded in the NLP has been analysed.  
 
The social implications of the political power configuration in the CPA for the 
implementation of the NLP have been discussed. I have shown that the 
implementation of the NLP can lead to official trilingualism at the regional state 
level, and to official bilingualism at higher educational level. I have drawn on my 
ethnographic observation of the sociolinguistic practices of the people in the Nuba 
Mountains to argue the case that language planning from bottom-up can achieve not 
just its immediate aims, but can also contribute to the community development of 
linguistic resources. To support this argument, the linguistic contribution of the TLC 
in the development of social literacies has been reviewed.  
 
I have demonstrated that the NLP acts as a framework under which regional states’ 
language policies can be made. The southern Sudan language policy is broadly 
reviewed with a focus on sign language research in the Sudan. The discussion of the 
status of Sudanese sign language planning has pointed to the fact that language 
planning works only when there is grassroots support. I have demonstrated that the 
NLP is designed as a corrective to the nationalist policies of Arabicisation. I have 
shown that the inclusion of the NLP in the Protocol of Power Sharing lends support 
to the argument that language planning is an arena of social struggle in the Sudan to 
construct an alternative reality. The NLP is a constituent element of this alternative 
reality, metaphorically termed the ‘New Sudan’.  
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The study had the following related objectives: 
1. To provide an overview of the nature of the sociolinguistic order in the Sudan 
before the institutional intervention of state–driven language planning, with 
particular concentration on the historical genealogy of the policies of 
Arabicisation.  Another related aim has been to identify the sociopolitical 
implications of Greenberg’s linguistic work within the context of the Sudan 
language situation;  
2. To survey the historical development of language policies in the Sudan during 
the colonial and postcolonial periods. The aim here has been to identity the 
linguistic measures adopted by the colonial rule to construct two self–contained 
social identities in the Sudan; 
3. To examine the politics of linguistic indigenousness that is triggered by the 
statement ‘all indigenous languages are national languages’. The aim here has 
been to ‘disinvent’ (Makoni and Pennycook 2006) the ‘naturalised’ notions of 
‘indigenous languages’, the ‘north Sudan’, and the ‘south Sudan’ by revealing 
their colonial constructedness; 
4. To analyse the type of language rights sanctioned in the NLP;  
5. To examine the relationship between structural political systems and language 
policies in the Sudan with a focus on identifying the compatible structural system 
for the implementation of the NLP; 
6. To identity the relationship between the allocation of political power in the peace 
protocols and the NLP, with a concentration on the ways in which power 
relations may impact on the realisation of the language policy. A related 
objective has been to anticipate the type of language change that the language 
policy may bring about given the distribution of political ideologies in the peace 
agreement. The aim of providing an initial assessment with respect to the 
institutional implementation of the Naivasha language policy will be broadly 
dealt with in this chapter. 
 
For the first objective, I have produced a reconstruction of the linguistic map of the 
Sudan prior to the spread of the Arabic language particularly in the northern Sudan. I 
have socially contextualised the languages spoken in the Sudan by reviewing one of 
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the commonly cited linguistic typologies of African languages, Greenberg’s (1963a) 
classification of African languages. I have provided a sociohistorical understanding 
of the intellectual context which shaped Greenberg’s antagonism to the mobilisation 
of the physical anthropological concept of ‘race’ in the description of African 
languages. I have shown that the historical environment at the time was dominated 
by the Hamitic hypothesis, which in turn depended on philology in its construction of 
racial typecasting of Africans into Hamitic (and Half–Hamitic in Seligman’s 
typology), Semitic, Negro, etc. The Teutonic theory/Hamitic hypothesis was in 
alliance with politics, and both were assisted by philology. It has been shown that 
researchers including Lepsius, Muller, Cust, Westermann, Tucker, and Meinhof 
manipulated the racial construct of the ‘Hamitic’ as a descriptive category in their 
typologies. Greenberg debunked the use of the Hamitic hypothesis in linguistic 
analysis to the extent that his book of 1963a is considered by some critics as a 
reaction against Meinhof’s typology. Greenberg’s work on African languages can be 
interpreted, among other things, as an attempt to de–politicise and de–racialise the 
study of African languages by first abandoning the very use of the term ‘Hamitic’ 
and secondly by conceptually treating all African languages on an equal footing. It 
has been my contention that the stance of trying to be ‘apolitical’ in such a context so 
riven with ideologically–laden views is itself political. Devoting the machinery of 
linguistics to de–naturalising the link of race (or identity) to language lies (or should 
lie) at the heart of political linguistics. The argument here has been that Greenberg 
provides a counter–evidential argument against the language ideologies which view 
the Sudan in terms of abstract, polarised and categorically racial/religious/linguistic 
constructs (the south vs. the north Sudan). I have shown that these political 
constructs are in themselves colonial inventions, the construction of which involved 
complex social processes of linguistic differentiation. I have also reviewed the way 
in which Arabic was spreading in the Sudan before the emergence of the institutional 
practice of language planning. I have argued that the official declaration of Islam and 
the Arabic language as state policy in the north was a colonial practice that directly 




For the second objective of the study, I have reviewed the diachronic development of 
the institutional practice of language planning in the Sudan from the start Anglo–
Egyptian rule in 1898 to the signing of the CPA in 2005. The analysis has shown that 
the colonial language policy was intended to separate the south from the north 
Sudan. I have demonstrated that a number of linguistic measures were employed to 
differentiate the south from the north including the Rejaf Language Conference of 
1928, the construction of no–man’s land, and the creation of the Closed District 
Order. These measures taken together constitute what came to be known as the 
Southern Policy. I have surveyed the postcolonial policies of Arabicisation in the 
Sudan. The analysis has shown that Arabic was a key tool in the attempt to build a 
unified and homogeneous nation–state in the Sudan. I have shown that the state–
declared policy of Arabicisation has been strongly resisted by southerners. The 
refusal of the northern power holders to accommodate the political demands of their 
fellow citizens led to the eruption of civil war.  
  
For the third objective, I have attempted to construct an interpretation of overt and 
hidden effects of the status–planning statement that ‘all indigenous languages are 
national languages’. I have analysed the sociohistorical conditions (at textual, 
intertextual, and contextual levels) that led to the discursive construction of the 
‘indigenous’ as both ‘language’ and ‘national’. I have argued that the colonial and 
postcolonial practice of language planning in the Sudan in themselves have acted as 
an ‘ideology broker’ (Blommaert 1999a: 9) both when they have ‘objectified’ and 
‘naturalised’ the ideological construction of Arabic as a single national language, and 
when they have endorsed a top–down approach with the aim to shape the social 
linguistic practices of the diverse multilingual communities. I have shown that the 
postcolonial version of language planning in the Sudan, informed by the structural 
functional view of language, is implicated in the ideological processes of the 
‘objectification’, ‘naturalisation’, and justification of imposing Arabic as a national 
language upon the diverse communities in the Sudan. I have argued for a radical 
conceptual reframing in the Sudanese folk and institutional discourse of the role 
language should play in the gradual restructuring of the existing sociopolitical 
configuration, and consequently, the construction of a new sociolinguistic order, as 
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part of the project of ‘New Sudan’. Otherwise, the Naivasha language policy will 
remain a rhetorical tool that may be manipulated by power holders to perpetuate the 
existing structures of the Arabicisation policy which is widely blamed for the current 
social disorder. I have shown that the term ‘indigenous languages’ in the NLP is 
intended to function as a metaphorical strategy of symbolic differentiation of the 
‘African south’ from the ‘Arab north’.   
 
I have argued the case that ‘indigenous languages’ in the Sudan are a colonial 
invention intended as a dialectical part of the project of constructing two 
isolated/isolating social identities in the Sudan. I have drawn on Irvine and Gal 
(2000) to identify the processes involved in the colonial construction of the linguistic 
difference between the ‘south’ and the ‘north’. Contrary to Phillipson’s argument of 
‘linguistic imperialism’, I have argued that English served alongside vernacular 
languages in the resistance to Arabicisation. I have demonstrated that the essential 
connection of Arabic to Islam is a consequence of the colonial policy in the Sudan 
which involved the processes of ‘invention of traditions’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger 
1983), creations of tribes, construction of ‘indigenous languages’, etc. I have 
contended that the historicisation of the NLP provides an informed avenue for 
understanding the genealogical continuity of the southern social struggle. I have 
pointed out that the discourse of linguistic indigenousness is far from being innocent, 
but rather politically motivated. The fact that the south is given the right to external 
self–determination in four years’ time now points to the ideological implications and 
political instrumentality of the notion of indigenousness in the NLP. I have shown 
that this employment of the term ‘indigenous’ is perfectly intertextual and 
compatible with the international legal discourse on the rights of indigenous people. 
The analysis has shown that language has always been a site of, and had a stake in, 
the colonial/postcolonial struggle over political and material power in the Sudan. I 
have shown that the language policy encodes this social struggle. The discourse of 
the NLP is riddled with tensions and contradictions due to the historical fact that it is 
a discursive compromise between two different ideological projects.   
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I have contended that the politics of linguistic indigenousness may lead to, among 
other things, to the emergence of ‘cultural racism’. This point has been exemplified 
by the fact that the JPF, a very recent northern nationalist movement with an overtly 
separatist political agenda, is mobilising northerners around essentialising ideological 
discourse (e.g., that the CPA threatens the Islamic and Arabic culture in the north). It 
publicly demands the separation of the north from the south (the north seen in 
monolithic terms constitutes the majority with respect to political power). I have 
argued that the emergence of this northern secessionist movement has exposed the 
‘banal nationalism’ (Billig 1995) of the dominant northern social group. The 
historical cultural and material domination by the north is ‘overlooked, forgotten, 
even theoretically denied’ (Billig 1995: 17). In the past, secessionist ideologies used 
to be strategically projected on the southerners, while the (cultural) nationalism of 
the dominant northern people was objectified and naturalised as the determinant of 
the essence of the whole nation–state.  
 
For the fourth aim, the analysis has shown that the language policy requires that 
bilingual education in English and Arabic be implemented at higher educational 
levels. It has also been shown that trilingualism is likely to emerge in regional states 
if a local language is selected as a third additional working language at the concerned 
regional level (territoriality principle of language rights). The analysis has explained 
that English and Arabic are granted equal constitutional status as official working 
languages at the national level (personality principle of language rights). I have 
strongly argued for the consideration of language (educational) rights as part of the 
habitus of the people and not as an unsituated fixed–given. 
 
For the fifth objective, it has been shown that the monolingual language policies of 
Arabicisation are congruent with a centralised unitary political system. The analysis 
has shown that there is a high degree of compatibility between the proposed 
structural system and the distribution of language rights suggested by the NLP. The 
compatible structural system with the NLP is a federal political system. This 
compatibility is achieved at the status planning level, and its implementation at the 
practical level remains to be seen with respect to the northern part of the Sudan. I 
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have examined the new southern Sudan language policy and I have shown that it is in 
accordance with its matrix framework of NLP. 
 
For the sixth aim, I have compared the distribution of political power in the Protocol 
on Power–sharing and the distribution of languages in the Sudan. The analysis has 
shown that the peace agreement imposes an uneven allocation of power with the 
ruling party (NCP) maintaining domination at the national level and the southern 
opposition (SPLM/A) dominating the south of the country. Other major northern 
political forces which have a mass of public loyalty have been granted little power in 
the north. Such an unequal distribution of authority and power is less likely to bring 
any language change in the north (with the exception of the west and the east), and 
thus the policy of Arabicisation may not be affected. The language policy is much 
more likely to be fully realised in the southern Sudan because Arabic–speaking elites 
would have little power in the region; and thus local languages can be revived and 
maintained. The western Sudan – another multilingual region – which, as I write this 
conclusion, is suffering the bitterest civil war the world has witnessed since that in 
Rwanda, is more likely to redistribute the map of power and thus render the whole 
current peace agreement invalid and the proposed language policy void. For such a 
language policy to survive and to succeed in achieving the goals of egalitarianism 
and accessibility of power to local people, a radical transformation in the political 
environment may be required; notably some form of a decentralised and 
democratically–based system that can shake up the present structural power. Yet, I 
am not claiming that the proposed language policy, if it was to be implemented 
faithfully, would blur power inequalities and would reconstruct a Sudanese society 
that is free of power conflicts. I am very well aware of Rajagopalan’s (1999a: 205–
206) argument that ‘in any society, language planning and language teaching 
necessarily entail rehashing of existing power relations simply because power is 
exercised in and through language’. However such a position, as Canagarajah 
(1999b: 211) cogently counter–argues, ‘urges us to bury our eyes ostrich–like to the 
political evils and ideological temptations outside. Divorcing our moral sensibility 
and social consciousness from our profession’. The point is that ‘a lot of things can 
in fact be done to negotiate, modify, and even change power – at least in certain 
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limited domains – creating in the process relatively more democratic relations’ 
(ibid.). 
 
I end this thesis with the following remarks about the implementation stage of the 
NLP. One cannot sensibly and meaningfully talk about the implementation of the 
NLP in a manner decontextualised from the current social conditions. The ensuing 
broad remarks stem from direct observation of the language situation in material 
reality following my visit to the Sudan from 4 December 2006 – 10 January 2007.  
 
I started to investigate the implementation process of the language policy at 
Khartoum University. The guiding question was whether the university has been 
teaching bilingually in English and Arabic according to the new language policy. 
First, I have observed that there are a number of commercial photocopying shops in 
University area. I noticed that materials which the majority of students belonging to 
different disciplines bring to the shop to have copied are exclusively in Arabic. When 
I asked some students whether there had been an English version, they replied in the 
negative. Apart from departments of languages and the Department of Linguistics 
which teaches in both languages, the rest of departments teach in the Arabic 
language. I asked some of the university teachers why they did not implement the 
new language policy. One of the senior lecturers reported that the University Vice–
Chancellor’s Office had not yet made an official decision directing teachers to do so. 
I went to the Vice–Chancellor’s Office, and was transferred to the officials who are 
assumed to hold information about the new language policy decisions. When I met 
them, they said there was nothing issued to teachers concerning the issue of bilingual 
education, since they have yet to receive an official directive from the Ministry of 
Higher Education and Scientific Research. I went to the Ministry, which is a 
walkable distance from the University of Khartoum. I visited the Office Manager of 
the Minister of Higher Education and, surprisingly, I found out that the new language 
policy is, literally speaking, unheard of there among the majority of officials. I was 
directed to the person who was said to be part of a language committee established 
by the National Council for Higher Education and Scientific Research. I found out 
that this committee was formed to deal with the issue of ‘decline’ of English and 
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Arabic at the university level. When I enquired as to whether the implementation of 
the NLP had ever been started, a committee member replied that it deserves to be 
attended to.  The committee member went on to explain his interpretation of the 
language policy, which is that the NLP grants universities the right to use ‘either’ 
English ‘or’ Arabic, and that the Ministry should not ‘discriminate’ between 
languages in the sense that it should not intervene to influence a university’s choice 
of language. Clearly this interpretation is based on both statement 5 of the language 
policy that forbids linguistic discrimination, and statement 3. Yet, this way of reading 
the policy has changed the term ‘and’ in statement 3 to ‘either’. This is where the risk 
lies in the ambiguity of the statements. Another significant observation is that official 
correspondence in the Ministry of Higher Education is still carried out in Arabic 
only, instead of Arabic and English. The Implementation Modalities of the Protocol 
of Power–Sharing (signed 31 December 2004) prescribes that there should be a 
national council for development and promotion of national languages (see Table 
6.1). The law for this language policy has been drafted by the National Constitutional 
Review Commission (NCRC), but it has yet to be ratified and passed by the national 
parliament (http://www.smc.sd/en/artopic.asp?artID=18499&aCK=ED).  
 
To say that the text of the language policy has yet to be ‘faithfully’ implemented is 
understatement. As I write this paragraph, a crisis has broken out between the two 
the peace partners. This crisis has been marked by the decision of the SPLM/A on 
11th October 2007 to suspend its participation in the Government of National Unity 
(GONU). The SPLM/A has accused the NCP of failing to meet its commitments in 
relation to the implementation of the CPA. The NCP has returned the same 
accusations. It is assumed by commentators that the crisis will be/should be resolved 
soon or the whole peace agreement will be threatened. The implementation of the 
NLP must now be carried out within this environment which is ridden with 
contradictions and tensions. However, the question remains whether the parts of the 
language policy that were meant to be implemented starting from the pre–Interim 
period have ever been implemented (see Table 6.1).  
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Pantuliano (2006) has carried out an ethnographic research on the public perception 
of the peace agreement in the Eastern Sudan, and has found that:  
The CPA was seen by most actors in the region (eastern Sudan] as a 
bilateral agreement between the National Congress Party and the 
SPLM/A, which has failed to take into account the instances of the 
many different groups living in the Sudan. Many people emphasised 
that the title ‘comprehensive’ is highly inappropriate for an agreement 
that has been so exclusive. Most of the people interviewed in eastern 
Sudan felt that the signing of the Machakos Protocol [between the 
Government and the SPLM] and the process leading to the signing of 
the other protocols has led other groups to resort to armed confrontation 
(e.g., in Dar Fur) or to escalate fighting (e.g., in eastern Sudan). 
(Pantuliano 2006: 5) 
Pantuliano (2006: 712) has found out that ‘a number of Beja actors claimed that their 
culture and their language have been discriminated against by a series of 
governments and that it is important for the Beja to preserve the use of TuBedawye 
[the Beja language]’. Morton (1989: 66) defines the Beja as ‘the indigenous 
inhabitants of all but the eastern tip of Red Sea Province, and much of Kassala 
Province, and are the largest of the peripheral northern groups to speak a single 
language’ (for a detailed historical account on the Beja tribes see Paul 1954; Hasan 
1967). Greenberg (1963a) describes the Beja language as Afro–Asiatic of the 
northern Cushitic branch (for the classification of Sudanese languages see Chapter 
2). The interpretation of Pantuliano’s findings with respect to the educational 
planning is that the Beja language is a means of socialisation of children into the 
cultures of those parts of eastern Sudan. Halliday’s remark on the importance of 
language in the process of the child’s socialisation points to the role the postcolonial 
practice of language planning in the Sudan would have played: 
Every child is brought up in a culture, and he has to learn the patterns of 
that culture in the process of becoming a member of it. The principal 
means whereby the culture is made available to him is through 
language: language is not the only channel, but it is the most significant 
one. Even the most intimate of personal relationships, that of the child 
with its mother, is from an early age mediated through language; and 
language plays some part in practically all his social learning. (Halliday 
1978: 213) 
Pantuliano has observed that a majority of rural people in eastern Sudan cannot claim 
their rights for the simple reason that they are unaware of them: 
An important element which emerged throughout the assessment is that 
most people, particularly rural communities as well as of much of the 
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people living in urban slums know very little about the CPA, its 
provisions and the implications it will have for the East and the country 
as a whole. An important issue for the region, for instance is the 
establishment of the Land Commission envisaged in the Wealth Sharing 
Protocol, but it is not clear how people in remote rural areas will be 
made aware of the Commission in order to claim back land where they 
are entitled to it. The mechanisms of implementation of the agreement 
are not even clear to some of the leadership in the region. (Pantuliano 
2006: 7) 
The argument here is that the general awareness of common people across the Sudan 
of their rights embodied in the CPA is inseparable from the implementation of the 
NLP. A language policy statement in the Protocol on Power–Sharing (Article 2.5.9) 
reads: 
The Government of National Unity shall implement an information campaign 
throughout Sudan in all national languages in Sudan to popularize the Peace 
Agreement, and to foster national unity, reconciliation and mutual understanding. 
 
The conducting of the above linguistic campaign is detailed in the Implementation 
Modalities of the language policy. According to the Implementation Modalities, the 
timing for implementing the linguistic campaign is ‘from the beginning of the pre–
Interim till the end of the Interim period’. The Implementation Modalities state that 
the executing bodies of the linguistic campaign are the ‘parties’ [NCP and SPLM/A], 
and ‘all levels of government’. The Implementation Modalities further stipulate that 
the ‘parties and all levels of government’ should fund the linguistic campaign. The 
direct involvement of the ruling political parties as one of the funding sources makes 
this policy formulation a straightforward statement of promotion–oriented rights for 
non–Arabic speaking ethnies (see Kloss 197, 1977). The Implementation Modalities 
indicate that the organisation of this campaign will be under the supervision of the 
‘parties and GONU’. The Implementation Modalities state that the procedures and 
processes through which the campaign will be conducted should include: ‘Media, 
seminars, workshops, leaflets, political public rallies, etc’. The point that I need to 
make here is that the implementation of the linguistic campaign would probably have 
contributed to raising the general awareness of the ways in which Beja people in 
rural areas could redress the problems concerning the establishment of the ‘Land 
Commission’. An understanding of the cultural representation of land in the 
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collective culture of the Beja tribes might itself substantiate their claim to the rights 
of ‘indigenous people’ as they are understood in the international legal discourse (for 
a discussion of the politics of linguistic indigenousness see Chapter 5) For the Beja, 
land is an objective cultural element which sets them apart from the Arabic–speaking 
groups, and supports their demand for regionalism. Morton writes:  
One notable feature of Beja society is the territorial system, by which a 
strong cultural and emotional value is placed on the land claimed by a 
patrilineage, while actual regulation of the use of the land is in fact freer 
and more complex … The Arabic–speakers often have attitudes of 
extreme condescension towards Beja, whom they see as primitive and 
aggressive. Yet Beja see the city [Port Sudan] as built on their land, and 
many see the Arabic–speakers as trespassers upon it. It has in fact been 
land, and not the Beja language or separate cultural identity, that has 
been the major motivating symbol for Beja regionalism. The Phrase 
uhash hashon (the land is our land), so often used in intra–Beja land 
disputes, is taking on the character of a political slogan; and some Beja 
use the characteristic gesture of waving a handful of dust from the 
ground under the nose of an Arabic–speaker (meaning; is this yours?). 
(Morton 1989: 66–67)  
Pantuliano (2006) has provided evidence that neither the GONU nor the state 
government in eastern Sudan has started implementing the linguistic campaign in the 
Beja language. The argument which can link (adult) education with democracy and 
critical citizenry as a (discursive) practice is that people should not assume that 
(undemocratic) ruling regimes will always look after their rights. Rather, rights have 
to be consistently and incessantly argued and struggle for by people (see Crowther 
and Tett 2001: 112). Crowther and Tett (ibid.) state that ‘an education that does not 
alert people to the forces that infringe their rights and examine ways in which they 
can be protected and extended will sell them out’. The point here is that the 
implementation of the NLP is inseparable from the philosophy of the ‘New Sudan’ as 
an ideological project of constructing a new active citizenship in the Sudan. The 
critical language planning researcher Tollefson (2002: 336) reminds us that ‘a 
conception of “citizenship” must be developed that acknowledges the important 
social function of ethnolinguistic identity but does not lead to the creation of classes 
of citizens with unequal rights and privileges’. 
 
It should be mentioned that the evaluation of the status of the implementation of the 
NLP is not a one-off event, but rather an ongoing process (for a discussion of 
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evaluation of language policies see Chapter 3). I believe that it is worth recognising 
that only democratically inspired language planning will make possible a 
representation of local voices in the country of Sudan. Speakers of minority 
languages should be empowered to participate in the ongoing struggle towards 
protecting and preserving their local idioms, cultural practices, and identities. My 
visit to the Tima tribe, which I have drawn on in the previous chapter, points to the 
conclusion that the desire to achieve these purposes should stem bottom–up from the 
people themselves. In a word, it is hoped that the thesis might contribute not just to 
combating the ideology of the standard monolingual policy of Arabicisation, but also 
towards providing insights upon which the governmental practice of language 
planning in the Sudan can draw. I conclude this thesis with the following 
suggestions: 
1. There is a vital need to see how the resolution of the conflict in the western region 
of Darfur will alter power relations in the CPA and consequently the implementation 
of the NLP itself.   
2. A careful study is required with the aim of developing critical awareness of local 
language practices of minority groups, since it is the basis on which any just 
language policy in such a country as Sudan should be established.  
3. The analysis could not touch on the issue of the input (e.g., sociolinguistic 
surveys) on which the proposed language policy was made due to the lack of 
information. Thus there is an urgent need to know the type of input politicians made 
use of in their reformulations of the policy statements. One piece of anecdotal 
evidence states that the statements which stipulate the recognition of all ‘indigenous’ 
languages as national languages and the permission to use a local language at the 
regional state level stem from a dialogue between southern tribal leaders and the late 
John Garang (the founder of the SPLM/A). 
4. The dynamics of the language situation in the Sudan, and the ways in which 
peoples perceive of it should be researched ethnographically. 
5. There is a need to examine the ‘collateral damage’ of the NLP.  
6. The issue of linguistic appropriation should be further researched. There is a need 
to understand the different historical contexts under which Arabic is invoked as a 
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